


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
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WAYFARER'S WORDS



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
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.LITT., M.A.

PRESIDENT OF THE FALMOUTH TEXT SOCIETY

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Stretches a path scarce visible and old,
It reaches into me, was found by me;

It is the path that man through Brahman finds.

Byhad: Upanishad.

This is the Way for going to Beyond,
And therefore is it Yonder-faring called.

Sutta-Nipāta.



PREFACE

THIS span of my earth-wayfarings is nearly accomplished, and such books as I have these forty years brought to birth—Pali first editions, translations from Pali, manuals and essays on the comparative history of Buddhism and on certain problems of vital religious interest—are for the most part still to be had by the few who would consult them. But there are also many sporadic writings: articles and comments buried in periodicals and 'Commemorative Volumes,' and after critical revision I have decided that such of these as had not been wrought up into my books might still, if disinterred and collectively presented, help to carry on the mission that is in the manuals and essays. They too tell, in a work that yet needs doing, of two things.

They tell how the religion we now call Buddhism was different at first from what it now is. This needs showing. Others do not yet fairly and freely show it. It will need showing yet for years to come.

And they tell how man's more-will in his wayfaring is not yet taught as it needs to be. I see men holding up ideals to be followed without a word on the will, the will by which alone man can value what they hold up. It may be said that, in religion viewed as a life-quest, man's main factor is his will. Without will he can never learn to become according as he is taught. He needs, as the Jesus-word said,

to "will to do the will" in knowing the true from the false:

*'Εάν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν . . .*¹

He needs to exercise will in wayfaring through the worlds. He needs to will a More in many ways to the Better. He needs will as to the last mandate of earth-life, that next step which, as yet, is so wilfully put aside.

The More in life, when life is viewed as a growth, a becoming, figured as a wayfaring towards a Most, very long in time, time past and time future, not for mankind only considered as a whole, but for each Man, each Woman: here is what these Wayfarer's Words have after divers manners been trying to say.

If in these articles I at times am found repeating myself, I admit at once I was not aiming at a symmetrical shop window, or one showing great diversity of wares. It shows rather the persisting need I have found, in these latter years, to emphasize certain essential points in the history of religious thought that seemed to call for greater emphasis than is as yet given them. Emphasis in varied presentation, it may be, but mainly emphasis in saying the unheeded over again.

Where the periodicals that first gave light to these items still are running, and where war conditions have not prevented access to them, permission to reprint, for which I am duly grateful, has been obtained. In every case reference to them has been given.

¹ John vii. 17.

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WAYFARER'S WORDS

I

A WORKING BOND OF FELLOWSHIP¹

IF we come apart and think for a while over life's essentials, as being not of the body only, we may agree that, whatever and however be our ways of living, we are not standing still therein; we are somehow moving on; and in moving, seeking. Some may say: we only want to maintain a *status quo*; we think we do maintain it. Well, these admit "they want"—and this wanting is also in a way a seeking.

That we seek brings up the question: What seek we? and how best may we seek this "what"? If I say we seek a More, a Better, a Higher, which we ultimately, though not yet, shall come to know as a Most, Best, Highest, the fact confronts us, that many are obviously seeking a Less, a Worse, a Lower, though they may not see their object as such. Possibly they may so see it, but there are few who will say, with the candour of the Shakespearean Richard III, "I am determ'd to be a villain." They have just a mistaken view of what they deem is a Better.

Such an one may be fortunate enough, while yet here, to come to curse himself for his mistaken view, as, it is said, did the author of the German "Hymn of Hate" of the British not so many years ago. That

¹ Published in *Buddhism in England*, 1939.

pseudo-poet—I forget his name—did not at the time see that what he wished, not only for us, but for himself, was a Less, not a More. Moreover, he did not seek the Less for us as an individual; he sought expressly to lead others to seek with him, both in what he sought and in the way in which he sought. In other words, he saw a section of his fellow-men as foes, worthy to be not loved but hated.

We have not long ago seen another instance of this seeking a Less both for and with fellow-men. In opening "Parliament" (if we may so call it), the Russian dictator was reported in *The Times* to have said these words: "We have had many successes, but we are surrounded by enemies, who do not attack us only because they see we are strong." He only differed from the Hate poet in that he saw his neighbours as potential enemies only. But there was no friendly outlook on any of his fellow-men who were not Russian. As latent enemies we were all to be looked upon with the hatred of suspicion. And it is fairly dismal proof of a low stage of civilisation, that a man in so exalted a position could, at this time of day, so speak, and not have been shouted down at once as no better than a savage.

Let us now turn to the uttermost opposite of such sentiments. In the pages of an American monthly, over a year ago, I read a suggestion, put forward by a well-known writer, J. Delafield, as to how we might best seek our supreme goal of living. Unity with our fellow-seekers, that is, with practically all men, could only be brought about by unity within the spirit or self, the individual; and this unity could only find true expression as creative love in and for all. (I quote from memory.)

Here, let us hope, is food more palatable for readers of this Journal than that other diet of suspicion and expressed or implicit hate. It is indeed a More that we have here to be seeking, such as tends to this end, not a Less. And it may even appear as workable to some.

I frankly do not hold it really workable for mankind; for man, taken by and large, is *not yet ready for it*. Its plausibility, it is true, depends on the fulness and depth in which the elastic term "Love" is used. The Buddhist *mettā*, for instance, so often translated by "love," but which is only the abstract form of "friend" (*mitta*), in other words "friendship," or, as I usually render it now, "amity," is a more workable bond than when used in the transcendental depth of the word used by the writer quoted. We need to be very, very honest with ourselves over this; if we are, we shall see, that if we seek our goal on that cited "basis"—the writer's own term—of love for each and every one of our fellow-men, we shall be playing a great game of "let's pretend"! We need first to select, to eliminate, to get a Platonic republic, a gentler, saner world, before we can quite truthfully proceed to "love," in word and also in deed, each and all our fellows. We are asking too much of ourselves and of each other. *We need a Middle Way.*

That notable term brings me to the early Buddhists. They had, at least in the lifetime of their first missionaries, a "basis" for intercourse chosen, or to be chosen by the seeker as avoiding the extreme of side-issues (*anta*). They looked on living in the many lives, many worlds, as an onward faring (*samsāra*), to be made into a way or road (*maggā*) of coming to be in a More (*bhiiyyo*), and as taking a long time before the

Thing Sought (*attha*) could be reached. This they called with reverent reticence the Beyond-that (*tat-uttarim*), and the Peak of the immortal (*amat'agga*). Nothing in their chart of the first missions is put forward about man as having to love his fellow-man, much less as having to hold him in suspicion. The missionaries, we read, were to teach the God- or Godly-living (*Brāhmachariya*) out of "sympathy" (*anuk-ampā*), since everyone was in the great Way of seeking the Goal by becoming what he was not before.

I think that, even for us after all these centuries, there is here an immortal truth. In the common bond of fellow-wayfaring, our chief aim is that of the traveller: to reach his goal. That which we need chiefly to avoid is to be hindered or to hinder, as is the way of all good travellers. Hatred of the fellow-man, in whatever form it be, hinders both self and others. So too may loving the fellow-man hinder, if the fellow-man become in any degree a goal. To help him where there is need—here we link up with the Jesus-word—may be not a hindrance but a help. A parable, a simile must not be taken too literally. Hindrance comes with the helping only if we forget the chief objective of each: the Goal. The good Samaritan stopped to help a bodily need. Well and good. But we have in mind a bond to satisfy a spiritual need. It is as neither body nor mind, but as a human spirit that I see man in relation to man as fellow-traveller, bound on no earthly journey only, hut on a longer trek, and as using his journeying with body-and-mind vehicles as opportunities for progress in that way-faring.

I believe that we have here a practicable middle

basis of intercourse, one that has never been given, since that long-ago day, a fair chance. In this our world of enlarged and quickened travel it should find that chance. I a traveller; you a traveller; let us wayfare with one another as such !

MAN A WAYFARER THROUGH WORLDS¹

WE do little in this country to promote systematically the historical and comparative study of religions, old and new. There was a chair on the subject recently endowed in protesting generosity at Manchester University; there may be others; I do not know of any. I believe we are in this respect insular among cultured nations. English-wise an attempt is now on foot to make good by private, unendowed, disinterested enterprise. A society, namely, has been launched in London as the outcome, or the out-to-come, of a public meeting at Westminster in February last, to promote the study of religions. Its prospectus lays emphasis on its object as being strictly that of the historical investigator, not that of the special pleader, the propagandist, the eclectic synthesiser. The movement makes no claim to be a novel departure without precedent conditions; it refers its coming-to-be to a feature of the Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1924. This was an immaterial exhibit of living religions represented within this Empire, by means of addresses by votaries of, or in a few cases of inquirers into, those religions. Held for greater convenience at the Imperial Institute, and under the auspices of the School of Oriental Studies and the Sociological Society, it attracted large audiences, and wishes were expressed that the exhibits

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, London, 1930 (October).

so sampled might be, so to speak, planted and reared as more permanent growths.

A well-known writer and teacher of philosophy in the Calcutta University, Professor Radhakrishnan, about to terminate a lecture tour in this country, consented to give an inaugural lecture at Westminster, choosing as his subject the Theory of Rebirth.¹ For the winter sessions it has been proposed to take a subject of cardinal importance in all religions, and discuss the attitude of world-religions towards it serially and separately, or also comparatively, by different experts. In this way there will be advantage to both hearers and the Society's teachers. The former will obtain a channel of concentration in midst of variety. The chosen subject will come to attain a depth of interest impossible where a course of lectures flits from one topic to another. And where are as yet no funds to reward fitly any one teacher, no specialist will be called upon to make undue sacrifice of labour and time in giving a course.

The subject selected for the first series is "The Man," proposed by the writer. Not "Men," be it noted, nor "Man." Here is no matter of sociology, of ethnology, of anthropology. The field of these is not the field of religion. There is no religion which does not implicitly start from and build up upon a certain conception of the man, the man here including the woman. Nor, in spite of the sub-title to the series, with its philosophic abstraction: "Human personality as conceived by the great religions," is there involved a study of those philosophies elaborated in the lap of "great religions" when grown to scholastic maturity.

¹ Ill-health prevented him. He gave, however, a different lecture before the Society a little later.

What has any world-religion meant, what does it now, if yet living, mean, by its central unit, its maker, its valuer, its votary, "the man"?

It is a profoundly interesting point of departure. It is for me the one true point of departure in the study of religions. We are to make the many "isms," covering as they do so many historical strata of religious thought, subsidiary to the chief subject. And we are directed to seek this and that concept of the Highest, Best, Most, Uttermost as framed in the history of each "ism" by "the man" in each. As one who has been a labourer in the vineyard of India's religious concepts at a certain epoch, I will try, by what I have found, to unfold a little what has just been said in brief, and in particular to stress, in the nature of the man, that wherewith India now and again was in labour in a way less noticeable in the lands west of her. And as a teacher in that vineyard I will drop the writer's impersonal appeal and come to the man or woman, speaking as "the man" to "the man."

I as man, you as man: each wants the better man, wants to be, to see the better man. Men want this. The better may not appear alike to all, but it is thought of as that. As that, it is sometimes that a man should keep up what he is, should carry on as that and fare no worse. They will say "he is 'better' so." Sometimes it is that a man should get what he has not yet got, should go on to that and fare less ill. They will say "he can improve, he can become better."

And a man will value differently the effort to get what he has not, or is not, yet. If it is a following on in gaining more of what has proved useful in his needs, he may find this sort of "better" worth while. It is

a "better" he is coming to understand. If it is to be effort to win what he has not, the usefulness of which does not yet appear, he may not be persuaded that the effort is worth while. The new, he judges, may not always be the better, even though the better must be the new.

That which is deemed both "new" and "better" men figure usually as of one of two ways: improvement for body, improvement for mind. Or of both: "healthier mind in healthier body" is then the reading of the adage. And for most men the better Man is just this. Would you say so?

Some there are who would add to these two ways of betterment, improvement in what they would call "character." This, they would say, is the something latent in a person—a sort of product or outcome (it should rather be "out-to-come")—which is the truer expression of him or her than is either mind or body. Let a crisis arise, let a temptation be felt, then there emerges, in a way perhaps not seen before, "character," or want of it, that is, a poor sort of character. Then, say they, we rightly know the man, the woman.

Are you content to be called just a character, even without the popular drollery sometimes attaching to it? Character, we know, is a mark or stamp on something, in the Greek. On coin it indicates value. So, when character is shown, personal worth is discerned. The worth of you is shown by or in the character you reveal. Character is the revealing; you are the revealed. "The coin is but the guinea's stamp; the man's a man for a' that." The revealing, the character is how, out of and above the routine of the day, this man may be trusted to behave. "Trusted" when either you have already seen him behaving in such and

such a crisis, or when you are sure you have rightly divined the "sort" of man he is. He is the behavior. He behaves so, being a man of such a character, not because he is character.

Do I seem to worry overmuch about words? Will not any word, more or less fit, being in vogue, serve to name what we mean?

It depends, I would say, on the degree in which we value that which we are naming. If I worry, it is because here the thing most worth is not so valued in our day as to be truly, justly, fitly named. Our day is concentrating on two relatively side issues about the man: the betterment in body, the betterment in mind; we consider it relatively unimportant how we name that in whom body and mind are instruments. Character we say will "do," will serve.

As to that, it is worth noticing that this word in our tongue is relatively new, unknown I should say to Jacobean translators of the Bible. If that is so, it is of interest to note that it has come into use, as a substitute for "the man," together with the rise among us of the science of mind, or what we now, oddly enough, call psychology. (Phrenology was pre-empted; noölogy never got a look in; mentology might have served, but we probably followed continental usage, where a good word for "mind" was lacking.) But in Indian thought there arose a similar term: *lakṣhaṇa*, *lakṣhaṇa*: having the same meaning in material handicraft, and coming to have the same meaning in "the man," namely, the salient feature or features in his nature, or in the nature of anything. This term came into use when India also had come, for the first time, to consider *the mind of man apart from the man*. This new way of thought took birth in

probably the seventh century B.C., hardly later, and was known as the teaching by way of number-and-name: the word Sāṅkhya means both that and computing, and we may not unfitly call it the Analytical School. It grew to have a tremendous influence; the older Upanishads of Brahman teachings reveal this together with a certain wise anxiety about it. Those teachings finally adopted Sāṅkhya without being in their religious conceptions swamped by it. It spread over the new teaching of Sakya, as Buddhism was called, and this it ended by swamping to a very serious extent. Men saw so much in mind, that they lost sight, at least in dogma and category, of the man, whose mind they "numbered and named." They substituted "mind" for man in the contexts where the "man" was the one right word. Take the parable in the Buddhist Suttas, where is taught the lesson of the True coming to the man at different stages of his life in varied guise. Messengers ride in swiftly, now this one, now that, from North, East, West. The city governor in the midst of the town judges their message. "Now he," said the Sutta-exponents, "is the mind."¹ We perhaps are not shocked. I heard the other day by wireless, in an excellent "talk" on teaching the blind, the teacher describing the sightless hearer as an active laboratory wherein *the director was the mind*. So much has the like happened among us to-day as happened among the monastic Buddhists of India, where the changed values represented a more tremendous and shocking change than among ourselves. An early Christian would admonish his brethren that

¹ *Vijñāna*, one of three terms used in the Suttas for mind. Meaning "discerning," its older implication was man-in-surviving-death as aware.

they were "the sons of God"; the earlier Indian impressed upon his listener that he *was* (not "son" but) That, the divine nature itself, in himself. But the new spirit in that early India was coming to see much in the mind, much that was more in consonance with the conviction, that all things were in process of change, which was growing up and jarring with the current teaching, that the Highest is, ever is, and changes not. And little by little it came to be held that the man could only be "got at" in or as mind. This I discussed in the *Hibbert Journal* two years ago (July, 1928).

Here and now I am more concerned with the position in which our own less rudimentary psychology, in its divorce from philosophy, has landed us. It was a gradual business, this divorce, and it was not till after certain men of medical training had published tractates on the mind, with the physiological parallels drawn from their own tradition, that the parting began to take shape. Academicians wrote on the mind under the title of metaphysics and philosophy. And psychology is still taught in London from the Chair of "Philosophy of Mind and Logic." Locke and David Hume wrote of the mind under the title "Human Understanding," but no one would call their works unmixed with philosophical considerations. Nor can anyone nowadays fail to see how inapt they are when handling mental processes, or how they relapse into the traditional way of philosophy, which is to see the man in the mind, the proceeder in the process.

Consider Locke doing this. "The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it." Here Locke actually makes the soul, *i.e.* the man, an

instrument of the mind. "Sometimes they (i.e., ideas) start up of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding."¹ He has made the mind into a dummy man (just like Buddhist monk-editors), and ideas into so many mannikins. Faithfully, too, has he been imitated in this by some modern psychological manuals.

Consider, again, Hume. His inapt handling is best shown in his well-known attempt to expugn the man or self. He wrote, you remember, in the Personal Identity section of the *Human Nature*, that when he "entered most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception. . . . I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception," and so on. This has a certain air of seeming very acute, but to us of to-day it should appear slovenly and shallow. It is slovenly to admit that "I" am aware of heat or cold, or (as Hume goes on) that "I" love or hate, and then admit truth in the heat, the cold, the loving, the hating, but see only untruth in the "I". According to and quoting Hume, we get this comical sequence: "I" (not real) "catch" (real) "myself" (unreal). And it is shallow to deny the reality of everything that we cannot perceive. Actually we believe many things to be real which we do not outwardly or even inwardly perceive. I cannot "perceive" all my outward form, at most only portions of it, while talking to you; I cannot at all perceive the working of my brain while I tell you my thought; I cannot perceive the flow of the thoughts passing "through" my mind, as we clumsily say. Yet I know it is I who talk with you; I know it is

¹ *Human Understanding*, II, ch. x.

" my " brain, the brain of " me " that is busy; I know that I am thinking and trying to reach response in your thinking. Everything here I can perceive (using the word in Hume's wide sense of " being aware "), I can in a way contemplate, I can appraise, I can value. But I cannot so contemplate, appraise, value myself; and that is because I, the very man, the man-in-man, am not valued, but am valuer. All of me save Me is valued, or to be valued. I, the valuer, can only be valued in that which expresses me, that which I can put forth from me. As output it is become something which I and others can contemplate, appraise, value. It is of me; it is no longer I, even as the poem, once made, is not the poet, the melody is not the composer.

Do you say: Then cannot the man be both valuer and valued? Is not mind both minding and minder? Is it not a matter of aspects?

Our manuals try to make them so. But is it not a feature of them, how unhappy, how unconvincing, how leaving-unaccounted-for are the efforts of such manuals to fit on, or into, consciousness what they call self-consciousness? Always the " knowing that I know " waves above their tidy pyramids of complexes like a loose end in the wind. There is more in inner experience to be taken into account than the pyramid. Something that is not just " other way of looking at it," as in a matter of aspects. And it is notably in the underrated psychology of will that we come nearest to the " More " to be taken into account. When the man is in a crisis and must put forward " more will," then does just " willing " show as quite inadequately filling the picture. It cries for the willer. Then does he loom large: What must I do? I choose this; I reject that.

It is, as James Ward tried to say a generation ago,

a question of facing facts. The Buddhists and Europe have been hurrying their heads, in this matter, in the sand. Their eyes, as in a Buddhist simile, have grown dusty. "Where there is a way, there will be a way-er,"¹ wrote a great Buddhist scholastic, with the dust for a moment wiped off. Yet he relapsed and endorsed the tradition of his cloistered world in such words as "Going is there but no goer."² We can surely see more clearly than that. Where there is a machine, there will be a machinist, at least as creator, as starter, however Robottian it may have come to be. Where there are means, instruments, there will be users. And of these the instruments are not aspects; they are but adjuncts, sub-factors, if the word seem more just, of him who is, in the using, the "-er," the "-ist." If we use any of these adjuncts to mean him, the very man, we are not in fact resolving him into them; we are artificially raising them to stand for him. To say, man is mind is to make mind mean minder.

Do we not see that to say, "The man is a myth," needs the man to judge that this is so? I must be there, to say "I am not." This was said long ago, as Buddhism was wilting out of India, its good work done, its central canker of the "not-man" repudiated by Shāṅkarā. That was eleven centuries ago. And we are needing to have it said here and now.

But we are needing to have it said with a fresh emphasis in our conception of the man. This was an emphasis which India, in rejecting Buddhism, rejected with it. Nay, Buddhism itself in rejecting the "man" (or self) was rejecting it also. The Buddhists, under the name of Bauddhas, or Saugatas (i.e., the men of

¹ Dharmasāṅgī Commentary.

² *Maggam atthi, gamako na vijjati*, Visuddhi-magga, 523.

the Good Way'), were credited with a doctrine of Becoming taking the place of *Sat*, the concept of Being. *In its earliest teaching*, almost buried in the scriptures called Pitakas, the "man" was taught as neither being nor not-being, but as *becoming*. And this was figured by progress in a road or way, or journey of life through the worlds. There had been a movement somewhat earlier to adopt it in Brahman teaching, for the very act of divine creation was represented as desire and effort *from one to become many*. Had this been incorporated into the teaching of immanent Deity as being in, of, "the man," the Divine Ātman or self as being one with the human ātman, then might we have seen the best in Sakya, or early Buddhism, as "not destroying, but fulfilling" the best of the day in Indian thought. But the world was not ready for that. The concept of Becoming-in-change, as the most divine of attributes—that supreme thing which is adumbrated in the world of art—withered in both Brahman and Buddhist teaching. The former reverted to the concept of Deity as Being; the latter worsened Becoming as belonging to rebirth, and wilted it down to a theory of momentary change-without-becoming, in terms curiously like the very words used unwittingly by Hume: "Men are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." To such a pass had an undigested, new preoccupation with man's mental instrument brought, at different ages and independently, the East and the West; the hard, but immaturely thinking Indian, the hard, but immaturely thinking Scot.

¹ This came to be applied, save once, in Buddhist records to the Founder only.

In India that psychological bent may have been a reaction from over-much speculation on the nature of the man. Teachers had come to indulge in foolish childlike imaginings about the where and the how big or how little of this Self-in-the-Self; of how it was in the eye, in the heart (brain was neglected), as big as a thumb, or infinitely small. The tradition strongly survives in the Buddhist Pitakas of a repression of this speculative tendency in the day of the Sakyamuni.¹ In Europe of to-day it is possibly the opposite extreme in preoccupation, namely, the getting the "man" out of his body. Buddhism tried to flatten out the man to a mere word of conventional convenience. Europe has either denied his reality, or has laid him on an upper shelf, as a metaphysical curio, or has smothered him in complexes. Can we find a reason for this?

We might approach this problem by considering recent deepenings in the concept, not of "the man," but of "man." These deepenings have had and have their value, but it is a gain won at the expense of a cheapening in the value of "the man." This is the sort of deepening to which I refer: This little world of our earth to-day is a very full, a very filled-in picture. In days of old, we read, a man like the Sakyamuni might come with a mandate to further "the good, the 'well,' the happiness of the many, of men of this and other worlds." But the earth that the many saw was an uncharted world, a portion of one or two continents, perhaps a portion of only one. Man's imagination peopled the unseen, the unknown, perhaps because of that, in a less hampered way. Worlds heard the saviour's voice; thousands thronged from these worlds round the few earth-dwellers² to

¹ Called "Buddha."

² Vinaya Texts (S.B.E.), i, 1.

listen. But it was a child's imagination, not therefore picturing the untrue, but with little knowledge of the world of earth. More of this knowledge, much faring in many lands has made full-charted the map of the how and where and when of earth.

In face of this new knowledge, a new sympathy has arisen for, a new holding in worth of the needs and hopes and fears of, these newly visualised fellow-men. It has come to seem a sorry pose, a distorted emphasis to say, *I am, I will, I hope I may one day win to the goal*. What are you, little I-man, to count in this mighty stream of the Race? It served you in the past, striving for the better; serve it now, and let its better be your sole aim, the one thing that justifies your existence. Live in, live for your fellows; be a stone in the bridge where-over they may pass way-faring to make other bridges. Lie down, little man, lie down!

This is how many of the thoughtful and worthy used to think, still think—a gospel of bitter-sweet tears, but one that could inspire. It came from France, offshoot of the great Revolution. It was a widened outlook; but not nearly wide enough. By a mighty effort man had risen to his knees—one penetrated by that gospel wrote so of woman¹—and he saw as far as that suffered him to do: a vision of life on earth. And since, thus limited, there could be for each man no individual perfection, man's only hope lay in the future perfection of the race, that is, on earth. Still do younger prophets write of the future of religion as lying in "thinking racially."

But this is a very long ascent, very far, very doubtful, nay, with earth-body and earth-surroundings, however

¹ Olive Schreiner, *Dreams in a Desert*.

improved, virtually inconceivable. Anyway it called for the submergence of this temporary individual earth-life. Who, what, am I, that I should survive? The snowy peaks of the old mandates still stood in the skies: "Thou art That"; "Dearests, now are we the sons . . ." but they were, they are, cloud-covered. The "man-in-man" has become just transient-complex-man. There was no "More-than-man" left in him. But might he not evolve into that, given a long future to earth? For was he not evolved, as he is, from the less-than-man?

Such was the new word that followed close on that gospel of Comteism. There had been no ingress of the new from without; all that seemed so was an unfolding from within, aided by pressure of a sort from without. And so worsened had the idea of "the man," as submergible in the "race," become, that it is not strange to see, how all, even the teachers of a religion which considers man as in the first place "soul" or "spirit," have come to acquiesce in the long ascent of mankind from an apelike ancestor as involving, not man's instruments only (body and mind), but the very soul, the man himself! Were it not for this wilted notion of the very man, the man-in-man, we should not now be witnessing this anomaly.

It is in those teachers of religion, I repeat, a wilting in the idea of "the man" as being (or worse still, as *having*) "soul" or "spirit," which has acquiesced in a seeing the very man himself as evolved from the purely animal, and not his mind-worked body only. I am not here presuming to say that the one thing is true, the other thing is false. I am only saying that they have got the *emphasis* awry. If you will try to think of the unseen as including something more real

than any seen thing, you may see what I mean. When we say "the real man," we must be speaking of a thing unseen, rather than of the visible mind-worked body. It is then that we get the emphasis better adjusted. But so little is this now honestly done, that when men, even those teachers, speak of soul or spirit, it is a wraith or shadow of the man whom they have in mind.

Now so long as the man is for us just and only man-on-earth, so long will the man as citizen of other worlds be a wraith. But when once anyone looks upon the man as wayfarer through worlds, all unseen but one—as one to whom any and all worlds are, at different times, and because of the wayfaring, his Right-of-Way—then the question of his earthly origin is no longer the same. It is not one of his absolute beginning. It is the question of his first visit, *during his wayfaring*, to this earth. It is not necessarily true that he, as "man," began here.

This is not to explain the conditions or the happening of that first visit; it is to will man to set out on such a quest with a better, truer start.

You will say I am only shifting the problem of man's real beginning back to a scene and date even more impossible to get at than that of man's first birthday on earth. Impossible with his present limited sources, yes; but do not forget, that the limit to those sources is one that man has himself chosen to fix; it is not an absolute nature-limit.

You may tell me: men will say they are not concerned save with the limit of the earth-birthday. As to that, I do not myself set much concern on that earth-birthday. Interest in it belongs to that zest in looking back as we try to walk forward, which makes

heavy embargo on the energies of to-day's thinkers. Even were such missing links discovered as would make continuous evolution more certain than it is, this would only bring us a "more-word" about man's body. It could not now show us how the very "man" first showed he was not "less-than-man." A far more important birthday will it be, when man recreates himself as neither body nor mind, nor a complex, nor a product of these, but as the much more real "valuer" of these, as he who *has* these.

And as not only not less-than-man, not only as man-in-man. It will be when he once more sees, and sees more worthily than before, that as man he is "more-than-man." What do I mean?

I mean that on that birthday he will have come to see that, in his very nature, he is not, as in the ancient Indian idea, a "ready-made" Highest (he is but That in the germ), but that, in his nature, there is that which leaves him no rest for long unless he obey It, and fare on towards that whom he conceives as a "better." He may, on earth, so mess up his nature, that he shows to men only a faring to worse. But "on earth" is but a stage in a long faring. His next stage will in his case be bitter rather than better, because of the messing up, but it may end in a good advance, and who knows how much will be yet to come? For he, too, has in his nature the very guarantee of ultimate salvation; he is by nature "one-who-becomes." It is because we speak of "men" and of the ways of men, and too little of the man, and the man's faring, that we are still hearing how "human nature," or "man," does not change; or that "human nature is always changing in that it does not change"—that is, changes back and forth without permanent advance.

The very "man," wayfarer of worlds, is not present to such speakers.

Can the younger generation work this re-creation of the man, who is in his nature the more-than-man, who is, in that, Becom-er, Werdender, Devenant? They must not be held by the old Indian difficulty. They have to reconcile the two ideas: "the man as becoming" and "the man as potentially the Highest," in that he, in the germ, is That, is "now the son of God." "That"—Highest, God, Most, Best—cannot as yet be even fitly conceived. "Then shall we know if we *follow on* to know"—worthy word of Hosea—points to an indefinite future. But it shows us, that knowing, that coming-to-know is a matter of living. In seeking we become. Quest of the Best makes the Better to become. But our quests of health for body and of sanity or efficiency for mind have tended to crowd out the ideal of a growing towards a "well-ness" of the very man.

I began by saying that each man wants the better man; that is, for us, where we have yet reached, the man who is relatively well. We have as yet no idea of the man—discounting body and man—who is utterly well. No present values of him can be so described. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." To fall short in idea here is to see in "to be well" a reverting to the normal. Such is men's wish in health restored after illness, in peace restored after war. But for "the man" who is becoming, that which is to be sought is not emerging from a worse to a better which has been known before, but an emerging up and into a better than has yet been known.

Map the wayfarer, man the coming-to-be is in a process, which, while it is allied to the Better attempted

in mind and body, is yet other. It is the man making to become That Who in nature he is. And as he becomes, he may come to conceive and value That as Itself a becoming. That becoming he now practises as a tyro, as apprentice, as a neophyte. He is only in "the Better," "the More." He has much to do. He has far to go. He associates becoming with his own stages of imperfection, with just a getting better. But the idea can be deepened, can be heightened in significance, till it be made to replace more worthily the ancient association of "being" with That who yet passes all our understanding.

III

THE MAN IN EARLY BUDDHISM¹

FELLOW-STUDENTS . . . I call you so, and this includes you, my chairman, because, in the first place, you must be interested in the subject in which I am a student, and on which I am to talk with you—or you would not be here seated on chairs which the Caxton Hall ought to pay you for occupying—and because, in the next place, the subject is so beset with difficulties, that no one can as yet speak of it save as a student; that is, as a fellow-groper; we are all groping, and anything I say, I will ask you to take as results of my groping, and not as words of “one having authority.”

How comes it that the subject is so difficult?

First, we are here to treat our subject historically; this means that we have to place it within the general history of religious ideas, and particularly within the history of Indian religious ideas.

On the one hand we have the religious literature of India, in so far as it is reckoned by the learned to be either earlier than that of early Buddhism, or to be, in part, contemporaneous with it. On the other hand we have that which is now admitted to be the earliest surviving literature of Buddhism, so far, that is, as we yet know. I hope it may not remain the earliest that we yet know. We are still, nay, more than ever,

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looking east in the hope of coming across, in translations from Indian languages, documents in which we can find teachings bearing the stamp of religious ideas which *just survive*, and no more, in that "earliest surviving literature," known as the Pāli Canon or Pitakas. (By "just survive" I mean are recorded without being made central, or otherwise emphasised.) And our hopes may not be so ill-founded as, on the surface, they seem. I mean, that the teachings which may come to light need not of necessity be repetitions from the Pitakas. Here is a case in point. I have learnt from that veteran of research, A. J. Edmunds, that in one Chinese version of the First Utterance, the Way is said to be, not "eightfold," but solely the Way of Will (or purpose, *samhappa*, ranked in the "eight" as seventh).¹

The Pitakas were the "Authorised Version," undertaken at the revisional Council of Patna, though only completed many generations later. The standardising there accomplished was the weapon by which a great number of adherents, not holding the views of the majority of judges—that is, of the new orthodoxy, styled at the time Vibhajjavādins, or Analysts—were expelled from the Sakyan, that is, the Buddhist Community or Church. Among these were the numerous Puggalavādins, or Defenders of the Man, whose centre was, not Patna, the new imperial capital of Asoka, but Vesālī, the city to which the aged Founder turned, as he walked away to die, to bid a last look in farewell.

These Defenders of the Man, so far as they were of the Sakyan Order and teachers, being turned down, may well have carried their energies to lands beyond

¹ See Gunabhadra's *Samyutta*, Taisho Tripitaka, Tokyo, 1924, II, p. 103.

India. At present, recovery of other scriptures has been in those of another great section, also, turned down; the Sabbatthivādins, or Sarvāstivādins. Their disagreement appears to have been, not so much over the reality itself of the Man, as over an accessory to that reality. I cannot go into it here. But on the very Man, his nature, his reality, there may yet come to us, after my time, emergence of exiled teachings such as are barely touched upon in the Pitakas, yet which, as bearing on that earlier religious teaching of India, may help us in two ways: in getting at the original teaching about the Man in Buddhism; in finding the right historical place for the Pitakas.

At present there is too much of a gap between the religion of the Upanishads, on which our chairman was addressing you, and the Pitakas. There is, I hold, a way of bridging that gap. And that lies mainly in rightly getting hold of the original "Sakyan" conception of the Man, which in the Pitakas is visible, but is diverged from, and finally denounced.

Then there is this other difficulty: the subject of the Man has, I venture to think, never been quite fairly and squarely dealt with by writers on Buddhism, whether they be Buddhists or non-Buddhists. There is plenty about men, their qualities and their conduct; there is plenty about one Man, or Superman; there is no little allusion to an abnormal or superman, called Worthy one (*arahān*), whose waxing and waning can be traced in the literature of Buddhism; there is much about ethics, non-theism, and philosophy in these modern writings; but the attitude towards the nature of the very Man is mainly negative.

THE MAN IN RELIGION

As to the last term, philosophy, I am sorry it has crept into the programme of our present studies. We are to study the history of religion in its cults, and that is a different thing. Philosophy is concerned with elaborately worded structures of ideas about things as they are. There is no word for philosophy in early Indian thought. If we want to get at anything resembling a system of philosophy in Buddhism, we must begin at the second millennium of its existence. Religion, on the other hand, is concerned with the advent of a new Announcement, with first votaries, with the expansion, not so much of a system as of a fresh outlook on the Man, on his nature, his life, his destiny, his possibilities. This may not be quite new to the Few, but it is to the Many that the new view is brought. And herewith the main stress is not so much, as in philosophy and science, "This is so," but "This ought to be so." And so much does philosophy, in comprehending and generalising among our specialised sciences, express itself in the general and the abstract, that its writers are less taken up with the individual and his ideals than is perforce the case in religion. In religion we are looking at *the man* reaching out to a Somewhat that is greater, less imperfect than he feels himself to be, reaching out in idea, in faith, in desire, in conduct.

How then did Sakya or original Buddhism regard this forth-reaching man? Did it regard him as a body, as a mind, as a soul or spirit, as a person or personality? Or, as a complex, or product of more than one of these?

THE INDIAN CONCEPTION OF THE MAN

I seem to find that it regarded him as not only one of these, but that, in some way, not better understood than it is by us, he *disposed of* or *experienced through* the first two: body and mind. The other terms are not Indian in any way that we can equate: neither soul nor spirit nor person, let alone personality. The last as being an abstraction we can leave to philosophy. "Person" has suffered a fate unusual for words; it has not depreciated in value; it has been given a higher value, from having once meant just the mask of the actor, "through which the sounds" of the voice of the speaker sounded (*per-sona*). But we don't want the mask or "loud-speaker"; we want the very speaker. And here it is that we come upon the Indian values; the speaker, the knower, the seer, the experimenter, the doer. It is the invisible source who "sounds through" the mask of body, the sounding-through being those ways which we collectively call mind. And there is no word which covers our own very elastic term "soul."

There is a word which comes near to "spirit," and that is *ātman*, elastic also in range, but originally meaning breath. There is the word *jīva*, the living one or thing, a word for the man preferred in Jainism. And lastly, there is just the Man, the word *purūṣa*, in Pāli *purisa*, for which, when monastic vogue worsened the high religious value attaching in Indian tradition to this word, the less honoured word *puggāla* (male) was substituted. We of Christian traditions can only get a little nearer the sort of value implicit in *purūṣa* in such a term as "the Son of Man."

Now, whereas the word *Ātman* could be used to mean just "one's self,"¹ and the word *Purūsha* could be used to mean just any person, both of these words had come to mean, had come to include in their meaning, the highest meaning, that namely whom we here and now term God. In the Vedas, the Indian read his manhood into Deity; God was conceived as the Great, or Super-Man (*mahā-purūsha*), as the world-self. Later, but before the birth of Sakya, the Indian read Deity back into himself. God became immanent in the man. That and he were one in nature. There was no need for him to become, as later the Christian taught, a son of God by adoption, by grace, through atonement. *He was That in virtue of his manhood.* Was That only potentially, of course. He had no word for potential. He had had no Aristotle here. And he tended, as teacher, to rely on making men realise this essential inevitable More that was in them, as the best incitement to wise and worthy living. Could the man but enter into full awareness of this tremendous heritage, he could not but become wise as speaker, knower, seer, experiencer, doer.

You will notice that there is here no mention of the man as a wise willer. This had never struck the Indian, and he had hence no word for will or willer. He judged that wise action was a necessary result of wise thinking. He was here much on a line with the Greek, who in Socrates taught that virtuous action was a necessary result of wise thinking. And the Greek, too, had no good word for will! It was a great weakness, a great hindrance in both worlds of thought.

¹ In early Indian tongues, a pronoun is never prefixed to "(the) self."

WHAT GOTAMA THE SAKYAN FOUND WHEN HE BEGAN TO TEACH

We have now sketched how India conceived the Man in the literature which, when Buddhism began, existed only as Sayings in a bookless world. The Man was the invisible agent and experiencer, somehow in a body, but in nature akin to the unknown Divine Being. And there was this also: there were ways of him that were not bodily; mental ways, for which he was coining terms both special and general. Special, such as "purpose"; general, such as "mind," or understanding. This way of distinguishing mind from the man was rather new, was the work of a teacher in the near past, Kapila, of whom no details have survived, but who, as the founder of Indian psychology, had a far-reaching effect on the established religious teaching, and yet more on early Buddhism. Thus a word for mind or understanding—*viññāna*—was actually used *for the man*, both as an expression of the Godhead in man and also as the essential man who survived the dead body, both in the Upanishads and in the days of early Buddhism.

The Man was thus taught by the established Church, that is, by Brahmanism, in India, when an aristocratic student, known in India as the Sage of the Sakyas, after a few years as a Parivrājaka, or wandering student, began to teach a New Word in his world. He did not start as an agitator to attack the established teaching. He was on friendly terms with members of it. Two-thirds of his first co-workers were Brahmans, nor is there a word surviving to show that these were declared Non-conformists opposed to other Brahmans. Many debates with Brahmans are recorded, but not one shows

that the men of the New Word debated with Brahman on the current Brahman teaching about the Man. Nor is there in the records of the first utterances any new attitude revealed about the Man opposed to that of the established teaching. We can only conclude this: that the new teachers accepted the Brahman religious values as to the Man. And this, that what they sought to bring to those values was some quickening element for the Brahman teaching, wherein, for the world of that day, that teaching was weak or worsened, or both. They will have sought, like Jesus, "not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it." They will have been like the Wesleys of two centuries ago, who strove to bring fuller life into a church grown in some ways torpid.

If this be right, we ought to find some correspondence between what the Brahman were teaching about the Man, and what the early Buddhist records say about him. We do find such a correspondence in teaching. The only difference, beside now and then one of wording, is that what Brahman are found emphasising, the Buddhist scriptures either do not emphasise, or make central, or give with a different emphasis, or have, as it were, retained on sufferance, as so many survivals. But we must look upon those "survivals" as of the earliest teaching, for, as Buddhism expanded, it diverged, as have done other reforming bodies, from the established religion, attaining final divorce perhaps only in Southern Asia. Hence these survivals could not possibly have come into the scriptures later.

I have here some nine sayings about the Man from Upanishads, reckoned as before, or as contemporary with the birth of Buddhism, and nine sayings parallel

to them, taken from the older portions of the Pitakas. They are these:

INDIAN AND SAKYAN PARALLELS ON THE MAN

1. *Upanishads*.—The Self is all-knowing, all-wise . . . he is in the divine Brahma-city (the heart) . . . the Self-power of God hidden in his own faculties.

Pitakas.—Body is not the Self; mind is not the Self. Were it so, neither would tend to disease; either could attain (as God) to saying: Let me be so and so! (*Vinaya*.)

2. *Up*.—The Self (*ātman*) assuredly one should desire to know; he should be sought after (*Chhândogya*, *Maitri*).

Pit.—Ought you not rather to seek for the Self? (*Vinaya*.)

3. *Up*.—To become one for whom Brahman (=God—*Ātman*), is all: this for him is the highest bourn (*gati*) . . . the Man: this is the goal; this is the highest bourn (*gati*). (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Kaṭha*.)

Pit.—The Self verily is the bourn (*gati*) of the self (*Dhammapaḍa*).

4. *Up*.—When with the Selfhood as with a lamp (*dīpa*) one beholds Godhead . . . (*Śvetāśvatara*.)

Pit.—Be ye they who have the Self as a lamp (*dīpa*). (*Dīgha-Nikāya*.)

5. *Up*.—The highest Brahman is the heart . . . the support¹ of all things, on It all are established¹ . . . if a man clearly beholds this, then is he no more afraid. (*Bṛhad*.)

Pit.—The Self is protector² of the self; truly what protector were another? . . . Be ye they who have the Self as refuge.³ . . . Become Brahman I rejoice; whence should come fear? (*Dhammapaḍa*, *Dīgha-Nikāya*, *Sutta-Nipāta*.)

6. *Up*.—Not for love of the loved one is he dear; for love of the Self is he dear. (*Bṛhad*.)

Pit.—The whole wide world we traverse with our thought, to man naught finding dearer than the Self. (*Saṃyutta-Nikāya*.)

7. *Up*.— . . . the divine voice thunders: Training! . . . Know the Self as riding in a chariot, the body; intellect, the driver; the (sense-) mind, the reins; the senses, the horses . . . the Self it is who goes forth and holds them under control . . . (*Bṛhad*., *Kaṭha*, *Maitri*.)

¹ *Pratishtha*.

² *Nātha*.

³ *Sarana*.

Pit.—Excellent are trained steeds . . . better than those the man trained by the Self. . . . The pious train the self. . . . (*Dhammapada*).

Straight is the name that Road is called, and free from fear the Quarter whither thou art bound.
Thy chariot is the Silent Runner named,
with wheels of righteous effort fitted well.
. . . the Driver *Dhamma* is . . .

(*Samyutta-Nikaya*).

8. *Up.*—Stretches a Way scarce visible and old;
It reaches into me, was found by me;
On it wise men wayfare who Brahman know
To heavenly worlds . . .
The way it is that man through Brahman finds. . . .

(*Brhad.*).

Pit.—This is the Way belonging to the Goal¹ . . . just this Ariyan Way . . . (*Vinaya*).

The Way this is for going to Beyond,
And therefore is it Yonder-faring called.

(*Sutta-Nipāta*.)

9. *Up.*—According as a man acts, conducts himself, so does he become.
The doer of good becomes good. . . .

(*Brhad.*).

Pit.—The man is heir to his deeds, has his deeds as matrix. . . . (*Majjhima*.)

It would be possible to show you more parallels, for instance, where the Upanishads of middle date approach the teachings which are more emphasised in the Pitakas than those which I have quoted. But my subject is Man in Early Buddhism, and the Pitakas have too much in them of Not-early Buddhism. And I think that the parallels submitted go far to bridge the chasm, hitherto overstressed, between the best Brahman teaching and that of the Founders of Buddhism. Writers have paid too much attention to the monastic formulas and fixed terms, emphasised in the monastic

¹ *Attha-sakita*. The word has dropped out; it is rendered necessary by, is implied by, the context.

doctrines of the Pali scriptures, in the final shape they eventually came to have.

HOW BUDDHISM TWISTED THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE SAKYANS TO THE INDIAN CONCEPTION

"*The shape they came to have*" . . . this is where so much of our difficulty lies in getting at the truth about the Man, the very man, the man-in-man as I call him, of original Buddhism. Unless we go to work in the way I have indicated, we shall be trying to get that truth out of books which are drenched with the view-points and ideals of the *śramāṇa* or monk. This was an institution which was yet very young in India, when Gotama the Sakyan lived. It was growing, and it swept early Buddhism along into its clutches. And so it has come about that, in the Pitakas, and much more in later literature, he is represented as starting his inquiries abroad by becoming a monk and by his first men becoming so no less. But the monk or *śramāṇa*, of which the Pitakas are so full, is hardly mentioned in those early and middle Upanishads. And view-point and ideals of the monk about the Man, his nature, his life, his "bourn" differ profoundly from those held up in the passages I have quoted.

Not only is there difference in the shape taken eventually in those Pali scriptures; a great difference has come over the *meaning* in certain very important words. Take the great word, for which we have no good equivalent: *dharma*, or (in Pali) *dhamma*. This, for India ancient and modern, means the Ought-to-be, as other and better than the average Is. As meaning this, it has come to be used for the laws of the community, for social duty, for caste-norm or standard,

but in the Buddhist world it came to be so much externalised, as formulated doctrine, that a modern Buddhist may tell you it means the Sutta-Pitaka. But if we look at those specified Upanishads, whereas we only find the word occurring four times, it is not only never used for formulated teachings or mantras, but is said to "go against the Vedas," or mantras of the day.¹ Yet it is also spoken of as something of highest sanctity, as created by the Divine Self.²

And if we search our Pitakas again for what seem to be survivals, we may find an older meaning attaching to *dhamma*, a meaning prior to the day when Buddhism too came to have its fixed formulated mantras. We find a record of the Founder, just after he has decided what to teach men, worshipping *dhamma*³; we find him recorded as talking of *dhamma* to his co-missioners immediately after his first authoritative utterance⁴; we find him bidding them tell men that *dhamma* was lovely at first, midway and at end.⁵ Here there can be no possible reference to any set of fixed sayings later to be compiled as Suttas. We have here something deeper, something more at the heart of the Man, something Divine within, good as a guide in childhood, middle life and old age, a guide which was a safer "Inner Controller"⁶ than external Vedic or other doctrines; that which we now and here, and badly too, name "conscience." This it is whereof the Founder would say: Be ye they who have *dhamma* as lamp, as refuge, as leader when I am gone.⁷ This is it which he would, as recorded, bid folk take as guide to conduct.

¹ *Maitri*.

² *Chândogya*.

³ *Samyutta and Anguttara Nikāyas*.

⁴ *Vinaya*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Up. passim*.

⁷ *Dīgha-Nikāya*.

Dhamman: charatha : " walk according to the Ought-within-you."¹ Here too, then, in the meaning of words showing an earlier stratum betrayed in the Pitakas, is it possible to make a bridge between original Buddhist-teaching about the Man and the best teaching of its day.

Yet once more: the Pitakas underwent change not only in shape and in the meaning of words, but also in *inferences* drawn from mantras ancient in shape. You will have drawn different inferences from my very title as to what was meant by the Man. You may have thought of him as a complex of body and mindings only, not as the valuer of these, the self-expresser by these. This is because our day just at present has got into a rut of thinking like that. Now take the so-called second " sermon " of the Founder. This is a brief but very weighty mantra (with, probably, a monastic appendix), cautioning his men about teaching that the Man was *what he was not*. The caution was necessary because of the new interest that was being taken, not only in man's anatomy,² but also in his mind, as being in thought distinguishable from the very man . . . a teaching which was much interesting the established church³ and which came later to be known as Sāṅkhya, or Classifying. I have quoted from it above to show that, at the time, for early Buddhism, the word Self implied divine essence (so we too might say the word spirit implies the human spirit as " temple of the Holy Spirit "). Briefly it is this: Neither body nor mind is the Self; were it so, either could will as God wills, but neither can so will.

¹ *Dīgha Nikāya*.

² Cf. *Mālvī Up.* with details of body in *Pit. passim*.

³ *Up. passim*.

In other words and *positively*: Body and mind, though the man uses them here, are no fit instruments¹ or expressions of That who is essentially God.

Now there is here no denial of the Man as real, the self as real. Nor was any affirmation that the Man is, really is, then made. *It was not needed then.* It was the current religious ideal of thoughtful men. Yet the inference drawn from this mantra by Buddhism is, that the Founder taught there is, wielding body and mind, no self, no Man. This is as if, say, from a record of the sayings of Jesus: "The kingdom of God is not within X (some foolish man), or Y (some unrighteous man)," Christians had inferred he meant there was no kingdom of God.

This inference, once you get out of the groove of Buddhist teaching, seems incredible. Yet nothing is, unhappily, truer than this inference, in spite of some modern attempts to explain away the negative dogma of the Not-Self, based on that inference, together with tendential sayings in Pitaka, and yet more in Commentary. Through this false inference we have come to acquiesce in the idea that a great Helper of Man could start his mission by telling man that in his nature he was a "Less," a "Not," and not a More, a very Real.

THE MAN AS BECOMING THROUGH HIS DEEDS

You may now say: If the original Buddhism did but carry forward the best religious teaching of the church of its day, was it, as a distinctive New Word, needed? And if it was needed, for what was it needed?

¹ There was no word then for instrument.

These are very fit questions. As to the first: Consider the day of other notable Reformers. They were waging no war against the fundamentals of the prevailing religion. But there had come over the latter, in some ways of its teaching, neglect, in some, a materialistic canker, in some, excess of a kind. And more: the world receiving that teaching had been growing around and beyond it, at least so far that some features were being realised as needing something better, something new, something quickening.

This was also true then, both of men outside the established teachers, the Brahmins, and also of reforming Brahmins themselves. I will here speak of two such features only. In the specified Upanishads are two very noteworthy points: reference to a man's deeds (*karma*) as being of utmost importance, not so much ethically, but in the matter of, as we say, his salvation; and secondly, the developing view-point of the Man as not just being, but as becoming. Now the former topic is at first touched upon, and discussed in private,¹ then enunciated perhaps later, in the words I quoted earlier (9).² The second topic was then "in the air." There is no such use of the word "becoming" (*bhavya*, *bhavaḥ*) in earlier works, as we find at every turn in the older Upanishads. But I have looked in vain to find this idea: that the Man is in nature, not being, but becoming, brought to the centre of the Brahmanical teaching. Ever using as never before the word "become," their teaching has come down to us as most typically represented by the Man being told "Thou art That," not, as possibly some reforming men taught: "Thou art becoming That."

Moreover, the blossoming idea of Becoming was on

¹ *Bṛhad. Up.*

² *Ibid.*

the wane. The spiritual, the divine becoming, fit for the case of the very Man, was being likened to the waxing and waning in the worlds of matter and mind, where decay inevitably followed on growth. This was a very canker of a materialistic kind, which affected seriously the whole of Indian thought. Buddhism included.

It is in just these two features that original Buddhism sought to make a new Centre in the accepted religious teaching of its day. It was not enough to be affirming that man's ultimate goal and perfection lay within the self. He must be up and doing, seeking It in the discipline of life in many worlds, the nature of life x going to mould life y , so that, as he sought in living, so he became, in a becoming whereon no corresponding decay supervened, as in the case of body and mind. As Professor Radhakrishna has well said, "The God-in-man was a task as well as a problem."

It was essential that this new central teaching should be framed in a popular way, for the founders, though aristocrats, were not entering into any accepted circle of teachers. This may be why we find such a popular figure and symbol as that of a Way or *mārga*, chosen from the first, to present Man's long gradual Becoming, by way of choice (*i.e.*, of will), and of sustained effort; whereby he may come to win that consummation which is in himself, since he is, ultimately, That Whom he seeks. Uttered in the first mantra and re-echoing for centuries down the written teaching, with the Wheel as its graphic presentation, it is lamentable how few are the recorded sayings preserved, uttered by the Founder and his first men in terms of Way, interesting though those few are, and often without reference to the somewhat edited version in which we usually find

the Way as "eightfold," again as "fourfold" and even "tenfold." Perhaps the most striking record of it is the emphatic testimony of the aged Ananda to his deceased kinsman Gotama, as supremely and exclusively Way-teacher: "Verily was he maker to arise of a Way not uprisen, maker to know was he of a Way not known, declarer of a Way undeclared, Way-knower, Way-witter, Way-wise." (*Majjhima*.)

But what the Way-Man meant by the Man being a Wayfarer is perhaps best shown in the *Tevijja Suttanta*.¹ Here he is consulted by two Brahman students as to whether any one of their teachers was exclusively right as to the "ways" severally taught for attaining "salvation"—this being worded as "companionship" with Brahmā, that is, with the Head and World of the Brahmadevas, a better world than the next world.

The Founder is first made to reply in a manner impossible for a wise teacher; namely, that for a way to be right, the end must be known. Such a view would have prevented any one of the Great Adventures upon which man by will and faith has ever launched. It will have been the later editing of monastics who were, as Professor Edington would say, the creatures of a Code. The Wise Man's answer comes in with the advice that to attain ultimately to the Highest a man must not be fettered, must not lie down and sleep about it, must not merely make profession and invocation. He must shape his life as he conceives will make him fit for that fulfilment of perfection, not here, but hereafter. This is the true Way, the Way of Becoming, after much wayfaring. That who the Man potentially is.

The Sutta is then completed, as are those of this

¹ *Dīgha-Nikāya*.

section (the Sīla Section or Morality) of the Book with the detailed description of morals which is the refrain of the section. The monastic influence failed to give just emphasis to the Way-figure as being the symbol of Man's becoming, for it came to dread the idea of Becoming (*bhava*) as involving rebirth. But it never faltered in stressing the importance of the moral life for man's ultimate salvation. It lost herein that vision of the Man *as in his very nature becoming More*; it failed to see that in this lay for him the very guarantee of his ultimately winning the Goal. It merged the man in mind; it finally denied his reality altogether. And so it failed to bring about that greater religion for India which the Sakyamuni was feeling after, which in the Way he was trying to teach.¹

¹ Time and other limitations caused me to omit in my talk, which I have here and now written for the first time, one or two of the sections in these pages. The main points remain the same, spoken and written.

IV

THE SELF: AN OVERLOOKED BUDDHIST SIMILE¹

I AM not referring to the simile (and its fate) of the Jetawood and the faggots.² That at least I have not overlooked, nor have others. Charles Eliot once wrote to us, that it seemed to imply the existence of a self that was other and more than body and mind (as the wood was *there*, and other, and more than the faggots). I remarked, Was it not a curious way of teaching the existence of a something (about which there might be a doubt), merely by implication? I was then blind to two things: the tremendous emphasis on the immanence of Deity as "Self" current in the lifetime of the "Buddha" (rendering any assertion of It unnecessary); the decline in that emphasis by the time the Suttas came to be finally worded and canonised. To very few was awareness of this earlier and later constantly present. "Was?" It is still true of most.

With regard to the former point, Jesus *did not need* to assert the existence of Deity, nor even the aspect of That as Father, save only so far as to make It real for the Many. And when he said, according to the Fourth Gospel: "The father judgeth no man"³ . . .

¹ Published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1937; and, as rewritten, in the *London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, 1939, as "The More in Man."

² *Samyutta*, iii, 333 (the reference in my *Sakya* is misprinted).

³ *John* v, 22.

he did not hasten to add: "even if he does not judge, he is not therefore non-existent." In his day there was no need for him to add that. And so, with this parallel in mind, I wrote in my *Sakya*: "In the Jeta-wood parable, as in the Second Utterance, the central point in both is left unsaid. I mean that, in reminding hearers that the faggots borne away to be firewood were as body and mind, it was not necessary (then) to say that the wood was still there, as the 'man' was still there, becoming, even as the wood was growing. Nevertheless, it may be that we have here some later editing."¹ Yet an eminent scholar² once expressed to me the opinion, that there was nothing here which (in face of the growing anti-self position in Buddhism) could be called an omission, deliberate or otherwise. And St. Luke's words rose in memory: "But their eyes were holden that they should not know him."

The simile to which I now refer is ascribed to the "Buddha" in the 35th or Lesser Saccaka³-Sutta of the Majjhima-Nikāya. It illustrates the emphatic warning given to the first handful of fellow-workers, which is the pith, the original part, of the Second Utterance, called in later times the Anattalakkhaṇa-Sutta, the "Not-having-marks-of-self" talk, a warning from which Hinayāna Buddhism has drawn such a deplorably wrong conclusion. This conclusion is, that since neither body nor mind is (*i.e.*, has the mark of) self, *therefore there is no self*. This only became plausible, when (with the cleavage from the current Brahmanic teaching become wide, and with the ever-growing preoccupation with proto-Sāṅkhyan analysis of mind) the man or self was coming to be held as only

¹ *Sakya, or Buddhist Origins*, p. 325.

² M. Winternitz. ³ Pron. Sacch'aka.

"to be got at" through body and mind, nay, as some held, was just these two, and these only. I have suggested my own simile here, namely, that this is as if one were to come aboard asking for the captain and, rejecting boatswain and purser as being "not he," were to go away saying: there is no captain! Had I better remembered what I had read, I should not have overlooked the following similes, which appeal more to India of the sixth century B.C. than any marine figure.

This identification of self with body and mind is put forward as the opinion of one of the growing Jaina school among the Licchavi republican rījas of Vesālī. As to that, it is not the opinion we should expect from either a Jain, or from Vesālī. Jainism has no such psychological anomaly, and the Vajjians of Vesālī were the stoutest defenders of the Bhagavā as having taught the reality of the "man," as no mere complex, at the Patna Council. It is the following, the "Greater" Saccaka-Sutta which is more fitly located at Vesālī, showing the Founder of Buddhism as severely experimenting in that *tapas* of bodily austerities, which Jainism prescribed as the cure for karma past, present and future. It is not this Sutta that has been "overlooked."

Turning to the Commentary, we find a long, interesting account of the founding of the Jaina school at Vesālī by a man and woman and their four daughters, although nothing is said about what their "theses" taught. This account introduces the Lesser Saccaka, and serves also for the Greater. And the historically interesting question arises as to the significance, in the Majjhima, of the thirteen pairs of Suttas, in which either the Lesser or the Greater precedes the other.

Save that Saccaka appears in both, burdened with

inordinate self-esteem, there is nothing to connect the treatment in the two. The Lesser here is so curious a mixture of worthy sayings and unworthy trimmings, so suspiciously like editorial patchwork in its chief statement, so bespattered with appeals to a popular audience, that its legitimate presence in the Canonical text as containing any *ipse dixit* of the Founders, seems to be on a shaky basis. It reminds us of the odd intrusion of the ribald Kevaddha Suttanta in the dignified Khandha-section of the Dīgha-Nikāya. I am inclined to see, in the "trimmings" of popular appeal, matter that has got, either by mistake, or by a very slender majority of votes, into the Sutta from the Commentary's chat.

We have after all a somewhat similar occurrence as patent in the Cūḷa¹-Kamma-vibhanga-Sutta of this Majjhima. In the Sanskrit recension from Nepal, edited by the late Sylvain Lévi, we find an episode—of a foolish popular kind—put into the text which, in the Pāli Canon, is *only in the Commentary*. I referred to this in my review of the work two years ago.² Indeed, this feature of a Lesser and a Greater paired Sutta deserves further inquiry. Why should any two be so named? It is not the relative length for, of the thirteen pairs, several Lessers are longer than the Greaters. Nor the relatively serious treatment; the Pāli Cūḷakammavibhanga is a simple, sober and dignified reply to an inquiry about a man's responsibility hereafter for deeds done here. The Greater is much more wordy and discursive, the laboured enumerations of a pedant, rather than of a great sage.

But let us consider in a résumé the Lesser Saccaka.

The Jain Saccaka "swanks" about his dialectical

¹ Pron. Chula.

² *JRAS.* 1935, p. 358.

powers; he meets Assaji, one of the first five to join Gotama; asks what is Gotama's teaching about? Assaji answers, and Gotama endorses later, that "the five khandhas are transient and not the self." Saccaka, confident in his skill and his Vesāli backers, seeks a debate to smash this view, in the Greatwood near by, where the touring Gotama is staying. His response to the view just stated is, that the essence or substance of each khandha (*rūpatta*, *vedanatta*, etc.¹) is the basis (*patitṭhā*) whereby a man works merit or demerit, even as the earth is the basis of all growth, all activity. Gotama: "See here, are you herewith contending, that 'I' am body, 'I' am feeling, perception, and all mind?" Saccaka: "Yes, I am." Gotama: "Well then, do you admit that a king has judicial power over any subject deserving punishment?" Saccaka: "Yes, and republics too. They have both the power and the right." (Then comes a leap over the point in the argument. Gotama goes on past it to say:) "You say, you are your body, your mind. Now have you, as body, as mind, the power to make either do what you will?" Saccaka is silenced. (The king has admitted he is *merely a subject*.) Thrice is the question put, and is unanswered. (Then comes a gallery-appeal.) "Answer me, or your head will be split into seven." Over Saccaka appears a Yakkha, thunderbolt in hand. Saccaka trembles and recants: "No, sir, when I say, I and body, I and mind, are one and the same, I as

¹ The Comm. reads *rūp'attā*, bodily self, etc., and so on. This curious compound is, I believe, unknown, while *rūpatta* . . . *vedānatta* occur in the Khandha discussion, "Sīha," *Samyutta*, III, 86 f. Lord Chalmers follows the Comm.; I confess I cannot make sense of this reading.

² We do not find in Pali literature any judge except the king, nor, I believe, any word for one.

such have no power over them." (Abruptly a stock formula is brought in. Then:) "If both be liable to ill, can either be called self? If both be ill and you be both, can you judge of and dispose of ill? Why, you are seeking timber in banana-pith!" The crushed Saccaka is rallied by Licchavi jeering. "O come, come" he protests, "I'm not talking with you." Humbly he asks for guidance. He is taught about each khandha, in terms *which besit only the first, the body*. This subject being abruptly left, the Sutta ends majestically on a note of release, enlightenment and nirvana. Abjectly he takes leave, to prepare for hospitality to the Order on the morrow.

Compared with many Majjhima Suttas, this one is unquestionably made picturesque, dramatic, attractive. But it is at the cost of being, as to teaching, no more than a thing of scraps, with a solitary gem in the midst. Saccaka's metaphysical feeler is (rightly) ignored. But the incisive simile of the royal judge is *left unapplied* with the clearness that was needed—an application that, we may feel sure, was originally given, in so far as we have just here—which I don't doubt—a true memory. The talk is instead swung over to the question of the self as being divine. And the striking saying, that what is ill cannot judge of, or get rid of itself is drowned in a damning simile and jeers.

Doctrinally, a good deal too much has been attempted in little, with the result, that the hearers, while doubtless entertained, have lost the point in the teaching, and the editors have gone far to slur it over. If only the simile had been used (and clearly applied) in the Second "sermon"—as perhaps it really was—what a history of error might have been averted!

Let me try to give the simile more clearly put and applied.

"You admit, that the head of a State, being *ex officio* judge, and as such superior to his subjects, has power to dispose of their persons. But if the head were to become merely a subject, he would no longer have this power. Even so, if you, the self, say, I am just body, just mind, that is, a tool, a subject of the self, you have therein and thereby no longer any of that power over your body and mind, which in life (to a limited degree) you know you have. *Ergo*, you are either claiming what you have not, or you are in a way, not just body and mind, but *more than these*. (You are not therefore non-existent, but you are taking a wrong view of yourself.)"

But instead of this direct application, we get first a "church"-formula and then the king-argument applied to the subject of "ill," wherewith Buddhism became so hag-ridden, so monk-ridden. Thus: "Body and mind are, you admit, ill (that is, one in nature with ill, pain, misery). If then you are body and mind, and not other, not more than they, can you who have thus gone wholly over to ill either understand it or get rid of it?"

This way of applying the analogy is indirect and hence is possibly wrongly chronicled. Yet it is also one that Buddhists and 'verts, who see in Gotama's teaching what I have called a mere doctor-gospel, should ponder over, when they come more thoroughly to study their scriptures. The founder of a world-religion, an historical religion, will not have been one who was out to tell man how to avoid his earthly birthright of old age, illness and dying. As a disciple said of him: "he taught me more than that."

The application rightly is, that, as spirit (*attā*), man is more than his instruments. User is he of them, valuer by them, experiencer through them. The Western idioms, Greek, Latin, and Teutonic, with their possessive pronouns "my," "your," have lamentably helped us, in Scripture and elsewhere, to appropriate as "mine" that who is "I," and make soul, self, spirit a mere appanage, as were It body or mind-ways. Perhaps there is no greater lesson India has to teach us than this discarding of a possessive term in the case of not the possessed, but the possessor. In the frequent phrase: *na me attā*, it is just as accurate to render *me* by " (It is) not *for me* the self," as to make the pronoun *me* mean "my." Anyway this is how a few of us Pāli translators have recently rendered it.

And surely it is with a different outlook that we regard soul, spirit, self, "I," the moment we cease to speak of *having a soul*. Buddhism has ruined itself as religion by *denying that the man is soul or spirit*, as a more than body or mind. How much may we not have hurt our own religious traditions by *affirming that he has one*, instead of rightly maintaining that he is one?

We are each of us in religion seekers after a More, a Better, a Higher, these implying an ultimate Most, Best, Highest. Is it not of the first importance that we get it clear and clearly expressed what of us is here and now the More who seeks, who seeks as having instruments—body, mind, character—"character" is but the impress we leave on what we do) but who is More than any of these?

AN OVERLOOKED PĀLI SUTTA¹

It will one day be considered curious—the prejudiced and partial way in which the Pāli Suttas, up to the present time, have been exploited. Buddhists, for instance, both Hīnayānists in their way and Mahāyānists in their way, had let it be known, that for them both the reality of the "man," as an entity over and above body and mind, was illusory. He was but a name for a complex of fleeting *dhammā*. European writers on Buddhism, taking this assertion at its face-value, and not at its historical value, selected passages from the Suttas endorsing it. They made no search for passages which seemed to throw doubt, at least at some period, on the dogma. These passages remained overlooked by adherents and by external commentators alike. When are we going to develop a better historic *fleur*?

For there certainly are passages of the latter kind. I call them "left-ins." They could never have been suffered to come in later. Consider, for instance, the parable thrice ascribed to Sāriputta: that of the kumāra taking from his wardrobe a suit appropriate for morning, midday, or evening wear, to illustrate the procedure of a man who had "his" thoughts, "his" mind-ways at "his" disposal, but was not under the control of those mind-ways: how does not

¹ Published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1933.

this utterance cut like a knife through that *an-attā* doctrine, which a Buddhist will say runs like a red thread through his religion! According to that doctrine, there is no wearer of the suits; the suits are the man. In the simile we find ourselves in the India of the Upanishads and the Gītā:

As a man having put off worn garments takes other, new
ones,
So having put off the worn bodies goes he to other, to new
ones.

In the simile we have receded from the *later India* of Buddhist influence, from Ceylon, from Burma.

In that earlier India, too, are we in the overlooked Sutta of the Anguttara "Threes" (No. 40) known as "Adhipateyyāni," or Mandates, or What belongs to the Mandater (*adhipati*), or Master. A later compilation than this would have called the three: "Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha," or *Sabbam aniccaṃ, dukkhaṃ, anattā*, or *suññaṃ, appanihitaṃ, animittaṃ*. This Sutta calls them the self (*attā*), the worlds and *dhamma*.

Under the first head, the speaker (of course he has to be the inevitable monk), contending that he had taken up the religious life from no worldly or material motives, confesses he as yet scarce sees his way to spiritual health. Worse would now be his plight were he to seek again the lower things he had forsworn. "And he ponders thus: 'Stirred up for me shall unsluggish effort become; called up unmuddled mindfulness; serene shall body be and one-pointed the mind.' He having made just the self his mandate puts off the bad, makes the good become, puts off the blameworthy, makes become the blameless; and cherishes the pure self. This is called the mandate of the self."

Under the second head, after the same anxious heart-

searchings over want of progress, and fearing he may fall a prey to sensuous, malicious, and malign (*vihimsa*-) thoughts, he considers: "Great is this concourse of worlds. Therein live recluses and brahmans who can with deva-sight see me and read my thoughts, though they be far from me, though if near they be unseen. And they would thus know me: Look at this clansman, who left the world out of faith, mixed up with bad and evil things! Devas, too, there are of like powers, who would say no less of me." And he proceeds to ponder as before, having thus made the worlds his mandaters.

Here, parenthetically, are two points of interest.

The compound *loka-sannivāso*: "together-dwelling-place of the world," is, I think, a way of using "world" as many. The plural (*lokā*) we hardly ever find in the Piṭakas. As yet (we have, alas! no Concordance) I have only found the plural in the Mahā-Gosīṅga-Sutta (M.I., p. 213): *sahassam lokānam*. The more usual equivalent is *sahassadhā loko*, or *lokadhātu*. And we know how we meet with "world cum denizens," described with the prefix *sa-*: *sadevako*, etc. How again we find the memory of former worlds or lives ("life" was equally confined to the singular) called *pubbe-nivās'-ānussati*. As I have said elsewhere, one result of this curious limitation was the use of *bhava* to mean, not only *bhavya*, becoming, but the many opportunities of becoming: "worlds" and "lives," with that merging of the great guarantee of salvation into its opportunities (*bhavya* into *bhavā*), which, alas! monastic pessimism held up as so evil. In this old Sutta we have nothing of that; we have the truly ancient Sakyan awareness of the man of earth as watched in his career by an unseen concourse, an

awareness that finds so striking an echo in the epistle to the Hebrews: "Wherefore seeing we are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight and the sin that doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us"—the race in the Way of the worlds.

In the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka we find these two mandaters: the self, the worlds, recast as the term *hiri-ottappam*: "shame" and "to feel hot" (with guilt). The Commentary hereon, given in *Bud. Psych. Ethics*, p. 18, n., shows Buddhaghosa as trying his best. But in the text (*Dhammasaṅgaṇi*), the depersonalising of the mandaters into two states of consciousness is characteristic of the fading out of the "man" into mind.

Under the last head, the speaker, again anxious over his backwardness, reflects thus: "Well proclaimed by the Bhagavan is *dhamma*, (as of) present interest, yet not to be reckoned in earth-time only,¹ inviting, leading towards, to be known by the wise in the very soul (*pratyātma: paccattam*). Now there are for me fellow-religious-students: he who knows, he who sees, living (with me). If I who have left the world for a *dhamma*-rule so well proclaimed should live in sloth and carelessness, this would not be suitable for me." And the will to effort follows as before; the will surely, though he had no word for it. He falls back on "stirred-up effort"; better truly than nothing, but the will is *the stirring up*.

The man's argument here is curious, and for me suggests a much later editorial hand interfering. *Santi me sabrahmacārī jānaṃ passaṃ viharanti*: why are the participles in the singular with subject in singular (or plural) and predicate in the plural?

¹ *Akālīko*, not in *kāla* but ? in *kālas*.

Let us first forget the change in meaning that *dharma* underwent, in time, in Buddhism. We see the Founder at the start practically substituting *dharma* for *ātman* as the aspect under which he rendered homage to the Highest. We know that this is said to have been his gesture immediately before he had uttered a word as a teacher. *Dhamma* was for him no externalised doctrine; it was That-according-to-Whom man should walk. It was the Inner Monitor, the *Antaryāmi* of the brahman teaching; the sense of duty; conscience—"ay, that Deity within my bosom." Have we not here the Divine Fellow-student knowing, seeing, the Witness of whom the verses, combining *attā* and *dhamma*, go on to speak? Here are we truly in India, where *Sādhana* sees Deity under many aspects: not only as Santo but also as Sakhya, the Friend, from whom the believer "shrinks no more" (*Bṛhad. U.*, 4. 4. 15). *Sabrahmacāri* is not only a plural form; as singular, it fits the *jānam paśaṃ*. We have but to replace *santi* by *atthi*, and add the singular predicate. If editing there has been here, methinks this is better editing.

And there is certainly nothing of monastic Buddhism in the verses till we come to the last two:

Nought in the world is secret for doer of evil deed.
The self, O man, knows what of thee is true or false.
Ah sir, the lovely self, the witness, you despise,
Who hide in self the self that's being evil.

Devas and wayfarers see the fool unevenly walking in the world,
Hence let him mindful walk, having the self as master.
Delicately let him walk, a muser, having the worlds as master.
According to dharma let him walk, having dharma as master.
The man of worth ne'er falters advancing in the true.

¹ Shakespeare, *The Tempest*.

Then a verse of monk-values:

Māra routed, the Ender overcome, he the striver has touched
the waning out of birth.
Lo! such an one is he, worldwise, sagacious, a man of worth
who grasps at naught.

It is not uncommon to find appended to verse or prose this later outlook.

But in the rest of the Sutta, albeit the man of will is made, not Everyman, but a monk among monks, we have a worthy picture of what the early teaching will have been: man the wayfarer as the very real, very present, mandated by the ideal self in himself, the immanent Deity of the time and place; man as mandated by the worthy of all the worlds, his witnesses; man as mandated by the inner controller, whose monitions are as God not leaving Himself without a witness. So for me will the first men of the Sakyans have taught.

I cannot find it possible to place in the same decade, the same generation, nay, the same century, (a) the utterer of this Sutta and the utterers of the view (Majjhima, No. 22), that the self as eternally real (the passage is obviously corrupt) is entirely an opinion of fools, or of the flagrantly unfitting Samyutta analogy of the chariot. Or (b) the utterer of this Sutta with the later meaning of "the world" as having not "mondial," but only "worldly" qualities, or as "impermanent, ill, not-self." Or (c) the utterer of this Sutta with the later meaning of Dhamma as a fixed corpus of teaching "to be learnt by heart," to be remembered, to be known "in the meaning and in the letter," in a "beginning, middle, and end." Such utterances are quoted to support the views still held by and about Buddhism. This Sutta is overlooked.

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VI

"EXCEPT THE MAN HIMSELF"

WE have been lately recalling that the father of English psychology, the founder of Experientialism, John Locke, was born just 300 years ago: "that modest man," as Voltaire wrote, "who never pretends to know what he does not know." And we have perhaps been reminded how, to the Experientialist dictum: Nothing is in mind (*intellectu*) which will not first have been in sense, Leibniz rejoined with *Nisi ipse intellectus*: except the mind itself. It is as if he said: You may pitchfork out of you your real "nature," but it will turn up again within you: *tamen usque recurret*. (Horace's *naturam*, in his adaptation of the pitchfork proverb, was not "your real nature," but we can in turn adapt it.)

Now it is for me not without significance, that among all the many eighteenth-century critics of the new Experientialism, or Sensationalism, of whom my Englished Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy* gives a précis, I do not find one who improves on Leibniz's rejoinder in the terms of *nisi ipse homo*. So strongly does the vigorous hantling of British psychology, aided by the myopic scepticism of Hume, appear to have

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led aside the thought of our land, from Locke's age till the present day. So far as I know, there has been from then till now but one voice crying to us in the wilderness of our sensationalistic psychology—that of James Weyd in 1885—that we were as ostriches hiding our head in the sand (or is it a bush ?), in our blindness to the fact, that unless *ipse homo*, the Self, be on the stage, our mind-analysis is meaningless.

Experientialists have rallied to Locke's defence, and have shown that in effect there is plenty of the congeries called "intellect" in his sensationalism. But they have not equally contended, that Leibniz's rejoinder has no real force. There is nothing given by intellect that can truly be called those "necessary truths," which sense could not give, namely, that whereas in sense we have the proposition "S is P," in these we have "S must be P."¹ For intellect is unable to fill the place of that unique factor in experience: the experiencer, the valuer. It is but a name for a number of mind-ways, or mind-ings, by which man, neurally wielding his body, reacts to the impressions which he, as being alive and intelligent, is "willing" to receive. He alone is the inexpugnable "I" who experiences. And if you get lost in your "stumbling" upon this and that "perception," and doubt whether he actually is, it must be you, the inexpugnable you, who are the doubter.

It does not matter as to the word wherewithal we clothe this indisputable, this "necessary" factor. We may use the representative "we" for the "I"; we may use the royal "we" for the "I." Ultimately it is I-who-experience,-who-value,-who-judge. We may

¹ G. Croom Robertson, *Elements of General Philosophy* (edited by the writer), 1896.

eliminate the pronoun: an apparently easy matter in some languages (I say, apparently, for the pronoun has a way of peeping out in the inflection), but we cannot pitchfork that which is behind the word. A queen may say, in a now classic flout: "We are not amused." But she meant, that "I, the appraiser of your anecdote, as reported to my senses, as tried by my taste, my *savoir faire*—these being the instruments, the 'mindings,' by which I judge—I decide that you do not amuse me."

If she had said, "There is the opinion that no amusement has arisen," we should no longer have had something fundamental and unique: the expression of the "nature" of this particular woman, given in a personal opinion, not shared with anyone else. We should be left with the very *homo* who shot the dart ejected, and only the mind-way of impression and reaction left to replace her or him.

Now this was what Buddhism gradually came to do, as it drew, in time and in place, in its point of view, ever further from its original inspiration. I have described this tragedy, briefly or at some length, in book and article for more than seven years. I was under no illusion that, in presenting an historic picture of the matter to readers who had till then been shown the usual unhistorical picture, I should "draw all men after me." It is true that I have since found myself in good company: e.g., in that of Edmond Holmes, who, though a reader of translations only, refused to see aught but a libel on the Founder of Buddhism in the dogma, that the very man—the soul or spirit—is not real; and in that of James B. Pratt, who, similarly limited in reading, had come to the same conclusion. But I have yet to find that I have converted readers

anywhere, especially writers on Buddhism. These, with those two exceptions, have already committed themselves to the unhistoric view that " primitive Buddhism " was upheld by certain formulas, on which adherents base their belief.

There is something to be said for an older man's unwillingness to own he has something to learn. But he must first find out he has something to learn. To find out, he must read, or he must hear what his critics are saying. Nor even then will he be disposed to concede, that to accuse Buddhism of " starting with the negation of the soul or ego " is to deny at once the possibility of its having ever become, with such a mandate, a world-religion. Especially in India ! But this is what writers, especially mature writers, persist in saying. So I—" Lo ! we turn to the Gentiles." It is to the younger men and women that I turn, and in my hope in them, " fed up," as they may be, with this irrationally nihilistic repetition, I once more, in different setting, say what hereon I have said already. It is worth repeating. It will one day be the way in which we shall value the old Indian gospel now called Buddhism.

The very man (soul, ego) was " expelled with a fork " : that I grant, yea, grant it more fully than they who seek some less irrational compromise are willing to admit. I grant it fully because I happen to have a little knowledge of what Hinayāna writers of the fifth century A.D. said. And albeit these works are now accessible as never before, very few inquire into them. Thus Buddhists will tell you: " But we do not deny the self is real. We only deny the self is persisting and impermanent." But Hinayāna exegesis is by no means content to allow such a qualified acceptance. Let them

but read their Visuddhi-magga, a work ranking as does the work of Aquinas in the Catholic Church. Notably the concluding ten chapters. For example: "in the ultimate sense there is no such thing as a being or person; it is a misconception that makes one say 'I am' or 'I'; in the ultimate sense there is just name and shape." "Way there is but no waygoer." And so on, over and over again.

But the expulsion took a long time. We must get well away from "primitive Buddhism" if we would place the descent in true perspective. There was even in early days a slipping here and a slipping there, but there was for perhaps nearly two centuries no *dégringolade*, no subsidence by a general worsening. And it was probably only in the exotic daughters of the Sakyan gospel, in S. Asian lands, that the fall reached its nadir. The *Milinda Questions* show, however, even discounting much Ceylon editing, that already in India there had been pitchforking of more than the Divine Soul as within man. Man (or soul) somehow there was, but, as in the Kathāvatthu,¹ he could only "be got at" in mind.

But to-day I dwell not on the pitchfork, but on the *tamen usque recurret*. How did man come right back again? Or more truly, how did he never really get pitchforked, save only in formula?

Buddhism could cast him out in formula, in creed, in theory, but she could not cast him out in language, and therewith in all that language implies. Very plastic is the "word," in its changes, its fissions, its permutations, its blending of roots. But there are limits to its plasticity. Man cannot wholly expel himself from

¹ Translated as *Points of Controversy*. Pāli Text Society, 1915.

his speech—or at least he never does. He may hide himself in some languages more than in others. We of Europe have to learn that in some, to say " *I* do " is to be very emphatic in " my " having done anything. We learn this of course in our classics, but we forget it when we translate Indian tongues. I have already called to notice the surviving traditional ascription to the Founder of Buddhism of the frequent use of this emphatic "*aham* "; "*I*," as if he had a premonition of the way in which his followers would make him deny that which, as supreme mandate, was so present with him.

What do I mean by supreme mandate ?

In a portion of the Canon which we may fairly value as early is a Sutta completely overlooked by books on Buddhism. It is called the Three Mandates (*ādhīpateyyāni*; what belongs to the *pati*, or master). In it the man has begun " in faith " to take his conduct seriously, but is troubled over his want of progress. He takes to heart one of three mandates, or two, or all of them. These are (1) *the Self*:—the ideal self within, Witness of all he does or does not do; (2) *the Worthy* in this and other worlds who may be watching him and wondering he is no better; and (3) *Dharma*, that monitor of the Ought, that " conscience, ay, that Deity within my bosom,"¹ here presented (in true Indian fashion) as his mate in the holy life admonishing him. Here are India's supreme mandates. And here truly for me is " primitive Buddhism." But how we are to reconcile it, given the Indian teaching of 600-500 B.C., with " negation of the ego " I am at a loss to conceive.

Even without the *aham*, the " *I* " peeps out in verb-inflections—e.g., *karo-mi*, *el-mi*, *nion-co*, etc. Every-

¹ Shakespeare's *Tempest*.

where in self-expression has the man, the agent, the experiencer, the valuer, left his traces. And the only way to oust him in theory is to make out, as does the Buddhist philosophic teacher, that man doesn't really mean what he says. That when he says "I," he would have us take the word only true as "conventionally true"¹—not the thing behind the word. That to become really wise, you must at the threshold strip off from the word the entire history of man's efforts to express himself in words, and see, in these, mere labels of something that isn't just "man."

But there was another way, beside that of the pronoun, as distinct from, or merged in the verb, by which the expelled man came back—and still comes back. Very gradually Buddhism came to resolve the "man" into what we now call a complex. This was at one stage (and it lasted long) of five factors, bodily and mental, known as *skandha*'s. Then it became enlarged into fifty to sixty *dhamma*'s, the word "things" here taking on a psychological meaning of "things-as-known," our "states of consciousness." And the permutations of these *dhamma*'s amounted, of course, to any number of shifting complexes in the fleeting mental continuum into which the "man" had faded. But look! man's inexpugnable intuition of himself "saw," in this conscious series, some relatively persisting *dhamma* in which, or for which other *dhamma*'s happened in groups. Such a *dhamma* would be called usually *chitta*, or *mano* or *viññāṇa*—i.e., mind. And one or other of these three we often find posturing as the "man" or ego—e.g., mind as reacting to sensations, or receiving and valuing an incoming complex of impressions.

¹ The late Buddhist technical term.

So the text. But the commentary, that is, the expounding teacher, will illustrate by making the man " come back." Thus, the mind is like a *king* to whom villages pay revenue; the mind is like a prodigal *prince* receiving envoys from his father. Nay, not the Commentary only. The rebellious sensuous mind or " heart " (*chitta*) likened to a " jiggling ape " is only the " man " seeking the Less disguised in his instrument:

Within the little five-doored hut an ape
Doth prow], and round and round from door to door
He hies, rattling with blows again, again.
Halt, ape! run thou not forth! for thee
'Tis not herein as it was wont to be.
Reason doth hold thee captive. Never more
Shalt roam far hence [in freedom as of yore].¹

And not the mind as a whole only. To this and that constituent complex of mind will be allotted desires and activities, fit only when applied to the central " subject " or man. Faith, we read, arrests hindrances, effort supports other *dharmas*, wisdom cuts off, splits. . . . It may be said: But such play with words, such anthropomorphic diction is surely a frequent feature in literature and deceives no one. Do we not find it, for instance, in the Upanishads? For instance, in Chândogya VII: " Earth . . . space . . . mountain are musing. . . . "

This is true; but note how relatively restrained is such diction as we there meet with. And why? The man is ever coming up to take over the agency, the human self, the divine self. " Earth, as it were, muses (*dhyāyati*) . . . atmosphere, sky, water, mountains muse as it were . . . he who reverences musing

¹ *Psalm of the Brethren, Valliya.*

as Brahman, he becomes boundlessly free." And so on.

In the Buddhist texts we do not in this way walk beside the man. We only see him in his dummies. Once we surrender ourselves to "ideas about" things it is easy to speak of "mind," or wisdom (*paññā*), or attention (*sati*) performing this or that, as if it were the man, the "I." And this is what we find in the Buddhist classics; less in the more archaic Sutta form of the Dīgha and other older portions, more in the more sophisticated Majjhima and Abhidhamma and more, much more in the Milinda Questions and the Commentaries.

What, for instance, could not the Sutta of ancient seeming, the Mahāvedalla (Majjhima) tell, could it speak now, of an editing, changing the statement, the natural human statement, that it is the "man" who enjoys what the five senses bring, not *mano*, the mind? Tolerable in analytical works of Abhidhamma, it is out of place here, in teaching intended to help Everyman. It is to bring the class-room into the church. The man is withheld, the man who alone is counted as the object and end of the teaching. It is not the man, it is but an attribute, or state, or instrument of him which is said to "enjoy," and to be "the resort" of other states or instruments. The subject-attribute, whether it be the bundle-word "mind," or *dhamma's*, is invested with functions that belong alone to the worth-er or valuer, the enjoyer, the contemplator, the agent: they are personified; they are used in place of the man. And hereby it is that the man comes back: *tamen usque recurret*.

It is only in what I call the "left-ins"—a most fortunate collection of, shall I say, accidents?—that

we see the man not yet ejected dominating in the text itself the parable, the simile. The Way, the Middle Way of the first utterance was taught with the wayfarer in such scanty fragments as survive. What meaning has way if wayfarer be not there? Yet in the scholastics we repeatedly find the way said to be without wayfarer. The man has indeed been expelled when that could be written. Sariputta is repeatedly shown comparing man's worthy control of his thoughts with one who takes, on different occasions, suitable garments from his wardrobe. Here have we indeed the man, not body, not mind, still holding the stage. It was only the later values that represented the wearer as no other than the garments.

It is rather lamentable to see how, not only Buddhists but we, who have written on Buddhism, have sought passages which buttress the church-made dogmas, but have neglected these " left-in's." These, the *original* Buddhism, reveal a different, an Indian standpoint, which aimed at " supplementing, not at supplanting " the religious thought¹ of the day. How is it that this irrational expulsion of the " man " has by almost all readers been found reasonable?

Is it perhaps that we have inherited, in our own young psychology, a similar slovenly usage? Usage which we may tolerate in poetic or " elegant " literature becomes anathema where sober truth is aimed at. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was no " mental and moral science," no listing of the " psyche " under the analytic " ologies." Man's immaterial world was considered as the philosophy of literature, and discussed with the tropes and embellish-

¹ " All great teachers supplement but do not supplant." *Life of Shri Ramakrishna*, 1929 (p. 175).

ments of literary diction. So masked in these was the man, that readers did not see, nay, do not see, how scientifically nonsensical was much in the description of that inner world.

Consider this from Locke's *Human Understanding*, ch. ii: "The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns, as it were, the eye of the soul on it." The "as it were" (like the *iva* of the Upanishad above) offers a literary apology, yet even so what a topsy-turvy way to present the "man" or "soul" as the tool of the "mind"! He goes on: "though sometimes too they start up of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding." Here "ideas," like those Pāli *dhamma*'s, are presented with a "will" and with "selves." In this elegant vein Locke could have written the *Questions of King Milinda*!

I will not weight this little article with more of such slovenliness in either Locke, or in his heirs, Scottish or English. I quote so much to show how blinded we were as to a clear vision of the experiencer and the experience from the start. When psychology passed into the scientific laboratory, its diction became more austere. My own teacher Croom Robertson and his teacher Bain were fastidiously unsloven in their diction. Yet even they were so far myopic that they did not take the man, the self, as the inexpugnable *pośi sśi* and avowed limit-point, in their exposition of experience as (a) presented to him, (b) valued by him, (c) reacted upon by him. It was only James Ward who holdly got the ostrich's head out of the sand as to (a). And he failed to convince, perhaps because he was not bold enough about (b) and (c).

But he did fail, being held to have imported meta-

physic into science. Else is it hardly credible that psychological manuals of our own day, bearing among them such a proud title as *The New Psychology*, should revive the old foolish methods permissible to the seventeenth century. Look at this sample: "The rational faculty prompts the mind to refuse implicit obedience. . . ." (But the mind, like Queen Victoria, is "not amused" and hits back.) "The complex responsible for the act . . . is not recognised by the mind . . . most minds simply cannot tolerate . . . a recognition; . . . they expend untiring ingenuity in inventing some more respectable reason . . ." (viz. more respectable mannikin). There is plenty more of this sort. The writer may have meant us to take it all as humorously as we do the queen's biting jest. But he does not seem here to have lapsed from scientific seriousness, nor does he send over to us any *caveat* about mannikins of mental states posturing as the man.

Not for a moment would I hold up to ridicule the work and importance of psychology. More power to her elbow! Her object is the discovery and clear sober presentation of what is true within a certain range. But her power is likely in that object to be more effective if she will but take up a sound attitude from the first, and not one which has led her to start, and here and there to maintain, a way of slovenliness in verbal subterfuge, which is so similar to that on which Buddhists of old fell back, on which they yet fall back to-day.

Were I young, I half think I might come back to *mes premiers amours*, and write, not a New, but a very Old Psychology. I should like to see the self, the man-in-man, in it given, under my (a), (b), (c) a fair chance.

I want to see him *lamen usque recurrens*. Psychology has followed physiology with too little vision. She has not sufficiently seen that she is not a wholly parallel study. She is not just the study of mind-ways or mindings; but is the study of "man as being impressed," "man as fitted to receive impressions," "man as reacting, valuing impressions." She is a middle term. Not to see this is "to expel nature." In the mind as dummy man, in the personified ideas, etc., the man does come back. But it is in his servant's guise; it is masking as his clothes. Expelled as a More than his mind, he is taken back as a Less than he truly is, in what is a Less than he.

It is in this getting the worse in the exchange that I would, here again, emphasise what I judge to be the harm Buddhism has suffered, is suffering, through this expulsion of the true manhood, this setting up of a makeshift manhood. I now once more stress this aspect of the expulsion, that, whereas in a great world-religion, its first messenger sets before the man a More in his nature, his life, his destiny, not so well seen before, any succeeding dogma, which ejects the man himself, and replaces the void so left by his instruments, is a telling him that he is, and has, in and before him, a Less.

My friend James B. Pratt has lately said, in the periodical *Visvabharati* that, of two very noble religions asking admission or readmission at India's door, the *An-attā* doctrine in the one is neither of its best nor is it fundamental. I agree, but I go further. I look on it, in its full evolved sense as recorded, as a terrible libel on that Gotama whom his church came to call Buddha. Pratt does not think it likely that such a dogma will make appeal to the deeply spiritual people whose

greatest books have been and still remain the Upanishads and the *Bhagavadgītā*. To this I could better agree had I first-hand knowledge, as has he, of India. But I would add, that I see here for young India a twofold danger. Because of the modern evasions and compromises as to the true historical meaning of *an-attā*, students may fail to see it for what it truly is. Because of the makeshift dummies posing as the man their vision may be confused. Secondly, they may, in acquiring Western culture, get infected by the equally self-cheating methods in our own psychology.

The true, the original message of Buddhism, when shorn of its monkish superstructures, is both an Indian gospel and a world-gospel, as true now at its centre as it has ever been. India in the Few had been feeling after it; Gotama brought it out to the Many. But it was something a long sight better than *an-attā*—or than *aniccha* or *dukkha* either. It was something different. These belong to man-in-the-Less. That was of a More in and for man. And for it the Man, first and last, was the most real thing about it. However much the pitchfork got to work, the "left-in's" survive to show us that.

VII

YOU AND YOUR MIND¹

It is recorded in the Pāli scriptures at least three times, that the chief comrade of Gotama Buddha, Sāriputta, used to speak of "you and your mind" in a parable. He would say, it is recorded, you should have mind, or thoughts (*chitta*) under your control; you should not be under the control of the mind or thoughts. Just as a gentleman, with many suits in his wardrobe, would pick out one he wanted for morning wear, another for midday wear, another for evening wear, putting on a suitable suit (the pun is mine), the suit having nothing to say in the matter. (You will find these passages in Majjhima-Nikāya, Sutta 32, Samyutta-Nikāya, Mahāvagga on Bojjhangas, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Bojjhanga-kathā.)

Here is a very clear distinction made between the man and his "kit," his equipment, tools or instruments. The latter are to be kept in their place. You see the distinction made again in another parable, this time told of the Master: Men are in the Jeta Wood about the *vihāra* (where he spent his last years) collecting faggots. And he: "you would not call those faggots the Wood? So look on the body and mind as not of 'you,' not the very 'you.'" The faggots are carried away for burning; the wood stands and blossoms again.

Once more, in the two first verses of the Twins

¹ Published in *Navayāna*, Honolulu, 1933.

(Yamaka) chapter of the Dhammapada you read: "If with corrupted mind he speaks or acts, ill follows him as wheel the foot of drawing beast; if with mind serene he speak or act, bliss follows him as shadow goes not from the tree." Here again, mind is the instrument "with" which the man acts (not *mano*, but *manasā*).

But in time a change came over the teaching. Master and comrade had passed away; other teachers arose who were, as was all Indian teaching, greatly influenced by the new mind-study that had been gaining ground, and which came to be known as Sāṅkhya (Pāli: *sankhā*, *sankhāna*). Man's mind was in it being analysed, as if it were an unseen body, or group of processes of an orderly kind like those of the body. It was a beginning of what we in our day have come to do also and to call psychology. And gradually it affected the Buddhist Sasāna much as it has affected our own teaching: the "man" came to be resolved into his thoughts or mind. Just as in a modern book I read the words "the self or mind," so did Buddhist teachers come to use the mind or thought for the self or man. Thus we read in a Sutta (M.N. 43): that it is the mind (*mano*) who enjoys collectively all the sense-impressions, not "you," not the "man," not the "self," as the earlier teaching would have said. Only the Commentary retains the older way: "as a raja owning five villages would enjoy the revenue they paid."

Turn again to your Dhammapada: in those two "twin verses," each of a couplet like the rest of the "Twins," there has been added, or rather prefaced a line in each, to show the new importance assigned to the mind: "Things are forerun by mind, have mind

as best, are compounds of the mind." You can see, that if you take away this line, the meaning of the couplets is just as good, and the symmetry of the "twins" is better.

For in them it is clear that it is not "mind" which is the speaker or doer; in them the clothes are not made the man, nor the faggots the wood. But in the interpolated line it is just this that has happened. This seems a long way from the Founder's first advice to laymen: to "seek the self, the man." But we are all of us just now, in East and West, in bondage to this thrusting of man's ways or mindings into the place of the man who "minds." I see it constantly in European writing and speaking; I see it in Buddhist writings. So much so, that the Master's central figure of the Way is spoken of as if there were no Wayfarer, but only ideas about his faring. Truly is the mediæval monks' teaching carried out, that "a Way is there, but no wayfarer!"¹ Yet what meaning has a way without the wayfarer? Is he only there for the sake of the Way, or is the Way there for his sake? A road made for nobody to travel on is futile.

Let us get back to the better teaching of the wardrobe and the wood. Let us be the master of the suits; let us dispose of our faggots. Then shall we, as the wood in springtime, break out into new and finer blossom, in that we have not wronged the great New Word taught by Sāriputta and his beloved Friend.

¹ *Visuddhi-magga*.

VIII

CLOTHES AND THE MAN¹

THAT the body of man's encasement is to the man himself as now the worn garments he puts off, now the new garments he resorts to, is no unfamiliar figure to India. The lines in the Gītā:

E'en as a man doffing worn gear takes new and other,
So bearer doffing worn body fits on new and other. (II, 22.)

are perhaps as familiar to the cultured son of India as are many verses of the Gospels to Christians. Not so familiar to the former, let alone the latter, is a figure repeatedly ascribed to a very worthy son of India, the Bauddha or Śākya Sāriputra, a figure which is a fit and a needed complement to the former simile.

"As a Raja or Raja's minister takes from his full wardrobe one suit to wear of a morning, another at noon, another of an evening, even so does the man of worth dispose of the mind, and is not at the disposal of the mind." (Majjhima-Nikāya, Sutt. 32.)

The two sayings are complementary in this way: the man in both cases is shown as being more than his body or bodies, as being more than his mind, that is, his "mindings."

In the former figure, we see the soldier, stricken with horror at the coming carnage, reminded by the Deva that there is in death but a rejection of bodily vestments; in the latter figure we see the *mind-ways* as

¹ Published in *Vedanta Kesari*, Madras, May, 1933.

so many vestments. The warrior is more than his armour; the man who sees the more of beauty lent to the Sāl-grove by the moonlight, sees also the more of spiritual beauty there is in the man who has his "instruments of contact," his *mātrasparśas*, as servants, not as masters.

We feel no jolt in reading the former citation. It is in keeping with the prevailing Indian attitude, old and new. In this we have the man—"he-who-has-the-congeries, the *dehī*"—always to the front, first and last. Invisible, immaterial being, he is yet in a way present. In what way, not one of us knows, at least as yet. We may speak of the man as *ātmabhāvastho*: "standing-in-(or-on)-individuality," yet is a "standing in, or on" an inadequate makeshift. For all our speech is ultimately in terms of matter, of a being in space. It is only when we speak of the man as "I" that we have in any degree got to a centre, where space, where matter is transcended.

But when we read the latter citation, we, if we be readers of the older Buddhist Suttas, do feel a jar. Or if we do not, we ought to. For it is from a literature where, save at moments, the man is much less to the front, he is more often pushed into the background. In that literature we see the mind made leader and arbiter, both of sense-impressions and of actions. The man is gradually becoming one who has no more pertinent reality than is the bowl containing nourishing food a real part of that food. To return to our figures, it is the suits of raiment that have become the man. As the wearer of them he is fading out of the picture.

The simile in the Sutta seems to me to be a precious survival. There was no question, in the day when Sāriputra and his Leader were teaching, of any dis-

tion between a popular and a "philosophic" way of teaching. That belongs to a time centuries later. Nor, even had the distinction been drawn so early, would there have been here any need for that "popular talk" (*sammuli-kathā*), judged by Buddhaghosa as having been used "by Buddhas" for beginners and the ignorant. The conversation is between half a dozen of the most noted first disciples. The implication in Sāriputra's parable (and its application) is for me very clear, as clear as it is in the parallel about the body in the Bhagavadgītā. But the Commentary evades it, even while it speaks of the controlling subject as "the wise man." Buddhists overlook it. Writers on Buddhism overlook it—overlook the fact that in Sāriputra's words we have a view opposed to the monastic *anattā* doctrine of a later day, but agreeing with the Indian teaching of the day of himself and his Leader.

When, with the growth of Sāṅkhyan psychology and of monastic ideals, the man became merged in the mind, became a mere bundle of things-as-known (*dhammapuñjamattam*), when first Deity had been ejected from the man, and next, the remaining reality of him had been ejected, *then* India had no further use for what we now call Buddhism. Too impoverished had it become with its doctrine of Not-Man, the Man-in-the-Less, the very opposite view of those two figures.

Yet neither did India remain faithful to her own attitude. Ever, it is true, did she see the man, as entity, as one who is more than his equipment. But she failed to see that entity as even more essentially a "becoming" than a "being." She shrank from seeing in the *satta* a *bhavitā*. She saw the latter term as belonging only to material things, wherein becoming.

wherein growth is naturally followed by decay, by dying off. And there is danger, that in her man-as-static only, she too may drift with dragging anchors—drift as Buddhism has drifted in the past, drift as we of the West have been drifting.

India is much occupied with a racial, a national ideal. As to that, she is more than a nation; she is a continent. And the federation of a continent is not realisable as yet. But there is on her brow a prestige now and again accorded her: that of being the Mother of Religions. If she would continue to merit this, she must not rest on her past. She must show that she is ware of the kind of mandate given by any great religion. This is, that the message of religion is, not so much to "men," as to "the man." In every other mandate, social, ethical, political, it is well to think of "men," racially, socially, nationally, internationally. In religion the man is first and foremost; the man is the ideal. In religion, though a man give himself as a bridge for others to pass over, no oblivion, no annihilation is there for the unit, for the man. In the lowest specimen, in the most sordid, the most tragic earth-life, there is the divine potency, there is the Way of the worlds, there is eternal becoming.

Will India look to it that she mandate the man-as-real with a reality of such a kind as this? Will she take heed that, in her national ideal of "men," she must ever begin with "the man"? With the man as essentially divine, because he is in process of an essential becoming, not a becoming merely of body, of mind, but a becoming of the very man?

This is not what we now call egoism. It is not saying that, if we begin with the man in our ideals, we must stop at the individual. Man cannot become a More,

save in relation to the fellow-man. The other man is fellow-wayfarer. But each man must hold the other man in worth in virtue of That Who is in "thee" as well as in "me." This is the ideal man, *Purusha*, *Atman*, *Brahman*. Still can he say, as in the ancient Upanishad, "Dear are you to me because of that Precious Thing within you." In this way he can radiate out over any number of "you's." But let him see the ideal within himself to start with, since there alone *can he be sure*.

We in Europe and beyond have marred our advance in the ideal by letting the man fade into a holding *mind* in worth. When we struggle out of this, we hold in worth what we have come to call "character." But this word is a mask (just as the word "person" is also in origin a mask). It transfers, from the word "man," the way in which the man will act in an emergency. It is the "stamp" he will set on his self-expression. It is not "he." Why use the mask-word, and not that for what is behind the mask? The result is, that we are ever using man for "body," we are ever speaking of *this* as "he" or "she." Ministers of religion and poets are the worst offenders. How *ad nauseam* do we not hear of how "our dear brother was laid to rest," of how "our sons lie beneath Flanders' poppies"! How are we not ever brought up against the odd, the repulsive dualism of hearing about man and his soul: "I am the master of my soul."

So do we cheat ourselves! Will India help to save us from the muddle? We have been in it quite a long time. Our Bible language is often of highest beauty, yet has it in the hands of translators maintained the muddle. "As the hart panteth after the waters, so

panteth *my soul* for Thee, O God!" "*My soul* is exceeding sorrowful. . . ." And our intervening science of psychology—our Sāṅkhya—made things worse. As in Buddhist India, the "man" was put carefully on the shelf; the mind-ways became the man; one may say he became the dead wardrobe; the clothes postured as he. But if India will take to her heart her real man as man aspiring to a More than he is or has, a man in process of coming-to-be as man, and so word him to herself, we shall come to hear; we shall, it may be, through her, strip off our mask; we shall walk in the light; we shall adjust with her ideals, national and international, for our common welfare.

IX

MAN AND HIS BECOMING IN THE UPANISHADS¹

I AM here suggesting, that this is a needed study. It would surely be a good thing, if of those who are competent, some man would undertake it in some detail. Without such guidance, we others, the incompetent, walk stumblingly; first because of the language, secondly because of the translators, and the commentators, of later dates, on whom they too largely depend. There is first the Vedic double verb to express existence, past, present, future: *as* and *bhū* (*bhav-*), paralleled by the German *sein* and *werden*, but for which we English, to our much loss, have not kept alive a second verb as strong as the first. Now it needs first-hand acquaintance with texts and historic changes in their idiom to pronounce, with a flair born of long experience, whether in a given passage the word *bhū*, as *bhavati* or otherwise inflected, means a more than does *asti*, or a less, or the same or not the same.

I wrote on this matter to my friend and fellow-worker, Mr. Helmer Smith, asking too about the parallel Swedish terms, which are of much interest. In his kind, informative reply, from which I am permitted to quote, he concludes by seeing danger in German treatment of the Vedic in this connection, their

¹ Published in *Indian Linguistics*, Bulletin of the Linguistic Society, Lahore, being written for the Grierson Commemoration volume, part iv.

language being too supple, too rich, their "marvellous philosophical vocabulary being borrowed from Romanticism." And that when, e.g., the Upanishads give us the time-triad in terms of *bhū*: *yad bhūta ca bhava ca bhaviṣyac ca*,¹ or again *anyatra bhūta ca bhavya ca*,² "this *bhavat* is not necessarily *das Werdende*."

As to that I would reply: Gently, my friend, it is not a constant rendering of *bhavat* by *werden* in the German (Deussen) and German-born (Max Müller) translators' works that has led me to put forward this inquiry. It is rather their frequent evasion of *werden* or become; their recourse not only to *asti*, but to other and makeshift terms which has helped to force the inquiry from me; forced me to ask here (a) Is *bhava* sometimes either just *asti*, or one of those makeshifts? (b) Has a commentator been seducing? (c) Has there been a wish, conscious or unconscious, to belittle the significance in "*werden*," "*becoming*," either in the translator's own mind, or as not to be made much of in the utterances of the older Upanishads.

Let me first dwell on that wish as indicative of a present-day attitude. Our literature has rung with the word evolution for some time, but so much have we been concerned with its application to things material, that we have never fitly linked it up with the idea of becoming as of the nature of the very man. And by man, I do not mean mind, or a complex or product of mind and body; I mean the mind-er, he whose ways in using body are mind.³ But then we think about this as we do, as M. Bergson reminded us some years ago

¹ Brh. 3. 8. 3.

² Kath. 2. 14. So in many other passages.

³ "Not the bundle called the 'me,' but the I who inspects it." Radhakrishnan, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*.

in London¹—just because our science happened to begin with the material and not with the immaterial. We shall one day be as alive and alert about the unseen very man, the *puruṣa*, as *essentially in process of becoming*, as we are now about evolutionary processes in matter.

I say this, as in the second place true of modern treatises on the Upanishads, so far as I have had access to them. These works have rung with the phrase *Tat tvam asi* for some time, yet so much have they been concerned with identity as *being*, that the tremendous problem of identity through *becoming* has, so I have found, been relatively neglected. I have consulted several such works, also indexes and tables of contents. But either the word *Becoming* is omitted (e.g., the Index volume on S.B.E.), or it is barely mentioned (e.g., Dr. Hume's translation, on which more presently), or it is only mentioned as being "contested" (e.g., Deussen's translation,² on which more presently).

Now in that the word has been practically passed over, this can only mean one of three things: either (a) the writer, or (b) the indexer, or both were not interested in the word *becoming*, or (c) the Upanishads do not show such interest in it as to merit treatment, or index-place. As to the last instance in indexes, given above, surely, if a term be so significant, that the "contesting" (*Bekämpfung*)³ of it is sufficiently prominent in the text to call for a place in the Index, there is good reason, in a great historic succession such as the Upanishads admittedly form, to suspect, that the same term has, earlier in that succession, been championed. And I contend that we do find this

¹ Presidential Address, Soc. for Psychical Research.

² *Sechzig Upanishad*, p. 527 f.

upholding of "becoming." But Deussen happened to be not only a fervent Vedāntist, but a staunch Parmenidean—he admitted as much to me himself—for whom "what is, is," for whom becoming was "illusion." Hence, whereas he is very happy over the *Bestreitung* of *Werden* in *Īśā* and *Māṇḍūkya*, and its "glorious continuation in Gaudapāda's *Kārikā*,"¹ he tends to belittle the striking and very frequent *bhū*-references in the older Upanishads, and often uses a weak substitute for what we should expect to find rendered by *werden*.

To take but one instance out of dozens: in the well-known passage on the dissolution of the bodily and mental complex, *Bṛhad.* 3, 2, 13: *kvāyam tadā puruṣo bhavati?* "where then does the 'man' (the soul) come-to-be?" in other words, "where thereafter does the becoming (which is the very life of the soul) go on?" Deussen makes the feeble rendering "Wo bleibt dann der Mensch (remains the man)?" Does the Sanskritist rejoin: But *bhavati* here means just "is," "happens," "finds himself"? He does not convince me, but I bow and give another instance. In *Taittirīya* 1, 4, 1, *amṛtasya Deva dhāraṇi bhūyāsam*: "May I, O God, become bearer of the immortal?" Deussen gives us "möge ich . . . sein." What waste of a fine word ready to hand! Surely the act of praying is man's will reaching into the Divine Will willing to become, to *be-a-More* than he is! There is not even metrical excuse, for he has anyway, in rendering otherwise faithfully, got too much into the line to scan. Deussen then *didn't want* to find any signs of appreciated becoming; he was not a sufficiently disinterested historian to seek for such signs; he even went out of his

¹ Sechzig Upanishad, *loc. cit.*

way to avoid them. He is therefore no safe guide for those who depend on translations.

Nor for that matter are R  er and Max M  ller, or in the one, the greatest Upanishad—Bṛhad  raṇyaka-Herold.¹ Far better in this one subject do I find Dr. R. E. Hume, who renders *  kara-* by "become" far oftener than any of those four, even though he too here and there lapses. To take an instance out of many: he alone of all the five has, in the following, "become" and not "is":—in the life (in his other body) of the man in the earth-body's sleep, earthly relations become invalid; "mother becomes not mother, śramaṇa not śramaṇa, Vedas not Vedas"—how much better and fitter here is "becomes" than "is"! And yet, in the impressive teaching of the homily in the Taittiriya, taken over by the Sakyaṇs²: *matṛdevo bhava*, "pitṛdevo bhava" become he-who-has-mother-(as)-God, become he-who-has-father-(as)-God, Dr. Hume with the rest falls back on "Be one for whom," etc. Just as if the teacher were not trying to make the pupil *come-to-be-better*, more, than he has been! And further, when, in the Maitri Upanishad (6, 8), the teacher urges that the   tman be sought after under its many attributes (the list is probably later) of      na, Śambhu, Bhava—Dr. Hume has preferred here to render the last as "the Existent," and not as "the Becoming"—and leaves us wondering!

This may sound captious, but it will be, I think, conceded, that if we use a static term (and that the

¹ Messrs. Mead and Chattopadhyaya's translation—alas! unfinished, but breathing more the Indian spirit than any other—usually has "become," but there too are a few lapses and makeshift terms.

² Bṛh. 4, 3, 22.

³ *Anguttara Nik  ya*, i, 132.

strongest we have—"be") for an idea which is pretty obviously dynamic, progressive, we are *weakening the emphasis on the progress*: we are literally, if not virtually, using the drill-sergeant's command: "As you were!" We are bidding, if not like the sergeant, to revert, at best to be "marking time." Now my concern in these suggestions is with the sergeant's other order: "March!" I have after years of study been driven to hear *that* in the mandate of Śākyamuni; and in studying him and his day, I am driven to see, that it was also in the mandate of the advanced wing of that day, in teachers of the established religion.

I will try briefly to buttress this assertion. Conceding all the way to the Vedic expert, that *bhū* may not always mean as strong a "More" over *as*, as becoming is over being, I would at least remind him of this: In the Rik and Sama Vedas I find the verb *bhū-*, *bhava-*, finite tenses only, used some forty times. In the nine Upanishads, generally ranked as the oldest, I find the same finite verb used some 300 times. Bulk for bulk I believe this represents a great proportional increase, in the use of the *bhū* by the latter over the use in the former stratum of Vedic literature. The old Upanishads are mainly in prose, as the Vedas are not; but in the few metrical portions also use is made of *bhū*; it is not a word confined to prose. The *bhū* contexts in these Upanishads are as follows (approximately):

Aitareya	4	Taittirīya	10
Kaṭha	18	Bṛhadāraṇyaka	86
Kena	2	Maitri	16
Kauṣṭaki	18	Śvetāśvatara	6
Chhāndogya	60				

If to these we add the number of times the verb is used within many of the contexts, we get at least 300. It

will be said, that from these we must deduct the cases of the verb used in the future, where *as* becomes *bhū*. I on the contrary would suggest, that the preoccupation with the future, worded necessarily as "will become," weakens the case for "being." It is a good point for the metaphysician who has seen that he must broaden his outlook by including history: Does Being, as that which will be, remain Being?

Other cases for which deduction may be claimed are matters of material change or happening: as in Brh. 6, 3, 13: "fourfold becomes the wood of the fig-tree" or where in German, one would say *es wurde Nacht* for night fell. And there is the (apparent) idiomatic expression: *tad api eso sloko bhavati*, rendered "as to that there is this verse." Translators have apparently thought that the speaker is quoting a mantra. I would suggest, that save where, if at all, the passage is recognised as of a Veda, or of an Upanishad deemed older, it may be that a coming to pass of a creative effort is meant: the teacher suspends his prose; improvising *afflatus* has arisen: "there becomes (in me) this verse——." In Pāli the expression is common in the Aorist: *evam assa ahosi*: "thus it occurred to him." But I deduct and pass.

There still remains, as I rightly or wrongly see it, a preoccupation with the word "become," which in its frequency is I believe new, and as new, significant of something new in teaching. I must here be content with the numerical statement. Were I to give the full analysis I have made, this sketch would grow too long. Our translators, excepting the welcome literalness in this respect in Dr. Hume, show, that either "to be," or other words *could have been used* by the

utterers (and by later editors), where in the text we find "to become." But they don't; they choose to use *bhava-*. And I am not here including the future tense; I am concerned with the marked frequency of *bhavati* (as present or "historic present"); and also with this, that in nearly every case it is used of the very man, the self; and also with this, that in most cases we see the man, in becoming, as becoming More, and also, here and there as becoming the Most. In this frequency I see no mere chance, no wording without a cause.

Rightly or wrongly I see in it a preoccupation with the man, not as being, but as in process of becoming, which is new, and which is, or should be felt to be, deeply significant. So deeply or I would say so highly significant, that it could not be more so. I seem in these Upanishads to be in a world of teachers profoundly convinced of the truth of a great and new mandate in religion, *not put forward as new by them*, but by a Helper of man of an earlier, not much earlier date, which they are developing, amplifying, vindicating. That mandate was, that the man has it in his nature, by becoming More to become ultimately. That Most Who he (potentially) is. *They had no word for "potentially."* (We owe the wording to Aristotle.) So they fell back on the word, the great word which they had at hand, the word "become." "Man is Brahman" means: Man is becoming Brahman: *Tat tvam bhavasi*. Once we substitute this verb for the *asi* which editors have, with a repudiated Becoming, handed down to us, then a gospel which, as stated, is perhaps the height of impiety, becomes a message of light and hope to every man, in that it is the *very guarantee* of his personal salvation, in that it makes every

stage in life, no matter how many the lives, supremely worth living.

But with man as linked, in Becoming, with Deity, there would necessarily go a mighty *sublimation of that attribute*. And so we find it raised "to the highest power": we find it as positive attribute of Deity in action in the creation, as conceived in Taittiriya, Brhadāranyaka and elsewhere. Here is no mere uttered fiat: here is the Divine Artist becoming, *Itself becoming, in the desire from being One to become More, Many*: "Let Me bring forth Myself," etc.¹ Becoming is here raised, from a state of progress from the imperfect to the less imperfect, to the glorified level and sphere of the work of one we call a great genius; becoming is now a becoming-other, a becoming a new Manifest, the Divine Play (*līlā*) of That Who, as Rāmānuja wrote, "creates and reabsorbs the universe."

This was a bold word; it was a conferring "the Immortal" on man as a corollary of his nature, and not, as in earlier mantras, a destiny conditional only on a man performing this and that prescribed act. We see this: "the mortal becoming immortal" lingering on in the Upanishads. It was too great a gospel to withstand inevitable reaction. Was not immortality a chief aim of the sacrifice? Was this to be pronounced unnecessary? And so those progressive teachers became as were the prophets beside the priests in Israel: their great mantras survived more or less intact and

¹ Not only in the one verb did the early teachers word becoming though they use it where translators do not (cf. e.g. M.M. in Brh. 1, 2, 5): *vibhāvati*, develop. is used (Brh. 1, 4, 11), and such a play-in-words as *adhi-ardh* (develop, greatly thrive) and *adhi-ardha* (one and a half Brh. 3, 9, 10). Others might be adduced, such as *ma gamaya* "make me to go" (Brh. 1, 3, 27).

established, but the ecclesiastical ritual remained also, and with it reaction set in.

This reaction against the concept that man, in becoming, is but being true to his divine nature, may, I suggest, be seen creeping up in the Maitri, but no more. It is not till the Iśā and the Māṇḍūkya, that actual repudiation is worded.¹ The Śvetāsvatara cannot be said to sound this change. Still for it does the man become, namely "on seeing the very Ātman, unitary, end-won, griefless," albeit it speaks of time not wholly in terms of becoming: the present is now not "the become" but "what the Vedas tell"; doubtless metrical exigency drove here. But the Maitri begins to "hedge" on the matter of creation as a becoming of the Highest. In it the speaker makes the primeval Man, when creating, not desire to become, but (a) "brood upon himself" (*abhidhyāyan*), (b) "think (Let me enter—)" (c) "utter—." Even here the traditional way lingers, for we read "This One became threefold, eightfold," etc. Yet the three substitutes I give, whereas they may by some be rated as ripper thought, reaching out after more fitting terms, may rather indicate a shrinking from the earlier, bigger conception of becoming, and are ushering in a shrinkage in it, a reinstatement of the Highest as Being, and not as Bhavat.

In the later Iśā and Māṇḍūkya Upanishads, later I deem by several generations, later than the beginnings of Buddhism, we see implicit the confession, that this matter of becoming *versus* being had evolved into a battle-cry in religious debate, becoming being now

¹ I am aware that the Maitri is said to quote the Iśā (7. 11), but this is only in the admittedly later Khilas, or 6th and 7th Sections.

termed *sambhūti*, a term which I do not find in the older Upanishads. Becoming is now reduced to mean, not exercise of an ever new Manifold in That who is, but an originating from that which was not—which is a different thing; and as involving a complement of decay—which is a different thing. And in the comment of Gaṇḍapāda, which Deussen's biassed zeal forces upon readers of his Upanishad translation, we are landed in the view which sees, in the manifold and becoming, illusion, and that what really is cannot become, becoming in truth being only of what is there already. In the *Īśā*, while there is the seed of decay of faith in becoming, in that it is viewed as involving *passing away*, we yet retain the faith, that the man "in becoming wins the goal." Here then is a becoming which, being of what is by nature divine, does *not involve* decay subsequent to maturity. In the *Māṇḍūkya* commentary, the halting logic of the *Īśā* is purged, but at the fearful cost of voting becoming in the very man, the self, to be an illusion. And this coupling decay with becoming appears, a source of bane, in Buddhism.

It is the word of the "after-man," reflecting his own age, unable to discern the greatness in the older wordings which were nearer in time to one of the greatest gospels of this world's history. And when I note, in the many translations of this literature, how the after-man in commentary has biassed the modern translator, I yield consent to K. E. Neumann's trenchant remark, that "when ecclesiastical fathers and doctors go to work with the best will to clear up dark mantras, they speak as would the blind of colour—*Auf mächtigem Glanz folgt naturgemäss Nacht.*" But with this added reservation: that I would undertake no translation of scriptures without consulting commentaries, both for

what they have said and for just that which they do not say, for herein also is history.

When all is said, however, the commentator remains as one who sees worth in the Less and the Worse. For they, that is, their age has no longer understood the real message round which the Sayings on which they comment were uttered. So they fall back on less direct, and weaker meanings of words. Thus through them the strong causative of *bhū* is veiled under the idea of foster or cherish, as in Aitareya 4, 2, 3. And elsewhere are such weaker renderings, as "propitiating," "comforting," "pleasing" the devas, of this same causative, with which the strong *bhāvaya* has, in the first instance, nothing to do. Why should we really feel compelled to fall back on such derivative renderings? In the Aitareya, the mother is "making her embryo become"—that is all in order. But why should we not also make devas become, that is, be More, Better than they were, and they make us the same? The Vedic scholar with a pantheon of "gods" filling the picture, may smile. But the passage I have in mind, to which my colleague, Dr. W. Stede has drawn my attention:

devān bhāvayatānena te devā bhāvayantu vah,
parasparam bhāvayantāḥ śreyāḥ param avāpsyatha,

which my colleague Dr. Barnett has rendered: "With this comfort ye the gods and let the gods comfort you," etc., is from the Gītā (III, 11), in a context reckoned as a later interpellation by Garbe. By that time devas were, as we have them in early Buddhist tradition, virtually the wise and kindly gentlemen who had passed for a while from earth to the next world, and often came back to those who were yet on earth

either to give or to receive good counsel and who were very likely, their life-span over, coming back again to earth in the long Mārga of each man's becoming. Thus the mutual making-to-become in the More towards the Most, is a very reasonable advice.

But a less wholesome expression crept up and is also visible in those passages judged by the same able critic to be later. This is the term *brahmabhūta*: become-the-Most.¹ The term may, like other affixes: *-maya*, *-gata*, have come at some time to express our "of the nature of," or "akin to." But we do not find this compound in earlier Vedic, and in these probably early instances it seems highly significant, namely, that the happy state of the Yogi consists, among other features, in his "being *brahmabhūta*." Here we have, as it were, said farewell to the healthy state of willing to become, of living in that willing, and thereby becoming step by step as far Brahma-wards as it is given any man, however saintly, to become on earth. The one-in-nature-with the Most is realised, but to the exclusion of any emphasis on, any joy in, the *becoming More on the Way to the Most*. It is a premature value in the "done"; and again—another later symptom—it is *value in the Idea*, rather than the Thing; and that means that the man is holding himself in worth as mind, rather than as he who is minding. As we should expect, the mind-ridden monasticism of early Buddhism shared in the expression, calling both the recluse and its founder Brahmabhūta, "experiencing happiness dwells with the self become-Brahman."²

But whereas the Buddhist came to slur over, and finally lose sight of, this once vital phrase, the Vedāntist

¹ Bhagavadgītā 5, 24; 6, 27; 18, 54.

² Majjhima, I, 341 f.; 412; Anguttara, II, 205, 111, etc.

saw in it only the idea of identity, losing sight of the needed making-actual the potential oneness. The commentators' tradition no longer values the idea or the word *bhavaśi*, or its causative, in its earlier meaning, nor for that matter do we either, and so we too, I venture to think, fail either to see, or to value what the original utterers were, it may be, trying to say.

And this was, not the "thou art That" in the preposterous sense of the one term equating the other in any complete sense of the word, but the *Tat tvam asi* only where both *asi* and *bhavaśi* coincide, both in the spirit and in the letter: *Tat tvam bhaviṣyati*. Only in becoming the More, with the will ever working, will the man ultimately "be" in and as the Most.¹ In such holy becoming there is no complementary decay to follow, as in things material; it is a Becoming-other in the More and the Many, which, in virtue of the man being the Self in-the-Most only potentially, or in the germ, is in his case, of necessity, a becoming less imperfect. But it is little wonder that we so veil this word of the life-career in, not body or mind, but the very *puruṣa* when that *puruṣa* himself we of to-day keep so in the background; when too we have so lost sight of the Becoming which was what the Śakyamuni was trying to say in his Way-figure, and for which India's mediæval manuals blamed his followers, the Bauddhas, the Saugatas. For these followers had themselves lost the message of Becoming in the greater sense, just as their critics saw in it only an impossible becoming out of nothing.

¹ As G. Radhakrishnan well says: "The God-In-man is a task as well as a fact" (*Philosophy of the Upanishads*).

X

ORIGINAL BUDDHISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE¹

I

WHEN I spoke to you some years ago, I remember I called "Buddhism" a gospel of hope. I should now, so far from retracting that, say it was a gospel of expectancy. That is a step further. Things hoped for may become; things are expected when they are likely to become. As to that, it is of interest, that the word "hope" is very rare indeed in Buddhism. Similarly in the Christian "Gospels" it does not occur at all as doctrine. But in the Epistles it is plentiful, and as such, ranks with faith and love, and is a feature in the "high calling" before the Christian, when the Master had been torn from him.

Pāṭikāṅkhā: what may be "expected" from this or that in conduct, namely, either growth (*vuddhā*) or decline (*hāni*, *parihāni*), comes frequently into that which, as suitable for a "Philosophical Group," I have called early Buddhist "philosophy of life." It belongs to the very essence of that philosophy.

But as to the word "philosophy," a quaint and ineffective Greek compound at the best, I have nothing to equate it with in Buddhist early teaching. There was in Indian idiom the unspecialised term *vidyā* for

¹ Published in the *Prabuddha Bharata*, Calcutta, 1934, having been delivered as lecture to the Philosophic Group of the Forum Club, London, 1933.

knowledge generally, another term *ñāna*, a rather later term *nyāya*, and *paññā* (*prajñā*), another variant of "knowing," a lofty term closely connected in early Buddhism with spiritual growth or becoming.¹ But there was also the word *dharma*, meaning, like *paññā*, the more practical aspect of *vidyā*, always associated with "what ought to be," "what ought to be done," a word unknown in the Rig-Veda, but which was coming into use before Buddhism was born, like a harbinger of further Divine revelation to come. Original Buddhism took up this term and exploited it to an extent that was new. To it I shall come back. Look upon this talk as a cord of two strands, and Dharma as one. The other strand needs a special introduction.

There had come over North India, as you doubtless know, in the 8th, 7th and 6th centuries of the era B.C. an acceptance of a religion which we now call Immanence, or Immanency, and that of a special kind. Namely, Deity was conceived, not as transcendent to, or external to man, but as in and of man. Man's fundamental nature was Godhead, even though as yet on earth he was handicapped by a perishable, imperfect body. Centuries later St. John the Elder reminded Christians: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God." The Indian Immanist said: "We are God. *Tat tvam asi.*"

Was this astonishing assertion accompanied by, or due to, a lowering of the idea of Deity, or to an uplifting of the idea of man?

Most certainly it was an uplift in the idea of man. There could, with this tremendous birthright imputed to man, be no speaking of him as we have not yet

¹ *Paññā bhāvetabbā*: wisdom is to be made-become (*Majjhima N.*, No. 43).

outgrown the speaking of ourselves: "poor miserable selves." It was the finest case of *Noblesse oblige* ever taught to man. Several things help to constrain man to maintain a certain standard in his "philosophy of life," but none approaches this. It was a sublime, a terrific ideal to live up to, even more than our ideal of Divine sonship. We may even hear a much-tried British teacher call his pupil an "imp of Satan." But there we have a call to live so as to be worthy of that all-perfection who the pupil by nature is. And more than that: the fellow-man, the fellow-woman was no less "That." The he, the she, must be cherished as also an encasement of Deity. Had India, as alas! she did not, followed up, expanded this, the finest basis of ethics I know, what a glorious thing would Indian religion have become!

But was there, with this uplift in man, a lowering in the idea of Deity? In a way, yes. It was impossible to teach a gospel of Immanence and leave the Nature-gods of the Vedas in the position they hold in the Hymns. When Deity had come to take up Its abode in the spirit, the self of man, there was no longer any question of looking outward or upward to gods of sky, tempest, winds, dawn, sun, soma-juice, to Rudra conqueror, to Prajāpati father. All these had been more or less superseded by indwelling Divinity, called Brahman, the "prayed-to," and Ātmā, Self or Spirit. And this curious and interesting result followed, that in becoming disdeified, Devas in general, Indra in particular, were resolved into quasi-human beings of the next and other worlds, men who had lived many times on earth, and were not alien therefore to man, but on the contrary deeply interested in his welfare, his religious welfare. One of the greatest achievements

of early Buddhism was this bringing of the worlds closer together, by faith for the majority, by actual personal psychic experience for the minority, who cultivated such intercourse in what was the earlier form of the preparatory musing called *Dhyāna*.

II

Do you see what this opened up in Indian religion? In Immanence as taught in the early Upanishads, there was the actual "is"—man as he is—on the one hand; on the other, a Highest, a Most, a Supreme. *Nothing between!* But this disdeifying of the unseen world of Devas revealed a More *between* the Is and the Most; men in a "More-becoming" a *bhīyyobhāva*,¹ between these extremes; a More to be traversed, to be won by man on his way to the Most Who he essentially is.

Thus while Immanence uplifted man, and disdeified external deities, it retained Deity, nay, it raised Deity to an ineffable Highest.

And now we see indicated what was, I believe, the expectant philosophy of life in original Buddhism.

Let us follow up this that I have called an astonishing assertion. You may be familiar with the type-mantra of Immanence: the nine times repeated refrain of father to son: "That art thou." That the "thou," the *tvam*, is uttered at all shows the emphasis on it, as it would in Latin and Greek, if not in modern European tongues. The emphasis was not uncalled for. You might say: Madame X is by birth an English-woman; which may be true or false, but which would not, if

¹ A frequent term in the Nikāyas, especially *Samyutta*, "*Mahāvagga*."

true, be the most amazing thing you could say about her. But it is not easy to bring into an all-embracing statement of identity a subject who is man as we know him, good, bad or indifferent, and an object, or more rightly perhaps a predicate, who is not Deity if It be not Highest, Best, Most, Perfect. The two terms are so far apart, that the linking copula becomes strained, becomes of more importance than just the verb "is," "art."

Does it not seem as if we needed to use our Aristotle, and speak of things as being either in potency (*dunamai*) or actuality (*energia*)? As if, in a saying so irrational on the surface as is "Deity art thou," Indian teachers really meant, "Thou art Deity potentially, but thou wilt become Deity actual—in time"?

As to that, we are ourselves not innocent of over-reaching statements, as when we say, "The child is father to the man." This as said is also absurd; we imply, "The child is he who will *become* a man of a given sort." Or he will grow into such and such a man. But, old, very old word though it be, "become" has ever been ambiguous, and so fails to be the incisive word our other stronger word *worthan* was, which we let drop from our language. And writers, especially translators seem to prefer to evade "become" by using a marvellous variety of makeshift terms and phrases, less fertile, less pregnant in meaning "growth" than is our "becoming." Becoming meant for a long time mainly "coming to," "happening," or "suitable," while *bhū* is akin to the Greek *phusis*, and our "build." But when *worthan* fell out, it was inevitable that "become" almost of necessity took its place where any future happening meant not mere recurrence, or happening, but where a certain "more," or product

or growth came into the future event. Thus already in the Tudor English of the Gospels we find the word not only serving to render the Greek *prepon*: "thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness," but also the Greek *genesthai* (the Pāli *bhavitum*): "gave them power to become the sons of God."

Now India had not the Aristotelian pair of terms: potential and actual, but she had this in common with Latin and German: her verb "to be," *As*, was defective, and was ever borrowing from the not defective verb *Bhū*, to become, which takes inflections as *bhav*,—become, and also *bhāv*,—make-become. For instance, "will be," is not an *As*-form, but a *Bhū*-form, and she can only express "will be" as "will become": *bhavi-shyati*. So also for "may become," and some other forms. The future tense should therefore have *tended* to suggest a more than mere futurity, a more than our "will be."

Now the introduction of Immanence into Indian religion was accompanied by a curious and interesting increase in the use of the *Bhū*-forms. It amounts roughly, bulk for bulk, to about 300 occurrences as compared with about 40 in the older Vedic literature. Surely this increase was significant of something.

And it is also interesting, and a link between the early Upanishads and the earliest Buddhist scriptures known to us, the Pāli Tripiṭaka, that the Suttas in the latter carry on a very plentiful use of *Bhū*-forms, especially, be it noted, in the future tense: *bhavissati*, and in the causative forms: *bhāveti*, *bhāvand*, *bhāvitabba*, *bhāvita*. I am making a Concordance of these and their abundance can be nothing but significant.¹

¹ Since dealt with at length in *To Become or not to Become—that is the Question*, Luzac, 1937.

English and even German readers of translations will not realise that abundance, because of the way in which most translators evade the use of the words "become," and "werden," to a degree that is sometimes comic, were it not also tragic. I refer to both early Upanishads and Buddhist Suttas. Take an instance from the *Taittiriya*:

Amytasya deva dhāranti bhūyāsam !

"May I, O God, bearer of the Immortal"—would you say "be" or "become"? Surely here is a More prayed for, and not merely a future event as such; added growth, added worth is aspired to, so that thereby dying may for ever be got rid of. Yet here, while Max Müller and Roer and Hume have "become," Paul Deussen has *möge ich sein*! "may I be," he who had the strong verb *werden* ready to hand!

But then Deussen had his prejudices; he believed that only Being, and not Becoming was reality, was permanent. He was, in philosophical creed, an Eleatic, a Parmenidean; it was as such that he deliberately evaded the "werden" in the word *bhūyāsam*. When it is English translators who evade the use of "become," I believe it is simply because it is not in such approved literary style as are many other makeshift terms. But much progress herein has recently been accomplished by the American Dr. E. R. Hume, who in his *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, uses "become" far oftener than anyone else, and rarely fails to do so when it is needed.

III

Now while there was among Brahman teachers the presence of this strong buttress to a defective but important verb, so that "being" and "becoming" were more closely allied than with us, and whereas there was going on this preoccupation with expressing things in *Bhū*-forms, as coming to be, a reaction set in.¹ I think it will have been just when the Buddhist mission began. Teachers arose who said that Becoming always meant subsequent decay; said also, but later, that becoming meant ultimately a production of something from nothing.

Both of these arguments were fallacies; they were not made from right premises. As to the former, teachers were seeking an analogy for spiritual things in *material things*. Decay is inherent in the body, but there is no proof that it is so for the immortal adolescence of spiritual man. As to the latter, becoming, if widely conceived, is *not only* the production of something *ab ovo* and *de novo*, but is also the production of something different in a manifold. As when a musician or a poet arranges anew notes and words that were there already, making, it may be, a new divine melody or poem.

But the reactionaries prevailed, and hence it is no wonder that, whereas many of the Becoming-phrases are left in the Upanishads, the essential mantras of the God-and-man identity were by editors kept severely to the *As*-form: That art thou, etc. And we never read That art thou becoming, or thou wilt

¹ I have already treated of this in the Grierson Memorial volume, the print of which has been delayed two years, and in my *Manual of Buddhism*, 1932. See above, p. 79 ff.

become. But this is the way with old scriptures:—have we here the very words, or only the changed words of editors who had changed values? Anyway India fell back on to the belief that only in the word *As* could she express the Divine reality. *Sat* (i.e., *Asat*), "being," became the main attribute of Deity. We still see *Bhava*, "becoming,"¹ left in as attribute of Deity, attribute ascribed to Deity in creating. This was strangely, almost incongruously, left in, as venerable old things, fortunately for us, do get left in. But it was left "on the shelf," unused.

Now the infant Buddhism took up the teaching of *Bhava* just as the Brahmins were turning from it, taking what had been taught to the Few, the wealthy Few, to the Many to whom it was a fresh mandate. Of the Brahmin minority, who will still have adhered to God and Man as becoming, we hear nothing. Unless we can thereby account for the record, that *most of the leading first disciples*, co-workers with the Sakyamuni, were *Brahmins*? The record is undisputed, but no one has yet tried to account for it. (If here I am wrong, I would like to be corrected.) These first teachers will have felt how weak, how unstressed was the Upanishadic teaching as a practical "philosophy of life"; how curt and slight (if impressive) was the showing, that to become That Who he is, man needs to pass, not merely his student years as *brahmachārin*, but his whole life in perpetual preparation, in a career of training, in short as Wayfarer in a Way leading from what he is to what he *may be expected* to become. All the moral injunctions of the Upanishads could go into a single page.

The pages of Buddhist Suttas, on the other hand,

¹ *Maññi*, etc.

swarm with this training, this preoccupation with a "making-become (*bhāvanā, bhāveti*)" in preparation, with this business "of the Road." And note how, with this More in living, the More in sodality goes along. Moral conduct was to be practised because, as righteous wayfaring, it fitted a man for companionship of the worthier who, in "more-wayfaring," were beyond, ahead of him.

When students of religious history will begin seriously to read through these Suttas, when they will know enough Pāli just to check the translators' liberties, when they can discern sufficiently to get past the monastic superstructures of the monk-editors, then will this word "become" win at length due appreciation.

IV

Let them especially not forget that wholesome distrust of us translators. It may be that sometimes we have not the right, the coincident, word in our language. Far oftener we default because of our seeing, with Deussen, "an axe to grind" in the text, which coincides with our own particular religious or philosophic prejudices, or because we are content to make our text accord with the views we have come to accept about the ecclesiastical machinery of which the text has become a vehicle, or it is because we want, before all, to write elegant or vigorous literary English, whether or no this is done at the fearful cost of sacrificing some of the literal truth of the original. Usually these causes are all working, I believe, in each of us translators. And for me it is a happy sign of growth that, lately only, have I been taxed with writing at times in a heavy unwieldy style, so much more have I

been concerned to get literal truth, so much does the reader like to get the jam of good style to make the powder of the actual message palatable.

Let us read a short example of how a translator can leave you quite unaware of what may have gone to help a very pressed emphasis in old Buddhism. And first note this. Disciples are frequently enjoined in the Suttas: "*Evam vo sikkhitabbam* (thus must you train yourselves); the way of training which then follows being usually given with the future of the verb "to be," that is, in terms of "will become."

"*Samaṇas!*"—This is the name by which people know you and by which you, being asked: Who are they? should confess: 'We are *samaṇas!*' Now for you, thus confessing what you are, it is on this wise that you should train yourselves: You should embrace and show forth in your lives the things which really make the *samaṇa*, so as to prove your vocation true and your profession a reality, and see to it, that the alms you enjoy ensure to fruit and profit in yourselves, making your pilgrimage not barren, but fruitful unto its harvest. What are these things? Train yourselves (first) to be conscientious and scrupulous. When this is done, you may rest content with the idea: 'Enough is done? We have reached the aim of the *samaṇa*; there's nothing further to be done?' I declare unto you, I protest unto you, let there be no falling back in your aim while aught remains further to be done. What then remains to be done?"

Further stages are named, with the same vehemence

¹ *Majjhima N.* "Assapura Sutta."

² I have slightly altered the translator's rendering in certain terms not bearing on the passage differently translated, and referred to below.

of appeal against stopping, but even had I time, I would not give them, so utterly do they belong to monkish training . . . as perhaps was here fit . . . so unessential are they to the religious mandate of a great Helper.

Now let me read the middle part of the injunction as I would have it translated: "the things which make the *samāya* we will take up and practise, and thus our *samānaship* will become¹ true, and our profession become¹ a fact, and the alms which we enjoy will become² very fruitful agents in us, and thus our religious life will become¹ not barren, but effective and fertile. . . . You are to train yourselves saying: We will become³ characterised by conscientiousness and discretion. . . ."

How is there not an emphasis here on "becoming"!

The translator might rejoin, that in Indian idiom one has no choice; "will become," "will be": there is but one way, not an alternative, for expressing both mere future happening (like the tenth tick of a clock compared with the first tick) and growth. I would say to that: Firstly, even if you are right, it is juster to use the borrowed meaning, and not that of the defective verb. Secondly, many, indeed most, Suttas make their injunctions in the very different form: "There are so many lists of good or bad things, dispositions, habits" and the like, which *might* have been used where we find these more driven-in injunctions. Where the latter occur, let them not lose, by a weaker verb, an ounce of their driving force.

If the *bhū*-forms in this passage be rendered by the true and literal meaning of the word, we shall more clearly see the religious importance, the religious

¹ *Bhavissati*.

² *Bhavissanti*.

³ *Bhavissāma*.

earnestness of the things enjoined. We are not on the ground of mere Rules recurrently observed. We are on the ground of a Road in which further advance means further growth, a new coming-to-be, a Way-faring in the More.

For consider once more how this new moral urge was needed.

V

How did Brahman teachers teach Immanence? It was that, in fully truly *knowing*, you in your inmost nature were God, you established the truth for yourself. "He who knows this, yea, he who knows . . . he has, he inherits all,"¹ etc. Now so tremendous a tenet would inevitably constrain you in some measure by its "*noblesse oblige*." You could hardly, so realising, be always mean, base, false. But young men are fallible, and we find scarcely any ethical expansion in the chief Upanishads of the practical philosophy implicated in the tenet. Nothing, for instance, like the Buddhist "Tevijja" Sutta, where the Sakyamuni, consulted on the matter, it appears, by young Brahmins, tells them, that the only way to win hereafter companionship with "Brahma-devas" is, not to invoke gods only, not to sit still about it, not to go to sleep, not to hamper themselves, but so to live as *they believe those Devas live*. He thus brought morality under the sanction of religion. He made the moral life as essentially a procedure in religion as was the rite, the prayer, the sacrifice; nay, as more essentially so. "Think you that to stand on the river bank and pray to the other shore to come over to you will take you

¹ See Dr. Hume's chap. ix, *op. cit.*, for a list of such passages.

over? Nay, make yourselves a raft, and paddle yourselves over, exerting your limbs."

It was in this need for the man to become, to grow into a spiritual More than he habitually, normally is, that I see the way in which the Sakyamuni expanded the religion of his day, or, as Jesus put it, "fulfilled the Law not destroying it." His philosophy of life he put into the figure of a Road or Way. It was a departure from the figure of a City or House, the man dwelling therein as in a shrine containing the Holy of Holies, such as peeps out in the Upanishads: "this city of Brahman . . . the heart . . . wherein man beholds his own greatness," and so on. He converted this static teaching into a dynamic gospel of open way-faring, among men, among Devas.

And for this, man needed "will," a word which India had once well worded, but, as we with *worthan*, had let drop, and pathetic are the attempts to make good, in its absence, in the Buddhist Suttas, as I have said elsewhere. In this philosophy of life man had to co-operate with the Highest by willing, by choosing how to wayfare—that is, how to live the philosophy. Again, he was, under this figure, to consider himself—and by "self" India meant not the body, not the mind, but the very man, soul, spirit—as at once *persisting*, surviving, yet *changing*, changing in a way that was called Becoming, or Making-become, or growing.

This is the one of the two strands in my view of the original Buddhist "philosophy of life." Man is in a state of Becoming (not merely of change), by which is meant a *willed change* for better or worse, but which "faith," which is so highly esteemed in Buddhism, prompted was ultimately for the Better, in that this

Becoming was Man seeking and ultimately finding his way to That Who he essentially is, was Man becoming not potentially only, but actually That.

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VI

I come back to the other strand: to the original Buddhist exploitation of the word Dharma.

I do not mean Dharma as it came to be understood in Buddhism: something external to man, fixed, presented, as a Code-law, or as a cosmic mechanism. We do not think of these when we say "conscience," and it is in our "conscience" that we get nearest to original Dharma. In two Suttas we see Gotama, before his mission, seeking a supreme Guide, and virtually substituting Dharma for the Upanishadic "Self." We have the idea already in the Upanishads, in the striking term calling the *Ātmā antaryāmin*: "inner controller." And we have the idiom there of "dharmaṃ cara": walk according to Dharma (which translators much weaken). And the idea, of the Self as witness, and as moral judge occurs in both Upanishads and Buddhist Suttas. For me the following verses, possibly very old, convey eloquently what Dharma was originally for the Sakyan missionaries:

Well doth Dharma protect him in sooth who Dharma follows.
Happiness bringeth along in its train Dharma well practised.
This shall be his reward by whom Dharma's well practised:
Never goeth to misery he who doth Dharma follow.
For Dharma and not-dharma have not like results:
Not-dharma leads to baneful, Dharma to happy doom.
Hence let a man put forward desire as to Dharma,
Delighting in that he findeth so good a Wayfarer.
Standing in Dharma disciples of Best of Wayfarers
Venturing come to the best and the highest of refuges.

(*Theragāthā*, "Dhammika.")

Here I now hold, and it is not the only context, it is Dharma that is conceived as the Divine Comrade on life's way,¹ as when a Christian might speak with humble joy of walking with the Holy Spirit.

Does not this more dynamic idea of Deity as an inner Monitor find echo in our modern poets? Does not the Shakespearean *Tempest* say: "conscience! ay, that Deitie within my bosom!" And Sir Thomas Browne a little later: "There's a Man within who is angry with me!" And Goethe, yet later: "The God within my breast who dwells can deeply move my inmost thought" (*Faust*).

And to return in closing to the Man of the Way, let it never be forgotten, that he is said to have uttered among his last words, and at other times a message blending this fusion of Self and Dharma as *Antaryāmin*: "Live ye as having the Self, as having Dharma as your lamp, your refuge: this and no other."

A word more: Should it be said—for it is said by many—did he not mean that a man must depend upon no other ultimately than just his human, unaided self, in the sense we use that word? I would reply, even if we grant, which is historically impossible, that for an Indian of that day, the religious use of the word "self" meant *only* what it means for us (and that is usually our lower self!), is it credible, that such a comfortless, rudderless gospel could ever have so taken hold of men and drawn a great part of the world after it, to be looked upon as their guide and comfort and stay in this mystery we call life and death? It may suit a few Stoic philosophers; it will never have appealed to everyone. It is like chucking a little child into the sea and bidding him swim unaided ashore.

¹ See p. 54.

Man looks in religion to something bigger than himself. India found this in taking God into her bosom. Gotama found that God so taken was no still, static ideal, but a mighty urge to the man who was the shrine of That, a Guide within, guiding man in his Becoming, and helping him become.

Take up into the Immanence of the Upanishads the moral urge in the Way of a will to become a More towards that immanent Most, and you have there, as I hold, the original Buddhist philosophy of life.¹

¹ I have noted a wincing at what I have said on the need, in the Upanishadic teaching of this Buddhist dynamic, hence I here reprint the editorial comment:

That does not mean that in the Upanishads there was no "moral urge." When the Upanishads declared that man is Brahman, they took for granted that all did not realise this truth because of Avidya. Therefore the whole struggle of a religious life is to remove this Avidya. This, in a way, may be called "Becoming," on which the writer lays so much stress —ED. P.B.

XI

REALITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN BUDDHISM¹

I HAVE been asked to speak to you, in the series "Reality of Religious Experience," "as representing Buddhism." This should mean I am to show how that reality is felt, is experienced by "a Buddhist."

Now I do not forget that it is likely you would not find, in this country or in any other, anyone—Buddhist or critic—who would admit I am fit to do this. I am arch-heretic for most, a dreamer or intuitionist at best. In this country I have only two supporters who accept my conclusion from the scholar's point of view, and one or two well-wishers inclined from a general religious point of view to think I am right. In Ceylon, eldest daughter of the Buddhist Church, I have heard monks have forbidden pupils to read me. I am shown loyalty by a few former pupils of Ceylon, but it is like the loyalty of monks shown to the Founder in old age: a loyalty which makes *namaskara* and then teaches the traditional code of the country's monks. One genuine outburst of approval I received from an English Buddhist monk. But this is exceptional. Yet even if I were an accredited interpreter, I do not think it possible for anyone, even for a Buddhist, "to show what it feels like to be a Buddhist,"²

¹ Delivered before the Inter-Religious Fellowship, October, 1937.

² James B. Pratt: *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*.

in order "to enable the reader, at the end, to understand a little how it feels," etc., "not merely to expound its concepts and describe its history. One must catch its emotional undertone, enter sympathetically into its sentiments, feel one's way into its symbols, its cult, its art . . . and expound these in all sorts of indirect ways."

I am not sure even then that Pratt has succeeded, or that anyone else could. Take, nearer to us, the traditional atmosphere of an earnest sincere R.C. not a new convert: could it be entered into deeply by a similar Scottish U.P.? How much less by a similar Jew!

But even were it possible for me, not a Buddhist, to make you feel what the reality, etc., means for a Buddhist, I should ask which Buddhism, Hīnayānist or Mahāyānist or Original? and I would add, frankly, I would decline to attempt either of the former. Just as if, were I asked to represent what religious experience meant for an R.C. or a Scottish U.P., I should in that case prefer to give you only what I *imagine* would be said on this by one of the disciples of Jesus: say, Mary of Bethany or Martha or John of Nazareth, brother of James. So in Buddhism, the only thing I could bring myself to do would be to ask you to come with me to the Hill of the Vultures above Rājagaha, and listen to, say, what the Founder's best friend might tell us, Sāriputta Upatissa, who alas! predeceased his great friend, comrade and teacher, and so could not guide the young movement as it might have been guided, but was not. It has come to me he might have spoken to us like this: and I want you to note that we have here a religion much more that of the religious India of his day, than of the day when the

books in the old Pāli Canon were finally compiled, much more when still later they were put down in the new art of the written book. All the books about Buddhism you read, whether by Buddhists or by outside comment, tend to describe Buddhism in terms either of this later Buddhism, or in the technical terms of Western religions:—that Buddhism is a religion without God, prayer, sacrament, priest or worship.

All that Buddha had to say about the great centre of every man's religion:—man in the foreground, in the middle distance or nearer, the life hereafter, on the horizon, the true things unknown but to come, when the Better melts into Best, Higher into Highest, More into Most, is usually made quite subsidiary. It is quite forgotten that Buddhism was the child of an accepted Immanence wherein God had come as it were to dwell in man as his ideal Self: "we worship Brahma as the Self," and that original Buddhism *started with this* attitude. That *for its day* prayer had become aspiration, introversion. That it developed its own simple sacraments; that worship was the continual directing of the self towards the Further in the long way; that the priest was, not an unneeded intermediary between actual and potential Self, but teacher only and friend, the need of which is ever present even in the later scripture. We have to put away the Western technique and also most of the later Buddhist technique, such as Nirvana, the four Truths, the three Marks of everything, the Way as eightfold, the Ideal conceived as "empty."

With the ground so cleared, let us listen :—

I was, as you know, of a Brahman family. My father was a landowner, himself supervising the ploughing and the culture of crops and cattle as you

read in the books. It was no disgrace *then* for Brahman to do that, as say the later Laws of Manu. My mother Sāri was a lovely woman and taught us to try for the things worth while in life. I was sent, as was usual, to a Brahman teacher (not to Taxilā but nearer). He taught me that Deity or Brahma was to be sought within, rather than by ritual or invocation. He would say: Think of the Self within you as the very best Self; as a most, as Beyond. And more, as That Whom you should be ever seeking to know. *That is You.* But you are not yet That in the *amṛta*.¹ You must become That. (You see we had no word for potency, nor for a word as strong as your will. But we had *amṛta* and we had *bhava*.²) When my time with him was up, I became like many other young men a wandering student, seeking to learn what other well-known teachers were saying before it was time to take up work and marry. As you know, I sat at the feet of the teacher Sañjaya, a Brahman sophist, and learnt to know Moggallāna, another young Brahman. In both of us, the will was to seek to get, even here, nearer to that Immortal which for us meant the unknown Most, who was in nature the very We. Someone told us there was a new teacher called Gotama of the Sakyans who had the power of getting into Jhana or semi-trance, and so of learning or becoming a More than was otherwise possible. I, we, felt he might open for us the "door to *amṛta*." In the Scriptures you have a sad confusion about this. It was Ajita we asked about Gotama, about our quest *amṛta*. But his answer, as given, has nothing to do with *amṛta*; it is about cause and effect; it was a new matter much in the

¹ Immortal.

² Becoming.

air then; how, not only outward material things happened not capriciously but by a cause, but inner psychical or spiritual things also, so that every man was in a way himself a cause, and also an effect, not in body only. Ajita's shy humble answer, is a reply he gave to another, at another time, viz. to Moggallāna about a teacher—you would call him a psychologist—who was wise about this inner causation. It was about *amṛta* that Ajita sent us to Gotama, and we found him. He made a powerful impression on us, as he did on all. Tall and handsome, with the air and carriage of an aristocrat, there shone beneath his black curly hair wonderful blue eyes, eyes which said as much to me about the very Man as did his words. Those eyes were wonderful; I did not then know they were a feature, in their colour, of a far north Indian people, his mother's people. His manner was not that of the teacher; he had the spontaneous careless almost wanton way of the noble, saying just what came to him. He used short words like *alam! tena hi! tiṭṭhātu! tam kim maññasi?*¹ and short sentences. He never used the sing-song intoning way of the brahman teacher over the mantras; he spoke in a natural and a most musical voice. He said, when we told him what we sought: That is what I also seek. I am seeker in *amṛta*, not in our present actual worth, but in what we expect we may become: *bhavyyāma*. We seek what we may become. We must value ourselves as in truth more than we now are. We will, we desire to become that more; in willing it we are becoming more; and the End will not be here nor over there for a long while yet. We

¹ Enough! Well then . . . Stop! What d'you think of that?

are in a long way, a way "by the middle," "by the mean," between just what we *just will* to do and what we *check our will* in doing. It is as in a Way that we shall reach the uttermost Goal. For us there is "no turning back"; we have become already, not yet *amya* but "further-farer in the life divine." Turning back would be to the less; we see the being well, that is happy, and we seek it "by happy ways."

These his main teachings sank deep: seeking, way-faring, the More, the Becoming, the desire to become as becoming, the expecting the not yet become; and I became knit to him, his close friend. And you have found me reported as teaching in praise of becoming, in blame of standing still. You found it called not becoming but growth, and you have shown why this word was later used for becoming. This was our outlook: not a finding peace while seated cross-legged; that is later, of the monk outlook. Men of the Road were we, ever faring onward, here and hereafter, through a long, long More toward the Most, the *uttāram*, the *anuttāra*. We were not wayfaring alone. Ever with us was the fellow-man in the Road. Later the monk lost sight of him, or recognised only the fellow-monk as on the Road. But for us of that day he, yea, and she was always with us. If we turned aside to rest, we came back to walk with them, each of them, whether he knew it or not, seeking, as were we, the Immortal, and that, whatever was his class, his station. We did not make so great a feature of compassion as may appear from books and the fellow-wayfarer was not as our brother, or our neighbour. To say that was the work of Jesus. But the other man was in the Road with us, fellow-seeker

with us, each as not being the other, making for his own salvation.

But it was not only the fellow-man here who was with us in the Road, and was fellow-man further on, who was able to respond, if we are, as you say, *listening in*. For this was what our leader had found in the exercise called Jhana. It was hearing of the inner voice, the "still small voice" of a Jewish prophet, yet one which came from without. Since it was not from the Highest immanent in us, but from *messengers*, we called it "*Voice from Beyond*." I noted how the Leader would listen, and perhaps say "a deva has told me." I strongly desired to learn and I did (books call me "lover of Jhana"), but it took long. I feared lest worse should mandate me, but the Leader would say, Fear not! *Mā bhāyi*—so only you seek to learn from the Highest, you will be safe. New things I heard thus, and things unexpected. And would feel I was, as your epistles say, "compassed about with a great cloud of witnesses" in the Way.

This he taught me. And this too—he gave new force to the word *dharma*. It meant for us norm, status, code, the "what is done." He used it as "what should be done," as a living *urge* within us, like your *conscience*. And he spoke of it as if it were Highest no less than the words "Self" or "Brahma."

Thus my religious experience I might put into three words:—you have written about the three—the Self as the Highest "I"; the worth in the fellow-man, seen and unseen; the urge within as to the Ought, worshipped by them who sought, by and in It, the Highest Self.

¹ *Parato ghoso*, lit.: from what-is-Other.

XII

WANTED : WORTH IN WILL¹

I HAVE been invited by the Editor to send a contribution to this annual, and in doing so I take the opportunity of following up the leading given by the editorial in the *Hindu Mind* of last January (II, 7), entitled "Wanted: Will Power." I do so mainly because I hold it regrettable that such following-up is done so little. Writers tend to behave as if each of them was wayfaring alone, as if each was fighting for his own hand. The last thing any of us seeks, is to recognise the work of his fellows and stretch out hands of fellowship. Hereby, it is true, much diversity finds voice. But collective, comparative effort, from which further and quicker advance might come, does not happen. We do not mind each other's step.

I wish here to mind another's step, and to strengthen it by a suggestion in keeping with it. He was writing in accordance with the "British" psychology of the 19th century, wherein mind, consciousness, or man's "inner" world was resolved into three factors of equal ultimate validity, rational, emotional and volitional "faculties." And whereas, in concluding, he called the third factor "the most important and indispensable," at the outset, it was the first, the rational factor which he saw as the more important,

¹ Published in *The Hindu Mind*, II, Tiruvadamardur, 1935.

the more essential. Thus he wrote: "A man who is wholesome in these faculties is an explorer, and the culmination of his explorations is *the perception of some fact* previously unknown to him." (Italics mine.) Here man's ideal is "in exploring the new to win to a more in the rational factor."

Now whereas I greatly like his view of man-in-the-better as "wholesome," and "an explorer," I take a different view of this essential "more" resulting from his exploring. And this is because I no longer follow the psychology of yesterday in structure or emphasis, being what is, I fancy, called a voluntarist. I agree that a man is by nature, essentially, an "explorer," a seeker. But that which he gains, which he comes to, I do not see as something to be described most truly as a perception, that is, as something rational, as an idea; I see that gain, that coming-to as a more in that man's becoming. Put into terms of wayfaring—that ancient Indian figure:—*yāna*, *pañthā*, *mārga*—the man's gain is that he is now nearer to his goal, his *paryosāna*. He is no longer what he *was*. He has become a more (*bhūya-bhūta*). This is more than *having* now what he had not. He is more, he is other, he has grown.

This is not to see in the man, fundamentally, essentially and finally, a mind-er or thinker with coefficients of feeling and volition; it is to see in the man fundamentally, essentially and finally, a willer, his will having, as modes, thinking (or intellection or cognition) and feeling. Psychological activity is will, will in all grades from bare conation to resolve. And to experience rational or emotional modes of consciousness is to be consciously or mentally active. In sensory consciousness we are not passive, but exercise,

with or in sense, a coefficient of psychic energy. Were it not for an uprush of this, the most sudden sense-experience would amount to no more than a physical shock. The work of perception is a *voluntary* co-ordinating of sensations. The work of memory, of imagination is equally psychic *activity*. Auto-suggestionists are psychologically at fault in opposing will and imagination. At best they oppose to imagination a contracted view of will. The work of thought-proper is will-energy, wording itself, analysing, comparing, inferring. Indian psychology rightly classed all "*manas*" (i.e., mind *cum* will) as a form of action. In Buddhist Suttas they called it *mano-kamma*. It did not class activity as a mode of *manas*, but conversely.

I may be told it is plausible to word a man's attaining spiritual advance as a perceiving, in that he has surely gained new vision. Well, I would also so word it. But not as the truest most essential wording, and it is just *this* wording that we lose sight of, that we cannot afford to lose sight of. It is to lose sight of what India's Seers of old so insistently taught—a lost vision she sorely needs to regain. She has reduced her conception of Deity's attributes to that which is statical only, rational only, emotional only. She has forgotten her Upanishadic concept of "That" as "*Bhava*."¹ She has lost her great word *Kratu*. She has debased her great word *Kāma*. She words that which we seek by "will," that is, "well," merely as "not-ill." (The editorial word "wholesome" is healthier than that.) She has no such strong word as our "life."²

¹ *Maitri*.

² "Life" is that which is left over, persists, survives, when mere life of body and mind-ways ends at each dying.

Let her then ponder more over the dynamic aspect of man—man the explorer, seeker, willer, who in essence is not but is becoming. "Become," said the great poet Pindar, "that which thou art," and that is to be ultimately, finally *well*, or what we *will* to become. Then will she once more find strong, fit words. Then will she better see the wonder that lies germinating in the potency of will.

XIII

MAN AS WILLER¹

WE know that in the Pāli and Jain scriptures we find, as we do not find in other early Indian scriptures, the triplet: action of mind, action of word, action of body. We know that the triplet is a feature in the ancient Persian thought which we associate with the work of Zarathustra. And we may or we may not have noted as significant, how three great founders of creeds, which were primarily concerned with the importance of man's will and man's actions or conduct, should be credited with the wording of this triplet, while the intermediate development in India of the creeds of the rite and the ritual, the priest and the sacrifice, left the triplet unstressed. When this threefold wording of thought, word, and deed as modes of action (*kamma*) came into use in Buddhist teaching we do not know. It does not appear everywhere in the Pāli scriptures. In many books it scarcely appears at all. It attains its chief prominence in the fourth, or *Anguttara Nikāya*. But wherever it does occur, it occurs as an unquestioned and accepted way of wording. It is probably of the original Sākya mandate.²

There is one important branch of Buddhist literature where it is not brought to the front—a branch where we

¹ Published in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, 1926, and republished by permission in *Buddhist Studies*, ed. by Dr. B. C. Law, Calcutta, 1931.

² Not without importance is its emphatic occurrence in the *Jātaka* "episode," No. 56: "*Kaṣicanajātaka*."

should expect it would have been brought to the front. This is in the field of the analysis of man *as expressing himself in body and mind*. As such he is not scheduled under the category of mental action, vocal action, overt or bodily action. He is analysed under other categories, chiefly under (i) the twofold one of "name" and "shape," and (ii) under the fivefold one of the material and immaterial groups (*khandhas*), and again later (iii) under the threefold category of material qualities, mind, and "mentals."¹ But when conduct and the consequences of conduct, either in the past, or here below, or hereafter, come to be considered, then it is that the triple category of action or the deed is worded.

It was no small achievement, in man's early attempts to word and worth himself as man, to sum up himself in this threefold activity. Wherever it began, it was a notable vantage-ground. For it presents man to men as chiefly and as always, not a static beholder, nor a passive creature of destiny, but as actor, as doer, and, as such, as willer, a chooser and a "becomer." It looked behind, it looked forward. It saw how man, as agent, is no creature only of the hour that now is. It saw him in the perspective of the worlds. It saw him in a state of perpetual becoming. As were his actions, so was he now, so would he be. He was not just played upon. He was actor, maker, *Werdender*.

Now it is because we of the West have come to realise this in our own way and our own wording, that we have found a place, in our summing up of the man, for the words "will" and "willer." It has taken us long to get even only so far as we have got. And India never got so far.

¹ *Rūpa, citta, cetasikā.*

But she felt early and much after what we have somehow come to know. We have come to know, because we have, at least to some extent, learnt what it is that we mean by "will." And that which we have come to learn in a very vital, very general way, we have named. India did not word "will" as Latins and Teutons and other Aryans worded it. The root of the word was in her Aryan heritage as it was in ours. That which we developed as *WALH*, she held, but did not equally develop, as *WAR*:—choice. It is not likely that the very different fate of these two forms of a common root—if common indeed it was¹—has been a matter of mere accident. The history of this very pregnant word has yet to be written. When it is, much of the history of Indo-Aryan and European Aryan will be involved.

India used her word *var-* in narrow, ineffective ways. It was used for one or two modes of choice: for a boon, for marriage-custom; and again as meaning "of chosen, choice, or elect quality."² It appears much in compound, and in these both Jain and Buddhist worded the importance of self-restraint. But we cannot point to any words in which *var-* has attained to a force and worth approaching that of *val-* in, for instance, *velle*, *volo*, *voluntas*, or *will (e)*, *wollen*.

We of to-day cannot imagine a literature where occasion for wording what we will to be or to do, does not arise. Man expresses himself in many ways both then and now, but if a literature reveals him as

¹ Cf. Skeat, *English Dictionary*, Aryan roots.

² *Kaustiki Up.* ii, 1. To him said Indra: "Choose a boon (*varam tynisvati*)!" "Do thou thyself choose for me that which thou deemest most well-working for mankind." To him Indra: "Nay, verily the elect (*varo*) for the unelect (inferior) chooses not. Choose thou!"

expressing himself, without it being often necessary to word that self-expression as some form of will, we should not in such documents get man as we ever find him. Indian literatures must contain substitutes for wording will. And they must attach more or less emphasis to that aspect of man which we have come to call will and willing and willer. Else there is something wrong with man in India, something lacking. The restricted use of the variant forms of *var* is not enough to make out, in that literature, a normal man.

But whereas in every collection of human documents we look to find expression of man as willer, we may, in any given collection, find more or we may find less of such worded expression. And I find that in Buddhist literature and in early Upanishad literature the ideas—will, willing, willer—are not made so articulate as we might well, *especially in Buddhist thought*, have expected.

We have in the Upanishads a storehouse of highest value for what we seek. We have in them teachers expressing themselves, without the preoccupations of the hymn or the sacrifice. We are, it is true, never far away from the rite and the ritual. But the quest is chiefly man and the whence and whither of him. And there is a certain amount of unorthodox freedom, inasmuch as opinions are put forth varying in many points. Here, if anywhere, we should find how man as a willer, and how his will are severally worded.

The harvest to our inquiry is curiously meagre. The default may lie in the present writer, whose hunting-grounds the Upanishads are not. But they whose hunting-grounds the Upanishads are, do not help us much. Not only were they not competent

psychologists; as writers on man, they had no convictions as to the profound significance of will. Deussen, for example, gives us plenty of good indexes, but in not one of them¹ does he mention the word *Wille* or any equivalent, save in one passing allusion to Schopenhauer! This may be due to want of psychological interest, yet it is inconceivable that a writer so sympathetic to most of his subject-matter and so humane should have ignored this great side of man's nature, had the literature itself worded that side with any emphasis. So far as I have been able to discover, the only use he made of "Wille" was to suggest it as an alternative to "Verstand" in one or two places where the text has *manas* (e.g., Brh. U., i, 2, 1; 3, 6).

Regnaud, on the Upanishads,² gives us no index, but under "Diverses facultés psychologiques" he distinguishes *saṁkalpa* as *manas* acting, hence we may take it, he says, to mean desire (*kāma*) or volition.

Now *saṁkalpa* is certainly a term involving will. The root of it (*kṛp*), according to Whitney, means "be adapted." And if we found it meeting us wherever, in the context, we should look for some reference to man as *willing*, the point of this article would be weakened. But it is precisely the very rare and the irregular use which is made of the term both in the Upanishads and in the Piṭakas that does not weaken but sharpens my point.

Taking the older Upanishads, we find *saṁkalpa*

¹ *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie (India): Sechzig Upanishad's: Philosophische Texte des Māhābhārata*. In the last work the index is expressly said to be of "noteworthy names and ideas." Hence he has found nothing "noteworthy" on will!

² *Matricaux*, ii, 93.

occurring in nine contexts. Judging by the renderings given of it in these, we cannot conclude that translators have made out for it so unambiguous a meaning as Regnaud does. A comparative table of the ways in which four of them have Englished the word will best show this:—

<i>Sakkrip.</i>	<i>M. M'Clver.¹</i>	<i>Darius.²</i>	<i>Talya Cowell and Kler.³</i>	<i>Hume.⁴</i>
1. <i>Alt. U. 3, 8</i>	conceiving	Vorstellung	determination ⁵	conception
2. <i>Kru. U. 3, 8</i>	conception	Erkenntnis	resolve	conception
3. <i>Kena U. 30</i>	imagination	vorstellen	ascertained	conception
4. <i>Chhā. U. vii, 4, 1</i>	will	Entschluss	will	conception
5. <i>Chhā. U. vii, 8, 1</i>	will	Wunsch	wishes	conception
6. <i>Bṛh. U. I, 3, 3</i>	representation	Entscheidung	determination ⁵	imagination
7. <i>Bṛh. U. II, 4, 11</i>	percepts	Strebungen	determination ⁵	intentions
8. <i>Svet. U. 3, 8</i>	thoughts	Vorstellung	determination ⁵	conception
9. <i>Katha I, 10</i>	(<i>Itatā</i>) pacified	beruhigten Gemüths	appeared in thought	intent appeared

We can sympathise with the translator's need, in using equivalents that do not coincide, of varying his renderings to suit the context. We could humour the alternatives: will, Entschluss, wishes, intentions, resolve, etc. But there must be a limit to alternatives, and we cannot justify a tether so loose that it brings in, with these, percepts, conception, ascertaining, representation, imagination, thoughts, Vorstellung, etc. We can only conclude, either that the translators were uncertain as to the meaning, or that precision in terms of mind was not a part of their mental equipment. If so, they falter in notable company. No one thrust the potency in the idea of will upon dormant European philosophy as did Schopenhauer, yet how slovenly he is in psychology one needs not much reading of him to find out.

Not only do translators here and there camouflage in

¹ S.B.E. i, XV.

² *Seckrig Upanishad's.*

³ *Twelve Principal Upanishads.*

⁴ *Thirteen Principal Upanishads.*

⁵ *I.e., definition, not resolve.*

this way the word *samkalpa* as a makeshift for will, but, as we see, the word itself is not used to express any very *fundamental* aspect of man, much less the most fundamental aspect. Thrust for one moment into relief, in the reference No. 4,¹ as "greater than *manas*," it is dropped forthwith into the series as less than *cittam* and as, *a priori*, less than many other aspects. It was not an indispensable, a constant in Indian thought on man. And this is equally true of the phase of Indian thought termed Buddhist, as we shall see.

Was there then any other word, were there any other words, by which the early Indian literature expressed man as willer? May we perhaps judge, as Oldenberg suggests, that the inner activity we word by will was implied in the word *manas*, but was as yet undifferentiated? Oldenberg, in his later work,² has nothing about *samkalpa* (which barely occurs in the *Brāhmaṇas*), but is more concerned with *kratu*, a word also of active import, and occurring frequently in Vedic works. Here, he judged, we have a word bound up with *manas*, and meaning both insight how to act and will to act. Such a meaning is implied in *manas* itself, e.g., in the passage "when he desires with *manas*."

If then we are discussing a stage of wording "man" prior to such differentiations, we need not judge that we are considering the records of an abnormal section of humanity. But let us not forget this—it is the very gist of what I have here to say—if the ancient Indian worded both mind and will by words belonging to the category of mind, leaving will to be implied,

¹ See table on previous page. "Greater" should be "more."

² *Die Weltanschauung der Brahmanatexte*, 69, n. 2.

it is evident that, for him (assuming we translate truthfully), man was mainly minder, not willer. Willing was an adjunct of thinking.

It is possible, too, that among the European branches of the Aryans we should not find, at so early a date, the notable developments of the *WAL* stem. Of those other branches, the Greeks, in their greatest thinkers, came nearer than India to a worthy conception of all that is really implied in our own words will and willer. They too earnestly worded the "man"; they earnestly worded man as both seeking the good, and as capable of becoming better. They conceived his inner world as "movements." And among these movements of the psyche they reckoned the will-word *boulē*, *boulesthai*. Plato even saw *bouleisis* in his conception of the Divine. But they did not raise the notion of will to that true worth which still is lacking even in our own outlook. A thoughtful writer, Miss Mary H. Wood,¹ has laid all the works of Plato under embargo to show that, while a definition, a doctrine of will—she adds "hypostatisation of will"—is not in him, the real thing is there, in that his whole philosophy treats man as exerting self-activity.

This is, I hold, most true. And Aristotle herein followed in Plato's wake. Miss Wood, as a special pleader, forces the note occasionally, over-emphasising a "principle of growth" in *phusis*, and "process of becoming" in *kinesis*, but both thinkers, I grant, were feeling out after a view of man as willer. It was only the heavy hand of tradition shaping the view of man as mainly thinker which hindered them from a truer perspective.

¹ *Plato's Psychology in its bearing on the Development of the Will*, 1909.

Professor Bloomfield finds the equivalent, for ancient India, to our "will" in the Indian "desire."¹ He quotes the notable passage from the Upanishads: "Man is wholly formed from 'desire' (*kāma*); as is his desire, so is his 'insight' (*kratu*); as is his 'insight,' so does he the deed (*karma*); as he does the deed, so does he experience."

This is well said. *Kāma* undifferentiated serves here for will, and might have continued worthily to do so. But it underwent that specialisation which usually connotes depreciation. And with regard to this poor, over-driven word "desire," here it is the modern translators who (with the exception of the more discerning Deussen) have failed to differentiate. As I have pointed out long ago, "desire" has been fitted by various translators to no fewer than sixteen Pāli words, all conveying varying meanings of, as we might say, feeling *with some coefficient* of will, or conversely.² It is here that *kāma*, in noun and verb, does play a fairly large part in the Indian's inner world emerging in action. It is even placed at the back of the all-creator's fiat in creating (*akāmayata*), both in Vedas and old Upanishads, as the wish of God.³ On the other hand, we find the word, in the troubled conscience of the Buddhist, restricted, I think without exception, to the world of man's sense-desires and sense-pleasures. But, for the desire stirring in the man of the Buddhist literature towards the Fit or Best—now worded as *sammā* or *brahma*-, not as *ātman*—we come upon very different terms.

¹ *The Religion of the Veda*, p. 259 f.

² So also Tatya and Hume; Deussen: "Begierde" = craving.

³ M. Müller: "will." I do not find "insight" a just rendering.

⁴ E.g., *JRAS.*, 1898, "The Will in Buddhism," p. 47.

⁵ Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, 179, n. 3.

Here the wordlessness I have commented upon becomes more marked and less explicable. The older literature is in its way as "religious" as is the Buddhist and the Jainist. And it is more closely concerned with the "man" than are these in the relatively later ideas which are *practically all that we get* in either scriptures. But that older Brāhmanic thought did not concern itself searchingly with man's *choice of conduct*, with man's will to righteousness as the essential in religion. Nor did it *systematically* analyse and define man as an outer and inner microcosm. Hence that older thought was not so travailing as were its successors with the *springs* of action, nor with the analysis of man, *as willing or not willing* to walk in a Way towards the Best. It could therefore use more lightheartedly, less anxiously, all available words bearing on its goodly, brave world of warrior and priest, of thinker and worker. It could mean much in little; or it could, as it willed, deploy some word here and there, especially if a little entertaining word-play were possible. And so we get a pleasant if incidental sing-song wording on *kā*-alliterations about wishing, enjoying, working; on *kalp-kṛp*-alliterations about planning and uniting; on *var*-alliterations about boons and rank, and so forth. The authors make out their "gods as loving cryptic speech,"¹ but that was because early man himself loved the oracular and the pun.

But in the Buddhist books, while we have also oracle and pun, we are in a world that has been changing. Attention is fixed on the plastic nature of man, on his being in a "way" of becoming better or worse,

¹ Ait. U. iii, 14, etc.; Bṛh. U. iv, 2, 2; Kau. U. ii, 1.

on his composite nature, on his serial life. Here, if ever or anywhere, was the world, one would think, where man's somewhere innate tendency to become "better," to live up to the Right (*dhamma*) which the whole. Buddhist teaching sought to develop, called aloud for a distinguishing, called aloud for a wording of what it was in man which could express that tendency. For *what was it* in man that sought after the best, the "right" in thought, word, and deed? What was it in man that responded to the teacher's monitions herein? *Manas* the mind, *citta* the observer, would never "seek," would never "move towards." What was it but "will" that moved, that sought?

Yet in this world we no more find that clear distinguishing, that adequate wording than we did before Buddhism arose. Some wording we do get. In the teaching, initiated (in wording in a dialect largely lost) by Gotama, and developed in "Pāli" by the church, which acknowledged him as its supreme teacher, we get a wording of human nature that plays all round the will, assumes it, evokes it in such words as *chanda*, *viriya*, *vāyāma*, *iddhi*, *padhāna*, etc., regulates and "tames" it. We get a wording of amity (good will) to men, of quest for one's own and of others' welfare. We get a wording of man's personality as composite. Yet we never get a wording of, a name for, man's tendency to seek his good as a bed-rock factor in his nature, nor any grasp of it as that on which his salvation depends.

I have tested the worth attached to will by indexes. Let us do so once more. In his valuable Coda to the Sacred Books of the East, the *General Index*, Dr. Winternitz has had eight volumes of Buddhist classical

works before him. Yet his articles on Will and Volition are *entirely unaffected by this increment*. The articles are of the briefest, and not one reference to those eight volumes is in them. The only references are to Pahlavi and Vedāntic texts. (The articles on Desire and Tapā are almost equally meagre.) Such a silence is impossible had a clear wording of will been forced from the pen of the translator by their subject-matter.

But while there is no clear word for that in man which could worthily respond and react to the Buddhists' system of *sikkhāpada* or training, they were not without makeshifts, else neither could they have formulated nor could we read of such a system.

In the first place, as with the Vedic wording so with them, the words *citta*, *cetas*, *cetanā*, all wording what we express by mind or thinking, awareness or consciousness, are now and then used in such an active or volitional sense as we convey by the words intent, purpose, or will, when the speaker wishes to express this aspect of mind. This is true also of *mano*. *Manokamma* "action of mind" can mean "will-to-act," notably in the Upāli-Sutta.¹ In it, as has been said, mind is viewed as active process. So is *cetanā* which, in one Sutta² (but in one only) is stated, like *manas*, to be action (*kamma*):—

"I say, monks, that *cetanā* is *kamma*. When we have *cetayitā*, then we make action of deed, word, and thought."

Manasikāra, again, "work of mind," is another word, unspecialised in the early literature and possibly

¹ *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I, 375 f.

² *Anguttara*, III, p. 415.

used with volitional application.¹ Again, we read of Gotama being made to say, he forced his *citta* by *cetas*,² albeit *cetas* is nowhere, early or later, defined, distinctively or otherwise.

Citta is even used to cover the four well-known Suffusion-sentiments called Brahmavihārā, or divine states, a volitional rite of aspiration ascribed to brahmins, but adopted by Buddhism. They are spoken of as the love-*citta*, pity-*citta*, (sympathy-with) joy-*citta*, equanimity-*citta*. In each of them, starting with a person, a house, a street, and so expanding, one suffuses (*pharati*) the person, etc., with these *cittas* in turn. We should call this "willing" or "wishing" the welfare of others with love, or pity, etc., there being of course present the thought or idea of those others. We ought not, as we now tend to do in treating of the subject, to lose sight of the will in the feeling. If Buddhists did not word will in them, neither did they word them as emotion. The whole inner man was engaged in these *citta*'s. And if we were to translate *citta* here by "will," we should be psychologically correct, but we should be historically wrong. Oldenberg discusses them—without psychological insight—as "a psychic gymnastic for a man of feeling." This is again historically (as well as psychologically) wrong. The Buddhist uses no emotional terms save in naming three of the *cittas* as amity, pity, joy (with others' joy). But he speaks of a "radiating"—admirable and true word!—whereby his *thought* spreads and spreads till the very world is warded by (the good will in) it.

¹ Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 95, n. 1, and Mr. Aung's note, p. 282.

² *Majjhima*, i, 242.

³ *Pharati*. Lord Chalmers is the first so to render the word in this connection.

Yet earlier probably he expressed this as a creating (*bhāvanā*) of amity.¹ And he speaks here of "the mother."² But he is not referring merely to her sentiment towards her only child, but to her warding will of him. Her love is but the reverberation of her very synergy.

In the second place, Pāli tried to make good its want of a worthy word for the strenuous and systematic mental and moral training it so commended, by certain adjunct words, some of which are strong and lusty. We find *saṅkalpa* again as *saṅkappa*. This is both raised to a factor in the Eightfold Way of the Middle Course of the right living, and it has a definition peculiar to itself and one other term in Abhidhamma. It is defined (and so is *vitakka*) as lifting the mind on to its object, disposing or adapting or applying it.³ Hence it is what we should now be disposed to call attention. And the word is often rendered intention. Corresponding to the *sāntasaṅkalpa* or "appeased intentions" of the Upanishad term, we get twice the compound *paripunṇasaṅkappa* "fulfilled" or "satisfied aims."⁴ We have here, as in attention, mind active, alert, purposive. To that extent a will-word is found. Yet nowhere is any use made of the term in the structure of the fivefold or *khandha* summary of man as body and mind. No factor or factor-group of this is reserved for will-terms. In the Abhidhamma analyses, where the group called *saṅkhāras* or "plannings" is specified under some fifty items, *saṅkappa* and *vitakka* are both included, as is also *cetanā*. But

¹ *Sutta-Nipāta*, 507: *mettāṃ cittaṃ bhāvayāṃ appamāṇaṃ*.

² *Khuddakapāṭha*, *Sutta Nipāta*, Vis. Magga, ch. ix.

³ *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, § 7, 21.

⁴ *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 192, 200; iii, 275 (mistranslated by Neumann).

they are defined, as always, more intellectually than volitionally. And they are classed in a list in which will is less represented than is either cognition or emotion. It is indeed curious that a term so suggestive of will, of *mano-kamma*, of man's inner world as movement, activity, as is *saṅkhāra* should have been thrown away as effective for will-classification, and have served as a dumping-ground for whatever did not fit under the other three mental groups: feeling, perception, mind (consciousness, cognition). If I have rendered the term by "synergies," it is merely to give a literal Englishing of the Pāli. It has no more reference to the miscellany classed under the term, than has *saṅkhārā*. The only old definition we have of *saṅkhārā*,¹ enforced by the Commentary, is that of a prepared complex. Yet among the 50 are items such as "calm," "rapture," "mindfulness," which we should not so describe. I am inclined to think that when those 50 items came to be specified, *saṅkhārā* had lost its old quasi-volitional force, and that the Buddhist teaching was virtually considering the items more as just *cetasikā*, mental adjuncts, "mentals," which were even then in use,² and were soon after to supersede the skandha classification.

Other noteworthy substitutes are three words of vigour: *iddhi*, literally "effecting," "having wrought"; *viriya* "energy," "effort"; *padhāna* "effort," "endeavour." Of these *iddhi*, as a mode of supernormal will-power, meets us throughout Pāli literature. Yet

¹ *Samyutta*, iii, 88. Cf. *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 50 f. In the Suttas there are only three *saṅkhāras* spoken of: those of deed, word, and thought, meaning pre-requisites. (*M.* i, 54, 301). Buddhaghosa's gropings here in *Visuddhimagga*, xvii, are not without interest.

² *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, § 1,022, and note.

it seems to be nowhere intelligently defined. Nor was it a faculty of the normally human. It was "psychic," abnormal, and as such to be found only in the few, whether morally worthy or morally unworthy. As now, quite a small minority then possessed or developed it. It was not the will of the average man. But it was in the few a tremendous *will-phenomenon*.

Viriya on the other hand and *padhāna* are both practicable, and should be practised, by every man who is morally earnest. *Viriya* is "mental inception of energy, striving, onward effort, exertion, endeavour, zeal, ardour, vigour, fortitude, unflinching verve, sustained desire, unflinching endurance, and firm grasp of the burden, right *padhāna*."¹ *Padhāna* is nowhere so defined; its modes are described in terms of moral training;² it is used to describe four modes of *iddhi*,³ but it is not included in the factors distinguished under the mental group *saṅkhārā*. *Viriya* is so included. And whereas, for all the fine earnestness shown in the teaching as to the importance of energy, endeavour, and "ardour in effort," no sign betrays that herein the most fundamental factor of mind itself (*citta, mano, viññāṇa*) was being laid hold of, we can at least say, that Buddhists in those terms just missed stumbling upon a notable doctrine of will. They were all the nearer not only to a doctrine of will, but to a truer doctrine than any psychology has yet put forward, in that, for them, *virīya* and *padhāna* were bound up with growth, with progress. To the world the saintly "almsman" may have appeared

¹ *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, § 13.

² *Ibid.*, § 1366, v.

³ *Buddhist Psychology*, 2nd ed., p. 299 f.

a Quietist, but his inner world was seething with energy.

O see my forward strides in energy!¹

is a recurring note in the anthology. The Community was

Of strenuous energy and resolute,
Ever advancing strongly . . .²

For the conception of the believer's remainder of life as a "way," was a transformed one. It was no longer the endless round of *saṃsāra* which we have renamed "transmigration." It had become a progress in holiness. It was a way of growth in many worlds. Here is a notable growth-word: "Growing by the five growths the Ariyan woman-disciple grows with the Ariyan growth; she becomes one who lays hold of the real (*sāra*) and of the excellent (*vara*) things in her person, to wit, faith, morals, learning, giving up and wisdom."³

The books hover in this way about this vital notion of growth (*vaḍḍhi* or *vuḍḍhi*, and *anubhūheti*, cf. Dhṛ. Comy, ii, 107), but just miss gripping the truth, that their central tenet of the Way is just that: growth of the *man* (not only of body or mind) along the agelong way of the worlds.

Still nearer was Buddhism to a worthy theory of will in yet another word, the word *chanda*. Abhidhamma early and late has been psychologically sound enough to save the term from the monastic associations which often lowered it to the level of *kāma*.

¹ *Psalms of the Brethren*, ver. 224 and others.

² *Psalms of the Sisters*, ver. 161.

³ *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, "Mātugāmo," § 10. "Person" = *kāyassa*, lit. group—i.e., either body or the whole person.

The Sutta usage wavers. Now *chanda* ranks with *viriyā* and its equivalents *vāyāma*, *ussaḥhi*, *ussāha*, *padhāna*;¹ now it named, as that, the suppression of which is the aim of the holy life. There was righteous desire, *dharmmacchanda*. And later, *chanda*, as such, is described as an un-moral "desire-to-do" (*kattu-kamyatā*). I have sought for many years² to do justice to this distinction, not without some special pleading. It was impossible without a hot sense of injustice to read the many fine calls in the *Nikāyas* on what we call the will, the earnest exordiums to energy, to noble quest (*ariya-pariyesanā*), to progress in the way, the lovely "faith in what we may become,"³ and then to note how translators and narrators glossed over it all and emphasised only "extinction of desire."

Yet after all Buddhism has been its own worst enemy. When the eminent disciple Ānanda told a brahman that elimination of *chanda* was the object of the holy life⁴—that the saint did but exercise *chanda* to gain his saintship and then needed it no further—"just as you, brahman, exercised *chanda* to come and find me, and have it now no longer"—we begin to see why it is that Buddhism had no worthy conception of will. For it the perfected man is a will-less man. He is not without intellectual or emotional powers. But he is depicted as using these for joyful retrospect over victory won in past struggle. He is conceived as so near the final mysterious change, past birth and death, of *parinibbāna*, that he is already *nibbata*, "in"

¹ E.g., *M.* i, 480; *A.* ii, 194 f. iii, 108.

² *JRAS.*, 1898, 49 f.; *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, 1900, p. lxx; *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 125, 153, 167; *Compendium*, 244.

³ Wordsworth, *Prelude*.

⁴ *Saṃyutta*, v. 272; *Chandapakkāṇatikāma*.

Nibbāna "the goal." He has "done what was to be done."¹ He can no longer become. And so he has ceased to will. Will is therefore not of the nature of man; it was not as were *citta* or even *redaṇā*. *A fortiori*, there could be no vision of the Man as Pure Will in Parinirvāṇa. Groped after by the brahman in his conception of the Divine Desire in creation, it was repudiated in all other such conceiving, much more so by Buddhism harping on its *Anicca*, *Anattā*.

When we read such vigorous will-words as these—"When a man is not thoroughly aware of some blemish, he will not bring *chanda* to birth, he will not strive, he will not set energy afoot to get rid of it,"² we ask, how can we say there is no wording of will in Buddhism? But when we read such words as Ānanda's we realise that, for Buddhism, such activity was not of the very life of the complete man, but was only an episode, was only the writhing of the learner.

Nearer still to a really worthy theory of will was Buddhism (as was Jainism) in the frequent use, in the training, of the causative form of the word "to become" *bhavati*, namely, the form *bhāveti* "to make-become." In our poverty of words for this notable expression, we render the term by meditation, practice, cultivation. These by no means coincide with *bhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* is not a learning by intellect, which also requires practice, cultivation. It is a developing-one's-self-into, a re-creating-one's-self-according-to an ideal. For example, the difference between *viññāṇa* and *paññā*, both words being forms of "to know,"

¹ *Kalam karāṇīyaṃ Bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vusseti.*

² *M.* i, 25. Lord Chalmers, in his admirable translation of the *Majjhima*, renders *chanda* by will-power, but this is a reading too rich for the Pāli.

is that the former is so to be understood, the latter is to be made-to-become.¹ For in the original Sākya from which "Buddhism" grew, *prajñā* will have been that potential Deity which was man's very nature.

Is it not a little singular, that with such a view of religious training, in which the disciple is expected to concentrate with utmost *vim* and *verve* on growing into, on becoming what he was not before, and which is figured as a way or road strenuously, unfalteringly pursued towards a goal, we should not find man conceived as a *willer* putting forth will—that we should only find man conceived as a *minder*, or as *mind*, set in body,² and having certain mental adjuncts or coefficients of energy, endeavour, desire, intention, which were to be discarded with maturity, with perfect attainment? How was it that the Buddhist teaching, finding no worthy form of *var-* to hand, did not look on man as essentially *using viriya*, or *chanda*, or as essentially *becoming* in his Way to Well? Why is there not even a *bhāvanā* or *viriya-khandha*? How was it that Buddhists made shift with these terms as merely incidental in the life they held most worthy, and not as fundamental in man's nature?

It is not enough to say that they did not find wording corresponding to ours ready to their hand. They were so far pioneers in wording, that they brought into use, brought into high relief, brought into re-created use words which we do not find employed till Buddhists employed them. Where once men "will" strongly about anything not covered by the day's wording, they will find a name for it. Language old and new is strewn with these increments.

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 293; *pariñhāsaḍḍam* . . . *bhāvetabbā*.

² *Dīgha*, i, 77; *Majjhima*, ii, 17.

It is an interesting problem and not to be solved in a sentence. To some extent, I repeat, they were their own hinderers. They felt after the truth that man, as he becomes better, is not as it were dressing or painting himself with something external, but is undergoing an inner *change*. Yet they feared the idea of change. Never are the words "transient," or impermanent, otherwiseness, or change used in any sense save as ushers-in, or guarantees of ill. They pictured spiritual progress as a *making to become*, *bhāvanā*, yet they strained every nerve to suppress the tendency "to become," i.e., be reborn (*bhava*). They spoke of saintly advance, yet they aspired to cut short vital progress by a cessation of that way of life in the upward way of the worlds, and by hustling on a final change for which not a single man on earth was ready. And in resisting rightly the brahmanic conception of the real man as unchanging, and as, even now, if he knew it, actually, not potentially Very God, they emptied the flux of man's activities, bodily and mental, of the man. Nay, thereby they emptied the stream itself, and spoke of the banks as the river.

Now we cannot get very far in an adequate notion of will without the willer. We may cheat ourselves by figuring *thought* as a world of impressions and ideas, and by figuring *feeling* as waves of somatic resonance or what not. But we cannot get on thus with will. Because will is a self-directing. And the Buddhist, with his excellent emphasis on the "taming of the self" and self-reliance, had inherited a protest against self conceived as God. This he *came to interpret* as meaning there was no self at all. So he barred the way to a clear view of all that *bhāvanā* implied.

In such considerations as these there may lie material to account for Buddhism, with no word for will in its world-heritage, finding or annexing any adequate term for that self-directed activity which it so zealously and admirably fostered.

Other considerations too we must take into account, considerations of world-currents, where Buddhism itself is merged in Aryan history, nay, is but a ripple in the word-growth of man himself. The laying hold and developing of the root-word for choice as *wai*, *weil*, *wel*, *wil*, instead of leaving its form *wey* in relative atrophy, belongs to most of those Aryans who took, not the southern (possibly the earliest) trek into India, but who went westward by the longer trek and spread over Europe north, west, and south. And of these it is at least noteworthy that the branches most potent and effective in moulding Europe by common action of each were the Latin, the worder of *wolo*, *uolle*, *wale*, and the Teuton, the worder of *Wahl*, *Wille*, *Wohl*. There would seem never to have been any such consensus of a race in action in Indo-Arya as to be driven to word itself by such ways. Nor of the Hellenic world, galvanised briefly into patriotic action, though it was, by Persia.

But the stage of Indian thought we have been considering is older by a little than these developments of European Arya, old enough to be the more overshadowed by the prior world-wording, in terms for thought and mind and action as compared with words otherwise expressing man. Man was first and foremost a beholder, a namer, once he tried to word himself. He was as we see Adam represented, looking at and naming a procession of interesting beasts.

He could do very little with his world. His will was very limited. He was a child of fate and the unseen. What he feared therein, and what he sought help from, was Will, yet he pictured it as power and as the To-be-placated. In course of time he figured it as Mind, like himself.

In these ways too, then, the sons of Indo-Aryans were kept, by obstacles not of their own making, from developing a self-expressing of man as willer equal to that of him as minder.

In conclusion I would say, that to render Pāli words in our own Western wording of will-terms is to let *traduttore* become to some extent *traditore*. I write this with a guilt-stained pen, which cannot be washed white. In changing the English of *cetanā* from thinking to volition,¹ I have consented to use the meaning read into the word by the Burmese scholar of to-day. That there was some notion in the Abhidhamma editors' mind of distinguishing it from *citta*, such as we get implied here and there in the *manas* of the old Upanishads, is possible. Why else are we given both *cetanā* and *citta* side by side in, e.g., the Dhammasaṅgani? But to say "volition," weak form of will as it is, is going too far. Again, I am co-responsible for *cetas* as "will" in Mr. Woodward's *Kindred Sayings*, III. It also goes too far. So does "will-power" used in Lord Chalmers's translation of the Majjhima for *chanda*. It puts something there which the Buddhist editors had not. It is a little like translating the "wooden horse of Troy" by "camouflage." It is part of our duty, as translators, to our readers to make them realise that India had no word equating "will."

¹ *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, 2nd ed., *passim*.

It is true that, when we review the muddled way in which "will" is used in general literature, and the boycotting (with furtive reinstating here and there) of the word "will" in current psychology, it may seem to matter very little where or how the word is made to serve in work on Buddhism. But for me that is not so. I see in the word "will," now under a passing shadow, or in the dust of misuse, a most precious legacy, a word pregnant with a great future. I will try to say why I see this.

We have the heritage which Buddhists had not. We have the word "will," and its daughter "well"—for "well" is just what we "will"-to-be. And we are freed, as the Buddhists were not, from a call to protest against a current use of the word "self," that is, "the real man," and also from the strangle-hold on life of a monastic ideal. In other words, we can believe that both God is spirit (*pneuma ho theos*) and we are spirit, and we do believe in life; we hold that the words: "I am come that ye might have life and that ye might have it more abundantly"¹ are a bigger, truer gospel than that man should renounce all substrates of rebirth. Like the Buddhists we hold that everything is in a state of change, that we *are* not so much as we are *becoming*. Unlike the Buddhists we do not view this world-fact *as a whole* with deprecation. We believe, with them, that there is a becoming worse in this or that aspect of life. But, unlike them, we believe that becoming better is that the *whole* man and the complete man should progress, not the man or woman who has renounced the betterment of the race in the family, the community, the nation, and has simplified his or her life to a segregated, a-sexual wrestling

¹ John's Gospel.

against human nature. We do not believe that man's progress, as man, is assured, aloof from that great laboratory of experiment in good will, life in the world. We believe, more consistently than the Buddhists, in the necessity and value of "making-to-become" (*bhāvanā*), for we believe in education, in training, in culture, in development, in evolution, in reform in the world by the world. We believe, theoretically, that we cannot stand still; we must go on, if we would not stagnate, rust, fall back, become Rip van Winkles. Actually we are not so consistent. We still hold there are traditions, "instincts"—oh, the word-fetter there for man!—tendencies we shall ever follow unchanging.

Here it is, that our psychology, no less than that of the Buddhists, is a creaking, still primitive vehicle. And we have not their excuse. We are still, as we ought not to be, overshadowed by the primitive domination of the old attitude: that man's inner world is fundamentally a beholding, a naming. We have not got to the bottom of what that inner world fundamentally is. When we shall have taken right home this thing, that the living man's fundamental self-expression is a radiating movement, an activity from within, after something felt to be "well"—whether we call it life-preserving, or "better," or well-being, or welfare matters little—that in exercising this *he* is "becoming" (and in "becoming" is making to become), that in "becoming" he is finding a way (*maggā*) towards what he deems is "well"—when, grasping this, we shall call that radiating movement of becoming:—"will to well"—then at length our psychology will become fit both for the great legacy it has in these two words and also for

the new heritage it holds in awareness of what they imply. Not ours should it be to rest contented with the saying of Kant : " You can for you ought." More fit for us is it that we say : " As willers we bear in us the guarantee of becoming whole." •

XIV

THE WILL IN BUDDHISM¹

SOME fifty years ago I was angled into the study of Buddhism by that fisher of men, Rhys Davids, my husband. He lured me by a double bait: the women poets of early Buddhism with their unique Anthology, and the psychology of Buddhism. In those days I was as keen as was he about the developments unfolding in the life of women generally; moreover, I had emerged from University studies with a strong bent for psychology. He assured me that along these two lines of Buddhist research I should be travelling on unbeaten ways, and be able to make a beat that would be my own. Nobody had exploited them with any appreciable result. The field was "white unto harvest; the labourers were nowhere. . . . Go you ahead!" I went "ahead," progress somewhat complicated by marriage and family, not to mention golf, which I took up to console me for bidding farewell to mountaineering.

Now my University College teacher, George Croom Robertson, had sown in my memory a notable saying: was it not truer to say, not with Descartes *Cogito ergo sum*, but *Opto*, I choose, that is, I will: *volo*, nay, I act: *ago, ergo sum*? This too he left with me: did British psychology, nay, did any psychology, do justice to "will"?

A joint result of the influence of these two men was,

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, 1940.

that after some sixteen years I put on record, at a Paris Congress, a general impression made on me by psychological data in such Buddhist scriptures as I had handled. This was that, whereas these scriptures emphatically taught man to will to train his will, there was in them no word we could translate as adequate to our own very strong clear word "will," let alone "willer."

As to that, have you, my reader, ever thought how curious it is, that there is apparently in no language save English, any word for "willer"? My French dictionary has only *celui qui veut*. And when an article of mine was translated into German, the rendering *Woller* had for me a forced factitious sound. Even in my big Americanised Webster, "willer" is inserted below among "rare and obsolescent terms," a slight we do not offer to the analogous terms "thinker," "feeler" or other psychological words.

I said in that paper, that Buddhist unawareness of this defect (let alone the unawareness of writers on Buddhism) was like the unawareness of the men of Soli, when they in speaking committed what Attic taste called solecisms—borrowing a quip of Matthew Arnold's. There seemed a curious dumbness in wording the very keynote, for so it seemed, around which those scriptures played so persistently.

Forty-two years since then have passed, and I still uphold that conclusion, that Buddhism, early Buddhism, was a gospel of will without a word for will. The newly-felt importance of will shook the religious mind of India. Makeshift words were used for will (Buddhists still use them); a word was coined¹; the new creed of Shakti (literally Ability) arose. But

¹ *Kartukamyāda* = "desire-to-do-ness."

exponents, Buddhists and other, remained myopic, and Buddhism came to be considered as a cult based on "knowledge"! It remains then for me to close the work passed on to me on this same, this very note: adding a few maturer riders.

I have spoken of makeshift terms. I mean, terms for "mind," in which, so it is insisted, "will" was implied. Again, there were many terms for "desire" —at least translators among them have boiled down some sixteen Pāli words as meaning desire. But desire is also, like those mind-terms, a mixed word as compared with the undiluted term "will." Again, there was, I found, a fine group of terms for "effort, energy, endeavour." The second of these, *virīya*, had evidently come to be used not in its older sense of manhood's essence or manliness, or *vim*, but as just our "energy." To use these hitherto little-used terms was evidently a felt need. The Buddhist teacher was ever directing learners to be in a state of getting further, making the new to become, to be not contented with standing still, to be choosing the better, rejecting the worse, to be as wayfarers seeking to get somewhere, enjoined to practise four sorts of "right exertion" or striving (*padhāna*). We find that he who in the far future was to be reborn as "buddha" would spend time in "striving the striving" (*padhānam padahitvāna*),¹ and would exercise will as to that future by making a "strong resolve," literally a superfetching-out (*abhi-nihāra*).²

¹ "Striving the striving, having done deeds hard to do . . . he will become enlightened. . . ." *Lineage of Buddhas*, p. 26, *passim*. (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, IX.)

² E.g., "Having made the resolve to become a buddha . . ." *Jātaka, Nidāna-kathā*, 14.

So I wrote, and have been writing: Here is a gospel of will and no fit word. And to this I add: we have to seek this gospel under four disguises: (1) in words for mind implying a coefficient of will; (2) words for desire, that is, for feeling with a coefficient of will; (3) words for effort, which is not will, but a mode of using it; (4) the marked use of the word "to become," especially in the "causative" mood of "making become."

Was early Buddhism opening up anything new in its predilection for these four sets of terms? Indeed it was. You will find nothing like that predilection in earlier Indian literature. Effort in religion, making-become in religion is either not there, or is barely beginning. You were taught and so you learnt to know, and you got "saving knowledge"—and that was that. But that, in religion, man is willing to find out, willing to become, that is, to grow spiritually, to shape his life anew, to translate his religion into conduct, into life: this is relatively little mentioned, still less insisted on. You could put it all into one page of Veda or Upanishad. I have not made myself popular with defenders of Vedānta in saying so, and have heard Dharma Sūtras referred to as filling this gap in religious teaching. And among these champions are found they who maintain that those Sūtras are in date pre-Buddhist, pre-Jainistic. European scholars I believe are agreed that they are, in their completed form, of much later date, and I follow them in the belief, that in these Sayings, as we now find them, we have a Brahmanic reaction to the ethical reform effected before them by both Jain and Buddhist teaching. We know that Protestant reform in Europe had an analogous effect.

Now it was because my husband brought me into

Buddhist study by way largely of psychology, that I came early right up against this matter of will and lack of words for it. He gave me, as an unpicked bone, the first book of Abhidhamma, that is, the third of the three Baskets or Caskets of the Pāli Canon, the Basket dealing wholly with definitions and debates. It is as if the compilers of these curious, often tiresome works of catechism-in-terms realised how differently in some ways they had come to teach (that is down three centuries of ecclesiastical existence) from other religious bodies, and how important it was, to be very sure how far these differences took them.

Thus this first book, published by the Royal Asiatic Society in 1900, begins with an analysis of what is in a man's mind, when he thinks a good thought. (This is followed by analysis of a bad thought, and of a morally indeterminate thought.) The answer is given in a list of modes of awareness arising from some sensation, or group of such. The items amount to fifty-six in number, beginning with contact, awareness as pleasant or not, perception, and so on. Among the fifty-six there is none that we can equate with such a term as will, choice, resolve, desire, wish. On the other hand, there are two compound terms, to wit, of thought with a coefficient of will: *chetanā*, literally, thinking, and *sankappa*, literally, composing. Both terms in use have a purposive, intending implication (So also has *manas*, which is allied to the Aryan *mens*, mind, but there it is merely used to define *chitta*, which had become the main term for thought or mind.) Again, there are two strong terms in the fifty-six for effort, that is, ways of using will.

Next comes a separate definition of each of the fifty-six, some being equated with others. The

definitions are, with two exceptions, very brief. These two are "wisdom" (*pañña*), a word ever held in early Indian literature in high worth, and one of those two strong terms referred to: "energy" (*virīya*, literally manliness, man-power), equated with *vāyāma*, effort. To "wisdom" is given a long list of synonyms. "Energy" makes a poor second, yet it is more richly defined than any of the other fifty-four. I quote:

"What is the energy that there then is? Mental inception of energy, striving and onward effort, exertion and endeavour, zeal and ardour, vigour and fortitude, state of unfaltering effort, state of sustained desire, state of unflinching endurance, solid grip of the burden, energy as faculty, energy as power, right endeavour: this is the energy that there then is."

Now I say it with confidence, there is nothing like this in Indian literature earlier than the Buddhist. The Vedic form *virya* hardly ever occurs in the former. It occurs only once in the earlier Upanishads, in the *Kena*:

With the Self one finds *virya* . . .

This is a notable saying, whether the "self" (*ātma*) mean man or Deity. "Spirit" were perhaps a better rendering. But, later on, when India came to settle on definite attributes for Deity, she fell psychologically short. The three terms that became orthodox were Being, Thought, Bliss; energy, let alone will, did not come into the picture; the concept was merely static.

I have spent myself for some years in trying to maintain, that in the value given by Buddhism to the dynamic in religion, i.e., to will as of prime importance in man's religious quest, *a new message was brought to man* that was both true and vitally important. When, six centuries later, Jesus gave the earth another mandate, he unwittingly carried on this dynamic vein;

but he found a word for will at hand. Not so much in Greek. It was, we believe, in Aramaic that he will have said to the leper: "I will! Be thou clean!" *Savena!* In Indian idiom he would have had to say only "Mayest thou be clean!" Will reverberates through his utterances: "Thy will be done . . . not my will . . . if any man will to do his will he shall know . . ."

Nor do I find Zoroaster or Muhammed detected by scholars as having been in difficulties over the fit word for will, the latter least of all. But we do seem to trace in Plato such a want. I do not say Plato is aware, that when he used *kinesis*, movement, for man's self-directing activity, he lacked a satisfactory word for will. My friend, the late Mary Hay Wood, went carefully into this in her fine essay: *Plato's Psychology on the Development of Will*. It is we, with our stronger more distinctive word, who can see how he had to use in *kinesis* what was not a distinctive psychological term. Aristotle makes, so I find, no fruitful expansion of Plato's insight herein. He merely enumerates among factors of mind, *boulē*, a makeshift term for will. *Boulē* is, I read, counsel, advice, decrec, more than the self-directing activity which went to shape these—unless, in *boulē*, we have what is basically the same word as the Latin *volō*, our will. I would not presume to generalise about Aristotle's terminology, but I once knew well his *De Anima*, and it is there that we should have found grip of will, if in his mind-analysis any good Greek equivalent for it had counted much for him. But it evidently did not. We can anyway be grateful to him that he brought out elsewhere the distinction between potential and actual—another lack in India's vocabulary, and one sorely needed by

the Buddhist reform missionaries, as I have often tried to show. But I incline to think that, if Plato and Aristotle had had a word for will as strong and incisive as we have, they would have had, not only a spectacular effect on posterity's thought, but an effect that would have been more dynamic.

I would go further in this matter of lacking the fit word. I look for a day—perhaps the youngest among us may be here to see it?—when there will come to earth a new message by a yet unborn messenger, perhaps about something in life and religion that we yet, most of us, not all, see as through a thick veil. I mean, of course, man's next step in the hereafter. And unless we of to-day get ready for him now, and see to it that he has the fit word, his message too will be hindered both when given and in its after-effect. I see him urged to speak of man as gone before, but with no better word for him than a lie—the "dead"! What are we doing to make ready the way of that messenger?

But here and now I invite critical comment chiefly on a possible result of this absence of the fit word in the message which blossomed into a world-religion. I am ready, if convicted, to own myself wrong, but if I am right about this lack, then I hold that Buddhism, "a gospel of will without a clear word for will," became the sooner and the worse side-tracked *because of this lack*.

Something of this I tried to show some five years ago in a book called *Outlines of Buddhism*, in the two chapters entitled "What Buddhism tried to do" and "What Buddhism did."¹ What it "tried to do" was to deepen and expand the current teaching of

¹ Methuen and Co., 1934.

Immanence in some five ways. What Buddhism eventually "did" was, losing sight and touch of that current Immanence, to teach, as its very gospel, that which was only implied in that Immanence. This was, that a man must live his religion, must in daily conduct be by it inspired and moved, else is that Immanence worthless. This was all good and vital. But, through the losing sight of that religious ideal of Immanence, Buddhism degenerated into an atheistic system of ethics, and scarcely deserves the name of religion at all, save in one aspect of its Far-Eastern branch.

Now can it be shown that, even in what it did accomplish—religion to be realised in conduct—Buddhism became side-tracked the more and the sooner through having to use makeshift terms for will?

I think it can be. If we see in the religious will an urge towards the becoming better, this urge, this will, belongs inexpugnably to the man; not merely to "ideas about" his conduct or fellow-men. For each man the will in religion means "I, potentially God, will to become actually God." For himself the "I will" is just as forcible as was the *Savēna* of the tele-volution used by Jesus towards the leper. With the "I will," too, there goes the urge "I will try," try to do as I will. Here too is a lack in a needed word. I never find in Indian literature, pre-Buddhist and Buddhist, the word "try," that is, will passing into effort. There is plenty about states of mind. But whereas "will" and "try" are dynamic words, mind is more static. The cry "Mind! Mind what you are about!" is a call to temporary halt.

Now if, when you are considering mind-in-action,

you have to use makeshift words that are mainly of mind or thought, such as I mentioned, such words may have force when a speaker is behind them; but when they are learnt as recorded, when they are weighed in records, by posterity, they tend to become lifeless, they tend to have weight rather in their basic intention as intellectual, than in their adapted use as volitional. And so the real ideal of the early teaching as a new gospel of will fades out, and we only hear of Buddhism as a teaching based on knowledge. As a willing to learn, to get further, it has lost its original stress.

Here is an instance of this side-tracking.

We find in early Buddhism a practice called Jhāna, literally "musing," strongly enjoined. Note that the word does not mean "meditation," "reflection"; there were other words for these. It meant the alert brooding of one who is "on the look out" to become aware of. A formula of four stages came to be drawn up to help the learner, that is, to get rid of *this* world-awareness, so that other-world-awareness might be discerned. Now the needed word here was "attention," a will-term. But India had then no such word.¹ So, in the formula, the word for the state sought for was called *sati* (Sansk. *smṛti*), i.e., "memory," a word stretched by Buddhists to mean "mindfulness," much more of a mind-term than attention. And the result has been, that both Buddhists and writers have lost sight of the object of this Jhāna training, and adherents are no longer anxious to become, or capable of becoming, proficient in gaining psychically light and guidance from wiser men who have gone before. The original attitude in Jhāna was that of the child Samuel: Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth! The

¹ *Manasikāra*, often so rendered, was just "work of mind."

present attitude towards Jhāna is that it induces mystic insight on ideas !

There is another field in which we see only too well how this dynamic gospel failed to show itself in its true colours, and is perpetuated as mainly both contemplative and retrospective. Its true call was to the More, the Further, the Way thereto. But, in the very remarkable Anthologies called Verses of Monks and Nuns, the prevailing attitude of the singers is a contemplating of what they have done and won. The long trek remaining, calling for further work of will, has, in nearly every case, become blotted out. The exceptions are all the more interesting. Here are two, the only two, exceptions:

O would that I who hourly waste might change
For that which ne'er decays—who ever burn,
Might change for that cool bliss—e'en for the peace
That passeth all, safety without compare !

And

O when shall I, hearing the call adown the woods
Of crested peacock, as I lie at rest
Within the bosom of the hill, arise
And summon thought, desire,
To win the Immortal—
Yea, when shall that be ?

And so on for many verses. Now there are 264 of these poems in the Monks' Anthology and 73 in the Nuns', but not one of them shares in the openly expressed aspiration and forward view of these two. It is only in these that we find the volitional, the dynamic coefficient come to the front.

Yet one other symptom might be adduced of a falling away from the volitional interest to the intellectual. Of the numbered bodies of teachings traditionally held to have been finally enjoined by the

Founder, one body of four heads was on ideas about the man, as bodily, mental, etc., one, also of four heads, mentioned above, was on strivings to eject the spiritually undesirable and beget and foster the opposite. In the discourses, for one reference to the latter there are several to the former. This, not the latter, is the stand-by when life brings trouble. Yet those listed modes of striving are a unique feature in ancient scripture.

But—and it is an important "but"—Buddhism did more than exploit terms for effort in making good the lack of a word like will. It brought into fuller use the growing need it found for using the word "to become."

We see the use of this verb strangely increasing in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, the vehicles of the new turn-over in religion to that which we call Immanence. The defective verb *as*, "to be," had to call in, for the future tense, the help of the verb *bhū*, "to become." (Just as we had to call in, for our own defective verb "to be," the help of the verb "was," "were," a word meaning "dwell, dwelt," to help us express the past tense.) And this has been a danger, since "will be" and "will become" being, in Indian idiom, one and the same (borrowed) word: *bhavissati* (Sansk. *bhaviṣhyati*), the mere statement in "will be" of either new occurrence or recurrence usurps very often the stronger significance of "will become." And greatly has this, through the myopia of translators, hindered us from seeing the will-power in the form "will become," they nearly always selecting the form "will be." But that, in Immanence, the idea of Becoming the indwelling germ of Deity, the being actually what one is potentially, became a logical necessity in exposition: this goes far

to explain what I have wrongly called a "strange" increase in use.

In this verb *bhū*, it was the so-called Causative form that Buddhism brought into the heart of its teaching: I mean, not "become" only, but the making-become. Here was indeed a valuable makeshift for "will." To make a thing come to be is so clearly an effort of will, of constructive will.

Yet here again translators are ever throwing us off the scent. They, finding "make-become" not just "elegant," bring in every kind of substitute: develop, cultivate, school, breed, foster, drill. And, worst of all, they render the verbal noun *bhāvand*: the making-become, by "meditation." As if the thinking about growth were the fact of growth, the making grow. The sitting cross-legged and thinking "about" something is by no means the all-important thing in early Buddhism. Far more had you to be up and doing.

In those early days of seeing in Buddhism a gospel of will, translations had largely obscured how effectively it had sought, at its birth, to shield the current Immanence-teaching from its great danger: the danger of acquiescence in the doctrine: Thou art That! when the only rational attitude was: How can I become That?

And if I now say this final word about my immature conclusion, it is not to call it wrong, but rather to endorse it by showing, better than I could in the past, how early Buddhism, in feeling after a more rational attitude, stressed on the one hand the urgent need of effort and endeavour, and on the other, brought into use the forceful verb and noun of "making become." Yet how it, through want of a fit word, let alone other

causes, failed to irradiate the world, just as the Founder had willed, as a message of

Effort and expectation and desire,
And something evermore about to be !¹

And we shall only get this attitude in true perspective if we never forget, that it was focussed about the figure of life—not "this life only," but life as a whole—as a Road to a Goal, man's relation to man becoming therein and thereby that of fellow-wayfarer. Here is where ethical ideals become less a matter of love versus hate, of communal unity versus discord, but more a matter of comradeship in the way, and of how to forward the one supreme need of progress, of willed progress in the way.

This is not a matter of alien and old-world interest only. It is at the very heart of religion for all time. Thus, if our self-directing activity which we call "will" be essential to our nature, we must will, and, in willing, we must be in process of becoming better or worse. But, in that "to become" implies, not only "will to become," but also "becoming," what a guarantee is it not, that at long last we who will shall become, not only a Better but a Best, not only a Higher but a Highest, not only a More but a Most? Not yet, not here, of course, but ultimately, after our long, long way, the way of each of us, is done, and when the ideals that we now have, which are only of a Better, are transcended by the dawning vision of a Best beyond anything we can here and now conceive.

¹ The word "expect," not "hope," is a Pali scriptural term.

XV

A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF MAN¹

It is an old theory I have held for over forty years, a theory ever being supported by as many years of research, that Buddhism started as a gospel of will without a fit term to say so. A more academic phrasing of this were to say "started with a dynamic conception of man"—of man, not as an essentially static being, using and partly hindered by, a fleeting apparatus of body and mind (that is, ways of using body), but as, no less than they, a growing, evolving being, not liable as are they to periodical decadence, in that the maturity preceding that decadence has never been reached, but, so far as earth life shows, is ever yet to be.

If for this theory the agreement I may have hoped for has been chary and slow, I have ascribed it less to an error on my part, and more to writers about Buddhism failing to discern new influences at work diverting the youthful gospel, unbuttressed as yet by sanctions of "orthodoxy," to an adoption of other values, and hence other terms in its technique of teaching, when these, after the long interval usual in India, came to be recorded in scripture.

I discerned three influences as mainly effecting this "side-tracking":

(1) The rising preoccupation with a monastic régime. This in India, unlike Christian monasticism, took a

¹ Published in *Indian Culture*, 1939.

pessimistic turn, emphasising life as "ill," and exercise of will as mainly evil desire or craving or thirst.

(2) The growing analytic attitude towards man's inner world (proto-Sāṅkhya), a world where man's interest was held to begin in afferent rather than efferent phenomena: a "naming" rather than "handling."

(3) The preoccupation of the widening rift between the orthodox teaching of Immanence and a certain Protestant feature in "Śākya" concerning ritual and the Brahman tradition, whereby the more optimistic "forward view" in the former became ever more discredited, its main teaching coming to be merged, in the rift, with matters less essential.

I have come to see, that emphasis on these three points needs, as fourth, addition of emphasis on that very defect alleged in my theory: namely, that the "side-tracking" was strengthened and accelerated by want of a clear strong word like "will" to express the essence of the New Message. There had been such previously, but from very indifference perhaps to need of "will" in religion, they had been worsened or dropped. Such words were *kāma*, and *kratu* (as used in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad), and *karma* and *tanhā* (*trṣṇā*). To choose (*vijñā*) was evaded rather than used. And words for resolve, determination (*adhiṣṭhāna*, *abhinihāra*, *ajjhāsaya*) were rather inventions for a need felt later (with academic growth), than idioms of early usage.¹

Two courses lay open to the first "sons of the Śākyans" in their mission. The one, with which I have dealt elsewhere, was to adopt the growing use of forms of the verb *bhū*. These forms are present

¹ Cf. too the Abhidhamma invention *kattukamyatā*; also the growth of the Śakti cult.

in nearly every page of Buddhist scripture. The incoming especially of the causative form *bhāv-* seems to imply the felt want; "to make become" is so palpably an act of will. And I have found reason to suspect that the much emphasised "eightfold" quality of the "Way" the leading figure of the teaching, was a later insertion, where there had been elided the prefix *bhava* which (cf. *bhava-cakka*) had come to be a badly worsened word, even compared with things held most vile.¹ Used as it had come to be for "lives" and "worlds" held by the monk to be wholly "ill," emphasis of appreciation was shifted to the causative, and to the gerund (*bhāvā*). Thus what might have kept Buddhism to its first teaching became, in this verbal way, no sure buttress.

The other course was to lend new emphasis to terms of effort, energy and endeavour. These were, it is true, not will-terms; they were but modes of using will. They seem to have been little used before the Śākya missionaries began, yet were they unworsened. And no students of Buddhist Pāli literature should fail to note, that such terms are listed as second in number only to the (much longer) list of terms for *prajñā*, that word of loftiest import for Brahman as for Śākya, till, centuries later, we find it all but eliminated from a leading manual of philosophy. In one item indeed an all but identification is made with will itself. This is *viriyārambha*, or onset of energy. Now it is work of energy that makes us pick up and throw a stone, but the "onset" was inner and an act of will. The same word is used in a striking but wholly overlooked Sutta of the Fourth Collection (*Nikāya*), where Gautama is shown condemning a disbelief in the reality

¹ E.g., *Anguttara*, i, p. 34: clearly an added gloss.

of the self as agent with the words: When you shift your movement, is not that an "initiative" (or onset: *arabbhādhātu*) of yourself or another's self? Nevertheless, with such rare exceptions, the word "onset" is not found emphasised in the gospel of "the Way."

It is in the makeshift terms oftener used by Buddhism for "will," that I find need of a fourth point as contributory to its "side-tracking" from its original aim, terms, I mean, not of effort, but of mind, words of intellection, cognition. Such were *manas*, *citta*, *cetanā*, *cetas*, *saṅkalpa* and *sati* (*smṛti*). It is a common occurrence to find these terms used, not as pure work of thought, but as having so to speak a coefficient of will, such as we allow in the words: purpose, intention, design.

For instance, where, in the well-known four Divine Abidings (*brahma-vihārā*) the disciple sets himself to "suffuse" some absent X with needed amity, pity, etc., the feeble phrase is used: "*citta* accompanied by amity," etc., when what is much more needed is the strong televolition of "wills a suffusion of X with amity." Again, in the Sutta-Nipāta, the aged devoted Pīngiya says:

Worn out and frail am I,
so that my body fails to get to him,
but ever I go faring by effort of intent (*saṅkappayattāya*);
the mind of me is linked with him.

And another loyal soul, Anuruddha:

He when he knew my "will" (*saṅkalpa*),
as were his body made of mind,
came unto me.¹

¹ The verse adds *iddhiya upasaṅkami*, and the reader may say: here was a word at least as strong as "will." That may be, but was it a fit term for a gospel for "Every man"?

Manas too is classified as a species of action (*kamma*), as if looked upon not as a relatively static form of life any more than are the other two, to wit, *kāya* (overt action) and *vācā* (speech). But the force of this is weakened by the *afferent* emphasis laid on *manas* as the referee (*paṭi-saraṇa*) of the varied messages of the five senses. *Cetanā* too is in one context only called a species of *kamma*, and it is, though only in the later Abhidhamma exegesis, specially distinguished from *citta*, being likened to a master giving orders. Indeed, my late colleague Shwe.Z. Aung insisted that modern Burmese culture sees in it "volition" and not cognition. Deferring to this, I altered the translation of it from "thinking" to "volition" in reproducing my translation of Book I, and have borne in mind the implied volition in both this term and *cetas* ever since. Nevertheless these words, as compared with our will, or the older *kāma* and *kratu*, are as weak as is to-day the word "sentiment" when used to mean emotion or passion.

Finally, the term *sati* came to take on a new force in early Buddhism. I do not think this has been fully realised. Meaning *saraṇa* : memory (this is in Abhidhamma given as an equivalent), it is practically never taken to mean this save with the prefix *anu*. Actually it is used in the sense of mindfulness, attention, for which there was in older Pāli no special term. *Manasikāra* : work of mind, came it is true to have this specialised meaning, but only much later. In the Suttas its meaning, coupled with the adverbial term *yoniso*, is as unspecific as are the intellective terms *vitakka*, *vicāra*. But in exegesis its given meaning is a "mental expectant moving towards," similar to *āvajjana* : adverting. Even where the *anu* prefix

occurs, the meaning is as often a "dwelling upon" as in the category of the Anussatis, as a recollecting, as in the psychic gift of far-back memory: *pubbe-nivās' ānussati*. It may be remembered that when the preparatory process of "the four Jhānas" is completed the *jhāyī* has a mental *tabula rasa* save only for bare *sati* and poise, he being held then to be ready for experiencing such of the five *abhiññās*, of which he may be constitutionally capable. And in general the good disciple is ever bidden to be *sato* (or *sātimant*) and *sampajāno*: mindfully alert and intelligent, but with no special injunction herein that he recollect this or that in the past, as in memory. Compare too the force of *sati* in the four Satipaṭṭhānas. In the Abhidhamma definition of *sati* as *apilāpanatā*, or absence of superficiality of mind, this can hardly be interpreted as enjoining reminiscence, much less the *smṛti*, "tradition," of Brahman culture.

In so far as *sati* for early Buddhism meant "attention," it was a term of will as much as of cognition. Our psychology has done justice to that. And Jhāna, as I have often shown, as preparation for developing the *abhiññās* of clairvoyance and clairsaudience, made necessary this state of blank attentive alertness. That *sati* was used to denote this does give the will-coefficient that is in attention in a way that we have too much overlooked.

Now, in that the first Buddhist missionaries were compelled, in the attempt to expand the current Immanence by the quickening force of a gospel of choice and initiative—in other words of 'will'—to cast about for fit words, such as would appeal to the "general" outside the Academy, and in that they were, as I have shown, compelled to use the relatively makeshift

terms mainly of intellectual import, I suggest that these relative misfits would, with lapse of time, bring about more quickly a side-tracking of the original line of teaching. Such makeshifts may have force and fitness when a speaker is using them, able to clarify and guard his meaning by figure, by gesture, by what not. But when those weaker terms are learnt as recorded, when they become weighed in records by posterity, when eventually they become written records, they will tend to be of weight rather in their main, their basic meaning as intellectual, than in their implied and adapted use as volitional. And thus the real ideal of the original teaching as a new gospel of will would tend to fade out, and the subsequent teaching become one of preponderant introversive thought, and of "ideas about." As a new message Śākya called on man as seeker after Ātman, as reaching out after (*atthiko*) an Aim (*attha*), as choosing a Way, as willing to become actually That Who he was potentially. To realise the peak of the Immortal (*t'ama* 'agge), he needed to be "willing to learn" (*sikkhāhamo*). To get further (*uttarim karaniya*), he needed effort to become. He was to be ever "for the More" (*hand'āham atirekāyā'ti*). I have here suggested, that herein he was handicapped by lack of the fit, the clear word, word such as Jesus had ready to hand, and plentifully used. And the teaching became ever more one of, not a splendid More in life, but a Less, a Not.

XVI

THE BUDDHIST WAY IN THE WORLDS¹

I HAVE tried to say, in our post-lecture discussions here, that no world-religions are ready-made, reach-me-down things from a shelf, divine or otherwise, complete at birth as they appear in scripture. They are growths from the stems of earlier beliefs. This growth means that they have changed. We need to watch this changing growth if we would disentangle the original form from a later form.

With this need in mind we ask what had Buddhism, early and late, to say about our present subject, the destiny of man?

CORPORATE EARTH-DESTINY

About man's destiny on earth it had nothing of any positive interest to say. The earliest looking ahead that we find is of gloomy forebodings, both as to the limit in time of the "very-teaching," or *saddhamma*, and as to the worsening in the morale of the Order. We find "fears as to the future" among the Sayings referred to in the Asoka Rock-Edicts (the Saying you will find in the scripture *Anguttara-Nikāya*, III, pp. 100 ff.). Degeneracy in the Order is vividly dealt with in the poem ascribed to the Elder, *Pārāpariya*, No. 257 of the "Psalms of the Brethren," as a calamity already realised in his day.

¹ Published in *Journal of Transactions*, Society for Promoting the Study of Religions, January, 1933.

Of a more general kind we meet with a belief in world-cycles of involution followed by fresh evolution: a belief apparently accepted as current and not belonging to the original mandate or gospel.

THE "NEXT" THINGS

Much more of that original gospel appears to have been a teaching about what are, for each man, the next things, not of earth. Our foolish term jumbles such things together as "eschatological," or "last things." I find this curiously impudent, as if a schoolboy were to write home: "Dear Mums, only four weeks now till the last things!" meaning the Easter holidays. If we must use Greek polysyllables for plain English, why not say "anchistological": the next (thing)? As to next things, then, after earth-life: herein is early Buddhism one with the great religions: it is closely concerned with the very man and the bond between him and the unseen things. Death of body does not pull down a final curtain. There is, it said, "a veil to be rolled back," bit by bit it may be, but one name of the Teacher was *loke vivallachaddo*: "rolling aside the veil in the world":

And rolling back the cloaking veil,
He sees both this world and the next.¹

And there is repeated ascription to the Founder of a parable, comparing the man-of-vision to one seeing two houses with doors, and men going out and coming in according to their deeds.² By the other house no immortal home was meant, as Christians tend, perhaps too easily, to say. "In my Father's house are

¹ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III. p. 166.

² *Further Dialogues*, I, 197; II, II, 255.

many mansions " is not of necessity so much unlike the Founder's simile. *Monai*, mansions, are but stations, resting-places, sojournings, to be " prepared for " loyal friends in the next world, or a yet worthier world. Why is our imagination herein such a creaky machine ?

WORLDS AS MAN'S RIGHT-OF-WAY

In Buddhism then we find man considered as having, not one world, but worlds as his birthright. And the opportunities, afforded in world after world for man's long process of becoming That Who he potentially is, were expressed in a word which is the very Centre of the new message of the Man of Sakya:—*Magga*: the Road, Way or Path. It was not a new simile; we find it in the Upanishad teaching, as I pointed out last year, (p. 33) of a date probably not much anterior to the day of the teacher whom men much later came to call Buddha. The new feature in his teaching (in so far as his first utterance is rightly recorded) is the calling of the Road a Middle Way¹: namely, that a man, in choosing his own way in his quest of the ultimate aim of life, should avoid both unrestrained will and over-regulated will. Or again, in other contexts, the man, the seeker, is neither always the same, nor is he a different person: he is becoming. Or again, in yet another context, the seeker neither is, nor is not, real, he is becoming. Here is the expansion made by original Buddhism in the accepted Brahmanic teaching of its day:—Let the man choose, and not be priest-driven ! and:—Truer than " Thou art

¹ There are but two in Zoroastrianism: the right and the wrong way.

That" was it to say "Thou art becoming That." And we get the curious phrase linked with the Way in the first utterance and after: "Man must make the Way become."

Those next things in the Long Way: what had Buddhism to say about them? You heard a fortnight ago how very vague about them is the Upanishadic teaching:—about as vague as are we as yet. In that, survival was held to be inevitable; immortal (*amṛta*) survival is prayed for. Now, it is briefly called "going to Brahman," to God, or "becoming Brahman"; now, it is rebirth here or there as man, or as deva, or as animal. And there is vaguely and tentatively worded the idea of a man's action (*karma*) as determining his fate: *how* determining it is, I believe, left untaught. There is no evidence of the Persian emphasis on a post-mortem adjudication being shared by India. Rebirth as animal is by one teacher, Kaushitaki, touched upon in passing, much as it was a little later in Greece by Empedokles. But there is emphasis on a form of temporary survival: the man or self as released from his sleeping (or otherwise unconscious) body, and faring (not up to, but) inwards, to a more interesting world the while. There is only one case of interest in what "death" may mean in the Kāṭha Upanishad: the youth who (was it in a dangerous illness?) temporarily, as it were, sojourns with death and—some of us know about this—learns new things. Beyond this case I find no betrayal of curiosity about the fate of those gone before. But then we must never forget that in the Upanishads we are in the world of the intelligentsia, of tutor and student; we are not among the folk of the market-place.

NEW INTEREST IN WORLDS

What then, to all this little knowledge, was the contribution made by Buddhism, early or later ?

In the first place, an immensely increased emphasis on the link in survival between conduct on earth and destiny in the next things. Nothing is so persistently repeated in the hundreds of discourses recorded in the Pāli Pitakas as this. Coming as I did from years of Abhidhamma study to these discourses, it impressed me profoundly. It was stepping into another world of doctrine:—this coming from the scholastic teaching of the cloister to the earlier word of the missionary monks.

Secondly, the particular destiny hereafter open to this or that man is no longer treated in the vague, logically indifferent, semi-Platonic way of the Upanishads. Faring to sun or moon or the like drops out. There is not, till much later, any going aloft or down. The worlds may be for most men unseen, but they are not made out as being far off. They are, as I have often said, more *otherwise, than elsewhere*. As with inhabitants of the unseen, so the man who is, as we say, psychic, who has their stronger will, or as the records say, had their *iddhi*, could be aware in sight and hearing of another world by an effort of will analogous to the contraction or extension of the arm. This vividly felt nearness of the unseen worlds, which is a special feature of early, not of later, Buddhism, is further shown in a charting of the next world in some detail, a detail much misunderstood later when the monastic interest had concentrated more on "this life only." It is taught that the next world was politically administered by a governor, bearing

the title of Shakra (Pāli Sakka), and a cabinet of thirty. (This is usually wrongly rendered as thirty-three.) It was inhabited by men termed, in general, *devas* (this word having undergone a changed value under the influence of the accepted immanent theism of the day of the first Buddhists) and, in particular, *Tusitas*, or the Pleased Ones. Opposed to these were the less fortunate denizens undergoing purgatory, either constantly, the *Nerayikas*, or intermittently, the *Petas*. Yet another group finds rare mention: the *Asuras*, or *devas* who had suffered reverse in some other-world wars. The word suggests the prehistoric overthrow of a sometime old Persian faith (*Ahura-mazda*) in India. Beside these there were three other groups or circles in the next world: the jural world of the *Yamas*, of whom more presently, and an apparently artistic, or at least, pre-eminently constructive class, called "they who delight in creating" and "they who are patrons of created things." Of these most interesting ideas unfortunately no intelligent comment has survived.

Of worthier status than this next world was the world of *Brahma-devas*, also of many named groups. Its more usual name came to be the *Rūpa-world*, or *Seen-world*, suggestive of a super-power of vision. The group-names are suggestive of both vision and radiance, and also of rapture, e.g., the "feeding upon rapture" of the *Ābhassara devas* in the *Dhammapada*. Saints recall visits to them. Of yet more alien worlds we read of an *Arūpa-world*, where *rūpa* has come to have the meaning of "body" rather than of "thing seen": it would seem to be a purely logical attempt to supply an opposite to the foregoing. More sober is the reference, in what may be a very old talk by the

Founder to a lady disciple, to worlds Tat-Uttārim, or "beyond that," "that" being the world of Brahmā-dcvas.¹

TRIBUNAL AFTER DEATH ON EARTH

Thirdly, as in the old Persian faith so in early Buddhism, we have the important contribution of an adjudication awaiting the man after he, as not body, nor earth-mind, enters on the next step. I wish again to lay stress on this, for it is curiously shelved by Buddhists and books on Buddhism. I overlooked it myself while I was yet preoccupied with the Abhidhamma standpoints, which have so shifted emphases in Hinayāna Buddhism. The idea that karma or deeds have a purely automatic effect hereafter, causing a quasi-physical resultant in the fate awaiting you or me, holds the field at present. This is consonant with the *later* monastic teaching, that there is no reality in you or me, over and beyond our body and mind, save only a conventional agreement to speak of body states and mind states—momentary events—as you or as me. And it is clear, that once we have an adjudication, that is, a tribunal, we have a judge, called Yama, mouthpiece of a communal will, pronouncing sentence on a person *held responsible for what he, or she has done*, well or ill. It is difficult to see anything rational in a new complex of body and mind being held personally responsible for what the discarded complexes have done. The overlooking of these Suttas and the present dogma of *anattā*, or "no-self" hang together. When Buddhists come to read their own old scriptures in their own tongues, as we can read the Christian scriptures—

¹ *Anguttara*, I, 210.

and a wonderful movement with this aim is now going on in Eastern and South-eastern Asia—that dogma will then indeed be arraigned before the new assize, not of the monk, but of the lay-Buddhist.

DEVAS' INTEREST IN EARTH

Once more: this feature of the tribunal, as a matter known to inmates of the next world, brings us almost logically to an important feature in early Buddhism, though it be virtually non-existent in later Buddhism. I refer to the sympathetic interest taken in man's earthly career by the worthy of other worlds. Devas and Brahmā-devas appear everywhere in the Suttas as watching this or that man—"a great cloud of witnesses"—as advising such as could hear, as learning from such on earth as were competent to teach them, as rejoicing in the advent of the good, as mourning that of the bad. Complementary to this is the widespread interest recorded as shown by the public in any man of psychic gifts: a Gotama, or a Moggallāna, who could give them news of the fate of someone departed in death. That the Founder is said to have been beset by such inquiries is another overlooked record. And further, that such knowledge of life in other conditions was deliberately developed by the quiet listening attitude called Jhāna, as, *e.g.*, by Moggallāna, has also been totally disregarded. Writers have heeded solely the Jhāna formula, which must be the work of a monasticism grown inattentive to the unseen life about it. And why inattentive? Because it was part of the monastic standpoint to hold

¹ Wherefore seeing that we are compassed about by so great a cloud of witnesses . . . *Ep. Hebrews*.

all life in any world as intrinsically undesirable, as something resulting from a desire which was at all costs to be starved out of existence. Yet even the formula depicts a practice in preparing a state of rapt listening. Cf. art. XVIII.

Such are the main original contributions made by early Buddhism to the faith of ancient India on the Next Things. They form a striking advance on what her older literature has shown us. And the only reasonable explanation I find is, that the founders of Buddhism headed a popular movement, nascent in their day, of awakening interest and longing-to-know about what awaits the man "from the breaking up of the body after dying"—to quote the oft-repeated Pāli phrase. Where man truly and strongly wills to learn, he will not remain as ignorant as he was. I see a grievous wrong to those Founders in the way in which this interest and this coming-to-know have been so thrust aside in expositions of the first years in the Buddhist movement.

REBIRTH AS ANIMAL

As to rebirth in animal shape, this notion, which had somehow grown up in post-Vedic India, plays a prominent part, so far as Buddhism annexed it, mainly in the *Jātaka stories*, to which it became (and is still) the habit of preaching monks to stoop, when trying to entertain the public on which they depended for support. Beside these there are one or two Suttas in at least one of the chief books (the *Majjhima*), where the belief is more seriously countenanced. I cannot see, in the belief, *original* Buddhist teaching, any more than I can find it seriously taught in the Upanishads,

despite the Kaushitaki passage. It is hard to reconcile it with immanent Deity as in, and of every soul. And this immanent Deity is for me present in original Buddhism. In this man is bidden (as in the Upanishads) to "seek the Self," and to see in the Self "the Inner witness who knows" all, and whence comes one of man's chief "mandates."¹ However, I do not profess to find the logic of the Indian mind everywhere on all fours with ours, and I leave the matter there.

THE LAST THING

I come at length to the truly Last Thing, the End of the Long Way of Becoming, not for men taken *en masse*, but for each man. What was here the contribution of Buddhism?

Perhaps there is no one who would not reply Nirvana. And some would add: is it not so stated in the first utterance? But on the one hand, if we read that utterance—it is miscalled "sermon"—carefully, we see that the word demanded for the goal of the Middle Way, by the context, is *attha*: the aim, or thing aimed at; on the other hand, we read that, when a questioner, in the Suttas, asks, What is Nirvana? the answer, assigned to the chief disciple Sāriputta, makes no reference to a final goal, but defines N. as a cleansing, erasing process of spiritual or moral ill, viz., of lust, hate and dullness.² So too the four substitutes for *attha*, the Aim, in the first utterance, are only so many preparations for final attainment: enlightenment, supernormal knowledge, calm and nirvana. It is only in the Bhagavadgītā that we first

¹ Cf. *Anguttara Nikāya*, I, pp. 147-50. See p. 51 ff.

² *Samyutta*, IV, p. 251.

come across the idea of *nirvana* as a merging into deity (Brahman¹).

But the notion of a merging or waning into an ineffable somewhat appealed to the monastic outlook, as it could not to popular demand for a new religious mandate. And again, as the teaching became fixed, first in fixed sayings, then in writing, it became ever more needed to distinguish between meaning and "letter." Now *artha*, or *attha*, happened to mean, among things wanted or aimed at, just "meaning," "case" too, and "matter." It ceased to be distinctive enough for aim or goal. And the word "supreme": *parama*, which we find joined to it in an old scripture: *paramattha*: "supreme aim,"² was also required for meaning, as "ultimate" or esoteric meaning. For these reasons I believe it was, that *artha* was suppressed as "goal," and *nirvana* and other terms substituted. There is, in the exegetical literature of a thousand years later, quite a list of equivalents for *nirvana*, but *attha* is not among them, and whereas *attha* is positive, these are nearly all negative terms.

Indeed we find *nirvana*, in the record of a talk between the Founder and one Magandiya, defined, and accepted, as merely physical health.³ As to that, there could be no finer definition of the yet inconceivable consummation of the man than just the being utterly Well, not in body, not in mind, but in himself as very Man. But unfortunately for her, India never got to the strong terms for health such as the Western Aryans of Europe found words for; she stopped short at "Not-ill": *ārogya*.

¹ Ch. V.

² *Sutta-Nipāṭa*, ver. 68, 219.

³ *Further Dialogues*, I, 359.

NOTA BENE!

I will in conclusion review what I have been trying to tell you, in the form of a memorandum I would fain have you take away with you. Suppose that the monkish teaching we find emphasised in the Pitakas represented truly the Founder's teaching, namely, that a man should train himself "against laying hold of this or of any other world," and depending upon life in them for anything.¹ In that case we should look also to find results of such a teaching in the Pitakas. In other words, we should find no teaching about life in other worlds. We should find no teaching relating conduct here to corresponding experience hereafter. Sayings about intercourse with other worlds, and their interest in men of earth would have been suppressed. We should not find the Founder having and acknowledging such intercourse. We should not find records, stated as truths, about the constitution of other worlds. I mean, we should not find a *new system of worlds* emerging in them. But all of this is *just what we do find*, intermixed with the teaching of that more negative repressive outlook.²

There are those who would explain this contrasted teaching by saying there was a dual gospel: one for the layman, one for the monk. I would say: such a dual gospel is what Buddhism *became*, and virtually still is. It did not begin as dual. A world gospel for Everyman is not one that cleaves mankind into halves, save only by the one measure of *spiritual growth*: is the man growing or becoming? is the man waning or declining? The Founder is recorded as saying:

¹ As, e.g., *Further Dialogues*, II, p. 303.

² Cf. my *Manual of Buddhism*, S.P.C.K., 1932, p. 177.

Not as houseman or as world-forsaker do I blame or praise a man, but according as he walks wrongly or rightly.¹ The Message is to the very Man, and to him as Man.

But as man he is wayfarer in the worlds; the worlds are his right of way. And to him as such came the message of Gotama the Sakyan.

¹ *Anguttara*, I, p. 69.

XVII

BUDDHISM AND THE UNSEEN¹

I THINK you will agree that it is rare to hear these two terms: Buddhism and the Unseen associated. I never have so heard them; I find myself in a minority of one in so associating them. It is not in this only that I find myself in that minority of one. I have just completed a little book² in which I make, under some dozen heads, restatements of what is for me the truer, the more original gospel of Buddhism than what you find in manuals and lectures and magazines. For instance, I have restated the position I have heard from platforms three times in the last six months: that Buddhism, *i.e.*, the Buddha, was either atheist or at best antitheistic. But this evening I ask you to consider this one restatement, or rather corrected want of emphasis you also meet with: this ignoring of "the unseen" and all that this implies when the topic is Buddhism.

I don't think you will understand original Buddhism or its degeneracy if you so ignore. If you do, you will remain ignorant of its eternally true teachings, buried as these are beneath institutional superstructure. I think you would be amazed, had you spent as many years over early Buddhism as I have done:—

¹ A lecture delivered at "The Belfry," London, S.W., February, 1938.

² *What was the Original Gospel in "Buddhism?"* Epworth Press, 1938.

off and on for some ten years and then "forty years on" as my sole subject—to see how extraordinary, how impossible, how often libellous are the things said and written about the subject. Consider what is written about it when put into a nutshell: *e.g.*, in Dr. Menzies' *History of Religion* (a University Extension Manual): "Here we have a religion, if such it may be called, without a god (little g), without prayer, without priesthood or worship, a religion which owes its great success, not to its theology nor to its ritual, since it has neither, but to its moral sentiment and to its external organisation." Here, every phrase, to be true, requires severe qualification. It is a description worthy only of one who had never studied the documents with critical, let alone sympathetic, insight, nor had visited so-called Buddhist countries. Or take the view of a Hindu infected with what we of the West call Rationalism: "The one characteristic feature of this religion is, that it has no god, no priests, no heaven, no hell, no soul to go to perdition or to receive reward and punishment, no fasts and no sacrifices."¹ Here every phrase can be not only qualified, but contradicted from Buddhist scriptures.

Or come to Buddhist verts: they can be even worse. In the manual *What is Buddhism?* published by one or two leaders of the Buddhist Lodge eight years ago and so far as they have told me, not corrected subsequently, we read this curious passage (p. 98): "Q. You said that we sometimes meet our friends beyond the veil of death. When? A. On our return to earth. The intervening worlds are entirely subjective." That sentence, knowing what I did of the early Buddhist Canon, made me gasp.

¹ Sir Hari S. Gour, *The Literary Guide*.

It was as if we heard someone saying: "Jesus said: 'I go to prepare a place for you, that where I am there you may be also'—but he did not mean we should be really with him, but we were only to imagine we should be." I want you to see, that, evidence for evidence, it is just as unreasonable, as untrue to say Buddhism holds after-life is subjective as to say Jesus said so. In either case there must be someone living hereafter to whom the intervening worlds are subjective, must there not? In which world is he?

But let me leave other opinions and come to my own positive restatement as Buddhism and the Unseen. Let me just state clearly, that what we now call "Buddhism" was based on, was related to, the religious teaching of its day: the 6th century B.C., but was a New Word in that teaching, quickening it with new life and depth, emphasising what had not been brought out; in particular, in this matter of that vastly greater part of our life in both time and space that we call the Unseen. In Indian culture we tend to think of this Unseen culture much in terms of *introversion*, of the man withholding attention and vision from the external and turning himself round upon himself. And we call it Yoga and we see it growing up in those Upanishads, which are probably contemporary with the beginnings of Buddhism, namely the Śvetāsvatara and the Maitri. The new Buddhist teaching by the Sakyan missionaries was *just the opposite* to this. In the then growing Yoga cult man withdrew attention not only from the external world of his bodily and mental experience, but also from all communing with men of other worlds, then usually called devas. The Sakyan missionaries bade the religious student train himself to get near

the unseen worlds; we should call it train himself psychically. It was their good fortune to have, in their leaders, men who were very psychic, the founder himself, Gotama, later called Buddha, and leading disciples such as Moggallāna, Sāriputta, Anuruddha and the man known as Panthaka the Less. Of these, most were both clairvoyant and clairaudent: Sāriputta was clairaudent only, Panthaka could also hypnotise a clairvoyant into seeing visions. And one and all of them are stated to have been much given to what was called *Dhyāna* or *Jhāna*.

This is a word difficult to render. I have called it musing, as only less wrong than such a word as meditation. I have been sneered at for using it by writers who never suggested a better word in its place. The chief Sanskrit Dictionary calls it "Nachsinnung, Vertiefung, Beschauung." A later German known to me, Dr. Heiler, called it "Versenkung." We first meet with this term *dhyāna*, not in the Vedas, but much later, in the earliest Upanisads. But in the Buddhist scriptures it is a practice that is enjoined with any amount of repetition and emphasis. And it is often mentioned just before a list of five psychic states: namely superwill-power of movement (*iddhi*), such as levitation; then clairaudence, then thought-reading, then memory of former life, then clairvoyance; apparently as a preparatory exercise to the practice of any one or more of these.

And we find a formula often repeated for the preparation. Perhaps you know it. It calls for first a divesting the self of attending to and reflecting upon—hence *Jhāna* can't be meditation—then, anything like ecstasy must be put aside—the word *pīti*—then any emotional interest whatever: pleasure or pain

about anything. Finally the seeker must be left in a state of mental alertness or attention (*sati*), and poise or balance. There the formula ends. We are not told why those two states are necessary; we are only, and only sometimes, given the list of those five psychic states. And the result of this is, that Buddhists having lost sight of the Unseen, tend to look upon Jhāna as what we might call "mystic meditation," or ultimate Reality, or heaven knows what other abstraction. This brings Dhyāna much nearer Yoga. And it is true that Dhyāna got pressed into the service of early Yoga; it is prescribed as a contemplating following on *dhāraṇī*, or the bearing up of our faculties above or away from external things. But not as what we call meditation or reflection. It is rather pictured as released inner energy: "friction" by which "a," or "the *deva*" is revealed.

Nothing of this appears in Buddhist Jhāna. You get rid of all attention to your surroundings inner and outer, and there it leaves you. And so we find it pressed into the service of a vague belief in the efficacy of so-called meditation, and of a disinterested outlook on things worldly. What then is my disagreement with this Buddhist attitude and my restatement of what Jhāna really meant for original Buddhism?

(1) In the first place I think we should always be suspicious of what is, in Buddhism so-called, teaching that is *obviously monkish*. If you have not attentively studied the rise of Buddhism after the Founder's lifetime, you will fail to see how monasticism, new in his day, grew ever stronger in Indian religion and dominated the nature of the recorded teachings. These became almost exclusively, not only compiled by monks, but composed so as to suit monks, and not

that Everyman for whom the missions were originally started. Now to sit for an indefinite time brooding on anything or nothing, on abstractions, ideas, there being for many monks nothing else to do, the getting rid, from consciousness of one's worldly surroundings: all this would appeal to the monk, the recluse, the *sannyāsi*.

But I submit it was no more the ideal of the first Buddhists than a similar course was of the early Christians, or indeed of any religious reform which touched on man's life and conduct. Their ideal was essentially active mobile living, the going about among, and tending their fellow-men. It is noteworthy, in Buddhist scriptures, how limited is the vocabulary for describing any mystic contemplative life.

(2) In the second place we must never lose sight of the profound advance in teaching about the Unseen in early Buddhism. A little study of the now translated Buddhist Suttas side by side with the much translated earlier Upanishads will show you that advance. In the Upanishads, teaching about the Unseen is very slight and most vague and shadowy. Some is clearly fanciful, pictures drawn by teachers of man's going at death to the moon and falling thence dissolved as rain back to earth. There is no sign of awareness of Everyman marching on in unending line through death to appear ceaselessly day and night, as man, before his fellow-man's judgment-seat, and have his fate awarded him. And there is no suggestion of any men of the Unseen, walking with the men of earth as unseen guides.

But turn to the Buddhist Suttas. There you read of folk crowding to ask the Founder what had become of X or Y who had passed on. You read of the Founder

telling his inner circle of disciples why he would speak of the fate of those they had lost: to cheer them, it was, by a vision of the happiness awaiting them too. You read of a happy or unpleasant destiny awaiting each man according to his deeds done here. You read of men of the next world, from the Governor downwards, coming to interview the Founder who could see and hear them. You read of Moggallāna going, as he could in sleep, or induced coma, to visit the next world and ask the happy ones, or the punished ones what had brought such fate to them, so that he might enlighten men on earth. And we come upon such passages as these: "What is it to be *deva-patta*? That is: one who has attained to *devas*. The reply is not: 'one who has lived worthily and passed on'; it is just 'one who practises Jhāna.' Access to *deva*'s is thus not only a post-mortem affair." And this too: "Has earth life any purely happy experience to offer? Yes, when a man in Jhāna has attained to converse with *devas* as present here with him and talking with him." One more: "When the man wants to make become a way of access to the world of *deva*'s, he practises Jhāna."

It is passages like these, completely overlooked by writers, that showed me what Jhāna practice really meant to the first Buddhists. They were not so sunk in monastic pessimism as were the aftermen. They had a gospel for Everyman, in home and field and market. And among such ordinary folk were here and there some man or woman who had the psychic gift, who could develop it, make it become, even where—and such was my own case—there seemed no pre-disposition. Here was a gospel which said: Knowledge of life *as a whole* is what man wants, not of *this*

life only. Try for yourself to learn more of life by practising to get that alertness and quiet poise. Make your mind a *tabula rasa*—so they would have said with our *writing tradition*. Empty yourself of yourself, they would have said *with our mystic tradition*. Speak, for thy servant heareth! they would have said if they had had the Jewish Jehovah tradition. What they actually taught was something like this: Life is a great, a long Way, a Road of the worlds. Therein walk many a little ahead of us, who are willing and glad to turn back and help us, if we will, or just converse with us, or even, if it is we who are wise, ask of our wisdom. Why not try to cultivate the power of converse with such? You will be helping your wayfaring immensely by it.

I am sure that, if early Buddhism had not been deflected from its original plan by the monastic canker, which saw all life as ill, and cultivation of its great manifold an evil, it would have lived on as the great *psychic*, or spiritualistic religion of the world.

To conclude: No religion worthy of the name has started with putting the unseen out of the picture and confining itself to this world only. Nor did original Buddhism. But Buddhism underwent profound changes: *we can see that*, by its many early schisms. *We can see that*, by the conflicting ideals in the earliest scripture, the Pāli Canon from which I have quoted. It is a good test to take a Sutta giving a bedside visit to a dying man, one who had been the teaching's best lay-friend. The monk visiting him at his request bids him "put away any laying hold, by desire, of this or of any world"; or of depending upon them in any way. Now if this were the true original teaching, we should not find sayings so much the opposite as

that I have quoted:—that disciples were to look forward in wayfaring with joy to the prospect of sharing in departed friends' happiness hereafter. We should find no teaching about life in other worlds. We should find no teaching relating conduct here to corresponding experience hereafter. Sayings about intercourse with other worlds and the interest felt there in men of earth would have been suppressed. We should not find records stated as truths about the constitution of other worlds. We should not find a system of worlds new in Indian culture emerging in them.

But all of this is just what we do find; and we find it intermixed with the teaching of that more negative, repressive outlook which is the handling of the monkish editor.

There are those who would explain this contrasted teaching by saying: There was a dual gospel: one for laymen, one for monk. I would say: such a dual gospel is what Buddhism became, and virtually is to-day. But a world gospel for Everyman, such as were all great religions at birth, is not one that cleaves mankind into halves, and presents a gospel for this class of man and another for that man. The message is to the very man, as man. What we actually find in the Sayings, as cleavage made by the Founder between man and man, is nothing external, like monk and layman, but something very inward. It is: is the man growing, or declining? "Not as man of the world or world-forsaker do I blame or praise a man, but according as he walks wrongly or rightly."¹

One word more, if you will be patient. I seem to hear:—this may be interesting for the student in

¹ *Anguttara*, i, p. 69.

Buddhist history, but is it of the slightest interest now, how original Buddhism taught, or didn't teach? What of us of to-day? Is there no message for us in all that?

Well, don't you judge there is? We are, alas that I have to say so! just as much in need of a better religious teaching about the Unseen life, as were Indians of that far-off past. We are for ever betraying by speech a very crassly wrong perspective, a very materialistic outlook. We say ever we are burying "John" or "Mary." We say "In this spot *the king* lay in state Jan. so and so, 1936." We write: "Ramsay MacDonald was brought home . . ." Does Christianity, does modern science justify us in this blinkered vision, namely, of denying by our ways of speech that life is anything more than just the one life here and now?

And more:—in any crisis where an important choice has to be made, are we not as a rule deciding *just as if* the great religions had never been taught or followed? Take the average novel or play and note how the hero or heroine comes to a decision. I was listening-in last week to a little play *Information Received*, where the wife is told by her well-loved husband that they are utterly broke. Do these two consider consulting wiser guides in the Unseen after committing themselves to Highest Guidance? Not for a moment does this occur to them. The wife sets her stronger will (like Lady Macbeth) to determine them both to commit suicide—which they do. I admit it makes more sensational stuff than committing their will to unseen guides. But this isn't even hinted at; and we feel Jesus and Gotama might never have lived and founded systems of wiser guidance for men.

The characters are out and out worse than pagans, they are no better than animals.

Is it quite out of the question that we should give serious thought to reviving the old practice of Jhāna, which is, I am convinced, nothing less than *listening-in to things unseen*, always in the sincere will to hear from the Better, not from the Worse? To train ourselves with patient persistence to unfold such psychic sensitiveness as we may have latent, but never dream we have unless we try? I have tried, and I have got some way further than I once dreamed was possible. And O! the widening of life it has been to me. I believe a day may come, not so long off, not for the very few only, when the fit title of my talk would be, not Buddhism and the Unseen, but Ourselves and the Unseen.

XVIII

THE MEANING OF JHĀNA¹

It is now over a decade since it was given me to use the word "musing" for the Pāli term *jhāna*. This was in composing the book *Gotama the Man*, where, in apparently great temerity, I show the Founder of Buddhism as speaking throughout. This work was begun near Padua in September, 1926. The book was published in 1928 (Luzac and Co.). In the meantime I had given an apologia without apology for the new term in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1927. The evidence, there brought forward to justify the innovation, I repeated in *Sakya, or Buddhist Origins* (Kegan Paul, 1931), chapter ix. In the following year I had a paragraph in an Introduction to Mr. F. L. Woodward's translation of volume I of the *Book of the Gradual Sayings* (Anguttara-Nikāya). It began: "In *jhāna* he has dropped 'trance' and taken over 'musing.' I very greatly appreciate this decision, for as yet we two are alone in so rendering the word, and it doubtless amuses some. But if, for *jhāna*, ecstatic terminology be rejected, such as trance or ecstasy, it were almost more inexact to fall back, as many do, on terms of intellectual concentration, such as 'meditation.' Even if we seek not to get behind the formulas for the stages in *jhāna*, those formulas make it quite evident, that the end aspired to in the practice was rather an emptied, than a full mind,

¹ Published in *Buddhism in England*, March, 1940.

was more of a *tabula rasa* than discursive thinking. And meditation is surely the latter of these. But if we try, as I have tried, to get back to an earlier day than those interesting but decadent formulas, we come to the buried remains of a practice with a very live, positive object, when to get the attention alert, but cleared of all pre-occupying, predisposing content—in other words, to get the very man willing to hear, mutely inviting, other-world intercourse—was of chief importance. *Sati* and the 'purged state' (*pari-suddhi*), then, and only then, become for the formula fit terms. . . . 'Musing' it is true is not an ideal term, but it is the safest, if we are going to find our Sakya (our original 'Buddhism') beneath the later monastic editings."

Eight years have passed, but I could not word this more truly. I said as much seven years later in my *What was the Original Gospel in Buddhism?* ch. ix, "Jhāna as I see it." Nor do I here propose to (it may be) weary the reader with certain evidential contexts given in these and other books. They are at hand for him who would herein get wise. Why then do I test the kindness of the Editor to give what, in my day, children called "stale news"?

Mainly for three reasons. These are (i) in the paragraph cited, I should have modified the statement: we two are alone in so rendering the word. I meant: alone as English writers. Elsewhere I have fully shown we acted in good company, and under a strong ægis. It is true that, in his *Sanskrit Roots*, Whitney, under *dhī* and *dhya* has, with unusual restraint, the single word "think"; while Geiger, in his *Pāli* (1916), has for *jhayati* the single rendering "meditieren." These two were there and then occupied with word-

structures. In literature again, in a good test passage, Max Müller renders *dhyāna* by "reflection," R. E. Hume by "meditation." But when we turn to the finer literary sense of a Deussen, and to the sensitive religious feeling of a Heiler, when again we consult the Bōthlingk and Roth Dictionary, with its wide literary range, we find *dhyāna* as meaning "sinnen," and there will be few who would find "musing" an unfit equivalent for that.

(ii) I contend, that to see in "musing" just reverie, absent-mindedness is, in the main, wrong. It is true that, so far as I know, no critic has turned my choice down because "musing" for him meant just this and no more. There has been too little "sitting up and taking notice" of my rendering for that. There has been no weighing of the evidence prompting my choice. I have had myself to draw the conclusion, that the choice has, in one hook, been turned down as "negative, feeble," hence "inadequate," because critics themselves used the word musing only in this depreciated sense. Had they weighed the meaning of musing in English literature, they might have judged differently.

For instance, let it be considered how in many contexts in the Suttas, the Jhāna formulas are given as apparently a preparation for developing one or more of five faculties, which came to be classed under the term higher knowledge (*abhiññā*)—faculties which we should now call "psychic"; modes of super-will, clairvoyance, clairsaudience, divining others' thoughts and memory of former lives. (Later a sixth was added of a different kind.) These are adduced as not requiring any explanation as to why they should be adduced, but as something in usual sequence. Now,

of these five, the last two might be conceded as implying such mental casting about as could come under "musing." For is not this the chief way in which our Shakespeare uses the word? Thus Edward IV: "Brothers, you muse what chat we two have had?" and Bertram to Helena: "to entreat you, that... you rather muse than ask, *why* I entreat you." And Alonso, at Prospero's "Strange Shapes":

I cannot too much muse:
Such shapes, such gesture and such sound. . . .

And the Dauphin in *King John*:

I muse your majesty doth seem so cold. . . .

We have here alert attention, combined with reflection.

In the other three "knowledges" reflection seems to fade out, leaving intense attention. Is "musing" therefore unfit? Look more closely at the word. In our language's history this word is no Greek alien, but of Latin descent from old French and Italian words for "muzzle," and, if our great lexicographer Skeat was correct, was explained by his Elizabethan predecessor Florio as: "to hould one's muzle or snout in the aire," as a dog scenting the air when in doubt, paw uplifted. Here indeed is musing, not as reverie, but as alert attention and intense surmise. And I submit, that we should be wise, not to depreciate our literary currency in this term, but to maintain its worthier usage in our English classics.

I would endorse this by inviting consideration of the Pali term *sati*. Philologists claim that this is a vocal breakdown from the older, the Vedic *smṛti*, memory, recollection. And exegesis gives *sarana*,

remembering, as one among a few synonyms. Nevertheless Pali usage tends to avoid it in cases of memory, e.g., in the extension of memory in one's own past. *Sati*, whether or not it be helped out by the prefix *anu-*, lending continuity in process, usually means what my husband sagaciously fixed to render as "mindfulness." And where *sati* is very pointedly used as title, viz., in the "four stations of mindfulness" (*sati-paṭṭhāna*), its meaning is far more moral analysis and heedfulness, than reference to the past. It may be, that the implication of "religious tradition," bound up from Brahmin culture in *smṛti*, would have no force for a new upstart movement as was, for Brahmans, early Buddhism. The Sakyans had to create their own "traditions." Hence a shifting in what *sati* stood for. It is certain that *sati* stands for mindfulness, alertness, attention, far more than for recollecting the past. And the crown of the *jhāna* process-in-consciousness lay in the entering upon *sati*, a "purged" state and poise.

Even with the prefix *anu-*, *sati* was not always "remembering." The category of the six, and then the ten, *anussatis* of the Fourth Collection is a study mainly in comparative analysis; devas, for instance, are to be thought about, death too, one's own, and one cannot "remember" that. *Sati* was an attending to certain real, worth-while things. And in so far as this attitude is fitly described by "musing," when used in its classic English sense, I say that to be "in *jhāna*," to love *jhāna* (*jhāna-rato*)—a term used of Gotama, Sāriputta and a few others—to be *jhānist* (*jhāyin*) is for me, unrepentant, best rendered by "musing, lover of musing, muser."

This mindful, watchful, alert attitude, which our

own literature claims as rightly expressed by musing runs, as we know, through the early scriptures of Buddhism, as a constantly prescribed attitude to be held by the faithful disciple in orders. Their heedfulness to it is twisted into a satirical view of them, put into the mouth of an unworthy man of the next world called Dūsin (deceiver). "These shavelings of monks, dark-skinned riff-raff . . . professing: We are musers! we are musers! . . . *bemuse, demuse, ex-muse,*¹ like owls on bough looking-out for a mouse, like jackals on the bank hunting a fish, like cats by scrapheap hunting mice, like asses their burden off by a dungheap. . . ." Always it is alert attention to something distinct from the very man—to, it may be, his instruments, body and mind, or to causes of possible or probable experience. *Jhāna* is not the plunging into rapt states of consciousness about ideas.

But what then, it may be asked, about the transcendent *jhāna* called *arūpa*, a word here standing for the unseen, and as much of a "heavenly" world as the monk permitted himself to aspire to? Are not these cited as led up to by a preparatory process of *jhāna* as purging attention and mental balance?

It is true they are so cited. And herein, for the careful student of the Pāli Canon, a fact of historical interest emerges. In that Canon, it is almost alone to the Sutta-Pitaka, that we must look for preponderant attention in the matter of *jhāna* as a process in preparing, and in that Pitaka to the Majjhima Collection only. Here, in some two dozen references to *jhāna* formulas, we find ten as preparation, in what was known as *rūpa-jhāna* formula, for *arūpa-jhāna*, and again ten in *rūpa-jhāna* as preparation for what came

¹ *Pajjhayanti, nijjhayanti, apajjhayanti. Majjhima, No. 50.*

to be termed *abhiññā*, or higher knowledge, ultra-knowledge. We never find *rūpa-jhāna* as preparation for both *abhiññā* and *arūpa* taken together. Can we deduce anything historically true from this? I think we can.

We must first get what *abhiññā* implied, distinct from *arūpa-jhāna*. This I have given above. *Abhiññā* was work of extroversion; *arūpa-jhāna* was work of introversion, contemplation in certain fetches in abstract thought. Namely, reflection on the infinity of space, on the infinity of mind, on everything rated as "nothing," on a middle point between consciousness and unconsciousness.

Now if we lay these *arūpa-jhāna* exercises beside the *rūpa-jhāna* preparatory exercise, it becomes obvious that the latter is not fit training for the former. In the latter there is at first a *laying aside* of all work of thought, of "thinking applied and sustained (*vitakka*, *vicāra*)."
How, stripped of these, is a man to build up, or eliminate, so as to form the abstractions just cited? I venture to think, that in the *arūpa-jhāna* formula we have a *later incomer*, inserted and substituted where, earlier, only the *abhiññā* faculties found their rightful place. For these, not introversion but extroverted mind-work was needful: attention, alertness, the "houlding one's muzzle in the aire." For clairvoyance eyes might be closed, for clairaudience ears might be idle; is it not the sense-faculties of the "other body (*sukśma-sarīra*)" that are then active? Here "musing," in its classic English sense, is precisely what is needed.

My third reason for this article is this. Whereas I am not presuming to prescribe what persons who have given their religious loyalty to Buddhism should,

in practising it, be mainly occupied withal, I am concerned to make clearer, what that religion taught, when it was given, as a new word, to India. In that day the orthodox religious culture was presenting the man (i.e., the spiritual being so called, *puruṣa*) as already Deity, over against a consummating that Godhead, worded as "becoming Deity" (Brahman), when he left the earth as ready for That. Of the great, the long Between, that lay between man (as really only *potential* Deity) and the consummating, *we do not find him presented with anything*, nor was the step further he might achieve here and now towards it taught with ethical insistence.

Now it is in this matter of the *Between this and That*, which we find as a New Word in original Buddhism. Not only as to a living here and now as befitted the man, who would be held, after death here, *responsible to a judge* for the mode of that living, but also *much more* about the Between—a Between not only constituting his near Hereafter, but also the Greater Present in which he lives on earth. We leave so much out of "early Buddhism," if we leave all this out of view; we leave out its very heart. Access to, converse with those he would wish and hope to be welcomed by, in the hour of death; this is what early Buddhism shows us; this is what the Founder is shown calling real happiness; this is what men are shown flocking to ask him about; this is what he is shown holding up to disciples as encouragement to them in the good life.

And there is far less emphasis recorded on the need for meditation, for contemplation. Pali is singularly poor in words for these. The word usually so rendered means nothing of the sort. *Bhāvanā*

means "making-become" literally "growing" (it is usually so explained in exegesis), and refers to the whole of conduct. *Patisallāna*, the word usually employed for considering "what he should do next," means "adhering," i.e., sitting still and alone (*raho-ga'a*). Once or twice a disciple is shown asking the Founder, or other teacher for "*dhamma* in brief, the which having heard I may keep alone, secluded, zealous, ardent, self-contained," but *never*, that I may meditate! The post-Pitakan word used for such occasions was *hammaññhāna*, i.e., occasion for action! Hence there is just as much reason for thinking that solitude was cultivated for that which I have repeatedly called the boy Samuel's "musing," with its "Speak, for thy servant heareth!" as for the introverted thought which we mainly understand by meditation, contemplation. Very significant too is the new cosmology¹ which grew up about life in worlds other than this, when Buddhism launched upon a literature of its own.

I am not contending, that this New More in man's outlook, so enriching his earth-life, was maintained. Monastic pessimism saw to it, as it grew strong, that interest in life seen as a whole was discouraged, in that life as a whole was "Ill." But it remains for those avowing Buddhism to decide, whether it is that old New Word they will study and shape life by, or the early mediæval transformation now counting as Buddhism in Southern Asia.

¹ Cf. art. XVI.

XIX

REBIRTH IN THE PĀLI SCRIPTURES¹

I WISH here to say a word of somewhat maturer import than that which I wrote eight years ago in the *Quest Review*, 1922, and made supplementary to the second edition of my manual *Buddhist Psychology*.² It is the reader who, when he has read what I will now say, must judge whether the "maturer" means added worth and deepened vision, or not. I will at the outset only say thus much: that here he will no more find sayings from the Pāli records put unquestioningly—as is claimed for these—into the mouth of the Founder of the Sakyan teaching. Beyond this correction in historic method, he will find no definite reversion of judgment; he will find added matter and, I think, sounder emphases. He were a poor man of the pen who could add to his experience seven years of study intensive and comparative, and write nothing wiser on any portion of it after that!

Before I summarise what the Pāli Scriptures contribute to the Indian teachings on rebirth, it may be wise to sketch very briefly that which had been, or was, current when the Sakya movement took birth. I can do this with a surer hand now that, since I wrote as stated above, we have the miniature sketches on this subject, given in historic order by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy* in addition to the earlier

¹ Published in the *Calcutta Review*, September, 1930.

² *Quest Series*, London, 1st ed., 1914; 2nd ed., 1924.

summary contained in Deussen's *Allgemeine Geschichte*. It is only when the former writer comes to Sakya called Buddhism, in which he will have found no historical criticism to guide him, that he lapses, with writers on Buddhism, into taking that Protean tradition of many changes, more or less, as having no history.

On rebirth he points out, that, in the Vedas, the subject of survival of death is on the whole joyous. The deceased may look forward to a "good time," of the kind we associate with the word Walhalla, of enjoyments of a material sort; but that a terrible doom is also possible, Indra and Varuṇa being hymned as "thrusting down" this man or that. The "righteous" man will find reward; but no "gradations of happiness" are met with. Nor is the back and forth of life, on earth and elsewhere, worded later as *samsāra* found. And there is much vagueness in mandates as to the how and where: "one becomes like the moon," for instance, and "one becomes just the moon" (*candram eva bhavati*).¹

In the later period of the compilations called Brāhmaṇas, we find the notion of rebirth as a "Way": the Yānas of the fathers, of the gods; we find rebirth on earth emergent, held as possibly a blessing; and specific rites held to avail in procuring rebirth among specific gods. Not yet is there a computing, that a period of *x* punishment there may expiate *y* misdeeds here.

In the period when the earlier Upanishads were compiled, there was advance in eschatological discussion, but no consistent theoretical unity. The idea of a

¹ This is not as silly as it may seem. Chandra was moon-spirit as well as moon, and the Indian idiom permits us to read "a," not "the" only; thus: becomes a moon-deva.

return to earth-life was being matured by teachers, yet very unequally distributed among them. Rebirth as animal emerges (suspiciously like a gloss), and also the idea of life as suffering begins to show its head.

I would add, that there is something which we do not find, coupled with something we do find in these earlier Upanishads, to which perhaps hardly sufficient notice is given. I refer to any teaching in them about a process of *awarding* awaiting the man surviving death, coupled with any teaching about the man finding *warding*. We know how very prominent a feature is the former in the early Zoroastrian records, but in the modern treatises I have mentioned (I am unwilling to rely on my own imperfect knowledge) I find no mention of anything of the sort. But I do find, though it is but slightly worded, a sense of warding as needed by the new arrival in the next world; and it a warding of man by man (*puruṣa*).

"Now whether there be cremation-obsequies or not, they pass over . . . (here follows the vague sort of sequence 'into this and that,' affected by Upanishadic teachers) . . . There is a man (*puruṣa*) who is not-of-earth (*amānava*); he leads them on to Brahman . . ." (*Chândogya*, IV, 15).

The man so led is bound for the highest, the uttermost goal; he is, as we might say, a post-graduate; tribunals are not for him. But whether we consider such a case, or turn to the tribunals of other cults, all should come, properly, under the head of other-world warding, both of them who are immigrant and of them who also, in view of a great and ceaseless immigration, live in need of warding from immigrants.

I now go on to inquire into the contribution made to these ideas by Sakya, that is, by early Buddhism.

My work in this field has shown me, that Sakya gave the world a more definite doctrine, cult, or theory of rebirth, reincarnation, or transmigration than any other religion before or since. But this goes only so far as to say, that it is less vague than any other in this matter. Indefinite it is, unfinished, a patchwork, but only less so than other creeds.

In the original doctrine, so far as we can really get back to it we find:

- (1) The fact of rebirth accepted as universally true;
- (2) The whence and whither of rebirth fairly well defined;
- (3) The acceptance of rebirth as not of a discarnate mind or soul, but of the man having a body and mind; still, therefore, an inmate of space;
- (4) No clear information as to the "how" of rebirth;
- (5) No *immediate* return to earth-life after dying there.

1. The birth of the Sakyan movement, taking place not so much after, as during the compilation of the middle Upanishads,¹ or at latest soon after, the first teachers found, in the religious world of their place and time, discussion on life as a whole, but no "consistent theoretical unity." Judging by the Suttas of the four Nikāyas or Āgamas and the earlier Anthologies, we find the vague earlier beliefs in life before this life on earth, and in life after it, gathered up into something approaching a definite orderly doctrine. We find in them, not so much faith in what *might* happen hereafter, and faith in what *might be compelled* by efficient ritual to happen hereafter, as acquiescence in a scheme of pre-existence and post-existence which amounted to what we should now call a law of nature.

¹ I call these the Kāṭha, Śvetāsvatara and Maitrī especially.

You were and you would be, whether you prayed and sacrificed, or whether you did not. Your life was taken up into the law of cause and effect. I venture to think this was a new standpoint. I am not saying it was of the Sakyan mandate or gospel. I am not saying it does not here and there emerge in the older Upanishads. I say rather, that it was astir among the new ideas of that time, and the teachers both of the standard religion and of reformers like the Sakyans felt its power. With this I have dealt elsewhere.

How was the more definite, more concordant position expressed in words?

Specific or technical terms for it are far more to seek in the Piṭakas than they are in our own discussions on them. Rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration, survival, metempsychosis—all are Western labels. Even the more or less adopted word *samsāra* means simply a faring on, being used with the companion term *samdhāvana*, running on: expressions of a worldwide acknowledged belief. Terms that we do find are the following:—

(a) Different spheres of existence or worlds are called "becomings" (*bhāvā*), never "existences." This word was there for the using (*atthitā*), but it is never so used. This is, I think, a significant feature too much slurred over.

(b) Rebirth is often termed "again-becoming": *punabbhava*.

(c) It is now and then referred to as a long, long faring on, running on "of you and me."

(d) Recollection of it by a few abnormally developed persons is called "recollection of former residings" (*pubbe-nivās' ānussati*).

(e) Death is often carefully alluded to as the

breaking-up (*bheda*) of the *kāya*, a word which may mean equally body, and frame, group, or world. The laying down of this, the taking up of another also occurs.

(f) The most usual term, perhaps, is just "happening" or "arising" (*upphajjati*), after "falling," "deceasing" (*chnti*, *chavati*). There is no spatial emphasis here of a going up or down, beyond the general and natural envisaging of renewed energy as a "getting up" and of death as a "lying down." There is, it is true, the less frequent term met with: *avakkanti*: "coming down into," for the rebirth of a man, who is in such contexts spoken of as either *viñ-ñāṇa*: substantialised mind, or *nāma-rūpa*: shape with name. But neither is there here any spatial emphasis beyond what is analogous to natural envisagings just referred to; the term is also applied to advent of sorrow or happiness.

(g) In the stereotyped definition of birth (*jāti*) the word *sañjāti*, i.e., going-on-birth occurs, but I do not meet with it applied to birth separately. "That which of such and such beings in such and such a group (*nikāya*) (is) birth (*sañjāti*), descent (*okkanti*), more-production (*abhinibbati*), manifestation of body and mind (*khandhā*), acquisition of sense: this is called birth." (*Samyutta-Nikāya*, ii.)

(h) The beginning of the life-series is stated to be unknowable, the ending of it is stated to be possible if the man will.

(i) That it is a given man or woman who lives on, when the temporary body is discarded, is nowhere referred to as other than to be understood and accepted. There may have been change of name, both in reappearance on earth and in immigration into

another world: the Commentaries give instances; but the man, although in process of becoming, does not lose identity. This is consistently shown in one Jātaka after another, when the teacher is said to "connect" the story with the present: "A was X, B was Y, but C was just I."¹ And in the Suttas also: "I was then that Brahman chaplain: I was then that young Jotipāla" . . . and emphasis herein attains its limit in the following: "Now it may seem to you, Ananda, that at that time Jotipāla was a different person. But you should not look upon it like that. I at that time was Jotipāla." (*Majjhima-Nikāya*, ii, 54, P.T.S. ed.)

Rebirth had become an old and popular tradition. It was taken up into the doctrine of karma, *i.e.*, of the power of the will and its outcome in action to shape the doer's destiny. "Lord!" babbles the crazy Ophelia, "we know what we are, we know not what we shall be." "We only know," said Buddhism, "what we are when we know what we have been and what we may be."

Moreover, recognition of visitors from the next world, as of men who have preserved their identity, is attributed, in the Suttas, to those who are psychically, abnormally gifted, as was the Sakyamuni, Moggallāna and a few others. Such recognition is recorded in visits of the deceased king Bimbisāra, the philanthropist Anāthapiṇḍika and the soldier Ajita, general of the Licchavis. The contexts are not the telling of dreams, nor of allegories.

2. The possible whence and whither also were in Sakya brought into clearer relief than before. They are usually enumerated as three "becomings," or,

¹ "Aham eva ahoṣi."

more specifically, as five "bournes" or "objectives"-in-going (*gati*, *gatiyo*). English here is poor, and I have to be either ultra-old-fashioned or ultra-modern. The three are the world, or worlds, of desire (*kāma*), restricted in Sakyan days, from the broader Vedic use, to mean sense-desire; the world of things seen (*rūpa*); the world or worlds of things unseen (*arūpa*). The first included all rebecoming of a grosser sort, to wit, purgatory, animal life, petas or manes (a life of intermittent misery), earth-men and devas of the next world in five groups. The second was otherwise called world of the Brahmās, where presumably the three more physical, less intellectual senses were negligible and sense was mainly confined to sight and hearing. The third was the worlds of vaguely conceived, practically discarnate beings, access to which, or to earth from which, is not recorded as an earth-experience. Of the five *gatis*, the first four and part of the fifth are of the Kāma-world. Rebirth as *asura*, a sort of titan or discarded deity, is sometimes included in categories of unhappy rebirth. A third classification is that of the four *yonis*, or matrices, to which we may recur.

Of the five "bournes" the fifth is a cumbrous concept, for under the word *deva*, or *devaloka* is implied a very dumping-ground both for survivals in eschatological beliefs, and also for results of the Indian logical fantasy playing about with *possible happenings*, such as rebirth of being (*satta*) without awareness (*saññā*), a possibility evoking endless catechism in that late book of the Abhidhamma, the Yamaka. Such beings appear as lifeless as logical abstractions would be. Such beings only live, for us, when they begin to think, whereupon they promptly die! And the

arūpa devas, who, as unseen by any man, are an idea of the bodyless, are practically just fetches of abstract thinking, with no other reality. So in the Dhammapada we read:

pitibhakkhā bhavissāma devā-abhassara yakkhā (ver. 200),
rapture-enjoying shall we become like the radiance-emitting devas.

where there are still the concepts of experiencing and of visibility. But in the *arūpa*-Brahmā-world there remain but (a) space, (b) mind, (c) and (d) negations.

3. Where we are shown any inmates of the worlds unseen, we find creatures having both body and mind akin to our own. Sufferers and enjoyers in the "next" world were, according to Sakyan tradition, much visited by Moggallāna, that he might have more weight in teaching men how to shape their present lives by what he could, as eyewitness, tell them. Of the former, the sometimes Petas, these are reported as dwelling around the walls of earth-villages in dwellings sometimes highly decorated. Sometimes they are reported as comely beings, but all, more or less intermittently, are said to be suffering from some distressing penalty in the body, because of their ill deeds on earth. And their term of suffering could be shortened by the transferred merit of their human kinsmen's benevolent acts. Thus they are to each other as substantial in body as earth-people are to each other, and are of average intelligence. Their world was the centre of their universe, and if they looked longingly for help from earth, it was analogous to our looking for help, uplift and consolation from a world "above," which is not as substantial a concept either to us as is our present world.

But—and here is where the Sakyan tradition in its older stratum is interesting—their other worlds were not above. I am not so sure about the worlds below. They, the woeful ways, are that in *Ablhidhamma* and *Commentary*. But in the *Jātaka* account of Nimi's drive in the divine chariot there is no definite downhill for the visit to purgatory,¹ nor an upwards in the turn of the chariot when heading for the deva-world. The latter is "in the air," the other isn't, and that is all. There is an approach to the idea of worlds co-penetrating space. And this is a more significant concept for us than it used to be. It was easy for Christian belief to rest in an "up into heaven" and a "descended into hell," when space had not been charted by astronomy as far as thought can reach, and when there were no Antipodes. But we do not now believe in a survival on the moon or stars or, with Veda hymns, at the back of the sun. We have to learn to conceive not so much, not so wholly an otherwhereness as an otherwiseness. One day this will be our most practical problem in Relativity. It may be that the otherwhereness is more of a super-withinness than a hyper-expansion of the external.

The idea of up and down grew up in Sakya, it is true, and even comes in for precise measuring in the day of the *Milinda Questions*. But in the *Suttas* I have thus far found nothing of that.² Of deva-world visiting inferior deva-world (inferior in worth) we only read of the need of the former to assume a

¹ There is a "below" in the *Commentary* on *Samyutta*, i, 8, § 10, where a hot spring near Rājagaha owes its heat to the Brazen Purgatory beneath. Cf. *Kindred Sayings*, i, 14.

² The English reader may point to *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i, § 68, "went up to the realm. . . ." But this is a liberty taken by the translator. The Pali is simply "went to."

relatively gross bodily frame. But for a man of earth to visit either of the other two worlds of becoming, presuming he was abnormally gifted, the transit is said to have been effected by an effort of will (the word "will" is not there), which is stated with the true psychological sense of referring the willed mandating to the "man." "Just as a strong man stretches out his flexed arm, or flexes his outstretched arm, so X, vanished thence and was made manifest (*pâtur-ahosi*) in Y." All the more far-fetched, if decorative symbolism of wings is in this literature undreamt of. "Seated cross-legged he can travel through air as a bird on the wing," said of saintly hyper-efficiency, is the nearest approach to that.

And once in those bright realms, called collectively *sagga, svarga*: "happy limit," the earthly visitor does not find himself among disembodied "spirits"—really a very impossible conception for us as yet—he is with men and women apparently as complete in furniture of body beminded (*sa-manin*) as he is himself. They see him, walk to meet him, take his arm, seat him beside their seat, and talk, all of course impossible without bodily organs. If an illusion or mirage is implied, there is no uttered hint of it. So also when devas come to earth from either sphere of becoming, they use arms (in salute), legs and voice, and wear clothes, not to say armour and weapons. They are longer-lived, more mobile, happier than earth-folk, and have, some at least, the power of reading thought. These are the deva-"conditions," but in kind they are human people. Of the earth they had been; of the earth many of them would be again. As it were clothes, they have changed bodies, and there-with psycho-physical reactions; they are not wraiths.

It may be noted that I speak here of *devas*, and not, as the word is usually translated, "gods." It is true that the denotation of "god" is wide and diverse, but the word should not be over-extended. When is a god not a god?

I should say, that a god is a god when he has, if not, may be, creative power, at least informing influence, controlling force, some power to bestow or withhold, aid or harm, reward or punish, and withal some form of cult and votaries. When he has nothing of all this, at least outside his own sphere of "becoming," then is he no god in a legitimate, unstrained use of the term. In the Vedic pantheon we do get deities having these attributes. But in the later age, when the Sakyan church took birth, it was only that which we should here and now call the "state" religion, the popular form of religion, in which personalised ideas of the Supreme, of powers unseen, were recognised, and by the professional priesthood were waited upon as "gods." Among that professional priesthood there were, at the same time, many more earnest men of religion, Brahman teachers, who taught practically a thorough-going *immanent* theism, to wit, that deity was knowable by man as within and akin to himself—in Indian idiom, "to the self"—the Warder of man was within, the Mentor of man was within; man was no atom dragged in the following after some warrior-god; he was the shrine of godhead; he was It.

Now the influence of this teaching would tend to leave disdeified, and unworshipped a world of beings still referred to as *devas*. They would not become dead ideas; they would come to be rated as of a different status; they would be levelled down to that

of the world of those who had, as we might say, "gone before." The population of the deva-world became restocked by the dying on earth of worthy men and women. And the Suttas bear witness to rejoicings among devas, when there is an influx of worthy "humans" well taught by a worthy gospel, as well as to mourning when the influx is one that swells the hosts of unworthy realms. Such a change in standpoint did not avail in the long run to banish either the professional rites and names, or the many local cults of this or that tree-devatā, and others. But it certainly changed the "content" of the word deva for the growing Sakya cult.

No; Buddhist devas are not "gods." And one way to understand Buddhist doctrine is to cease calling them so; to cease also the parrot cry, with which many Buddhists complacently indulge, that early Buddhism was "atheistic." Buddhists ceased to be "Deva-ists" and this was *because the earnestly religious world about them had ceased to be so*:—Mahā-Deva-ists were perhaps a juster word. But no worshipper of the Inner Monitor, *whom Gotama worshipped, under the name of Dhamma*, can justly be called atheist, unless it be first asserted, that by "theist," worship of that inner guide only in the personalised form of something external be meant.

The word *deva* thus became a much-needed, much-used word in Sakya. The will to know the fate of those gone before was then very alive and vocal. The fact that the Sakyamuni was a great "psychic" brought, it is recorded, men and women in great numbers to him to ask if he could give them tidings. The Dīgha-Nikāya Suttantas, the Dhammapada Commentary have much to say about this. It was much

to be able to affirm, to believe, that "our Tissa," "my Nandā" was reborn a *deva*, a *devī* in the happy world.

And it is for that matter curious, that while Christendom has always maintained its constant, if very vaguely conceived doctrine of survival, it has never coined a good word for the survivors. But it has been hampered by its want of light as to the body in which we survive, by its myths of a waiting sleep and of opening tombs; moreover, it never had just the gift of a good "spare" term such as was the fate of Sakya. Pure spirit is as yet an impossible conception. When progress in the theory of survival becomes more generally intelligent, either a word for "survivors" will be found, or we must hold by "soul"—souls that we *are*, not souls that we "have." The word soul is capable of covering both us and our bodies, witness the S.O.S. signal, which surely refers mainly to bodies. At the same time there is a spectral feebleness about the word, which will need new infiltrations if it is to be worthy to stand beside the Sakyan "*deva*." On the other hand there are, as we may say, reserves of strength in the word soul, in the uses of it, which are undreamt of in the more externalised "*deva*." Let the reader consult the rich abundance of meanings in the citations in good dictionaries from Johnson to the Oxford Dictionary, and he will see what I mean. But it is this very manysidedness which obscures the simpler, more clear-cut term that we need for just "the man as surviving death." If we could only get into our religion a satisfactory doctrine of "the man," then possibly those many implications of soul would fall into place.

4. I come to the matter of the *how* of rebirth:

what did Sakya hold happened in the process? In what did rebirth consist?

This may seem to inquirers to be for all and every religion an insoluble crux, a problem of which it is not reasonable to expect the key alone in Buddhism. And whatever the Founder may have, as the records claim, decided to withhold in his pronouncements, we are, in Sakya, dealing with, if not a primitive, yet with a pre-scientific attitude of thought. And further, we ourselves have not yet come to any well-attested conclusion as to the relation between "ourselves" and our bodies. It is anyway curious, but it is a fact, that whenever writers strive to get explicit on how "Buddhism" conceived rebirth, he, or she—I too have sinned—always goes, not to the older Suttas, but to Pali books of a much, much later date. The "Buddhaword" is put aside, and the relatively unauthoritative word is trotted out. Yet the Founder taught for nearly half a century. And no Paraclete came to make wise the later men. What is wrong with the Pali Suttas, late, in respect to the very day of the Founder's teaching, though they relatively are? What happened according to the Suttas, when a man came to die?

They did not say, that there would be immediate rebirth on earth, as man. Their theory is, that this, in general, was a very difficult thing to obtain. Putting this aside, the doctrine of the Suttas is, that the man re-enters other world-denzenship immediately, *either* without the intervening embryo stage in a parent, as *opapātika*, or "reborner" (in a deva-world), or, as *nerāyika* (purgatorian), in hell, that is a temporary hell, or else, with the embryo stage, in the animal kingdom.

Here we find nothing more informative than the transition as a thing done. No light is thrown on the *thing in the doing*. Whatever came to be the disbelief in the persistence of an invisible "man" or soul, the language both early and late stating the fact of the transit is always that of a persistent entity: The man (*puggala*) is "the bearer of the burden of body and mind"; *he* dies and (with or without "at the breaking up of the body" being inserted) is reborn (arises) in such and such a world. I will return to this presently. A word first on the belief in animal rebirth.

Sakya, as I have indicated, found a belief of the kind; we see this in the older Upanishads (though not earlier). Or did it *not* find such a belief? There can be little question but that the Upanishads underwent in time as much editing as did the Pīṭakas—what if the brief allusions, not integral at all to the general teaching of the Upanishadic schools, are glosses, due possibly to Sakyan influence? And not to very early Sakyan influence at that? I have put forward the theory,¹—hold it strongly—that the founders of Sakya did not teach rebirth as animal as any part of their central figure of life as a Way (*mārga*) of the worlds. I think that the belief belonged to primitive popular tradition, in common with tree-worship, belief in devils and much else and was waiting to be exploited when, with a great growth in monastic parasitism, it became of first importance to make the alms-supported teaching popular and attractive. And more: it was consonant with the decline which is revealed in the Pīṭakas, in the sublime worth and sanctity of the concept "man," that the notion of reincarnation in an animal became not only not repugnant, but plausible.

¹ *Stories of the Buddha*, p. xix f.; Chapman and Hall, 1929.

It is to read the new into the old to see in the notion any special Indian, or Buddhist sympathy with animals as being by nature akin to man. They are never included among "beings": *sattā*. Due worth is paid to the relatively high intelligence of horse and of elephant as beasts. But the only general reference to life in the "matrix" or world of animals dwells on its miseries:—"In many more ways could I talk of how hard it is to state adequately how ill is (life in) the animal world" (*Majjhima*, iii, 169). Older estimates of Buddhism will have rated the belief in animal rebirth as linking it with the paganism of old cults of other continents, infecting the European tradition through men like Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, yet only played with by them. The modern West, in its excessive cult of the animal, or at least of one or two kinds, tends to over-rate this decadent tendency in Sakya or Buddhism, and to follow uncritically the Piṣakas in this respect. It would be of interest to pursue the question, both in view of the little animal-worship there is in Indian cults, the climax attained in the idea of the sanctity of the individual man *gautama*, when Sakya was born, the fact that any world-religion worthy of the name reveals a *more*, and not a *less* in human possibilities and future, and the fact that the decline of Sakya was marked chiefly by just these two changes: the worsened worth in the theory of "the man" and the resort by monk-teaching to fables, especially of men reborn as animals. The last is on a level with the unworthy exegetical definition of the man: *puggala*, as "hell-gobbler": *puṃgala*. But here I must get back to the main subject.

We have now to consider the how of the man surviving and encountering apparently as adult (infantile

rebirth or survival gets even less careful consideration than it does among ourselves) the result of his earthly actions. There was the alternative of Nirvana, for which, even on earth, a man or woman was held to be ripe enough. But that was held to be other than being in any way reborn. Mysterious as the going of the flame of dead fires—by no means itself a going out into nothingness, as physicists of acumen now remind us—untraceable as path of bird in sky, there were, the wise poem says, no words to hand to speak of this. I revert to what is both conceived and discussed; or rather what fails to be discussed.

I am not here dwelling on any predetermined fate awaiting the survivor. We are as yet vague and weak in so-called eschatological treatment, and tend to merge the one in the other. I will only say in passing, that, passed over as it usually is in treatment, the Sakya doctrine comes second only to that of Zoroastrianism in emphasis on the fact of adjudication, of the judgment of a tribunal, in the case of rebirth from earth to the next world. No parallel statement is brought forward, I believe, in the case of an inmate of that world passing back to earth. We have of such a case only a little Sutta with poem, in the book called *Iti-vuttaka*: "the Thus-said-ings." A deva falls sick with symptoms of decease, and his friends wish him well on his impending return to earth, admonishing him in the good way (§ 83). Nor, in the case of the arrival from earth, is anyone's judgment described save that of the man who has let slip his opportunities and been knowingly heedless. The heedful are only alluded to as being safe and happy. The Sutta may well have been, in its original form—it retains a very vivid emphasis—an inspired message,

but, as teaching, it was just the heedless who most needed it, and whose case is therefore thrown into high relief. I may add, that for all the proneness to symbolic speech, and albeit the word "weighing" was a figure for deliberating and judging, the "scales," so familiar to us in Christian art, do not appear.

But there was, in this matter of destiny at rebirth, this lively belief in adjudication, in the person of the judge (he is the ancient Vedic Yama) and in the *dossier*, and in the idea of a legal ordinance administered. In other words, there is, at least in this branch of the great subject, nothing automatic. The man does not wake up to a good or bad destiny without being ushered into it according to plan. It may be said: is not that Sutta, in its repeated presentation (in two of the chief Collections) just a parable, an allegory? I should say, not; the Scriptures are careful when using parable to introduce it *in a set idiom*; I cannot recall any instance where this is omitted; the parable solution is to me very improbable.

To come to what, I repeat is not discussed; this is *whence*, when a man, leaving the earth-body, passed on to appear as purgatorial, *peta*, *deva*, *came the new body*? In every case, it has been shown as evident, that there was a new body, and that is all there is to say about it. Nor, apparently, were the founders asked concerning this so far as the records show. Ānanda is shown as very anxious to display his Leader's psychic communications in revealing, to all who appeared desirous to learn, the fate of their lost ones; but he puts no question about the acquisition of the new body. *The age was in such matters no more awake and interested than is our age.*

In their case this was perhaps the more curious,

because the teaching of another, a dual, body in earth-life, as the mate of the earth-body, was almost of necessity implicit in the current Brahman theory of the man's other-world activity during deep sleep. I refer to the well-known passage in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad. It is no discarnate "spirit" who comes forth from the earth-body in sleep, released in some limited way from the tissues of the latter, but the man himself, encased in a "finer" vehicle, who leaves "the nest." By this bright "light-body" he "looks down" at his sleeping other members and "goes again to his (real) home, golden person, lonely bird," has a pleasant time of sport and laughter and love, or sees fearsome things, learns things good and evil, and hastens back when the earth-body is beginning to wake, lest he leave that to die.

Of all this we read in the Pīṭakas not one word. Yet the majority of the first Sakyan teachers were Brahmans. On the other hand, two things may be said. It is possible that the Upanishads cited, evidently the work of one or more gifted, progressive reforming teachers, *may not have come to be finally edited and accepted as scriptural till long after the birth of Sakya*. And the Pīṭakas too were not finally edited and accepted in a Canon till centuries after that birth of Sakya, when by the Sakyan Sangha a definitely anti-Brahman position had come to be taken up, especially in regard to the man. Any teaching that involved the theory of the man passing over from one body's world to another body's world would, if worded and memorised, *tend to be let drop out*. The theory of the subtle body persisted in India and became orthodox in Sāṅkhya; and it would have furnished the

Sakyans with an explanation of all bodily rebirth not by parents. But, I repeat, we must always remember, that in "scriptures" we have, not records redacted at the time of the utterance of the events or ideas which are mentioned, but edited compilations belonging to and bearing the stamp of a much later date. And thus we find on the one hand Brahman scriptures (wherein the belief in the reality and sublime nature of the man is upheld) with the man's activity in sleep, a second body being implicit, accepted as orthodox; on the other hand we find Buddhist scriptures (wherein the belief in the reality and sublime nature of the man has been greatly worsening) without a word on this, or other matters, which could only be brought forward with a rehabilitation of the older belief in the man. Both sleep and death are occasions for the theory of the man, as of a dual body, being proffered as explanation. And Buddhists (or Sakyans), coming to merge the man in his body and mind, were not likely to hold in worth a belief in man as *the user* of one body, let alone two.

But what about the rebirth into a new mind? Is it a brand-new mind which they held was reborn? Was it ever held that the man had a dual mind?

When Sakya teaching took birth, it was not yet an accepted way to speak of mind as an entity distinct, either logically or actually from the man. The influence of Sāṅkhya, which was in fact a divorce of psychological from religio-philosophical standpoints, was only beginning to be felt. It was not yet held necessary to talk of rebirth in terms of mind, as well as of body and the man. Let me not be held to push this too far. Man under a certain aspect was mind (*vijñāna*). This was as "worther" and as "worder."

And in so far as there was, at death, only a "*bheda*" of the body, the *man* in every aspect was not held as also breaking up. The new emphasis which Sakya may be said to have laid on the man under this aspect was that, *as minding*, the man was presenting at any moment, not at death only, a perpetual change, a change made classic under the simile of the leaping ape. Were this aspect being taught now, we might expect an exploiting of the better similes ready to hand, such as electric force and apparatus. No man in replenishing the latter, when worn out, asks for a supply with it of new electricity. That is potentially ready all the time. All the man needs at dying is the new battery. He is the force; *his translation into the battery, the vehicle is mind*. Indeed this simile, which I and doubtless others first used some eighteen years ago, I see already commending itself to Buddhists rather than the classic figure of their own little studied scriptures.

Another classic figure which is now neglected was that of the station or platform: *thiti*, in or on which (the preposition would be the same) the man as worther, viz., *viññāṇa*, is in rebirth transferred or translated. The *thiti* was at once new body and new world; a new vista in fact in the long way of man's life-faring; a new opportunity for further becoming for growth. I hold that this idea belongs to the very centre of the original Sakya, and the "platform" figure is in harmony with it. It is accepted in the Suttas, nevertheless it must have been somewhat a rock of stumbling, in that it tended to uphold the emphasis on the man as watcher or worther on the new platform. And indeed we meet with this idea of the progressive minding-man, or *viññāṇa*, being severely trounced in a

lively Sutta of the Majjhima-Nikāya (No. 38). The belief in "that very *viññāṇa* runs on, fares on; not a different one is" condemned; so also is the definition of *viññāṇa* as "this speaker, experiencer who now here, now there experiences the result of good and evil deeds." And we are told, that, so far from being a persistent entity, *viññāṇa* comes into being, lit. becomes, as a result of certain preceding conditions.

The trouncing is put into the mouth of the Founder, and for those who see in the monastic values of the Piṭakas the earlier values of the Sakyamuni and his comrades, it is a very useful discourse. I found it so myself in my salad days of Buddhist interpretative work. I do not wonder, that some pronouncement, corrective of the awkward earlier teaching of *the man as persistent* and as "growing" by way of a succession of "platforms," was felt to be needed by later monastic theorists.

The whole question of the birth and progress of the great idea of becoming in Indian ideas is of profound interest, and will one day meet with adequate treatment. We see the idea knocking as it were at the door of the stronghold of being in the words of the progressive teachers of the Upanishads, declaring that the fundamental attribute of Deity was not being but "the desire to become." We see it both in their and Gotama's figure of man's life in its entirety as a way connoting advance in a more, a further, a new. The idea of causation as a world-law, which was afoot at about the same time, and which should have been brought under the greater generalisation of becoming, proved for a certain and a critical period to have, in Sakya, a hindering effect on that general-

isation. It was taught (a) more under the guise of atomic change, and (b) less in connection with process. (c) By the *less* of process, I mean that in the monastic formula of causation in "ill,"¹ only the suppression of cause is stressed; only a process making 'to cease is enjoined. And (a) positive process, when applied not to "ill" (*dukkha*) but to the man, is emphasised as, not growth, *i.e.*, becoming, but atomic, momentary succession in difference. It is not in fact till the date of the Milinda Conversations, that the question of cause and effect as *process* is shown coming to the front, with new terms for the valuing of it.² But by then it was too late to save the greater generalisation of becoming. We see it, both in the Milinda and in Hindu treatises, lingering on in India as the legacy of the original Sakya, but, in the transference to Ceylon and final redactions of the Piṭakas there, the ban of the monk on Becoming (*bhava*) became the authoritative mask, under which we have to try to recognise traces of the great New Word which had moved India for a while only centuries before.

In the Piṭakas, reading between the lines, we can, I think, discern this older seeing of the man as *viññāṇa* getting resolved into a seeing *viññāṇa* as just one factor among factors *making up the man*. The early Sakyan standpoint of seeing the man as *viññāṇa* is akin to the early Upanishadic teaching of, *e.g.*, the Aitareya, and of *viññānamayaṃ Brahman*. The later point, probably largely due to Sāṅkhyan influence, was a seeing in man a changing complex, bodily and mental, with "the man" ejected from *viññāṇa*. The older wording of the body breaking up at death

¹ *Paṭicca-Samuppāda*, or the "12 Nidānas."

² See my *Milinda Questions*, 1930.

became virtually a total dissolution, with a very ill-conceived rebecoming as a sort of resultant in the next world. There still remained the crux as to how, in decease, a power or influence could be conceived, in "transeunce," effecting the new man, who was yet in a way the heir of the old man.

We know ourselves, how cause used to be conceived as a transeunt influence. And mediæval Hīnayāna also annexed, from Indian religion perhaps, the very word influence: *śakti*, and wrote of causal influence: *paccaya-satti*. *But that was much later*. Later, but not so much later, are the inadequate similes of flame lit from flame, of mango from seed and the like, of the Milinda Questions, wherewith Buddhists still hope to satisfy learners. Later again, Buddhaghosa uses a simile for rebirth, which is no sooner said than nullified: the simile of a man swinging across a conduit by a rope tied to a tree. The man is *viññāna*, but, he goes on, "*viññāna* does not arrive here (rebirth) from a previous becoming; nor does it appear from thence without conditions, such as karma, activities (*sankhārā*), bending-on-to (*nati*), sphere (*viśaya*)," etc.

It was a troublesome and mysterious question, and one which, had but the Sakyan Sāsana, in adoring its Founder, maintained that more consistent adoration, which was the keeping intact the teaching a great psychic like him could have given about rebirth, and possibly did give, the question might have been, for it, neither troubling nor so mysterious. Western writers have suggested a solution for Buddhists, which these themselves have never in the past put forward as plausible and all-suffering. This is, that, for Buddhism, a man's collective actions, called "karma" (action), constitute a "force" which takes effect at

death in rebirth of a new man, yet of a man who, as having a karma x , and not y , is heir to x , not to y .

We see above, that for Buddhaghosa, there were certain "conditions" (*hetu*) in action, and that karma was *but one in many*. But, possibly with the printing of the Pāli books, a word here and there in them about man being "heir" of his actions (karma) and the like, has suggested this solution, rather than the little-known quotation from the later book, the Visuddhi Magga.

While the effective power of karma was more of a central doctrine for the Jains than it was for Sakya, there was certainly no trifling with the significance of it in the latter teaching. But, for Sakya, a man's karma came solely into account *at the adjudication subsequent to rebirth*: with the phenomenon of the rebirth itself karma had nothing to do. It is only a metaphysical playing about with ideas rather than with things, which could so trifle with results, that is, with things, as to fancy them gathered up into a sort of cumulative avalanche, automatically bringing to pass the new-born man. I admit, that decadent Buddhist dogmatics to a certain extent invite from us this interpretation of what they mean, when expressed in modern terms of "force" and "resultant." But the aim of this article is to suggest not what *they* had come down to, but what the earlier editors of the Piṭakas (late as these are in relation to original Sakya) had in mind regarding rebirth. And for the Suttas, there was *not yet felt the need* to explain the Man of the Wayfaring in the worlds in terms of ill-fitting, inadequate material similes of milk and mangoes, echoes and lamp-lighting, such as were found useful (in an age which believed in analogy as sound reasoning) by much later writers. For the Suttas the man, still

held as real, was (by implication) willer, chooser, valuer, experiencer of deed and of result. Hence it was he who was responsible, and not the deed, the karma. Deeds once done have left the man; they are no longer he. In deeds is no valuer; no choosing agent. Hence in deeds is no responsibility. "By you, yea, even by you have these things been done, and by no one else," is the judge's verdict in the Suttas to man at the next world's bar.¹

But of that bar and that verdict the Milinda Questions and the age of Buddhaghosa have not a word to say. Between them they had slain the "man"; gradually he was becoming, and then he had become, a mere complex. Bar and verdict were inconvenient and were dropped out. We could among us not possibly have suggested such a purblind solution as this of transeunt karma to the problem of the what and how of rebirth in Buddhism, had we not in the first place failed to consider Buddhism historically, had we not in the second place ourselves been getting as wilted in our concept of the man—or as we are now saying of personality—as Buddhism grew to be.

When we come to see history in Buddhism, a history of centuries, even already in these Pāli scriptures, which three great pioneers have made, and helped to make accessible to the world in one half-century—Fausbøll, Oldenberg, Rhys Davids—we shall then put forward fewer ill-digested theories. We shall no longer quote as of the Piṭakas, let alone as of the original Sakya, standpoints and emphases belonging to the later after-men. We shall have put on one side for separate treatment the ever more contracting view of the "man" at which decadent monasticism

¹ *Anguttara*, i. p. 138 f.; *Majjhima*, Sutta 130.

arrived; of the man in the many worlds as momentary successions, of the man at death largely replaced by an animal, of the man as capable of a perfection on earth impossible in any ideal of a perfection adequately felt after. We shall have sought, underneath this upper crust, for the remnants of a great world-gospel, bringing a new message for the man of the more that is in him and awaiting him; a message that he, being by nature and ultimately one-who-is-becoming, calls as his birthright for not one world, not one life, or life-station, but for many worlds, for many stages and platforms in his wayfaring; a message which bade him in that wayfaring ripen and realise all that lies yet dormant in his nature; a message which bade him not shrink in any way from the vistas of "Bhava's," in that *by way of them* he will in time come to conceive and to word, and ultimately to know That Whom now he worships as ineffable, inconceivable.

It will be no mean heritage for our day to enter into, although so long deferred:—this finding the real message of the Buddhist founders in a strengthening and deepening of the Immanence of their day. But when are we of to-day going to wake up to this problem; to the new body which man, in passing on, takes with him? The so-called "new psychologies" have not come to it yet, though they are so much prolegomenon to the great move on that is coming.¹ The psychology of yesterday tried to build up the mind of the individual from the racial mind of the past. It had to deal in masses, for it had not the Buddhist secret of rebirth. The psychology of to-day is investigating

I hailed with pleasure the conclusion of Dr. Bernard Hollander's *In Search of the Soul* (London, 1921): "Instead of saying 'man has a soul,' it would be more correct to say 'man himself is a soul.'"

the past of the individual—the last little bit of that past; it will have none of the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth. The next step will be to inquire into the psychology of our future—into what we rise up as, when we discard this body, the whence of that new body and the nature of it. It is no idle quest, but of tremendous practical importance. Few of us will urgently need to wireless to the Antipodes, much less to Mars. But we all die, and very soon. Are we always going to be so childish as to be content, not only with creeds, but with sciences that leave us in ignorance, and so in the fear, of death? This is no hopelessly impossible quest. Quietly research is going on, experiences are mounting up recorded more carefully now than ever. It is only the switching on of competent scientific investigation to an adequate extent and intensity that is lacking. This would in no long time bring us from our present darkness of fear and doubt and ignorance and anguish into a clearer air.

Still is the voice of us Rachels heard weeping for our sons—why? "Because they are not," said the ancient book. *Are they not?* Perhaps in a way nearer to us than ever they were, more otherwise than elsewhere?

Still do our poems smell of the tomb; still do we read epitaphs on *Here lies*—not always "the body of," but *Here lies John Brown*. And we stay our torn hearts with bed-ridden notions about "So He giveth His beloved sleep" and the like. Does John Brown lie here? Does he sleep? Is it not time, if we have burning within us the love of truth and the will to bring something worth calling consolation to the afflicted, that the scientifically trained among us should wake up and begin to put an end—as *they can*—to our ignorance?

THE ART OF LIVING¹

CENTURIES ago there came to be put together a little address by a Buddhist monk called Sabhiya of Rajgir, the first mother settlement of Buddhism in the Ganges valley. He, a tireless teacher, was talking to schismatic monks seeking to bring them into peaceful ways. His talk got set in verse; it was easier to remember verse when you never wrote down your thoughts. It runs thus:

People can never really understand
That we are here but for a little spell.
But they who grasp this truth indeed
Suffer all strife and quarrels to abate.

There's more, but this suffices for my text.

When I translated that for my Monks' Anthology: *Psalms of the Brethren*, I found myself recalling the one lecture I ever heard the famous savant Henry Bergson give a year or two previous: he said: "Yes, that death in which we do not really believe. Why do I say that? Because if we really believed that we should each of us die, we should act so differently from what we do."

A rueful little laugh went round the learned audience . . . and perhaps the hearers settled back into their respective grooves. Perhaps I too did, but the words haunted me, and I put speaker and words into print.

¹ Address published in *Peace and Progress through World Fellowship* (World Fellowship of Faiths, 1937), London, 1938.

Am I then here to advocate the futility of man disagreeing with man and coming to blows about it just because each and every one must soon vanish from the arena of the quarrel? That were to have no proper perspective of the range in time and space of man's intercourse with man. It has been noticed by men of other nations how friendly in other contacts members of the House of Commons often are, when in the House they are keenly in opposition. Life is larger than hours of debate at Westminster. It is not in view of the shortness of life that that monk bade his hearers leave off fighting; it was—for me, if not for him, for M. Bergson if not for him—just the opposite. It was because if you took a right perspective of life, the hours spent in quarrel were but so small a part of life. You may say: What of the so-called Seven Years' War, and the Thirty Years' War, of the 18th and 16th centuries? Is that so short a spell in any man's life? Much too long a spell, I admit, but, I repeat, a very short spell in any one life, if that life be regarded as a whole. They "who see life steadily and see it whole" come to recognise, that to live in the present only is not regarded as sane even by those whose view is tied down to this span of earth life; for ourselves and for our children we do take stock of the near future.

In this way we live at a higher level than the Grasshopper of the La Fontaine fable, who you may remember got the worst of it with the Ant. The Ant having worked steadily all the summer while the Grasshopper sang only, bids her go and sing in winter. To this extent we humans cultivate the art of living, but it is an art that we curtail most unreasonably. There is so much more that we need in theory, in system, and in practice to bring within the field of our art of

living. Unless we cater for much more in life than we habitually do, we have but a very narrow art of living. Our perspective is all wrong. Quarrels, private and public, bulk too large for us, as things necessary, important.

If you are a wayfarer on a long journey, to attain the goal of which is your heart's desire, you will not stop to bicker with a man because he has jostled you as you go. You have a very great More in prospect; you do not stop to consider what is, over against that, so very much a Less. It being essential to man's nature to will, to desire, a More in his life—whatever he call that More—the great religions, the gospels which have become world-religions are always revelations (in the mouth of some inspired man) of some new hitherto undeveloped More in his nature or his life or his destiny—in fact in all three of these—and the message they brought appealed to that essential in man's nature. In that More there was always posited the idea that life itself was a More than the life we usually call so. To call this earth-span of life life itself, is as if a wayfarer saw the end of his journey at the next bend in the road. And the call of every great, every world religion has been, at least at its start, to bid man adjust his living to this long perspective of the Way of life seen as a whole.

So adjusted, he will or should come to see, that the important art of living involves, not to get the best of the other man (or nation) by fighting, but to bring out the best of the other man by loving him. This for wayfaring is much less hindersome than the fighting alternative, but it isn't the really big thing in the perspective. That is the getting there, in other words the efficient travelling, in other words, the becoming

ever more like, ever less unlike the consummate living one is making for (*cf.* Art. I.).

What do I mean by this efficient travelling, not only in terms of the Goal or End or Consummation—we cannot yet even conceive what that may be like—but in terms of an art of how to live?

It is not exactly to sit contemplating a skull and saying *memento mori*. I do not suppose that the mummy case carried round the tables at Egyptian feastings ever made a single diner more careful what he ate or didn't eat. It was only a prompting by way of a Less, not a pointing toward a finer More. And if I say we are really very backward in the art of living the moment it includes dying, I do not mean that, having brought the fact of dying into the picture, we should stop and just look at it . . . look at it as if dying were the limit, the frame of the picture. In that true picture of life, the life not so much of men, as of each man and woman among us, dying is merely one incident among many of the same kind. For man is a traveller in the worlds. He is of the worlds world-denizen. He is a bird of passage. Men have known this from of old, and the passage, the unknown, the darkness about it has worried them. We read of this in those unforgettable words of the Saxon Chronicle, where a man comments on the advent of Christian missionaries as possibly bringing light on this unknown without, whence man, like a bird fluttering into the firelight, drifts into earthlife and flutters away presently into the dark.

But not all men have been equally in the dark about this. When those words were spoken, when they were recorded, man had been on earth many, many centuries, and even then it was but a feeble result to have got no further—or to think he had not.

We have now been more than a thousand years longer living on earth, yet is that comment very similar in substance to what the majority would say. Yet the majority still are disposed to pay honour in this country or that to certain inspired men, saviours, messiahs, all-wise teachers, who were themselves in no doubt whatever as to that lone bird's fluttering into earthlight, and whither it went when fluttering forth again. These saw and uttered this thing of man that he is not earthdweller only.

Yet are we in our thousands so little giving credence to these helpers of men, that we relegate what they are recorded to have said on this matter to the field of legend and to modes of edification to be found in scripture. Still does the priest here and elsewhere insist only, that we have in us what he calls the "hope of immortality," when what we need of him is to say we have the certainty of survival.

Man is an earth citizen now in a wider way than ever before. He is very slowly and timidly coming to realise this in his counsels and measures. But he is so far from realising his yet wider citizenship of the worlds, that he tends to forget it. Increasing his knowledge of this world he has been turning away from his wider heritage, and he has let the wider vision get dim and defaced. And yet he should be more mindful of it, more sensible of it, more inquiring into it, more wording it than ever before, if he would keep a balanced outlook.

It is when we face up to the fact that dying is in the picture in our outlook on life, is in it as just one change among many, just as we take out of our wireless an exhausted accumulator and put a fresh one in, that so we may go on listening and learning and en-

joying and switching off from, that we get a really corrected survey of life, yes, and of our fellow-men. I believe that, if we placed in the more visible background of our plans about all that, the firm faith, that we were going soon—I for instance very soon—to adopt a new country wherein to spend, not all the rest of our life but another spell of it, and that if we gave our will to it, we could find out much about the nature and standards of living there required, and our working energies here would gain, because the field wherein we exercised them would be a truer one.

We are winning to some truths painfully enough. For instance, that man will not realise his best here by fighting his fellow-men. When the war broke out, we heard the contrary now and then. But there are signs now, however troubled during this unfortunate decade be the skies, that the belief in welfare in and through peace is greater than we think. There are signs that we shall not always remain content to be blind or at best myopic. Here and there careful study is being set on foot. And we are struggling out of the herd-psychology into which we were sinking, by insisting on what some are pleased to call "personality."

I don't like abstractions any more than do my friends on the other side. I prefer "the man," homo, Mensch. And I hold, that when we have quite definitely ruled off the study of body and of mind as study of man's *instruments*, not of *him*, and that when we get sure grip of the idea that each of us is equally Wayfarer in life's Way, and not a negligible fraction in a herd wayfaring, we shall come to a just, because a true sense of our fellow-man as our fellow-wayfarer. Not for him any more than for us lies ahead a golden age on earth to crown our efforts. Earth is at best our school, our

workshop, and in it we are schoolboys, apprentices; we go home, we come back to it, we go eventually to a better home, not yet the Best.

Herein is the true art of living: as man of the worlds and wayfaring in them, to be seeking, willing to learn more and more of them, in company with my fellow-wayfarer, willing and seeking with me. Thus placing the art most worth while at the head of my life, all other aims should fall into their proper place, and we shall not, as Gotama, called the Buddha, said, according to scripture, mistake the lesser height for the peak of eternity. What a change it will be in our present darkness when our church-teachers will no more tend us on Sundays or when ill or in difficulties, with vague words on faith and eternity and heaven, but will themselves be trained vessels of access, and so once more, as in Israel of old, seers and prophets, passing to us messages from unseen guardians and bringing us answers from friends in that unseen. We speak on Sundays or oftener of the Communion of the Saints, whatever that in its dubious vagueness may be. But what a lovely day might Sunday come to be, if when folk forgather in companies, now smitten with dumbness as to what the world-way really means, they could learn through trained sources which they can trust, and so come to know, as never before, the Communion of Man with Men.

Yes, there is welfare waiting for us where there will have been trained and concerted climbing. Not only for me who have lost and suffered and found, but for you who have perhaps not lost so as to suffer; there is a wider, a firmer, a quickened welfare for all. There will come a forward view such as we dream of, hope for, but yet know not of. There will come, in place of

misty hells, purgatories and heavens as conceived in the past, knowledge of how our wayfaring here is watched and weighed and adjudicated hereafter by our fellow-men, who are guarding the public weal there as much as we do here, knowledge of how our coming is waited for, knowledge of how we go on to grow in will, in work, in worth.

Then will come an end to weary surmise and doubt. There will be sunrise over our dark valleys and we shall be in the Way of the Morning as we never yet have been. For we shall have discovered how much our welfare in these high matters of the greater art of living lies waiting on our will to know, on our realising that we are fellow-wayfarers in the Road to uttermost welfare. We shall have come to see around us, behind, before us a great design of will calling unto will; and in that Uttermost, that Goal, Willer beckoning unto Willer.

XXI

THE SUPREME SPIRITUAL IDEAL: THE ORIGINAL BUDDHIST VIEW¹

THE Editor has suggested that I associate what I have here to say with the article on similar lines in last October's issue by Professor Radhakrishnan. This scholar has been called, in a book appreciating his work, a liaison officer between East and West, so well does he understand both.² That article is a striking illustration of this. So much, in it, are West and East linked in jewels drawn from the culture of West and—no, not "East"; that were a slight to Far Eastern culture—but from the culture of Europe and India, that what we read is scarcely more the Hindu view than a loftier and wider Indo-European standpoint. To one who knows his India of to-day, as he does and I do not, it is very possible that the Hindu idealist of to-day is, like himself, an interesting blend of modern ideals, Eastern and Western. So that, when we seek the Hindu view, it is this blend that we find—a phenomenon only to be expected, nay, hoped for, as an ushering in of the ideal seeker, who will be the child of all older cultures in his quest for the New, the yet Better.

In that article, for instance, there come within purview the Hindu slogans of *māyā*, *śānti*, *yoga* (illusion, peace, introversive study). And of them he has a

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, 1938.

² *Counter-attack from the East*, by C. E. M. Joad.

word to say betraying their belonging to his cultural tradition as a Hindu. Yet even here, is there not a borrowing from the West, when he speaks of the last term as a "process of balancing the different sides of our nature"?

To another Hindu cliché he makes no such intimate reference, yet it long was once a very Leitmotif in Indian religion, developing from just the prayer, in Vedas, to be freed (*mucyate*) from this and that, to the noun-concept in Upanishads:—first *mukti* and *ati-mukti*, later, *môkṣa*: namely, a freedom beyond reach of death to Deity conceived as

The one God, inner soul of all,
cause of *samsāra* and of *môkṣa*;

and yet later, to a "pathway to Brahman here in this world, the 'mark' of freedom"; and then, but not later, reverberating in early Buddhism. Here, under a risen monastic vogue, it was diverted and shrivelled into the stoppage of a pathway, into the equivalent of "no more becoming." Freedom, emancipation, deliverance, liberty, release—in our greater word-wealth we are ever at odds how to word it—find due mention in the article, a butterfly touch, yet again it is mainly in terms of Christian apologetics—the liberty of the children of God (for early Hinduism it would be liberty in having realized one is God).

I have alluded to the spiritual ideal of freedom as reverberating in early Buddhism. It is a complicated subject, and in spite of certain striking contexts in Pāli scriptures it never was the central ideal. There will have been, I surmise, a revival of it in its new monastic dress, early in the history of the movement,

but by the beginning of our era (to judge by the *Milinda*¹) it was traditional, not vital. Somewhere, somewhen it will have undergone revival, as is testified by the Buddhist work, *The Way of Freedom*, preserved in China. In the classic Pāli manual of the eleventh century known as *The Compendium of Philosophy*, advanced study is termed the three channels of freedom. But for Southern Buddhism of to-day it is apparently and as told me, in religious teaching, a dead letter. In the earlier teaching, allusions to freedom are, with one fleeting exception, only introduced as a coda at the end of the addresses said to be earliest, and are also appended, like a pious tag, to the four rests of the Founder after the "tree-enlightenment." All bear the look of later gloss.

So much has the evolved gospel for the benefit of the monk overshadowed the earlier message, which was for "the man," that it is pathetic to hear to-day, as I have twice heard this year, the cultured lay-Buddhist uttering the former, as great enough for the outlook and conduct of the man or woman, who

Greift nur hinein ins volle Menschenleben
Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben.

It is true that there is talk to-day among Buddhists of losing the individual life in the Life that is All and is One (capitals used). I have vainly tried to get any such speaker to give me the source of such a tenet, for of their ancient Dharma it surely was not. There is not even a fit word to be found in it for life, nor for lives, beyond just the physical force or *jīvit'indriya*. To meet the demand for "lives," in a teaching bringing the "worlds" very near to this brief life-span,

¹ *Questions of King Milinda*, S.B.E., xxxv, xxxvi.

there appears to have emerged a plural form in the use of the word "becoming": *bhava*, namely, *bhava*, used for lives or worlds (forms of existence).

But for all this talk of "life as one," there is no grip in it so far, for me, of life and lives as being the framework, or rather the vehicle, in and by which the man is in a long process of becoming perfect: that namely which Radhakrishnan claims as being virtually the one ideal in all religions. It is rather an ideal which, with substitution of a term of negative form and implication, "nirvana" (replacing the original term *attha*: "aim"; thing needed, thing sought), would cut short that process, and see in the perfect man one who has done, has lived, has no further becoming.

It may well be that the modern Buddhist layman would not put his ideal into just these words. He has lost sight of his "worthy one," the *arahant*. He fills up his spiritual ideal with notions even more borrowed from modern ideals than that of the modern Hindu. Yet is his tradition of to-day an outcome of the teachings in that dual gospel into which his Sangha (or church), even while yet it was in India, split the original message. That tradition is of the monastic evolution. Its collar is full of hayseed from the cloister.

In the all but buried original gospel, on the other hand, I find a spiritual ideal worthy to be, as it was, the child and heir of the Upanishadic gospel—a gospel which we do not find as uttered by one Founder; somehow his memory has been let die (the fate of doubtless more than one saviour), but as in process of being exploited by his followers of the "academy":

a gospel of the man as being in his nature divine and needing to "know" this, to realise it, before he could "become" actually the Deity who he potentially was. The sayings, the mantras, teem with the word "become," aiding the defective verb "to be"; no one but a reader of the originals realises how much they do. Now here, now there we see the verb applied to spiritual growth: the student exhorted to "become one who has mother as god, father, teacher, guest, as god"; the teacher praying "Of the Undying may I, O god, become bearer!" As if it was realised how irrational it was, in this relation of Immanence, to use only the verb "is," and not see, in the mantra "That art thou," That art thou becoming.

Nevertheless, it cannot be pretended that, save by this one teacher, or school of teachers (the Taittiriya), the "becoming" was made an instant and pressing and vital need in this cult of Immanence. It is only when we turn from Upanishad to Sutta that we find the tables reversed. From first to last in the latter we find, not the call, the prayer: "May I!"—but the summons to try, to strive, to endeavour to become, to make become. The very word "call" is condemned as being, alone, insufficient.

"Such teachers," we read, "neglecting the things that make holy,¹ call and call on Indra, Varuṇa, . . . Prajāpati. . . . Now if a man seeking to cross this river Achiravati, stood calling, calling yonder bank to come over, would that bring it? Or would he tie his arms, or go to sleep. . . ." "He would, were there no boat, get boughs together and fashion a raft, and lying on it paddle with arms and legs. . . ."

From first to last there emerges in this monk-compiled scripture the fresh, the fuller vocabulary of

¹ "Make the (true) brahman," *Dīgha*, No. 13; *Majjhima*, No. 22.

words for effort and energy. The mission of the first "Buddhists," the sons of Sakya, started with man presented as exercising will, that is, choice, as to a way of life—a new bidding for India. Ever again do we find the Founder saying: "Wherefore thus should there be training; tell yourselves: thus and thus will we become." And his last words are still the Way and the Will: the last convert hears of the Way; the disciples are bidden "Earnestly accomplish!"

I am not opposing Radhakrishnan's contention that the Hindu spiritual ideal is *now* essentially ethical. I only submit that in its older emphases, the ethical aspect was, when compared with the original Buddhist ideal, negligible. And I would add that the latter had much to do with an improvement, in an aspect of renaissance Hinduism, for the better.¹ It is true that the monastic ideal, growing up later than those earlier emphases, and claiming higher "merit" for the unethical life of the recluse, invited blame both from Hindu, and from the higher ethical vision of Mahāyāna Buddhism. But as Buddhism ceased, many centuries ago, to be a missionary religion, and accommodated itself, where established, to the religious needs of the laity, its preponderant teaching was still so far ethical that it has not seldom been called just a "system" of ethics.

Let it not therefore be supposed that I am putting forward the *original* Buddhist spiritual ideal as mainly ethical. Not even though its teaching of ethical teleolution (known as the four Brahmavihāras) has never been equalled in any other religion. As to that,

¹ The ethical Dharma-Sāstras of a date when Buddhism was become powerful, may well have been the outcome of an ethical response in Brahmanism.

this feature was not original Buddhism; it was annexed very early (as I have shown),¹ and was never placed in the supreme position it would have occupied, either as original or in a truly ethical ideal. That which I see as the original ideal is neither the ethics of the Good Samaritan, nor moral or religious "freedom." A gospel that starts with the man as *being, before all else, a wayfarer*, is not in the first place considering either his fellow-man as such, or whether he himself is "at liberty," or becoming so. If the fellow-man can be made to come along, so much the better; if, with progress in the way, burden or shackles fall off (as with Bunyan's Christian), that is all to the good. But for the wayfarer Way's End is the Ideal. What makes for that is his first care. This would be part of his ideal, and the less he really knew about his Goal, the more would he with this "part" be preoccupied.

This would surely be culture in the art of travel, the rule of the road, or as we now say "road-sense," to be "road-minded."

And this "part" of the religious ideal appears, in their scripture, as preoccupying Buddhists to an extent wherein the ultimate goal of the road is little stressed. For it they had already, at their time in their land, a great mandate: that of Deity as immanent, as the ideal Self. "That is what you should seek" was their very first mandate. And this, as I shall later show, was enhanced with a new worth in the Immanent. It was also alluded to as *Agga*, highest, as *Pariyosāna*, Goal, as *Anuttaram*, Supreme, as *Attha*, Aim, the Sought, the Needed, and in compounds as *Brahma-*. But for the man, the thing in their day most needed was to realise and compass the long,

¹ *JRAS*, 1928: "Sequel to Co-Founders of Buddhism."

long *Between* that stretched from the actual man to his consummation as That, the years that lay between acorn and oak.

How to wayfare from this to That: here was life's problem. And very naturally came the reply of the road-mind: "train!" "become the efficient traveller!" For this notion the current idiom had two words, the one being *sikk* (surviving in India geographically in the name Sikhs), i.e., "train" or learn, the other being *dam-*, "tame." In canonical anthologies we find tamed and freed side by side:

*danā vimutā anighā nirāṣā*¹

in descriptions of those advanced in holiness. But in Indian idiom the being "tamed" meant less the cowed state of one overcome, more the educated trained creature, comparison being drawn with the finely trained horse and elephant brought to their maximum efficiency. And for such a man we read in the most treasured anthology the lines:

Tamed is the beast that men to concourse lead,
tamed is the beast on which the raja rides,
tamed is the man *who is the best 'mong men*.

Elect are well tamed mules and thoroughbreds
of Sindh, and the wild elephants we "nāgas" call;
man of trained self is *more elect* than these."²

In the unique nuns' anthology the Sister is shown taking her cue:

I saw an elephant from bathing come,
and man with goad bidding the creature stretch
his foot: Give here the foot! The elephant
stretched forth his foot, the man sprang up.
I saw the untamed tamed, and to man's bidding bent;
from that I fix the mind, for that to forest gone.

¹ "Tamed, freed, unfierce, not longing." *Sutta-Nipāṭa*, 493, etc.

² *Dhammapada*, 321-22.

The larger monks' anthology stresses the notion in alliterative word play:

Once hard to tame by taming now is tamed¹
 Vira, from doubts released, content, serene,
 Victor is Vira, freed from creeping dread:
 For him goal won, for him the standing still.

The phrase "goal won": *parinibbāyati*, is canonically used both for the perfectly trained animal and for that earth-life of the arahān, which the monk fondly believed was the final consummation of life as a whole. Even when he is found glorying in energy, it is in retrospect:

Into the homeless life I went from home,
 the life and training practising, all faculties
 well held in hand, in loyalty to him.
 Then longing rose within my heart, I yearned:
 now may I no more for a moment sit
 while dart of craving still is not withdrawn!
 of me thus aye abiding O! behold
 and mark the onward stride of energy.

As day broke with the rising of the sun,
 all thirst dried up, cross-legged, I had attained!

But whatever was his view about the attainment, his religion, for an early Buddhist, meant training with devotion:

Hence zealously within that Master's system
 let each man train, and as he trains adore.

I would not usually pass on to quote a formula for original views, yet I would mention how, in one such, giving the traditional aspect of the founder's work, this notion of him survives as not a liberator but as trainer. In the formula often introducing his appearing

¹ *Yo duddamayo damena danto.*

here or there, he is called "charioteer of men (who are) tameable": *purisa-damma-sārathi*. It is a precious survival of the mark left by him, the teaching of the Man of the Road. So, too, is the epithet "leader of the caravan" (*saṭṭhavāṇa*). So, too, are the epithets, first for the follower, later relegated to the Founder only, of *sugata*, "well-going" and *tathāgata*, "thus, (or) truly going."

It is true that the personified ideal of this great Man of the Road has survived in both South and East Asia as the perpetual Sitter. This, while its calm imperturbability has doubtless comforted many, is for me no fit expression of the original ideal—an expression which an India, in his day not making statues, failed to portray. It is rather the picture of a later day soaked in the ideal of monk-values grown very strong. The Sitter shows the man as done, finished, accomplished, surely no worthy conception of man as perfect. Greater for me is the vision of those wonderful Psalms of the Hebrew, xviii and civ, of Helper and Willer riding upon the wings of the storm. I can well imagine Gotama of the Sakyans preferring to be immortalised as a John Wesley ever wayfaring a-horseback missionising than as perpetually still and seated. Had he seen perfection in static rest, he would, after the famous hesitation, have opened his mission with that simile of the lotuses—"how they grow!"—foot-rooted, as India called the plant. He would not have translated that figure of growth into a figure of movement along a road, with all that wayfaring implies, as he did.

I would not give any one-sided presentation of a man whom we find accosted as now active, now passive. I seek here only to set something over against

the tremendous overweighting of him with static calm. That he and his teaching were a very dynamo of energy is as true as the opposite. Look past the existing misleading translations of this Sutta:

"So they call you *sāmaṇā's*?¹ Well, see to it that you make this become a true word and your profession become genuine . . . that your religious life become not barren, but fertile. . . . Train yourselves to become this and then that. Nor rest content as if you had done all. I declare unto you, I protest unto you, let there be no falling back in your aim while aught further remains to be done. What is there further?"²

So also the dear fellow-worker Sāriputta:—"I praise not standing still nor waning. I praise growth. . . . Herein is a man a striver. . . . Thus must you train yourselves!"³

Let it not be supposed that herein I see anything of that opposite evil to the passive: hurry, a strenuous self-deceiving pressure to get the ideal achieved in this little life-span, as in the later idea of the arahan. For original Buddhism the "road" was a figure of life as a *whole*, and that meant much survival, many lives. No religion before or since has ever brought the next step, and the many steps, so near to life in this world as did it. That under a monk *régime* it turned from this lengthened perspective, and lost the wider vision of its own figure of life as a man looking at a house with two doors, with exits and with entrances, has been for it a fearful loss. In the original outlook every life was a "moment" in opportunity.

If I am asked, is not the road, under the name "eightfold path," as alive in Buddhism as ever it was, I would say Yes and No. At some period in its history,

¹ *Religieux*.

² *Majjhima*, No. 39.

³ *Anguttara*, "Tens": "In Standing Still."

this "eightfold," that is, a category of eight rightnesses (*samattā*) was prefixed to the original figure, one among several experiments in substitution shown in an old Sutta.¹ Something that had been from of old prefixed had to go, as no longer in favour. I believe it was that "becoming," which survived in that "graph" of the Road, the Wheel. *Bhava-chakka* we have; *bhava-magga* is gone. Into this I have gone elsewhere. But the result of prefixing that eight has been that practically the whole attention of Buddhists has been shifted from the road to the eight qualities of the good life, good as far as they go, but omitting great essentials: amity, wisdom, great words in early Buddhism. I rarely take up a Buddhist periodical without meeting with talk about the eight or one of them; but talk about the great Between symbolised by the Road I hardly ever find.

How, for that matter, should the cult in the Between have been maintained when, in this relation, both of the terms had been gradually let fall? The one and the other, the Man actual, the Man potential, called at the birth of Buddhism by the one word "self" (*ātman*), faded out of the movement, as the rift with the established "Brahmanism" widened, and the growing vogue of mind-cult and mental analysis came to see, in the whole man, merely a complex. It is true, that in Buddhist exegesis the way echoes through the pages, but it also claims that "Way is there but no goer," and what reality can a road have where walks no wayfarer? Of the other term, too, Buddhism lost vision. By a disastrous mistranslation—so I hold it to be—it has lost a precious last word of the Founder: "Whoever among you wish for train-

¹ See my *Manual of Buddhism*, S.P.C.K., ch. vi.

ing, and only they, will become (they who are) That Immortal Highest." It has never been my fate to hear or read a Buddhist contemplating his ideal as just That !

Nor does he contemplate his " Way " or " Path " as a further-faring leading through a More to a Most. Yet his scriptures, could he but read them in his own tongue, would teach him this. Listen to them: " And while he often contemplates these things " (in the common life on earth) " the Road comes into being; and that Road he follows, makes-become and develops . . ." (and so)

Strength came to me. Ne'er now can I become
Addict of sense-desires. I shall become
A man bound never to be turning back,
A Further-Farer in the life divine.¹

¹ *Anguttara*, III, 75.

XXII

TAMED, FREED: AN ORIENTAL PACT¹

"TAMED, freed, not fierce, not longing": *dantā vimuttā anighā nirāsā*: so runs a line in the Sutta-Nipāta where, in a true monkish apologia, the rich and generous layman is bidden to give charity rather to the monk. The antithesis in the first two terms is not commented on in text or exegesis; they have become quite technical. But they will not always have been so. A gospel brought at its birth expressly to the Many will not have begun by telling men You are X; you are also no less, in a way, not X. We have to see in this later juxtaposition a past history; we have to ask ourselves: Which was the earlier teaching? and: What was it that blended them in this linkedness? A brief discourse can but suggest lines for fuller study; indeed such a study may exist, and I be ignorant of it. But I feel fairly confident in saying, that (a) the scriptural juxtaposition is not pre-Buddhistic, (b) the history of the Buddhist juxtaposition has not yet been critically dealt with.

That the worthy man, such an one as the Vedas call *arahan*, should be both tamed and freed is not a Vedic ideal. Freed, yes, but I do not find "tamed" as a desirable ideal, even in its Indian meaning of "trained." Nor is the freed man as such, much less the abstraction "freedom," worded in the hymns. The voices that

¹ Published in *Archiv Orientalni*, Prague, 1937. A few pages are omitted as coinciding with another article.

we hear chanting are those of man-in-the-bonds, wanting to be freed from (*mucyate*) this and that, such as foes or fiends or sorcerers or plagues. The nearest approach to an abstract term lies in these "bonds," not in their opposite, namely in the word *amhas*, a word perhaps akin to the Teutonic "Angst." The meaning of "sin" in *amhas* is later, when man's moral sense, possibly under Buddhist influence, was much more awake. In the Atharva-Veda we come across the notion of freedom, not only from the ills named above, but also from such as are (wrongly) called eschatological: release from perdition, from death itself. Here we are in the world of Upanishad teaching, albeit with little of the sublimer positive outlook it reveals. Yet in that outlook the freed state as such is secondary; it is the "becoming Brahman" that is the ideal. Nor do we find this idea of liberty till the Kāṭha-Upanishad, by no means an earliest number, and close, I judge, to the birth of Buddhism:

Knowing the Man (or self) he is liberated
and goes to the Immortal.

And then the Śvetāsvatara, also probably not pre-Buddhistic:

By knowing God one is released from all fetters;

and the still later Maitri:

So when (man) the charioteer is liberated from those things
wherewith he was filled full and overcome, he then attains
complete
union with the Self.

And it is only in these two last that we come upon the new abstract term *mōkṣa*, liberation. It is true

that already in the perhaps earliest Upanishad¹ we find the older abstract noun *mukti*, *atimukti*: freedom, utter freedom; but here the term does not mean an ideal, but only the condition for ultimate attainment, a negative leading to a positive, the positive: "a better world," being the only thing that mattered. It was after all but natural, as I have said elsewhere, that the Indo-Aryan, with his great trek and conquest in the background, should have little developed "freedom" as an ideal for the individual man.

The critical weighing of the extent to which freedom, emancipation, deliverance, liberation, liberty, release—in our greater word-wealth here we are ever at odds how to word it; the German cliché *Seelenlösung* is perhaps best—is a complicated question. I would venture to maintain that, in spite of striking contexts in Pāli scriptures, it never was at the birth of Buddhism the central ideal. I incline to think, that soon after that date there will have been a revival of the Upanishadic notion of *mukti* and *atimukti* and the later *mōkṣa* (Pāli *vi-mōkṣha*), as in a new way applicable to the monastic renunciation of the world: the "going forth," the rising vogue in which seems to have been creating much stir in early Buddhist days. Riddance from earthly desires and bondage thereto we meet with in the early Upanishads. But riddance from worldly cares and ambitions and ties and the work of the world: here was a new release not shared in by the Brahman teachers of gentlemen's sons, let alone by their pupils' families.

In time this freedom-ideal became traditional only; judging by the *Questions of Milinda* it was no longer vital. The monastic régime had become so accepted

¹ Chândogya.

that, of the three Marks: *anicca*, *dukkha*, *anattā*, only the third meets with respect. In other words *the monk had become an institution* and needed no longer to carry on flag-wagging about his having chosen the better part amid a world that was transient and evil. Somewhen, somewhere there may have come up *another revival*, from which sprang the treatise *Vimutti-magga*.¹ the original model or prototype, some presume, of the later *Visuddhi-magga* of the 5th century. Whether or not this be true, no one would call *vimutti* a prominent ideal in this latter famous work. Else the term "purity" had not been substituted in the title. My editing of the work is now much blurred in memory, and I am fain to have recourse to those fallible guides: indexes. Well, the translator, P. Maung Tin, omits all reference to English terms for *vimutti* in his otherwise full index. And the index made for my text is little better. For the author, Buddhaghosa, the term has become nothing more vital than something to be referred to as it is in the *Vimutti-magga*: a fivefold category of tradition, thus: "freed, that the freedom won which is specific extirpation, arrest, tranquillity, escape and freedom,"² where, characteristically, the definition includes the term to be described. For Southern Buddhism of to-day, so a Sinhalese scholar tells me, *vimutti*, as *sāsana* or "teaching," is a dead letter.

But to return to the Pāli Pitakas. I repeat that the attitude there towards *vimutti* is too complicated to be thus airily dismissed. It has every now and again a baffling way of coming to the footlights as if saying:

¹ Now translated into English in Japan by three Japanese scholars.

² P. 146.

The true teaching: that was I. But I will not here forestall the critical more detailed analyses forthcoming by the hand of my colleague Isaline Horner.¹ I would here only point to one or two interesting features in those foreground appearances of *vimutti*, namely, where the term appears linked with the earliest utterances of the Founder Gotama.

I have insisted for over a decade, and still insist, that, in the first two utterances placed in the mouth of Gotama, we have literature that bears the marks of plentiful editing, especially (if not only) in the latter portions of both. Here we find suddenly appearing a new bent given to the freedom-ideal of current (or recent) Indian teaching. The seeker is described as wording insight that arises in him and saying: "Unshakable is in me release in purpose (*ceto-vimutti*)," and again: "holding in no worth body or mind, he wanes; through waning he is set free (*vimutto*), and knows: As freed I am free!"

In both of these codas, we have left the leading theme of the opening sentences: (1) the choosing of a middle or right Way or Road in the Aim of life, and (2) the *caveat* lest body or mind be taken for the self (who is, unlike them, divine, able to do what they cannot). We have come to a "way out," unfit for a gospel for Everyman; to a release which is not that of the early Upanishads, viz.: to that freedom from lower desires by which man eventually "goes to," "becomes" Brahman, the ineffable Highest. The positive worth is lost to view; we see only a negative consummation into a very Not; a culmination of the renunciation begun here by the half-life of the monk.

¹ Author of *Women in Primitive Buddhism* and *The Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected*.

In the next place we find a recurring line, stating that after his "enlightenment" the Founder is said to have four times sat in enjoyment of "the happiness of *vimutti*"—just like that; no more. This, be it noted, is before he has "got off his chest," as we say, the Message he is shown brooding over. As to how enlightenment came we are left in doubt. The legend, which is uncanonical, shows him surmounting devilish assaults, which for a man so spiritually mature as he could have been without weight. The Canon only shows him reflecting, *after* enlightenment, on causal uniformities true for mental, no less than for physical procedure, with attention only to ill as caused, not to "well" as caused no less. The first utterance makes no explicit reference to the Road as leading to *freedom*, and only drags in freedom at the end of a coda differing greatly in style from that which words the first part.

It may be a hazardous step, but I have concluded, that in all this we have, in the allusions to *vimutti*, editorial insertions made by later tongues in the oral teaching, and confirmed still later in the written substitutes. Made because there will have arisen in the Buddhist Order teachers who, themselves very likely ex-brahmins, taught a revival of the *mukhi*, now *môkṣa*, ideal adapted to the outlook of the monk.¹

I do not propose here, I repeat, to deal with canonical passages pointing to this revival; I willingly leave this to another. I will but cite the fact, that, late in the compilation of the Fourth (Anguttara) Collection,

¹ It is not impossible that a movement for Social "Emancipation" among women, at the birth of Buddhism, very visible in the Nuns' Anthology, may have quickened revival of the term.

under the Tens, we find the Way of Gotama, a teaching which had been made earlier into an eightfold category, *expanded into ten features*, the ninth and tenth being an addition of knowledge (*ñāṇa*) and freedom (*vimutti*). I am not here examining, to what extent, in the revival I divine, the Upanishadic ideal of knowledge as well as of *mōkṣa* was included, but I commend the point to future research. And yet one more point: in the list, assuredly made early in the Buddhist movement, of this and that disciple, male and female, reckoned as best—*etad agga*,¹ . . . in this or that virtue or attainment, no one is reputed as such in the teaching of "liberty." It may be said: neither is anyone named as Way-teacher, and other noted doctrines, such as the "divine states" (*brahmavihārā*), might be included here.² Well, I meant my point also to count as negative, namely, that there was as yet no prominent monk associated with any such revival of the importance of "liberty" as I suggest may have at some time arisen, early enough to cause much concerning *vimutti* to be taught, or grafted upon many Sayings. We know, alas! so very little about the history of the Order, between the First Council and the Third, the one in Asoka's time, about which we get records of revision and standardising of Sayings and Debates as to what the Founder had really taught or had not taught.

But I am convinced, that research-pioneers in early Buddhism go too far in the basic importance they assign to "freedom": Oldenberg, *e.g.*, who sees in it one of four *Schlagworte der Lehre*: calm, bliss, peace,

¹ *Anguttara-Nikāya*, the "Ones."

² Only the first "state" is mentioned, linked with the name of a woman.

release: a pure monk-vision, not that of either the missionary or the man he seeks to help. Edmund Hardy too saw in *Leiden* (*dukkha*) and *Erlösung* the "two poles of the teaching."¹ That sagacious man said very little that was not soundly historical, but here he had to leave his admirable handling of details and to say much in a tiny compass, and I fear he found it convenient to indulge in an overgeneralising epigram. Winternitz, too, saw, at least till a few years ago, in *Erlösung* one of the basic things we could not comb out. Beckh found *Erlösung* very central, but the find involved him in the "howler" (as we say) of making the aged Founder talk of four, not three heads on his last tour. Rhys Davids was, as usual, more cautious, at least in this matter. So is Dr. E. J. Thomas, who nowhere refers to "freedom" as having been an essential feature in the gospel when first put forth.

And it is just here in the Pāli Sayings, that we should note carefully. There is for instance a brief Saying, given as very early in the movement, not I believe referred to by any of these pioneers, where Gotama to his first few disciples is made to say: I by rational thinking and by fit endeavour have come to know, to realise, supreme freedom. Do you do the same.² This on the surface would seem to support the claim they make. I would point out, that here he was not talking to the Many, but to a few men, mostly brahmins. These would be familiar with the subject; for them freedom would imply an unmentioned Highest, to be won through freedom from lesser desires, as in the Upanishads. The New in the Saying is the pair

¹ *Indische Religionsgeschichte*.

² *Vinaya, Mahāvagga, i. 13.*

of terms "rational thinking" and "right effort." Given then that the Saying is genuine, it does not give "freedom" a basic importance in the new message. But that freedom, as *riddance from life*, was, in the first charter given out for the first mission-tours, is not only no feature in that charter, but is an unthinkable item wherewith to make an appeal to the Many. We must turn to our other term: tamed.

In the all but buried original gospel of Gotama I find a spiritual ideal worthy to be, as it was, the child and heir of the Upanishadic teaching, which was exploiting the earlier gospel of Immanence first uttered by some proto-Yājñavalkya some decades, probably, before the advent of Gotama. In that earlier message man was in his nature divine, and needed to "know" this, realise it, before he could become actually the Deity who he potentially was. The mantras exploiting the message teem with the word "become" (*bhavati*), aiding the defective verb "to be"; no one, reading translations only, realises how much they do. The verb is ever being applied to spiritual growth, in injunction to students, in prayer, in outlook on life beyond that of earth. As if it was realised how irrational was the use of identity only, without "becoming," in a religion of Immanence.

But the vital necessity of growth or becoming is a pale thing in the Upanishads beside the instant pressing need of it revealed when we turn from Upanishad to Sutta. In the Suttas "prayer to become" has faded into the urgent importance of "so living as to become." Invocation as in itself efficient is scouted. Such teachers of it, we read, "neglecting the things that make holy (i.e., the true brahman) call and call on

Indra, Varuṇa . . . Prajāpati. . . . Now if a man seeking to cross this river here stood calling, calling yonder bank to come over, would that bring it? Or would he tie his arms? Or go to sleep? . . . He would, were there no boat, get boughs together and fashion a raft, and lying on it paddle with arms and legs . . ." (*Tevijja-sutta*). From first to last there survive in the monastic scriptures the new and frequent words for effort and energy. And ever do we come up against the refrain: "Thus are you to train: so and so will we become . . ." The Founder began with Way and choice, *i.e.*, with will; he ended with the same. The last convert is told of the Way; the disciples are bidden "Earnestly accomplish!"

I have spoken of "training" and this brings me to the first term of my title: "tamed." Had there not been in Gotama's gospel that Way or Road, they who see in it just a "system" of ethics would have a little better footing. But the Way lies "in the way of" any such shallow conclusion. For by Way was meant the fact that man is not essentially an ethical being, but a Wayfarer, wayfaring through life "seen whole," and the Goal of his wayfaring was repeatedly called "of other worlds" (*samparāyika*). A man as essentially a wayfarer will not, in the first place, consider the other man's interests, nor whether he is "free," or freed, or bound to become so. These become corollaries of right wayfaring. If the fellow-wayfarer can be made to come along, so much the better; if, with progress in the way shackles fall off, as with John Bunyan's Christian on pilgrimage, that is all to the good. But for the Wayfarer, the ideal is Way's End. And his first care is what makes for that; this would be his very instant outlook; indeed he would be

more preoccupied with this than with the ultimate goal. (Cf. art. I.)

It is this next step that we find stressed in early Buddhism, so much so that many will say the terms of consummation are *not to be found* save in what is, for me, the later emergent monkish ideal: nirvana. Such a conclusion needs only better knowledge of the Suttas to qualify it greatly. It would then not be as lost to sight as it is, how in them we come across the words *agga*: highest, *parama*, *paramattha*: supreme, *anuttara*: incomparable, *pariyosāna*: goal, *attha*: the aimed at, the needed, and in compounds, *Brahma*: God, terms so much better for the Ineffable than the Vedic names for particular deities or aspects of Deity I have cited above. But for the first Buddhists the thing most needed was to realise and compass the long, long Between that stretched from the actual imperfect man to his consummation as That; the long years that lay between acorn and oak tree.

Here is energy, but no sign of the self-deceiving pressure to get ultimate consummation in this little life-span, as in the later idea of the arahant. For original Buddhism the "road" was a figure of life as a whole; it was *samparāyika*, and that meant much survival, many lives. No religion, I say yet again, has ever brought the next step, the many steps after, so near to life in this world here and now as did it. In it every life was a "moment" (*khana*) in opportunity.

That the oft-repeated urge: thus is there for you to be trained (*etam vo sikkhitabbam*) was for a training or "taming" to cover this very long wayfaring—long even for the best, as the old Jātaka tradition reveals,

let alone the more imperfect—has been much blurred for Buddhism, by the insertion, before the term "Road," of the category of the Eight Rightnesses (*sammattā*): right view, right intent and, the rest. I repeat, that for me this insertion was a substitute, made when the word *bhava*: growth, becoming, *Werden*, came, as used also for "lives" "worlds," into monastic disrepute of the severest kind. The road had been taught as the *bhava-magga*—so I venture to think—but the prefix *bhava*-, coming to be a compared with any kind of filth,¹ was transferred to the graph of the Road-symbol, the wheel, henceforth called the *bhava-chakka*, symbol no longer, as once, of progress, the beneficent work of the Wheelturner (*chakkaṇṇi*), but of life viewed as mere repetition (*saṃsāra*).²

And so the idea of training (*sikkhā, damana*) came to be crowded into a burning need to shorten life viewed as "thusness" (*itthaṭṭa*): the view, as it were, of a man who, shuddering at the natural processes of decay in his temporary bodies, abjures doctors' remedies and concentrates on euthanasia. Somehow I cannot reconcile this monks' outlook with such survivals in the Sayings as:

"Whoever among you desire training—and only they—will become they who are That immortal Highest (*śamaṭṭ-aggā*)."³

"And while he thus contemplates, the Road comes into being, and that Road⁴ he follows, makes become and develops . . . (saying) I shall become:

A man bound never to be turning back,
A Further-farer in the life divine."

¹ *Anguttara*, The "Ones," xviii, 13-17.

² Cf. my art. in *Vissa-Bhāratī Quarterly*, May, 1937.

³ *Dīgha-Nikāya*, No. 16.

⁴ N.B.—Not the "Eightfold." *Anguttara*, "Fives," vi, 37.

Here is Road-sense and Road-training felt to be a moving on towards a very great consummation, not after this life some sort of waning out or emptiness, but a climax, yet afar, but positively conceived, a culmination in such *Werden* as man finds himself engaged withal, while yet in this or any subsequent sort of "body-cum-mind." Taught at a time and in a place, when and where this culmination was looked upon as Divine Manhood realised, the new feature, pointing to a great Between intervening to be crossed by ever better living, was strengthened by another new emphasis: that of Divine Manhood potentially present in each man as a Road-monitor: the idea of *dharma*: sense of the Ought, guiding inwardly, such as we now call conscience. Ill had it befitted a gospel of the Road to be without a Road-guide.

And so the man who began his mission-life by bidding men seek-thoroughly after the Self or Spirit, and revere this Dharma-monitor, ended the same by bidding men look for guidance to both Self and Dharma "as light and safety, and to no other"—certainly not to a trinity now revered as Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha. With a curious inconsistency we see this later category taught, together with insistence on Buddhism, as telling that man is "to save himself"—that is, not the ideal Man within but just the actual man. This is as if our road-rules prescribed turning a child on to our roads of whirling traffic to shift for itself. The first Buddhist teaching did not so orphan man as that. I think it saw too much the danger that lay in being "freed," without the safeguard that lay in the incessant need of being "trained."

As yet I have not found the two terms of my title held up in contrast or in reconciliation. The Sayings,

for all their repetitions, are a great thesaurus, a mine, little known as yet, especially by Buddhists. That I have not so found such contexts inclines me to end, as I began, by saying that, in their juxtaposition: *daṇṭā vinuṭṭā*, we have what is here already a reconciling tradition, concealing lost history. The term "trained" is, I hold, of the earliest, the all-but-premonastic beginning of the Sakyan mission, when the Man of the Road and his mates were opening up the Between of the More, the More of the *living* one's religion, which lay before man as he is and man as he may become. The term "freed" was then less new, but it had emerged later in the Sakyan mission, reclothed in monk's garb, with the fringe of pessimism on the robe, namely, that being "freed" was the assurance, that the short-cut in life (as "thusness") had been reached, and that *dhava*, once the very guarantee of immortal hopes, was at an end. Crooned out as intoned, the two words seem at one; actually they tell of a great word in the More to man, followed by a word in the Less. The "pact," as I have called it, is one rather of traditional acceptance than of reasoned concord; it points to an eclectic linking, rather than to the fruit of insight into a new and higher truth, such as we see in Gotama's fusion of "self" and "dharma":

Wherefore let whoso fain is for the Aim,
Who for the great Self¹ doth aspire,
Hold ever Very Dharma in high reverence.

¹ I differ here from my own immature rendering in translating *Samyutta*, I, "Gāraṇa," of 1917, equally from the similar rendering by Dr. Geiger of thirteen years later. The term *maḥatta*, as meaning, not the abstract "greatness," but a great man or being, as it is used in Upanishads and Gītā, and more frequently as the birth of Buddhism came to pass, is so

Here is a true pact, a sound base whereon to build a teaching of the Wayfaring in the More towards an ultimate Most, wayfarer bidden to see how the Signals were shining, to hear how the voice within was urging, warning to train so as at Way's End to win a freedom he cannot as yet even conceive.

used in the Piṭakas: *Anguttara*, "Threes," "Loṇaphala," and is contrasted with "little self" (*app'āhama*). In no case, moreover, do I see a man like Gotama prescribing a "longing for greatness."

XXIII

THE WELL—TÒ ET¹

My teacher Croom Robertson was one who often walked hand in hand with pain. And he would say, when lecturing on the ethics of happiness—say it too with a wry quarter-smile as one of "them who know," and alas! he did know—"Some say, why look ahead to pleasure or a neutral object? It is sufficient to be wanting riddance of pain. We can resolve to do without positive pleasure, but we cannot live with pain. Much of our action is to avoid pain, and no "calculus" is necessary here."

"Riddance of pain" is to word "the well" negatively. Pleasure, happiness is but the feeling accompanying the state of being well. When we are well, the body is in a pleasurable state, the mind, the will, is in a happy state, affairs, our little world, are in a prosperous state. But there is the "man," who is neither those instruments nor that little world, the "man" of whom those are adjuncts, vehicles, and these the occasion, the arena, the medium of self-expression, of self-direction. It is the very man, the very "he" of whom we can most truly say, he is well, he is better, he is unwell, he seeks to be well, he *wills the well*.

¹ This article was a contribution, by request, to the volume commemorating Charles Lanman's 75th birthday (1929). I partly rewrote it five years later, publishing it in the last journal of the Pili Text Society as "Buddhism and the Negative." I have here welded both together.

² *Mind*, January, 1893.

Now Buddhism, in its old Pāli scriptures, worded *to cū* very largely in that negative way. Its spiritual hygiene is mainly taught in negative terms. That its code of moral fundamentals was negative is not a distinctive feature. Even to-day we do not word a Christian code of them in accordance with the teaching of Jesus. He tried without success to reword the Mosaic, mainly negative code with "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." We still go on in the old negative way. We have yet to frame a positive code for more duties as owed to the Highest and to parents. We have yet to come to "Ward thy fellow-man as thyself. Ward his property as thine own. Ward a woman's husband as brother, a man's wife as sister and mother; ward the young as brethren. Let speech be truthful, kind, courteous, useful. Keep sober." But Sutta-teaching might be summed up as *sammā dukkhass' antakiriya*—"for rightly making an end of pain." Once or twice the founder is recorded as summing up his teaching, and once it is in these words: "Both in the past and now do I, even I, declare just this: pain and the destroying of pain."¹ And that which he was said to have beaten out under the Bo-tree was the making-to-cess (nirōdha) the coming-to-be (*samudaya*).

Earnest disciples were taught that ending of ill could only be ending of becoming (*bhava*). The word "life" was neither appreciated nor depreciated; it was not used doctrinally. The saint is shown awaiting the end of this span of life with the resignation of a weary labourer waiting for his wage—the sentiment of the little Pagan dirge in *Cymbeline*—but he is dumb about positive good to follow:

¹ Majjh., i, 140.

With thought of death I dally not, nor yet
 Delight in living, I await the hour
 Like any hireling who hath done his task.¹

The thing to make cease was the being reborn and the being redead. These were the milestones of the woes of all the worlds. And the man who has spiritually "rejected, cut-down at the root, the body" of his desires and craving, "made it like the stump of a palm tree, made it something that has ceased to become, so that it cannot grow up again in the future"—he alone is happy. So are the arahans happy—not because before them lay well-warded the way of the worlds toward the goal, in that it was the way of and to the divine Well-Willer. Safety ahead was merely the outlook of the convert, the entrant, the First Path wayfarer. His was the slogan: *Khīṇa-nirayo 'mhi*: perished for me is purgatory!² not that of the saint: *Khīṇa jāti*: perished is birth! The arahān was "well" because he had done with the Four Ways, he had "crossed over." His was the happiness of Lucretius's coast-spectator. He was safe, but his view was seaward at what he had come through. He was not looking landward at what now lay before him. That "before" was as "the track of bird in air untraceable."³

This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
 This never-ageing never-dying Path—
 No sorrow cometh there, no enemies,
 Nor is there any crowd; none faint or fail,
 No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment.
 To this, the Immortal Path have gone
 Full many . . .⁴

¹ *Psalm of the Brethren*, Sāriputta, Revata.

² *Samyutta*, ii, 70, etc.

³ *Dhp.* ver. 92; *Theragāthā*, ver. 92.

⁴ *Therīgāthā*, ver. 512.

He was in Nirvāṇa; of the "beyond" he did but say, it was utter Nirvāṇa: *parinibbāna*. For:

Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion.

That whereby we speak of him—that exists no longer.

Wholly cut off are all forms of our knowing,

Cut off are the channels of speech, every one.¹

His happiness was on the one hand so retrospective and on the other so barred from any forward view into the future, that it might have served Croom Robertson as a fit instance of a well-being in terms of riddance of pain. It may have been with such "as with one who after long toil and much peril reaches home, and is content with that for the day, whatever life may yet give or ask for on the morrow. They had won up out of the maelstrom of *saṃsāra* . . . to something ineffable, that now is, but is not to be described in terms of space or aftertime; and resting they sang. We will leave it at that."²

It will be said: This is the "well" held up in the teaching for the few, for those whose faces were set toward the highest, for those who, after ages of slow maturing, were near maturity. Of these I have said, quoting Emerson: "of immortality the well soul is incurious. He is so well that he is sure it will be well."³ But, the objector goes on, the teaching for the many, for the believing layman is more positive, less austere, more human, more suited to those who have not turned their back on the world that they know, on life as they know it.

This is true.⁴ No creed on earth may be said to sit

¹ *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 1076.

² *Psalm of the Sisters*, Introduction and ver. 511, 512.

³ *Psalm of the Brethren*, xlviii.

⁴ De la Vallée Poussin emphasises this distinction, so vital to a just appraisal of (early) Buddhism as a whole. *Nirvāṇa*, 1925.

so lightly and pleasantly over man's conduct and ritual observance as the Buddhist layman's *sāsana*. To inspection it may seem the creed of world-orphans. It is so. Yet is it less so than it seems. He too seeks the Unseen Warding, for is not the quasi-deified Teacher one in a chronic process of ever-warding Buddhas? Is not the Teaching, in some way not understood but accepted in faith, a world-gift to man for his salvation? Are not the holy almsmen, albeit very unequal as to holiness, an ever-present influence warding off ill, producing merit? The *layman* could afford to word "the well" positively. Worlds lay before him, but by a worthy life here, he could earn guarantees that they would be "bright," not "dark." He could afford to speak of things pleasant as pleasant, and not as in truth painful.¹ He could speak calmly of death, for it was not the end-all, but just the common lot.

All this we know. And if the worthy Buddhist layman is not always consistently cheerful over the last-named matter, neither are we when we, like him, find nothing better to comfort ourselves withal. Small blame to the inconsistency. The blameworthy thing for him and us is to find nothing better.

But there is one point about this layman's gospel that we forget to bring out. It worded "the man" more worthily than did the monk or *bhikṣu*. There is no denial of "the man," no *anattā* in such discourses to laymen or laywomen as that to Sigāla, to the thirty *kumāras* (who were advised to seek "the man"),² to *Viśākhā*, to *Chitta* and other "headmen," to *Anā-*

¹ *Sukham sukhato, Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 759, transl. in *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 86.

² *Vinaya*, i, 23.

thapiṇḍika. There was no robbing the word man (*purisa*) of having any reality, of being a merely conventional label. There was no whittling down the word to "a naming of something that exists (body and mind) by something that does not exist."¹ The layman was reminded that things are transient and that ills abound; but the third monkish slogan *anattā*—a word not of mondial import, but derived (and misused) from a local, a temporary protest in early Buddhism, was not brought into his gospel, to worry and undermine his conviction that there *was* really and truly "a man" who worked karma of thought, word and deed, and who reaped the harvest thereof here and hereafter.

And with this more direct, less sophisticated, worthier wording of "the man," the Buddhist lay-sāsana, be it noted, worded more rationally "the well" of the man than did the monk. This lay in seeking his good (*hita*) and that of others, his advantage (*attha*, *ānisaṃsa*) and that of others both here and hereafter. Before him lay the two "goings," the well-bourne and the evil-bourne (*sugati*, *duggati*). Neither was eternal, though either probably lasted long. Certainly the former, the *sagga loka*, did. And how far nibbāna—word as vague as our "heaven"—was in any way distinct therefrom he did not ask. Not till Milinda made out a case of a distracted mankind in suspense about it² do we come across any worrying over the subject.

¹ *Vijjamaññena avijjamānassa paridīpita. Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha*, viii, 14.

² *Mfn.* 323. That there was any worry in the simply put query of *Samyutta*, iv, 251, 261: "What is it that is called Nibbāna?"—is not clearly implied.

Nor had that other word for the monk's ideal, *vimutti*, liberation, any charm for the layman. Negative term though it be, it has come to appeal strongly to us, who are the heirs and the record-reading witnesses of ages of struggles for liberty, national, religious, social. Scarce any word thrills us of the Democracies more strongly than just this word of riddance:

"*Liberté, liberté, chérie !*"¹

and

"*Dear land of liberty !*"

It could thrill the monk, the nun no less. In her exulting we can also see riddance of domestic and social disabilities, but for both sexes the liberty is chiefly spiritual, that is, of the very woman, the very man. The positive thing they had got rid of was so fearfully positive—awful even as fire in the turban, fire in the house, fire in the jungle—that the very riddance itself stood for salvation, for peace, for "the well." The more usual Indian "riddance-word" of salvation as purity (*suddhi*) does not reverberate in the early "Dhamma" as does the prean of liberty.

But it did not appeal to the Indian layman. As a religious slogan it does not appear in the "three" Vedas. *Mokṣa* is a later development, due either to the influence of Buddhism, or to that which caused Buddhism to develop.² That other religions make little of it is deeply significant, maybe, of their more positive outlook.³ It is true that Aryans in general

¹ The "Marseillaise."

² We only find the notion, as developed, in the *Svet.* and *Maitri Upanishads*.

³ Cf. *Ency. Religion and Ethics* on its absence. The article *Mokṣa* was inserted by my special suggestion made to the editor.

can thrill to a negative shibboleth, witness *amṛta*, ambrosia, immortal, but the idea of being spiritually set free is too unworldly to come to the front in any world save that of the recluse.

Well then, we have put forward these two features in the gospel of the Buddhist recluse: man is not worthily worded; man's well is not worthily worded. The one and the other are negatively worded. The one is declared to be fiction; the other "is,"¹ but is entirely ineffable.

And let the apologist of the dual gospel in Buddhism remember this: *It is the gospel of the recluse* which is and will be looked upon by people of other lands and other creeds as the original, the venerable, the genuine "Buddhism." Not because the layman's gospel is not very worthy, or some later developments no less so. But the Pāli canon holds the field yet as the archetype in Buddhist literature. And in it the life, the welfare, the world, of the monk outweighs and dwarfs altogether the life, welfare and world of the "manyfolk." With monks as recorders, as compilers, as editors, as "libraries," nothing else could well have been expected.

There is yet another defect in wording, intimately bound up with those other two defects. But it is a feature in both gospels. Man *wills* his "well." But in Pāli there is no fit appraising of "will" such as our European Aryan tongues enable us to make. There is the significant approach to it in classing all man's self-expression—deed, word, thought—as activity, as work (*kamma*). But when the factors of that "self" are analysed, dynamic terms, approaching "will" in meaning, fall into the background, and no discern-

¹ Mln. 270: *atthi nibbānaṃ*. . . .

ment is shown of this: that to teach religion as a Path to a Goal to be trodden by each man, we must, *to make it intelligible*, show man as choosing, as willing to walk therein.

It is here that we see the monk-world of the Order reducing to secondary emphasis and importance—and that probably at an early stage—the very heart and root of Gotama's message: the appeal to everyman, as wayfarer in a Way of the worlds to the Goal, to choose himself the way to go, by the innate will in him to seek the better, the best. Here we have a positive idea, a positive word. And this in spite of the fact that no fit word for either will or choice was ready to hand.¹

The manifesto of the Way has ever been regarded, in the Piṭaka tradition, as a word, an occasion of the highest moment, and rightly so. And let not this be so much overlooked as it is, that, unless we see, in the noble figure of the Way, a substitute used by inspired genius groping for a word, a word that might serve for the man seeking, by inward prompting, his good, his "well," and choosing what seems the best way to it, there is no moving force about it at all. But, on the one hand, the editors made of the Way, not *the* gospel, but *one factor only* in a doctrine of over-emphasised Ill.

I refer, of course, to the doctrine of the "four truths." They made, as world-forsakers would make, omnipresent Ill in the forsaken world their gospel. On the other hand, they split up the Way (1) into an eight of desirable qualities in man, (2) into a fourfold matter

¹ The one word for "choose" is curiously rare in pre-Buddhist literature and hardly to be found in the latter. "Take" is preferred.

of what we might call negative progress, namely, of milestones in getting riddance of all the worlds, of life as we know it. The gospel of the Way was a great opportunity for transforming the truth that man, the very man, is of the Divine nature, into a truer conception of that nature as in him, namely, of a progressing from the potential into the actual. But this was too far a cry for a world which, even now, can see in Deity mainly Mind, not yet mainly Will.

It may yet be objected, that the reduction of the Way to a relatively decentralised place appears in the very first so-called "sermon."

I can well believe it was from the first in the order it still holds: the Initial Word. Where I see it changed for the worse is, that it has ceased to be the Message, the *Leitmotif* of anything that follows, and has become a mere foreword leading up to that which, at first ancillary, has been made *Leitmotif* in its place, namely, the "four truths." These have become central. Ask any Buddhist. Consult "books on Buddhism" of note: Oldenberg's, Grimm's, for instance, are little more than fourfold sermons on those Four. Oldenberg was content to see nothing "inorganic" in them, as against Deussen who did. Deussen saw, in the mechanical form of the "sermon," an historical parallel to the grouping of many golden sayings, uttered over maybe many months, in the Sermon on the Mount.

I am with Deussen, that there has been editing, not only with whole sentences but also with terms. But not regrouping of materials from other utterances. So short is the address, that, had the bringing in of other matter taken place, the original words would

amount to not more than three sentences. But there has been almost certainly a reduction of a discourse, or chart of teaching, remembered in *these* words by one listener, in *these* words by another listener, to be fixed wording. Especially of those sayings which came to appeal most forcibly to the monk: Ill and riddance of Ill. Indeed from the very start we see the monk appropriating words drafted as a mission to the Many to suit only an audience of fellow-monks! ¹

I hold this may well have happened in Gotama's lifetime, which was long, and sometimes in a wording and with an emphasis of which he may not have approved. That this could not be so will only be maintained by those who would see, in Gotama the very man, that quasi-deified Bhagavat and Tathāgata idea, which became the worship of a later day. To his own day a friend, a brother, father, leader, counsellor, helper, he could also be considered by some a dictatorial, tiresome old man.² Tenderly, reverently warded he will have been, as are they whose efficiency, after long service, is rated as over and past. But he had with wide sympathy and appreciation encouraged all sincere expressions of opinion in the Order. In it were stalwarts at work whose ways and words came to be merged in the shibboleth "*Bud-dhavaçana*," "*Buddhasāsana*." These would not all be meek and loyal repeaters of what he had held most worth while. Is not that lonely³ last tour with only his cousin significant of the act of one who could no more trust his following to teach just that? Charles Eliot rightly alludes to the "pathetic picture of an

¹ "By him-who-has-left-the-world two ends. . . ."

² *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 184.

³ On this tour as "lonely" see my *Sakya*, p. 340 f.

old man's fatigues " as hall-marked by truth.¹ But to me the loneliness of him on that tour is one of the most poignantly pathetic facts in the world's literature.

Let us return to our negativisms and their defects.

(1) In the tenet called *anattā* man is not worthily worded. The doctrine was in the first instance a protest, not without reason, against what had become a distorted emphasis in the brahmanic teaching. The "man," namely, worded more usually as self or spirit, was in fixity, immutability, divinity, identical with the world-soul. Hence he had, it was held, not to grow, to *werden*, to become; he had to come-to-realise. Hence he was, not so much a growing plant, as a jewel or star to be cleared of all that hid or dimmed.

But in time this doctrine of protest degenerated into the harmful dogma, never worthily reasoned out,² that the "man" is, not only not immutably divine, but non-existent; that there is no one who thinks, speaks, acts, but that there is only thinking, speaking, doing. It is not just to say, as do some apologists, that this denial of the man was an original protest. I venture to hold that the position taken by the founder,³ after a wavering start, was a teaching of the reality of the man as not just body and mind. Had he but gone on to say "these are what he uses; he is more," a world of misunderstanding might have been avoided. But there can be no doubt about the much more negative attitude that *grew up among the after-men* for one who reads, in an historic perspective, what they came to say.

¹ *Hinduism and Buddhism*, i, 161.

² There is an almost Humean approach to such an attempt in *Samyutta*, iii, 230.

³ *Cf.* *Vin.*, i., p. 23 with p. 13; *Majjh.*, i, 232; *Samy.*, iii, 66.

We must read both what they said and between the lines of what they said. Pāli literature is for us still a very new study. There is too much taking up or rejecting *en bloc*. The evolution of the brāhman as an animate book, the evolution of the mantras he handed on as such—we cannot get at the base and back of these. But the evolution of the Pāli canon, the evolution in its *animate libraries*—this is of more recent growth. Mainly we can only surmise, yet we can get nearer to the conditions under which the phenomena of Order and of Piṭakas came to be and to grow. And we can be more discerning accordingly.

We can discern, in the stereotyped, inadequate, ill-fitting *anattā riposte*,¹ something like an extinct coal, an archaic corpse. It belongs to the early protest, but it is applied to the later denial of the "man." It is no more alive; it cannot meet the query of the puzzled listener,² as Gotama would have met it *had he indeed been* the teacher on that occasion. We can discern, how needful it became, to the maintenance of this unworthy wording of the man, to buttress it about and around with every stone of support that could be brought together.³ We can discern in Buddhaghosa's Commentaries how this succeeded, how argument had died and dogma stood firm. We see the man, who is central in the early gospel as the wayfarer, "you and I" "faring on, running on" from world to world, the man who to body and mind is as the forest to the faggots, borne thence to the fire, the man who grows or sickens in

¹ Cf. among many repetitions—e.g., Samy., iii, 94.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 88. Majjh., iii, 19 f. Cf. art. "Reels. . . ."

³ Esp. in Kathā Vatthu, i; cf. *Points of Controversy*, Bk. I.

his karma and who stands after death before Yama (his fellow-man, as were all devas) to be confronted with that karma and judged by it,¹ this man, the very Thou, neither body nor mind:—we see him, in those commentaries, whittled away into a momentary complex of five khandhas. We see the current word for his personality: *attabhāva*, "self-state," treated as a mere concession to the conventions of the multitude, the "many-folk."²

(2) And in the tenet called *nibbāna*, *nibbānadhātu*, or *asaṅkhaṭṭa dhātu*, we see "the well," the *summum bonum* unworthily worded. However the word be interpreted, it remains a negation and indicates a tendency away from the positive, a tendency to which so many other Buddhist terms bear witness. We may, we should appreciate the reserve in early Buddhism, which refused to commit itself to any description of that Goal. Who, at this time of day, is content with the worth of such descriptions in other scriptures? But it does not follow that the ineffable is fitly worded only by a negation. We may rest too easily complacent in the contentment shown by the Indian over his *neti, neti*! It hints at that racial weakness, which found no word for "will," whence we derived our "well," which never developed its Aryan root *war* in the way we developed the twin root *wal*.³

In other words, what man wills strongly, he *tends* to name positively. He does not cry "No-land!" when he sights the longed-for sea. That contentment with the notion of riddance rather than with the notion of what we were to put in place of the things

¹ Devadūta Sutta (M., iii; A., i).

² Asl. 308; cf. Vis. M. 310.

³ Cf. art. XIII.

got rid of—that contentment said "not-diseased," *aroga*, *ārogya*, where our stronger positive words say *iryleia*, *salus*, health, *santé*. And it found a complement to that negation about man's body in a negation about the very man, soul or self, when utterly well. In *nibbāna* is implied extinction of the heat of spiritual fevers. Even the slightly more positive *sitibhāva*, the coolness of the saint, does but indicate riddance of fever. There is no fit word for the state that is won. "Growth" we meet with here and there; the notable causative of *werden*, *bhāvanā*, we also meet with. But when the long work in all that process is consummated, when the man becomes that which he has *willed to be*,—"well,"—for this word, daughter of will, we find no name. We do not even find a forced use (as in the Greek τὸ εἶναι, and my "the well") of *su*, to wit *subhāva*. *Sattibhāva* does occur, but very rarely, and not with emphasis. *Arahatta* is weakened to "worthiness to receive offerings"!

Men cannot eviscerate religion of so much as did Theravāda Buddhism and yet preserve the kernel. That the "will" was badly worded was a national defect which Buddhism did what it could to remedy. But unworthy wording of "the man" and of his goal was a mistake of its own making. In the Far East more positive conceptions somewhat remedied matters. But in Theravāda Buddhism the double negation has survived. And certain features it presents to-day are deepened in significance when we consider them as possible consequences of that survival. For is not this true, that if "the man" be unworthily worded, the will by which he seeks the ultimate "well" will certainly be unworthily worded, and that "well"

will be worded no better, will be practically blotted out?

Consider! Theravāda Buddhism negated man, the willer through body and will, and negated any concept of "well" as willed by a Willer—source, worker, end—of the man. To-day we witness how it has gone on losing substance as a *religion*, how it has become practically a system of ethics on the one hand and, on the other, a system warding a dead world—dead social cleavage, dead language, dead literature.

For the way of the worlds, the larger life of both the seen and the unseen, has faded out of its perspective. Its ancient gospel threw open the gates to the long vistas:

Apārulā itaṃ amatassa devāṃ ¹

Around and about its votaries, devas, no longer deities, but fellow-men of other worlds, stood warding, watching, advising, praising, reproving. Clairvoyance, clairaudience—to see and hear as could those devas—were not banned as devilish, but were welcomed by it as means of access to fellow-men here and over there. Man was shown as wayfarer in a Way, a way not only of present "best" living, but a four-staged way leading to the goal.

All of these opportunities and vistas—all that made his cult a very living *religion*: that is, the having heed to the unseen—the Theravādin has virtually laid on the shelf among the venerable things of his past. His attention, as layman, is concentrated on this one only of his many lives. The just-so-much as was given him of the way of the worlds in which we are wayfarers he has lost, and he has learnt nothing

¹ Open for these the gates of the immortal! Vinaya, Mhv.

since wherewith to word it more worthily, more truly.

Or, if he be monk, his forward view is otherwise blurred. For as monk, he has ever worded not only "man" and his "goal" unworthily, but "life" no better. He never had any hope of the life of the worlds, for everywhere that meant rebirth, redeath of the body. And body, he held, was, with mind, essentially "the man." Hence birth and death stood out over-large, over-fearful. He believed in growth only when the life had been cut off from the general life of the worlds. But surely the growth of "the man" is not the way of the growth of any of his bodies. It is the slow advance toward that immortal adolescence, in the consciousness of which growth our worthiest septuagenarians will say: "I would not exchange my seventy-five for your twenty-five!"

May the faithful and kind scholar-friend, to whom we herewith will well of youth eternal, gladly echo Lord Haldane's recent birthday saying!

Life, man, will, well: herein was weakness, herein lay a falling behind. In all four words we have worthier beacon-lights than early Buddhism had. How are we letting them shine?

What are we doing with our word "life"? We feel after the life of the race, but we measure the whole life of "the man" by this one little earth-span and its body. With that body we grow old, and the will, compliant servant, ages with it when "we" are not even "grown up."

What are we doing with our word "man"? In the school and academy we have thrust him out, replacing him with his instruments, body and mind, measuring

his growth by these. In the churches, in the world we speak of him as "having" a soul, or not, as if *he* were something else. And when we bury body, we call it him!

What are we doing with the word "will"? We have put it, in the school, on the shelf. Or we have screwed it down to mean conscious resolve. We refuse to admit that man-as-acting in *any way whatever* is using will; we do not discern that man's only way to "the well" lies in will. For will is coming to be, not only coming to do.

What have we done with the word "well"? We have not, even, with our wiser European neighbours, put it on its own feet as noun. We buttress it up with affixes: well-being, wel-fare. Then, taking from the meaning where we add to the letter, we tie it down to the body, we tie it down to earth-life, we tie it down to race-betterment. But this is not so unintelligible a cosmos that we must see, in only a stage of race-betterment, the uttermost, perfected well of "the man." To do this is to reason, believe, hope with our forward view limited to earth. The man, it is true, can only grow towards the immortal youth of his Well by work for the betterment of men. But in all men is "the man." And in the perfected well of each man and the way thereto lies the welfare of men.

XXIV

LET THE "WELL" WIN!¹

"*BE wailing, wailing uttered, but let the well win,*" is Æschylus's refrain of the Elders in the *Agamemnon*—or ought I to say, in the polished English of the translator: "May the good prevail"? A weak, stodgy, multi-meaning word is "good," and often have I uttered regret we have not followed our neighbours in giving noun-worth to the adverb "well": *bien, bene, wohl*, etc.

More urgent to-day, maybe, is need of the "wailing" than of the "well." "Well" seems suddenly so far away. Things that we had counted on as being corner-stones in our—has not one hopeful ecclesiastic recently called it?—"rising standard of civilisation," now stand bombed and battered. That nation should keep word with nation—1914 made a hole in that in Belgium; so again in Abyssinia did 1935; that war did not mean murderous attacks on wounded and non-combatant (1935 again); that to shipwrecked and prisoner should aid be given; that a man should at home be to some extent free to do or not to do; toleration for another's creed, whether it were the creed hitherto of one's own country, or the mother of that creed.

Those of us who, like those Greek elders, can no longer serve, and who "with our three feet wander weak as a child, a dream daylight," can only, whether we wail or not, at least be sure that it has now come—

¹ Published under another title (the Editor's) in *Light*, March 21, 1940.

to shift the metaphor—to the cutting out, as by a surgeon's knife, the civic cancer of aggression, intolerance, persecution, brutality, this time with a thoroughness that will leave a clean field for the healthier growth, now trampled underfoot; to begin, as it were, anew and leave the offending nations at least as relatively "well" as they seemed to be when I was young. We who in those days had so counted on "progress" are now fain to bring about a restoring, a maintaining only. Progress seems too good a word.

Verily we do well that there be a "wailing," especially if we be of the Faith till recently professed, nominally at least, by the two great seats of cancerous growth. As for Buddhists in general, a great smear has been drawn across the banner of their Faith by the thoroughly pagan campaign against China; so, for Christians in general, has their faith been savagely hindered from vindicating its claim to be manifestly the religion of humanity. So long as the aggressors in Europe do not label themselves as of a yet unnamed creed, so long must we look upon them solely as unashamed Christian renegades, so long does the banner of St. George suffer the great rent they have made in it, in ways of war we others had hoped belonged to the past or to a worse future that could not come to birth.

In saying "the aggressors" there can be no absolution for the nation as not being the gang that holds it under its heel. It is the nation, preoccupied with growth in body and mind, unmindful of spiritual growth, that has suffered itself to be throttled by the gang—gang lusting for power and private gain, a deadly civic laxity, now only to be remedied from

within by bitter suffering. The day of reckoning draws nigh. You may lie, stifle, imprison, shoot, torture, behead, but you cannot fool all the people, crush all the people all the time. So much for "wailing."

The "well" is surging up in a rising tide of sympathy in good-will and material help that will one day stand out as an unparalleled League of the Good Neighbour. It is not to-day as in the Crusades, where men rose to win back immunity for inanimate things from so-called sacrilege. It is the care of the fellow-man, his country east and north ravaged as never before, no matter what may happen to any religious relics of the past. The Crusades knew naught of the like. It is a "More," a "Better," than the cause in so-called Crusades. It is the rescue of brother-man. It cannot work as now it is working and leave the world as it was before. Our wailing cannot yet cease, but we can none the less improve on our Greek elders and say "the well will win."

Not that even then will it be a final, an ultimate, a Utopian "well." To be well on earth can never be more than a Better, wrought by imperfect tools of body and mind; decay is inherent, relapse is ever possible. The truly "well" is immunity from recurring unwell. I see this as alone possible when these instruments, however often renewed in this world or that, however improved, will have ceased to be for man's eternal adolescence a necessity. If we speak in the idiom of the earth-Utopia, we see a culmination attainable only by a terrific trail in time of men and women preceding it, who have, in a brief life of work towards that Most, gone down into oblivion as its foundations. Who could be quite happy in such a

Utopia, and justify what we mean by this negative term?

I confess I used once to train myself to be stoically content, if not happy, in picturing every one of us as in a vain illusion if we were not resigned to seeing ourselves as so many paving-stones—steps in what to follow, what to avoid—over which "mankind," callous, at best pitying, as to us, might the better fare further towards an earth of faith and promise.

I have long ceased so to feel content. "There was a war on" a quarter of a century ago, a red war, and mothers were losing sons as by a very holocaust. I lost, and I found that in the theory of contented paving-stone lay no rational balm. I might have persuaded myself, in humble cult, that it was good enough for such as me. But it was not good enough for the youth we had seen consigned to the shambles. Who were those who should, over them, wayfare to Utopia, that there should be found in them greater desert than in these, the glory of our land?

Neither was it a theory to satisfy him I had seen so consigned. We did not lie down, for in both of us—albeit in me unaware—there was working will to come up out of it. Not for him the turning of his back on step-mother earth groping behind the veil, nor for me to submit in misery of wonder where and how—not his world, but—*he* was. We went a-knocking, like men after the pit's subsidence; the one safe, the other (that was I) hurried.

And we broke through. We found neither was lodged in a war-grave, nor was a static mourner by it. We found we were wayfarers in a quest; not one leading to a betterment, a relatively well of earth, or of the next step to that. It might be, we should way-

fare once more on earth and together—on a better earth, maybe, than that which now calls for wailing, possibly even in what we might here and now call a Utopia. But that never for either of us would it be an ultimate Way's End.

This did not lessen our interest in betterment of earth, nor in that of his world. In helping the one and the other lay our journeying, our school-career, our right, when leaving, to fare further. Here and there, too, the fellow-comrade of the Way was needing help, as well as giving it, help that lay in our doing "our job." But the kinship that is between, not comrade and comrade only, but between each of us and the Highest—That Whom we can here and now only conceive as Perfect Man—this made it incredible, irrational to see, in each of us of the Ways, some as paving-stones, others as attaining that Goal. Even the popular ditty is wiser than this:

I'll build a fairway to Paradise,
With a new step every day.

That is, as not only myself the builder, or co-builder, but as he who paces on. The paving-stone theory may be heroic, but it is born of the despair to find, in a chaotic universe, a stoic content where no just cosmic purpose has been assumed. Where that cosmic purpose is seen as outcome of a just plan, the kinship between, not men in the block, but each man and the supreme kinsman, then does the Agnostic's brave pessimism give way to a glory of hope and expectation, such as the Helpers of man have led us to cherish. Father is guiding and awaiting son; the Great Kinsman whispers within the kinsman: "This here is your true kinsman; you can no other than be with Me; won

to evenness and unity with Me, then only canst thou become he who thou truly art" (*Mahābhārata*, *Mōksha*, Adh. 309).

Herein is the password to a noble aristocracy—not only a "Better," but a "Best" for every son of man. By it life becomes a "More" than lies in the vista of any earth Utopia. By it we see past the relative "Well" we now will to build up, in repairing the hideous breaches made by offending aggressors in our earthly civilisation. We see that "Well" as only a "fairway" towards a genuine ultimate "Well." We see it as but an improved school, more than which life in a body and a "world" can never become. Interest in, work for the better school need not therefore languish, since by schooling alone and work done therein will the step forward every day, forward and not temporarily backward, be possible.

But when shall we see it all in this perspective? For we do not. Still are we with Bunyan's man bending over our muck-rakes. Still are we singing our cradle songs over our old, our discarded clothes. But yesterday I was listening to yet another of these: a poem on the quiet laying to earth of the body of a good old toiler on the land and lover of it. And every verse sang, not of the wayfarer gone forward in a "new step," but of the man as there ended, the forward view totally out of sight. And I minded me of that world-helper of long ago, who to youths collecting faggots in the wood said: Are these *you*? You take these hence for burning—cremation, so to speak—but you will not, will you, be taking the wood? Nay, look up, the new buds are coming out. Verily you are as the wood.

XXV

BUDDHISM AND THE ESSENTIALS OF
RELIGION¹

THE question has in our days been sometimes raised: Is Buddhism a religion? Numerically speaking there would be a great gap left if, from the world's population regarded as nominally professing a certain religion, we omitted Buddhism. Buddhists are often shown complacent over the fact that my husband fifty years ago ranked that proportion as one-third. They forget the extreme caution with which he said so. I mean, he said, that this third only *come under the influence of* Buddhism; the largest increment being the millions of China, where not *one* religion is in any way national, but *three*, Buddhism being only one. And even then, the Buddhism there is profoundly different in much from the Buddhism of Southern Asia—Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and the south-eastern states.

It might possibly have been literally truer to have drawn up a different table of the world's religions, dividing that Buddhist one-third into (a) Far Eastern Buddhism and (b) Monastic agnostic Buddhism. And if asked "why," we should have to say, The two Buddhisms differ as to the essentials of religion. What then, it might be asked, do you hold these to

¹ Given as a lecture arranged by Mr. H. N. Spalding at Oxford, 1937. Earlier versions were published in the *London Quarterly*: "Popular Errors about Buddhism," April, 1932, and in *Eranos*, 1933-4: "Man the Communer."

be? Can we test either form of Buddhism by them? Of course we must; we must know our genus, before we include various species, must we not, Mr. Price? And so let's get to work on the genus. But first as to (a) and (b), I have a middle way to propose: That we omit both (a) and (b) and come to my own particular (shoemaker's) last: What *at its birth* was Buddhism? Let us leave religion as defined in creed and formula, by this ecclesiastical institution and that, and weigh original Buddhism in the scales of truth with the weights of the real essentials of religion for man here and there, man now and then.

And let us above all be heedful not to use for those weights, those essentials, terms which belong not to the religion of man, but to this or that traditional form of it. What do I mean? Here's a case where this was done.

A friend of mine, a University professor, was giving a popular lecture on the Jesus-message of the Kingdom of God as "within you." In this he saw an ideal of a fellowship of man, a fellowship of all good men, irrespective of place and time, of nation and creed: a Communion of Souls. At question time a man (an English Buddhist 'vert) asked: "How could Buddhism share in and forward such a community, such an ideal, when it had nothing to say about God or the Soul?" To myself, coming from the study of Indian Buddhism in a way he did not, the question was crude, unfit, and I said so.

A little first-hand knowledge of the scriptures Buddhist and pre-Buddhist suffice to show that, in the days when those scriptures were just oral Sayings, the words nearest to our "God," "soul" were used in a way different from ours, and to show, moreover, that,

in that different way, Buddhist scriptures have, on the contrary, a lot to say about God and soul.

About these two words it has taken the duration of a European tradition long, if less long than the Indian, to build up our mediæval and modern meaning. We may render each in various European languages, *Dio*, etc., *anima*, etc.—and yet feel we are keeping within the European family tradition. But when we come upon such words as *Brahman*, *deva*, *âtma*, *puruṣa*, we know we are in a relatively alien tradition, wherein the meanings may or may not coincide with our meanings. We can fancy an Indian student here pleading for the ideal of a *deva*-kingdom realisable in a community of men linked in the faith in a common *âtma*. And a Jew present rejoining that the Old Testament prophets have nothing to say about *deva* or an *âtma* common in all. We should retort: Why! those prophets are ever speaking about *deva* and *âtma*, but not in those words, nor with the coincident weight of meaning borne by those words. So too, in such Buddhist scriptures as most count earliest, we have those two terms, supreme in any religion: the very man and the greater than man, in plentiful reference. And when, with some first-hand knowledge we can check the liberties taken by the native commentator of a later tradition, and by the modern translator—when again we can probe a little deeper into what we ourselves mean by God and the soul, we may then be less ready to assert that Buddhism has nothing to say about either.

I have called that heckling question crude. Yet about it were two things that were less crude. I shall come at my close to one of them. The other is that, student at second-hand merely, as he was, he

had a fairly good backing in the popular manuals about Buddhism with which he was alone acquainted. You may yourselves know that they almost wholly give support to nihilistic statements as taught by what they call, with too great inclusiveness, just "Buddhis:n." Buddhism (so say Kern, Oldenberg and Rhys Davids) denies the existence of anything like a soul and hence the existence of the highest soul: *ātman* and *paramātman*.

Now, that pioneer scholars spoke after this fashion was then largely, though not wholly due to immaturity of study in the scriptures and history of Buddhism, not to speak of the fact of the very tender youth, last century, of the comparative study of religion in general. This is much forgotten, but it is only since yesterday that there has come into being a so-called higher criticism of Christianity; it is only to-day that there is dawning a similar criticism of other religions. Of Buddhism in particular, the materials in which to make comparative criticism have but quite lately become accessible. And the immature opinions resulting from this newness reverberate among general readers, leading to such crude queries as I quoted. So that there was some excuse to be made for the ignorant heckling layman. We still tend to discuss any given religion, and religion in general, in terms of our own religious tradition.

Here is another instance. Two discussions on the fundamentals of religion: not new, but by Indologists of repute: Max Müller and my husband. That by the former occurs incidentally in his *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, 1873; the latter is a rejoinder on that, in *Cosmic Law in Ancient Thought*, read before the British Academy in 1917. I have made a re-

joinder to both more than once in this decade, but I do not expect that the organs in which I have done so will have come into your hands.

Max Müller stated that there are five broad foundations on which all religions are built up: (1) the belief in a divine power, (2) the acknowledgment of sin, (3) the habit of prayer, (4) desire to sacrifice, (5) hope of a future life. Let us look more closely into these five beads; and first into (2).

The word "sin" is for us so closely linked up with the Old Testament, and St. Paul, that it is difficult to recognise in it a Germanic, an Aryan source. But, as dictionaries say, "sin" has dropped a *d* from the older form *sind*, of the verb "to be" . . . and is originally, not so much the misdeed, as the identifying the misdoer or sinner. Thou *art* the man, or, as confessed: "It is I." Language here regards the sinner as the man *who it is, or was*. So that Max Müller might have worded his second fundamental as the man aware that he has not been or done as he ought. It is awareness of mine, that I have fallen short of what I owe to somewhat *that is set*, or that *I have chosen to set*, over me.

But the word has been for Europe long associated with defaulting in relation to Deity—mainly so, if not *wholly* so, since Johnson's Dictionary quotes the lines: "I am a man more sinned against than sinning."¹ Anyway I know that Max Müller's use of the word "sin" will have provoked my husband to say: In that more usual English sense, Buddhism recognised no such religious term as sin. Had Max Müller only used a term less tied up with the Semitic tradition, such as "acknowledgment of offence against man's

¹ *Cymbeline*, 2. 3.

sense of the ought," his critic would certainly have been unable to exclude Buddhism from sharing this essential. In the Buddhist scriptures great weight is laid on the religious duty both for monk and layman of acknowledgment of offence against both man and code. There is even a formula for it, with the significant feature that confession implies "growth" in the man confessing.

Yet even to deny sin, as usually understood by us, as absent in Buddhism is wrong. We find in the Suttas here and there the phrase: Does the self reproach the self? Now this, in the Indian idiom of Gotama's day, can have only meant this: the Deity (then worshipped as *attd*, self) reproaching the human self. In that religious idiom there was the same essential identity between man the self and God the self as there is now for the Christian between the human spirit and Holy Spirit.

Nor is this peculiar to India. St. Catherine of Genoa wrote five hundred years ago: "My *me* is God, not by simple participation, but by a process of spiritual transformation." Sir T. Browne wrote: "There is a Man within who is angry with me." And in the *Tempest* we have Shakespeare saying: "Conscience: ay, this Deitie within my bosom."

Your conscience: here we have what Max Müller should not have left out in his religious essentials. It is the cause, where acknowledgment of sin is the effect. Conscience, *i.e.*, more truly the conscientious man—I wish we could say the consciencer—acknowledges his shortcomings.

Close on this take Max Müller's third fundamental: the habit of prayer. This also has its deeper ground.

Prayer is a result of something that prompts it. It is man's awareness of that ideal greater Spirit on whose side, under whose aegis, within whose will the wise man is ever seeking to place his life, his being, his destiny in *utmost* effort of co-operation. In contrast with the Vedic hymns, the Upanishads, teaching Immanence, very rarely use supplication; just three or four times. Petition is supplanted by aspiration, by self-devotion. Original Buddhism followed; its missionaries had been trained to pay less heed to external deities to be petitioned. Rather was there need to realise *unity with That divine self* "from whom one no more shrank away." That Self or holy spirit, called "Witness," should have no ground to reproach the actual self. And in an early Buddhist Sutta we find the earnest man aspiring thus: "Stirred up for me shall unsluggish effort become, called up un-muddled mindfulness; one-pointed shall be the mind." And then: "he having made just the Self his mandate puts off what is blameworthy, develops what is blameless, and cherishes the pure self. This is called the mandate of the self."¹ (Isn't it astonishing that a cult with scriptures saying that should be said to deny the soul?)

Never should it be forgotten—as it always is—that Buddhism began by accepting the immanent theism of its day, and that, where this is the accepted conception of Deity, prayer would take the form of a yearning to, as they said "make become" in less imperfection. That Who the man potentially was, rather than the form of an externally drafted petition.

Now what we tend to speak of impersonally as prayer, or aspiration or self-devoting is more truly *the man*

¹ See Art. IV: "An Overlooked Buddhist Sutta."

doing these things. This again will help us in our restatement.

Then consider (4): the desire to offer sacrifice, a desire found in most world-religions, but apparently not in Buddhism. It was in the matter of attaching importance to sacrifice, as to ritual generally, that we find early Buddhism openly protestant as regards Brahmanism—in that, *and in nothing else*, save the birth-monopoly claimed by Brahmins. But if we look deeper into the principle of sacrifice we shall not find Buddhism wanting.

Desire to offer sacrifice is more fundamentally expressed as desire to make somehow vicarious surrender of one's self, in outward surrender of what one is or has:—of one's self, as in the "take me, use me" of daily devotion. Or it may be the making offerings; this *may* take and still takes the form of animals sacrificed—perhaps an ancient substitute for the sacrifice of human beings. But this and all outward rite of surrender is more accidental than essential. There are fine lines in the Buddhist Suttas, where, in response to a brahman celebrant's inquiry about the true way of sacrificing, Gotama is shown pointing to the futility of such, and using the altar fire as a *symbol* only of deeper devotion:

I lay no wood, brahman, for fires on altars.
Within the self burneth the fire I kindle.
Ever the flame burneth, yea, ever tense and ardent,
I as one worthy practise the life that's holy.

Thus we see Buddhism going to the heart of the matter and showing the Man offering himself in the service of his ideal.

Can we thus far be said to have reduced three of the five so-called fundamentals to one? These are, as

three, acknowledgment of sin, habit of prayer, desire to sacrifice. I have suggested we have in them essentials, not so much of religion as of *the man-in-religion*: the man acting according to conscience, that is, as aware of a More and as willing to get nearer to it. We have seen that those three were active expressions of a somewhat more central in *him*, of a *spring within him*. Herein we have gone from qualities of, ideas about, the man to the man himself. This is for me the only true way. But we who are not on earth at the birth-throes of a new world-religion are ever tending, with all our ecclesiastical superstructure about us, to talk of religion in terms of cult and creed, of sin, prayer, sacrifice, confession, of rite and doctrine. And so we lose sight of the man, we lose sight of man as willer, wherein alone lies the meaning and explanation of it all. But once we see, in man-the-willer, a being bent essentially, whether he admit it or not, upon a quest how to become; how, I mean, to attain somehow past what he now is, past what he has as yet attained, we can then see certain features universally present in that quest. And these are those three: awareness of imperfection in his becoming, effort to gain right direction, utter devotion to the End of his quest.

I come now to Max Müller's last: the hope of future life. It is a tremendous end which explicitly or implicitly man feels after in his quest. I don't mean just survival. That, in the quest, goes without saying. The odd thing is, that even now there should be any doubt about it whatever. Future life is but the remaining stages in the quest. I mean here the ultimate end: the seeing the attainment of Godhead as the birthright of every man. To enter upon that as a

heritage must involve a very long period of becoming. As potential oak trees we are as yet but little shoots from the acorn. Only a stupendous miracle could shorten that long becoming, and that the man has no reason to expect. The getting conversion, getting faith, as we say, is but the coming to a consciousness that he is a Wayfarer in the right Way. This does but open up the possibility of surer progress. The believer grows into a more, but the Most before him grows for him with that More. A span of life on earth is as a mere mile in the way.

An eminent churchman has spoken and written lately about what he has called the Hope of immortality. For me it was more incumbent on him to speak of the Certainty of survival.

You may possibly not have noticed that in the Gospels "hope" is a not used *religious* term. St. Paul brought the term to the front. In the presence of the Founder, hope was less of a need; then, in the belief in a speedy return, hope was merged in expectation. With the one gone and the other fading, hope became dominant. It is interesting to note, that in the earlier Buddhist Canon, hope is also hardly used. It is always *expectation* that is averred, and utmost confidence that, when a right procedure is followed as contrasted with one that is wrong, happy result will follow, *growth* will follow. And, for the man-in-religion, future life tending towards culmination is more than hope, more than expectation, it is a *conviction*, deprived of which religion becomes a sham. With Bergson, the religious man will "instal himself in duration straightaway" and see in duration, not so much many periods of time, but the very process of his becoming the More on the Way to the Most.

Now this enables us to bring Max Müller's last fundamental also under my second. So that we now have his (2), (3), (4), (5), rolled into one. How? Thus: Man in the religious quest is not only (1) aware of imperfection in his becoming, (2) trying to gain right direction, utterly devoted to the End of his Quest, but is also confident that, at some distant hour after long world wayfaring, he will attain it.

Here too what of Buddhism? No phase in Indian religions did more than did Buddhism to strengthen and make relatively real man's life as a matter, not of earth only, but of worlds. So famed was the founder as a man of vision in life seen thus as whole, that it is said folk flocked to him to ask about the fate of their kin and friends who had died. And as I still insist, the training called Dhyāna, ever enjoined, was a matter of psychic development, such as we here and now in our own way can go about. The winning, by a worthy life here, a happy sequel of some years in a better world was held out by Gotama, and, long after, by the Edicts of Asoka, as a sure result.

It was not till monastic pessimism gained the upper hand, that future life ceased to be a thing to be hoped for. It can only have been the word "hope," borrowed from the Christian tradition and not belief, which led my husband to rule out Buddhism under this head. In the monk-outlook, life in any world had come to mean life of body and mind only, not life of soul or spirit, i.e., of the real man; and this meant the recurring processes of disease, old age and dying—why hope for that recurrence? That the recurring processes were necessary opportunities in the long way to consummation he no longer saw.

He had invented the way of a short-cut to perfec-

tion, the so-called Arahan attainment, a theory of perfection as attainable on earth, in spite of the obviously inadequate earthly body and mind. But with this jolt, fault as geologists might say, in their outlook:—In the arahan theory as in the chief arahan: the founder they came to call Buddha, the *Man*, is much worshipped, and is held to be *master* of body and mind. On the other hand, man in general was held to be a *mere complex* of body and mind with no user of these as real, no, not even transiently real.

But the original Sakyan teaching, whereas it did not *assert* the reality of the man or soul—this had been very fully done in the current teaching; no new revelation was needed—started by warning men not to confuse the man with his body or mind. It did not say you, the soul or self, are not real; it said: see that you do not accept your instruments as your self. A very different thing. The Founder is said to have put the matter like this: In that *one man* among you is king, and thereby judge, he is a More than the people; he disposes of their fate, their lives. If you make him merely a subject, the More in him vanishes. So is it if you make him just body or mind, you leave out, in your community, the judge, the king, the disposer.¹

Finally, the last, *i.e.*, the first of the five:—belief in a divine power. Here again we can only justify that "saying nothing about God or soul" if we cut away Buddhism from its parent stem, and try to make it coincide with a European tradition which has a partly Semitic source. The parent tree whence came Buddhism had been twisted from the externally conceived theism of the Vedas to the immanent theism of Upanishadic teaching. The One Highest, of whom all *devas*,

¹ See Art. V: "An Overlooked Buddhist Simile."

were various expressions, was worshipped as a perfect all-embracing self, so far as man on earth could as yet conceive such. No man is not self, hence was the Highest in and of every man. Remember that our modern oddly depreciated idea of self and selfish as "egoism" did not exist for the Indian of old, any more than it existed for, say, Samuel Johnson. The modern Buddhist has more or less learnt this view *from us*. The self as egoistic is practically non-existent in the Buddhist Suttas. Yet here in Oxford last July we had a Burmese saying this: "The ideal of religion is the destruction of egoism. The realisation of the doctrine of *anatta* (the teaching of the non-self) is the true aim, the final goal of religion." This is the monk-outlook into which the monk distorted his founder's teaching. But when that founder was on earth, self as self (as noun not as pronoun) meant in religion not egoist but Holy Spirit.

And here Buddhism has a lot to say about self in both meanings: God and soul. We can trace in it three consecutive expulsions: first, of the self as divine, then of the self as not to "be got at" save through the mind, lastly, of the self as being in any way a real entity at all. Man was but a label for states of body and mind, each momentary, uninspired by that supreme self, within and of him, who he potentially is.

And more: it is overlooked by Buddhists and by us, that the founder, though he accepted the reality and supremacy of a Divine self, sought to replace the word by another, then little used save for standard or norm, the word *dharma*, as meaning the God within as not static, but as an impelling urge towards the "ought," according to which man should walk. "Whoso longs

for the great self let him worship *dharma*," as do I.¹ *Dharma* for Buddhists has been made just code, not inspiration, just worded teaching. Yet Gotama is expressly said to have uttered this *at the outset*, before he had said a word as teacher.

Now you may say: There is more in the idea "God" than the Supreme, the ultimate End, Consummation, and it is surely this more that Buddhism at least implicitly rejects. Are not the titles of creator, disposer, providence, father of what is and is becoming made, in the Suttas, to be the attributes of only a governor of the next world but one, who as man, reigns, dies and is succeeded. This is true; Buddhism only vouched for the certainties of what such teachers, as were what we now call psychic, could reveal concerning the next two worlds, and "*beyond that!*"² so it said, and (in early days) no more.

In those concepts man has worded, not so much his knowledge, but his ignorance, the very childhood in which he still moves: problems they are and matter for faith rather than knowledge.

But in fundamentals, in essentials we seek our deepest certainties; and in this idea of a Highest, a Best, a Most we need not believe only, we know. We know that we do seek a More than we have been, than we are. And the More implies a Most, even if that be but an ideal point. The reality of the Most alone makes the More have a meaning. Man would never have placed a superlative case after the comparative, were a Most, a Best not necessary to his expression of his experience inner and outer.

The founder of Buddhism had no new mandate for

¹ In Third Collection, Bk. VI, and Fourth: Bk. of the Fours.

² *Tat-uttarim*.

man concerning these problems of faith; the current teaching had taught them almost to an excess; a very heady creed. But he had a mandate for man concerning the More and the Most in a very fundamental way. The Most we find called *artha* or *attha*. A word with a curious history. Meaning, before Buddhism began, just object of anything we do, we find it, in the first Sakyan utterance, called the *aim* of man's religious quest, the *supreme* object. Literally it is what is wanted, what is sought. We can even see it supplanting, as the religious End, the word *Attā* or Holy Spirit. "Thus do young believers make testimony of faith: they speak of their *attha*, they do not bring in their *attā*.¹ (Odd, but I believe I am alone in drawing attention to this as a meant pun.)

Later the word depreciated in coming to mean merely worldly objects, *affaires*, and in later Buddhism in Sanskrit, just "meaning," when the monks got busy, interpreting the letter of their sayings and the meaning. You will never find a Buddhist now using the word for the supreme End of man's life. But for earliest Buddhism *attha* was just That.

If the Most was *attha*, the More was called *bhava*, becoming. This was figured by a road or way of life (miscalled "path" only), since it was only by unfaltering progress in living a better, that man came to be, that his growth became real. That which gave meaning to the way in the More towards the Most was the Wayfarer himself. And it is by its monastic rejection of *wayfarer's reality*, a rejection plainly stated by a famous father of the Buddhist church, that Buddhism has forfeited the claim to stand beside the more worthy religious traditions of the world.

¹ *Vinaya, Mahāvagga, V, 1.*

In one way our heckler was right—I said I would come back to this:—He did name the two ideas on which all religions hinge; not five, but two, man and deity. Post-Vedic India was trying to make them appear as in a way one, I mean in its rune: That art thou. But there was always the relation between the two, between the That and the thou, the relation of making identical. This the Upanishads had taught as a work of *coming to know*, of realising in idea. Gotama found this not enough. The making identical was a long work of becoming. Are we? he was asked, or are we not? Neither, is the reply; you are becoming. He taught the man, the soul, was not a fixed static "is" or "art," but an ever-moving becoming.

And thus we get, I hold, as our irreducible essentials of religion, first, a belief, a conviction in the reality of a Highest Most or Best, and second, a belief, a conviction in the reality of man as potentially one with the Highest, but actually as a Less, in process of becoming that Highest in a long travelling through a More.

Now if we keep to what we can discern was, not the monastic Buddhism of the aftermen, but the New Word of the founder, we can, I think, claim rightly for that New Word, that in it lay these very essentials of all true, of all world-religions. To sum up: if we take Max Müller's five foundations of religion as he worded them, and try to fit Buddhism, even the older gospel so-called into them, I find my husband right all the time. But if, for belief in a divine power, we put a belief in a goal in the Beyond to life's way-faring, if, for acknowledgment of sin, prayer, sacrifice, we put man as aware of shortcomings to a supreme self or to his fellow-man, as aspiring to growth in the

More, as devoted to attainment in that More, we can include Buddhism, early or late, in a religion. And if, for hope in a future life, we put expectation, confidence in winning to a beyond and to a beyond past that, we need not exclude Buddhism.

But each religion has its different emphases, and I would end on one to which I have done as yet scant justice. There is no doubt that, as contrasted with the great creeds (I put aside Taoism and Confucianism), the way in which Indian Buddhism faces Deity is notably different from the way of those other world-religions. It is not that it anywhere denies Deity; it is its marked reticence over against the Highest. Of happier worlds than this it spoke of a *kāmaloka* and a *rūpaloka*; i.e., a next world, and a world of vision, or a Brahma-deva-world. Beyond that, it just said; *tat-uttarim*. Then in its first chart of teaching it called the end or goal of the right way just *attha*: thing desired, sought. That this was in the Beyond (*samparāyika*) is also said, though not in that chart.

Lastly, the Founder is recorded as being asked at least twice, Are there *deva's*? and then, Is there a self or soul? The first question he seems to have regarded as hastily, thoughtlessly put. The reply given is equally offhand. A young brahman to whom Gotama has apparently been talking of his own religious training, makes a polite rejoinder, and then puts his question, Are there *deva's*? Gotama is made to reply that the consensus is that there are. But, in the other case, we seem somehow to feel a tragic element in the Founder's silence. Is there a self? i.e., does God exist? Does he not exist? Unanswered the man departs. The disciples ask, Why did you not answer? The excuses given are so pedantic, so lame,

that one is amazed at Buddhist editors and readers being content with the tradition. But we are left with the discomforting sense that the great Teacher may have felt doubt about the truth in the teaching of Immanence of his day. To say *God is*, meant *then*, *Yes, you are God!* and that was dangerous for most men. To say *God is not* was for him untrue, as can be shown. And we are left with a great religion, not antitheistic, but to a certain degree showing a reticent agnosticism. The very frequent allusions in its scriptures to *doubt* as a great hindrance have been by us too much overlooked.

XXVI

BUDDHISM NOT ORIGINALLY A NEGATIVE GOSPEL¹

IN Europe psychology is a creation of yesterday. Its first specialisers were largely medical experts, who saw that man's mental ways might be analysed systematically no less than man's bodily ways. The ways of mind have become absorbing; they have largely ousted consideration of the mind-cr.

Now this happened long ago in India. There is, of course, no question of historical continuity; it is just a case of similar causes producing similar effects. The parallel need not be overstressed. But ancient Indian literatures make it clear enough that the arising, about the seventh century B.C., of mind-analysis apart from the "man" brought to pass, in early Buddhist teaching, a similar and even more emphatic exclusion of the "man." (We call him—the "man-in-man"—soul, self, spirit. The Indian name, the more fit name, was and is "the man," "pūrūṣa"; or "spirit" "ātman," as implying "man.")

One of the pioneers of Pāli Buddhism wrote over thirty years ago: "The more we try to remove the difficulties" (*i.e.*, in accounting for certain doctrines), "the more we are driven to the suspicion that original Buddhism was not exactly that of the canonical books."² This conclusion is still not accepted as it should be.

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, London, July, 1928.

² Theodore Kern, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 50.

According to early Sinhalese chronicles it was in Ceylon that the oral records of Buddhism were first written down at length, less than a century before our era, and hence centuries after the first teaching of the "Sakya" (later, "Buddhist") religion. Thus it was, nay is, imagined that some yet more archaic recension of the Canon called the Three Pitakas may yet be found and the original gospel revealed, freed from the scholastic and monastic complexities through and under which it is now presented.

Fragments akin to portions of the Pali books have here and there been found, but nothing bearing the impress of earlier teaching. This does not upset the truth of Kern's conclusion. With goodwill, time and concentration, together with a worthy idea of what an inspired mandate to men, whenever and wherever given, has essentially to show, such a mandate can be found under the Pali palimpsests, but only if we refuse to take these at the face-value given in them, by compilers and editors, to their own standpoint and their own standing.

So much is this even now overlooked, even among learned writers, that I may be forgiven if I again stress the need of Kern's denial.¹ We have in the Buddhist (Pali) scriptures a threefold thesaurus of accretions, of gradually collected "sayings," which were first uttered in a bookless world and, for a period of perhaps four centuries were, repeated in a bookless world. The repeaters were not so much live books as live pamphlets or tracts only, nor were their respective monastic centres, with perhaps one exception, living libraries of more than one group of such tracts. No centre, let

¹ Cf. *Buddhist Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1924, ch. xiii, "The Anti-Soul Attitude."

alone individual repeater, could have a knowledge of the Three Pitakas such as we can have here and now.¹ Even in the early fifth century A.D. Fa-Hien had to tour over the greater part of North India before he could find the object of his search, a MS. of the Vinaya Pitaka. Nor could he then find even that in the recension we have, nor any complete recension of the other Pitakas. So long was the oral habit, the sectional range maintained.

As to the relative perfection of Indian memorising, here also we should not accept, for Buddhist amateurs, that which was among brahmans a professional and, in a way, hereditary art. There is much evidence that all that mobile lip-repeating needed rectification from time to time. And the rectifying meant this: that the rectifying editors, capable and influential teachers, in collating the various spoken versions, adapted these to fit and express *the view they themselves had come to hold* of a given doctrine. And in so adapting, they would tend to re-word as seemed better: to emphasise here, to reduce or even drop out there. In this way it was inevitable that the original Sayings, in wording, in emphasis, nay in matter, edged little by little ever further from what they had once been.

We can the better concede this when we remember what was the peculiar standpoint and standing of those rectifiers. Though they were a vehicle for propagating a mandate for the salvation of men, of "Everyman," they themselves were not of the social community, but belonged to an inner, artificial world, a world we might say of "half-men." This is not

¹ The term *prāṇi* need not be taken to mean "repeater of all three Pitakas." It may have meant no more than our "Shakespearean scholar."

to question their goodwill to be truthful and wise. There is here no question of wilful deceit. But, very human though they were, their inner world-tradition had been of a pruned or hothouse culture, unfit for the Many to whom are taught all the inspired gospels. And it is just such a tradition and such a culture that we have in the "rectified" palimpsests of the Pitakas.

I come to the chief instance of this artificial growth. It is the evolution of what, in Buddhist monastic teaching, came to be the dogma of "an-attā," or denial of the spiritual "man" as existing in a real, ultimate sense. Now in the sayings ascribed to the first days of Gotama the Sakyan's mission, we find advice given *to seek that spiritual man*, and the *caveat*: the body is not the "man"; the mind is not the "man" (i.e., do not seek the man in these).

It should be noted that in India, then and now, the "man" (*puruṣa*) and the "self" (*ātman*, *attan*) were equivalents, and both represented what we express by spirit or soul. Thus the Teacher, known to be "psychically" gifted, when asked as to knowledge of a thieving woman, replies with dignity: "Were it not better, gentlemen, that you should be seeking not the woman but 'the man'?" (the text has "self," which misses the point.¹ It will be said that I am "rectifying" for us, though not for India. So I am; but I am digging for an original mandate that was worthy and true, before it was twisted into that religious absurdity—a negative gospel.)

As to the cited warning of the Teacher: this, which is recorded in a little talk entitled the "Not-man-featur-

¹ The translators (*S.B.E. Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 117) miss the point still more.

ing Discourse,"¹ must have referred originally to a new and growing vogue in the midst of which "Buddhism," more rightly the Sakyan mission, entered on its upward way. This was the Sāṅkhyan teaching of the preceding generation, secular, non-Brahman, to this effect, that since the "man" was not only not his body, but also not his mind, the mind could, no less than the body, be analysed, and thus considered apart from the "man." The "man" *sui generis* could not be analytically contemplated; the mind could. Sāṅkhya proved an absorbing study, making itself felt, as certain Upanishads show, in brahman teaching long before it became, in later Upanishads, formally adopted and commended.

Thus, perhaps three centuries before Aristotle, psychology may be said to have begun in India.² In Buddhism, albeit in no way inherent in its mandate, psychology proved a powerful leaven from the outset. There is a Sāṅkhyan tag: "This [viz., mind] is not the I, not of me, not for me the Man," in the discourse cited. It often recurs. Clearly the new Sakyan teachers knew this novel way of mental analysis and appreciated it, though not as did their successors.

Those successors changed the teaching largely through their over-appreciation of the Sāṅkhyan mental analysis.

The Sakyan founder's new and original word was, that for each man salvation is to be won mainly, fundamentally in the *life* he chooses of deed, word and thought. This is no matter of earth only, but a very long progress through the worlds. Life was figured by a Road along which each wayfarer travels, choosing the better or the worse direction, wayfaring being the

¹ *An-atta-lakkhana-Sutta*.

² Dealt with in my *Birth of Indian Psychology*, 1936.

man's "becoming" the worthier, the more he followed that inner Dhamma, or "ought," which we call conscience, but should call will. Now the wayfarer was not body, not mind; both body and mind were changed and renewed at each new span of life, each new bodily and mental becoming. Man the wayfarer travelled on towards the Goal, the Consummation. And because as he *went*, so he "*became*," the ideal differed from that of the brahman, who saw in each man not merely—as indeed he was—the faint germ of That who may not yet be adequately conceived, but already the very THAT who is ineffable: "That thou *art*!" As such, he *was*, he did not *become*.¹

So far from there being a denial of the really existent spiritual man in the original Sakyan teaching, it were truer to say, that had the founders taught this, they would have been looked upon as demented. This has not yet been generally discerned. We are in the habit of thinking, where we think at all, about the Buddhist gospel, that the warning cited above as to what the real man is not, leads to the inference that the real "soul" was not. But if we place ourselves in imagination in Gotama's day, we should be able to see the absurdity of the inference. As soon might we expect a denial of the real being of Deity in the teaching of the Founder of Christianity!

The true inference from the Teacher's warning is not what is supposed. It is that the *new word* of the mission was not, at least at first, an account of man's nature; and, further, that the accepted ideas about that nature *needed* a deeper, truer "seeking": "Ought you not rather to be seeking the 'Man'?" The founder

¹ Yet, illogically, the departing saint is said to "become God," e.g., *Brh. Up.*, 4. 4. 25.

himself did so seek; and what he found was immanent Deity—the reality, the very Man. In his teaching the Vedic term for code or law, *dharma*, took on an inwardness, an immanence, akin to St. Paul's "law of my mind" (*loi noos moi*)—an Indian would have said "law of Me." It was by no outward code or prescribed rite, of which brahman teaching was so overfull, that man became the better; it was by heeding the soul-dharma, the inner man-resort (*atta-dīpa*, *atta-saraṇa*)¹: the altar fire of salvation burning ever within the very self (*ajjhatta*)²—that the wayfarer chose aright.

Strange it is that the specially religious teachings ascribed to this Teacher, so straightly addressed to the very Me and Thee, should have become associated with a dogma that I am *not*, thou art *not*, in any real ultimate sense! Whatever the rank or culture of the hearer, it is ever the "man" in the hearer who is spoken to by the "man" in the teacher. Never is there a sign that he is speaking to what he believes to be just a complex of conscious states. Noteworthy (and much overlooked by writers) is the saying concerning the judgment on each individual, at death of the earth-body, by the Watchers (Yama) on the other side. Here at least a positive doctrine of the "soul," if it exists, should emerge. It does. The "man" comes over. The man is charged. The man is told: Not by your mother or father or another have you been thus and thus. By *you*, yea, by *you* has this been done; by it will *you* be judged.³

It is often said: This is popular gospel; there was a

¹ One of the last earnest injunctions of the aged founder.

² Here he contrasts his position with the Brahman's external rites. Above, p. 297.

³ *Anguttara*, i, 38; *Majjhima*, iii, 180.

hidden meaning, deeper than that of conventional word-usage, for the more advanced. *So they came to say.* But we *first* read of it as a valid distinction in a book dated some five centuries after the utterance of the Sakyan gospel. Four centuries later still, the written Commentaries parade it. But the founder, in his last words, is shown very earnestly repudiating that dual way of teaching. "I make no inner, no outer in my teaching of dhamma. Not there have I the teacher-fist about things (closed or open)!"

This distinction may be useful in the specialisings and analysings of the classroom; it may be necessary in a system of metaphysic; in a religion it is deadly, impossible. For if a religion is, even if only for a time and place, for "the man," that is, if it is worth anything as a religion, it must have a true message in true wording (so far as there are words) for Everyman, and not only for this or that sort of man. It is essential to a new religious mandate addressed to the "man," that it should rest on a positive conception of what he is; it will be a message of more light on what he is, what he can become, what he should do, whither he should look. When we see any teaching, new or old, putting to the front a teaching in terms of the negative, we can with some confidence conclude that, if it be new, it is uninspired and worthless; if it be ancient, it has grown out and away from its original inspiration; and in so doing it has become a valley of dry bones.

Is now the statement (still echoed in books on Buddhism) that "the 'not-self' or 'not-man' claimed as of its original message," *solely* derived from the discourse of that guarded warning with its Sāṅkhyān tag, quoted above? It is not. In the very body of Pīṭaka

Sayings, there are many sayings to show that psychological analysis of the inner individual sayings got the mastery, and that, in this analysis and by it, the spiritual man (*ātman* or *puruṣa*) was becoming identified with just that which, in the earlier warning, men were told he was not.

Take the Sayings on sensations and the "thing" we perceive by way of them. Each sense has its province, its function. How then do we perceive not only colour, sound, etc., but object? Observe that, when speaking of sense, we are already mental and the obvious thing is to say, "I, the man, perceive by my instrument of the senses." But when mind-analysis gets a hold, we become very wise and say "the mind" does it all. And there we leave it! We used to say a "faculty" of "common sense" welds together our sensations. And if we find an ancient Buddhist document with the reply: "the mind" (*mano*), we feel a complacent sympathy with this old-world sagacity! So readily do we, with our present wave of man-less thinking, our new vogue of non-psychic psychology, shelve the really inexpugnable "you" and "me," that we acquiesce lightly in what was, for India, a new departure, as it really was for us also. Now it is co-workers of the Founder who are represented as composing this Saying as a catechism for teachers' use. Would such elect men misrepresent the original mandate? But is it not possible that, amid all the long repeating periods and rectifying at intervals, "mind" later on got substituted for "man"?

Take again a favourite simile: the chariot used by Indian as by Greek, for the man, as expressed in body-and-mind. In the Brahmanic writings the man himself is not always pictured by the driver, and this is

but natural, for the master is he who rides, but does not drive, the driver by his side obeying his orders. But sometimes it is the master, the *ātman*, who drives. In Buddhist literature never. Either mind or the sense of right (*dhamma*) is driver. Here is nothing radically manless. But in the chariot itself, inanimate, resolvable entirely into its parts, with the name as a mere label, we see, worded already in the earlier metrical sayings, and composed by a quite obscure nun, Vajirā, a simile of man conceived as a mere bundle of "complexes," which eventually became a text for four of the five most famous scholastics of monastic Buddhism: Moggali-putta Tissa, Nāgasena, Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa. I have met nothing in historical irony to beat Vajirā's posthumous fame.

Vajira's verses, however, and many other Suttas, pointing to an ejection of the "man," or a merging of him into mind, are *not good evidence* that Gotama and his chosen men began their teaching after this sort. His was a ministry of nearly half a century, *during which* there was apparently liberty of speech and no Consistory defining what was orthodox and what not. Moreover, all the laborious task of choosing fixed wordings and the occasions of rectifying were yet to come. Perhaps they began during the old age of the Founder, when almost all his first co-missioners had left the earth.

During the still later compiling of the third, and analytical Pitaka (Abhidhamma), the a-psychic psychological method was greatly developed. So much so, that when the Commentator asks who is the agent, in a certain procedure, he pleads that where there is a way there must after all be a wayfarer!—a saying which surrenders his anti-soul position, did he but see it.

Meanwhile the current was not all setting one way. There was still a strong party in the Buddhist Sangha of monks who upheld that the man *was*, and that the teaching of the Blessed One had clearly shown it. Had he not taught in terms of *very man*? Moreover, there was other evidence, both from our experience and as a needed hypothesis, in the universal belief in survival. Who, in sense and thought, is enjoyer, contemplator, self-aware? And who or what persists when body dissolves and mind-ways can nowhere act? All this is the theme of the first and longest section of the controversial dialectic,¹ stated to have been compiled when, under King Asoka at Patna, about (?) 250 B.C., the great work of editing the Canon and the purging of the Order took place. It is fairly clear that "the Analysts" (of the "not-man"), as they were for a time called, were having, or had been having, to fight to maintain their majority.

They won, and the "man" thereupon died in Buddhism. When nearly three centuries later we come to that work of courtly ecclesiasticism, *The Questions of King Milinda*² (Menander), we see what had happened. The debating monk Nāgasena treats the "man" as a mere label from the outset (quoting little Vajirā), and dogmatically denies the reality of the experiencer (*vedagu*). That the experiencer also reacts, in will and act, on his impressions does not enter his calculations. Had the "will" ever been worded in India, even to the limited extent it was worded by Plato and Aristotle, her religious history might have been different. Without "will" it is easy to drop the

¹ *Kathā-vatthu*, trans. as "*Points of Controversy*," by S. Z. Aung and myself, 1915. Pāli Text Soc. Ed.

² In S.B.E.

"willer." We drop *him* now ourselves, but that is because, whereas we have the word "will," we have no worthy psychology of it.

Finally, in the Commentators' age (fifth century), when the exegeses of the older oral teaching, first written down in Sinhalese, were recast in Pāli by Buddhaghosa, we witness the now dead and buried "man" bandied about in the wordy pages like the mummy at an Egyptian feast. The divisions of his original treatise, *The Path of Purity*, are positively betitled: Morals, Concentration, Wisdom. But all they do is to expound the negative dogmas of the Non-permanent, the Not-well, the Not-man, as the ways of a subject who is ever and again declared to be a nonentity. We hear about events happening to, mental states arising about "a self, a doer, an experimenter" who is positively said not to be. That a "he" is spoken of "is merely, as the wise know, by way of common usage. . . . Only the events, the states occur: this is right view." Argument is no longer needed. All the teacher has to do is to say it over and over again, as a child might be told in the dark that there are no bogies.

Buddhadatta, of the same period, answers the question: "But can there be mind-states without a minder?" by saying: "Just as buds are put forth in spring owing to the influence of the elements and seasons, so do the mind-states arise from the confluence of causes."

Both of these good scholastics quote the once obscure little nun's verses as quite conclusive. Buddhadatta goes so far as to father them on the Founder himself! But his analogy, as improving on Vajirā's Robottian chariot, is, if faulty, at least interesting.

And both of them are quite sure that "the Buddhas" teach now by popular talk, now by "ultimate-meaning" talk. Neither alludes to the repudiation of the "teacher's fist" by their own Buddha. But one quotes him as saying that, in using the world's way of speech, he "is not led astray by it." That is a different proposition. Of interest it is to note that this dual way of teaching, which he gratuitously parades, in concluding his Commentary on the book of controversial dialectic mentioned above, is not made use of in that (older) book, *just where it was needed*.

Since that time this dogma of the Not-man, together with those other negatives of the Not-persisting and the Not-well (or the Ill of all life) have held the field for the monk and, as higher doctrine, for laity also in the Buddhism of Southern Asia. Lately, it is true, rumour has reached us of a stirring in this standing water. It is good to see movement in monasticism.

But "were it not better, gentlemen, that you sought," not the rewording of old dead negatives, but the "man," the "man-in-man," the man taught in the Way of the worlds, "becoming" as he fares, the "man" as he will be shown us, if we set our faces to the forward view and press on to the new light?

XXVII

WAS ORIGINAL BUDDHISM ATHEISTIC?¹

IN Buddhist Suttas the urgency of a request or an order is clumsily indicated by its being fully worded thrice—a mode indicating the long-sustained oral tradition. In the same way there would seem to have come to me a threefold, shall I say challenge or order? to write on this subject. Three times in six months have I heard it stated from lay platforms, stated not as a possible, but as an accepted truth, that Buddhism, as a cult, or as the word of its founder, was antitheistic, or atheistic. If the younger generation will not respond at sound of the hostile gun, it is meet that an older continue to act for it.

And first, it is a question how far we speak justly in using those two negative epithets at all when we are estimating Indian religions. We may take, as equally misfitting, an equation between our use and that of India in our estimate of "soul" or "spirit." We tend to think of "soul" as a mannikin within the "man," as possessed by man, in the phrase "my soul." We tend to think of a wraith or ghost or something as we say "discarnate" in using "spirit." Neither tendency is Indian. In the, for me, sounder Indian estimate it is the spirit or invisible immaterial "man" who possesses, not "soul," but body and mind. Man does not "have a soul"; he is soul, he is spirit. Equally misfitting is it to make coincident the

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1938.

concept of Western tradition "God" with what Deity has meant for Indian culture. The Indian saw Deity everywhere; the Western religions (save in mysticism) have seen Deity, in sky or universe, as always distinct from the man. Now "the Buddha" was a man of India, and of a date when the educated man believed in Deity as immanent in each man, as the Most, the Highest, the Best in that man's spiritual being or "self." There was for him, for his culture, no hard-and-fast line between man's actual and potential self, or spirit (*ātmā*). In religion "spirit" could for him mean "holy spirit," no less than it may for us, when we say with Paul "the spirit helpeth our infirmities," "the spirit beareth witness with our spirit," "maketh intercession for us with groanings . . ."

Hence to speak of Gotama, later called "Buddha," as atheist or antitheistic, could only mean, that he denied, or disagreed with the idea of there being in, of, or for each man an ideal "self" or spirit. Or, to say that he disbelieved in Indra, Prajāpati, Agni and the rest would, in Indian religion, mean, not a denial that there lived great beings controlling "nature"—which of us can say even now these do not exist?—but a denial that for and in each and every one of these beings too there was a highest self—such a higher self as we see earnestly engaged in conversation with the psychic Gotama in the well-known Sutta of the Indra-questions (*Sakka-pañha*). We must, we must, make this right-about-face in our attitude before we fling at that great man the charge of being a fool:—is it not the fool "who hath said in his heart: There is no God"?

There is another caveat to be borne in mind before

lightly imposing our terms and notions on the India of Gotama's day. Because of the teaching and acceptance of Immanence in its culture, there had arisen, not only the great uplift in the term self or spirit (*ātmā*), but also a great let-down in the word *deva* (god), *devatā* (deity). There had always been many "gods" in Vedic religion. Brahman, the impersonal Source of all, might be held as "One," but there were many manifestations or aspects of the One, as India confessed. When the "city of Brahman" came to take up Its abode in the man (I quote an early Upanishad), those beings who had been looked upon as aspects of It underwent a considerable disdeification. They became as men, men of the worlds, with right of way on earth as in other worlds. They became one with those who for us, for whom "there is no death," are judged to have "gone before" for a while, and who may return to earth as men of earth once more. Hence for the first Buddhists a *deva* was just a worthy kindly gentleman, often much concerned to help, and hold counsel with, those of earth who took the trouble to develop psychic gifts known as *deva*-hearing and *deva*-seeing. Our translators usually render the word *deva* by "god," unmindful of this disdeifying evolution.

Hence when we read of Gotama being asked: *atthi devā ti?* are there *deva*'s? if he gives a reply which in its odd vagueness (possibly its corrupted form) amounts to: "Most people say there are," this should not have been translated: Are there Gods? in our sense of the word. While as to the question to which, we read, no reply was given: *Atth'attā ti; n'atth' attā ti?* Is there a spirit, or is there not? it were just as correct to translate this by: Is there a God, or not?

The silence I will consider presently.

There remains the term *Īśvāra* (*issāra*), "Lord." Do we find this denied or slighted? I can only remember one or two occurrences of it as related to Gotama's teaching, and there the belief in a "creator-lord" as an accepted point of view is not denied or questioned. He is shown implicitly denying that the evil-doer is, as such, a creation of the Lord, the man's evil-doing being the work of his own lack of will to do better. This word had evidently not suffered, in Gotama's day, the worsening or let-down undergone by *deva*.

And lastly the term *brahman* or *brahmā*, the term of that day for Deity as Alpha and Omega, neuter, impersonal, albeit made personal in later centuries. Here, if we form our conclusions about Buddhism from a seeing in its bulky Canon of the Three Pitakas the production of a single generation, namely, the generation of the first Buddhists—alas! it is still the rule so to form them!—we shall hold that Gotama taught a very fairy-story about the evolution of the concept of Brahman, "father of all that is and is to become" from the invented fate of an enterprising individual, and that he makes an exalted *deva* called *Brahmā* confess to ignorance and send his questioner back to Gotama who is wiser. I am aware that we who see, in such Sayings, matter unworthy of the wisdom and methods of the founder of a world-religion will be called eclectic and arbitrary in selection and rejection. The Pāli Canon holds a great manifold of the true and the untrue, the worthy and the worse. Judaism saw no reason to reject the exceptional Song of Solomon from its Canon, the work very likely of a poetic-minded woman of Solomon's court, nor the Christian Church any reason to make it apocryphal,

making it presentable by a forced analogy between Saviour and Church. But then we do not ascribe the sentiments of the Song of Songs to a Founder, nor do we base our estimate of a Founder's belief or non-belief on its verses.

For me the somewhat ribald stories of the Pâtika and Kevaddha Suttas are not the sort of stuff a teacher would say who was, we read, entertained with much honour by learned brahmans, and between whom and them no word of dispute is recorded as to the doctrine of immanent Deity which they taught. But they *are* the sort of stories that humorous monks would compile when, and only when the rift between their own cult and the brahman teaching had grown wide, and they had become thoroughpaced Non-conformists. They are unworthy stuff to put into the mouth of such outstanding men as were the founder and his most efficient co-workers.

It was inevitable, with the growing rift alluded to, that aftermen put aside reference to Brahman, Alpha Omega; we have to discern such reference *surviving* in the compounds *Brahmacharya*, *Brahmachakka* (wheel, *i.e.*, way to B.), *Brahmabhikṣa* (one who has become B.: epithet for early "mystics"). More frequently references to Brahman denote just higher *deva*, denizen of the world better than the next. And here errors arise. The first of my three speakers, Dr. R. E. Hume, based his argument for an originally anti-theistic Buddhism partly on a verse where, not Brahman, but a *Brahma-deva* (*brahmund*, instrumentive of *brahmā*) is meant. My own translation runs thus:

Not even deva nor the sprite that bringeth luck,
nor Mara with a *Brahmā* could unmake
the victory by such a person won. (*Dhammapada*, 103.)

Here is no Deity involved, as being no more omnipotent than the other three beings of unseen worlds cited. Max Müller's translation, using "Brahman" in error, is of the very infancy of research in Buddhism, and no safe guide.

Dr. Hume further alludes to "Buddha" as having praised "self-saving." Here is where many others also trip up, in judging that the original gospel was anti-theistic, as being one that turned man back on "himself" as saviour, not outward to a Western tradition of Deity. (This is the more strange, in that such a conclusion conflicts with the slogan of the aftermen, that man must take "as his refuge" the trinity: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha. We cannot have it both ways.) The tripping up is the result of a deplorable mistranslation, or rather, of two such. We read that Gotama began his mission with the injunction to "seek thoroughly after the Self"—a teaching-refrain in the Brahman religion of his day. This was rendered "seek yourselves"—a Western mode of translation, emphatically not Indian. We read further, that he ended his long mission with the injunction: "Live as they who have self as lamp, self as refuge . . . and no other." This has been rendered, "Be ye lamps unto yourselves," etc. Yet, when translators meet elsewhere the word self compounded as here: *atta-dipā*, *atta-saranā*, they almost always render the compound as I have done. Thus: *ātma-kāma* Dr. Hume has rendered by "the Soul is his desire"; *ātmaddā*, by "seeing the nature of the Soul" (this he entitles "The vision of God") and, in the oldest Upanishad other such compounds by "has pleasure in, delight, bliss in, intercourse with, the Soul," or, with Max Müller, "the Self" (note in both cases the capital S). Why,

in the name of truth, should we say "yourselves" *there*, and "the Soul" or "Self" *here*? The Indian idiom is the same, whether in Vedic or in Pali. And, by the context, the idiom there and here meant Spirit in our sense of Holy Spirit. Where then is the "self-saving," unless by "self" is meant the Indian idiom of Immanence, "Divine Self"?

As if any religious teacher, then or now, worth the name, ever failed to see that in religion man seeks a Higher, a More, a Better than "himself"! As if any religion worth the name would ever fling man, the child, as he surely is, into deep waters to sink or swim!

If now it be said: Is not this absence of reference to, of reliance upon, of teaching about, a Supreme Being almost tantamount to exclusion, or at best agnosticism? I would not agree, and for the following reasons.

It should be plain that an accepted teaching of Immanence must lead to a devaluation of all external observance whether of deed or of speech, in which Deity as external is approached, invoked, appealed to, worshipped. And on the other hand, that it must lead to appreciation of, an uplift in, the view taken of the man as the shrine and temple of the Highest. Personal holiness (to use our idiom) would become the one fitting worship of the indwelling Potency of the man. Now this is just what we find stressed everywhere and always in Buddhism. Man had to become, yea, he had to "make become"—a very favourite word—That Who he was. In this faith the term for the quasi-monastic life lived by the student while under his brahman teacher: *Brahmacharya*, became the ideal life for each man and woman to whom the Buddhist missionaries went: "teach ye the very pure utterly

perfect God-living (*Brahmacharya*) to *devas* and men." Living was to become a divine thing, even in the life "in the world."

But further: this godly living was also presented as *dharma*—"lovely from first to last." This ancient word, meaning what is borne, i.e., as treasured, remembered, little used in earlier documents, blossoms into sudden prominence in and throughout the Buddhist literature. Unlike the institutional meaning given it by aftermen and to-day, it meant that weighty religious factor of "the ought, the should be," often called "duty," but by us better known as "conscience." "Walk according to *dharma*" is the Upanishadic injunction. And the Asokan Edicts enjoin that through *dhamme* a man becomes moral-living.

Now it is of deep interest, albeit oddly overlooked by Buddhists, that in the Suttas we find the Founder (a) confessing to a reverence for a worship of *dhamma*, (b) as a necessary result of a yearning for the great self (*attā*) or soul. And be it noted, that, in that last injunction, to take "Holy Spirit" as guide, refuge, he couples with it *dhamma*. It would seem as if here we have the original Buddhist twin aspects of Deity: the immortal static of Being (which yet for Buddhism was, as in one Upanishad, Becoming) and the persistent dynamic of Becoming: the inner urge towards the Goal of the long wayfaring. So that we can say: Here verily is nothing antitheistic, nothing atheistic. What we have really is a new theism, a protheistic teaching, one, namely, that sees in our "ought-monitions" the Divine Will working within us.

But speakers such as I exemplified bring forward, not words always, but the absence of them as an implicit antitheism. Why, they say, those silences?

Here I have only space to say a final word. Gotama's day had adopted a new cult heady and dangerous if misused: the seeing Deity in an ideal concept of the very man or self. We can spend ourselves on discussions about aspects, and qualities, even, of "God," conceived as external to ourself, without seeming irreverence. I say "seeming"; for me there is a want of reticence in discussing That Whom we cannot yet conceive, much less understand. "To the Unknown God" of Paul's Athens is perhaps a dedication more fit than all our fluent prattle. May it not be that Job was not the one and only wise and patient man to say "I will lay my hand upon my mouth"? May we not infer in his silence a judgment that his day called, not for facile handling of divine epithets, but for a reticence that was noble and wise?

NOTE.—Since this was published there has appeared, in another periodical, Professor Keith's criticism of a brother-professor's lecture, before the British Academy, on "The Buddha as a Master Mind." In it the critic repudiates the rendering used by Professor Radhakrishnan (as well as by myself) of *attadīpā*, *attasarāṇā*—"The Buddha's demand that we should have the self as our light . . . as our refuge should not be pressed into an affirmation of a transcendental reality, when a simple meaning insisting on self-help is so natural."

I would reply that such "a simple meaning" is very "natural" to us English of the present day, but it does not follow that it was "natural" in an Indian for Indians of the 6th century B.C. India believed then, and has believed ever since, in the need of every religious seeker to have a teacher—whom he has come to call his *guru*—to whom he could and can look for

guidance, and in whom, more than in himself, he must "have faith." That Gotama expected this faith from his followers the critic goes on to emphasise on the next page. The scripture-compilers make Gotama insist on it:—"whoever have but faith, but affection in me are goers to the bright world" (*Majjhima*, i, 142). And Gotama by his life-work was a living acknowledgment, in his own faith, that man in his Quest needs a guide. In fact the after-men showed how little they saw in him a teacher of self-reliance, by erecting a threefold guidance for all followers in the so-called Three Refuges or Jewels. He himself had explicitly, in the injunction cited, restricted the givers of that guidance to two only: *atta*, ideal or divine spirit, and *dhamma*, inner guide, and, he adds, "no other"!

Now had the meaning been our modern one of self-dependence, the contrary would certainly have been, not *añña*, but the more personal *para*: not a man's self, but another man: an opposition in terms which is characteristic of the Suttas. But *aññam* in the text is more comprehensive: "nothing else" or "no one else."

Nor would the enjoining of "help yourselves" have been coupled with the enjoining of "let Dhamma guide you." It might conceivably were Dhamma understood as our "conscience." But it is as yet taught as (a) doctrine, (b) cosmic law, thus taken as a "refuge" *other* than "yourselves."¹

¹ Adapted from my comment in *Indian Culture*, 1939.

XXVIII

SILENCE AND EMPHASIS IN BUDDHISM¹

BUDDHISM is accused over and over again with having nothing to say about God and the soul, or with denying the one and the other. According to many Buddhists and to most 'verts to Buddhism, this silence, this denial constitute one of its strongest points. Is the accusation, the commendation, based on textual fact? The man or woman who knows the texts, Pali and Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan, from end to end is non-existent. I know a little about the first, and in them I find, that in the first place denial occurs nowhere; that the then current terms for Deity—*Brahman* (neuter) and *attan* (masculine)—occur very often in compounds, and the latter now and then uncompounded; in the second place, that a *caveal*, not to see *attan* where "he" was not, namely in the body or the mind, is recorded of the start of the religion and runs through the Canon.

How then has the above written accusation become so general? How has the Buddhist world come to hold such a view?

I have previously gone into this matter, here and elsewhere. I will here and now only recall the ever forgotten fact, that the India, where and when that which we have in these times come to call Buddhism took its birth, had, in the profession of its chief religious teachers, accepted the belief in an immanent

¹ Published in the *Hibbert Journal*, 1933.

theism—a striking departure from the teaching in its more ancient hymns, the Vedas. This immanent theism had other aspects of a somewhat pantheistic kind. But the fact that the word *ātmā* (*attān*) had come to rank as synonymous with *brahman* for Deity—the word *ātmā* meaning in current idiom “self”—reveals a greater preoccupation with man's inner world than with the external macrocosm. We have here a field for the sowing of “Buddhism” where God and soul meant “God-in-me, God-in-you; God Who is I, God Who is you.” If we once admit this, we have to come apart from lands and times where it was, or is, taught that God is separate being from human being, or where man was, or is, taught as “having a soul.” In India the “man” (*puruṣha*) was soul, was self, and was (and is) in and of God. And this, in the superficial “accusation” stated above, alters everything.

What then was the religion, the scheme of salvation arising out of the immanent theism? If man wanted so to “seek the Lord as to find him,” he had to come-to-know this identity of being; had to grasp as present and not beyond our ken, “that Who is the *ātmā* in all things; who is for (or, of) thee the *ātmā* who is in everything.”¹ All the will, all the aspiration of the seeker seems to have been wrought up into and satisfied with this act of coming to know. There was no such adequate word for the Indian as our will; on the other hand he had a word in *īddhi* (Pāli *iddhi*), which could see in some men's knowing a power of bringing to pass surpassing the normal meaning of our will. And it may be that, in this tremendous assertion of indwelling Deity, he was deemed to have implicit this power in knowing, or coming-to-know.

¹ *Bṛhad : Upaniṣad*, I, 4, 1; 5, 1.

Now that this knowing, this making present called for an equally tremendous response in conduct, that the true way of knowing lay in the life to be led in the light of it, that a special culture in the art of living was necessary to fit the man for an actual, as contrasted with a potential, a theoretic identity—this is what we do not find *stressed* in the literature of immanent Deity, the Upanishads. Emphasis on conduct is hard to find. It was, therefore, a dangerous gospel; a heady doctrine without sufficient ballast.

Then Gotama arose, bringing the revelation that more, a great deal more, was needed, for reaching a positive identity, not a theoretic one only. He began with the Upanishadic mantra that a man should "seek the Self."¹ But he is not recorded as telling men the other Upanishadic mantra "You are the Self." That was going to be a very long business. It was not so much a matter of knowing; it was a matter of becoming, especially of "making become." Man was a Wayfarer, and, with a body and mind of earth's handicap, the Goal was for him not yet in sight. The records refer to it as "further than that," as the "beyond," the "further shore."² That the wayfaring led between this world and the next, and to better worlds, was made, in contrast with earlier teaching, vividly present. Wayfarers in worthier con-

¹ This is not generally recognised as it should be. In translations we have the odd result, that the same injunction, when found in the Upanishads, is rendered: "This, the Self should be sought, one should desire to know," is, when found in the Buddhist Canon, rendered " (better that) you should seek yourselves "—an idiom that does not appear to be Indian. (*Chand. Up.*, 8, 1, 1; *Mait. Up.*, 6, 11.) The translators, Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, were then (1879) probably unaware of the Upanishad passage.

² *Tat-ullarim* ; *pāram* ; *pāriman itram*.

ditions became vividly present and often:—men of that *More* towards which the wayfarer of earth was faring. But *about* the *MOST* we find a profound silence. Save only that for the aspect of Deity, as the ideal indwelling Self, we find a new aspect; or, if not new in word, new in *emphasis*, referred to till then only in one or two injunctions about *duty*.¹ This was *Dharma*, that sense of what ought to be done, that urge to get past the usual, the "what is done," which we now call conscience. To thus we find him at the outset paying homage, as "being fain for the Great Self." By this *Dharma* man was to fare. *Dharma* would "ward him so faring."

I venture to think, that this relative silence concerning the Divine Self, this insistence on the concept of It as an inward urge, this all-pervasive preoccupation with "making the Way become," with a getting Further, a Getting Beyond in conduct: in brief, this view of man as less "being" than "becoming" was in felt reaction against the overweighting given to that theoretic *knowing* the immanent identity, which held the field when Gotama's mission began. In it I see no denial of God or soul. An honest unbiassed study of Upanishad with Pitaka suffices to show that. Let us hope that before long this miserable libel will be banished from our writings. I see in the reticence concerning Deity, on the contrary, a profound reverence before an ineffable, an inconceivable consummation of life, and a present awareness of it, which found in the Hebrew prophets fit and sole utterance in the thrice "Sanctus!" Gotama recognised, as did Paul much later, that man, as being yet within the limits of the *More*, could only—it is a great "only"—

¹ *E.g., Tail. Up., i, 11, 1.*

set himself "to grow up in all things into the stature of the perfect Man." To call this reticence, this silence, a denial (which is a mere gospel of the Less) is to wrong India's splendid Helper of man.

It is surely more really religious than efforts at "searching to find out God." The way in which some writers handle this subject of divine attributes: love, pity, justice, surprise, power¹ and the rest, can affect us with something of the repulsion we should feel at a supreme work of nature or art pawed by hands not clean. Plentiful capitals for the terms do not make things more tolerable. Nor does the plea that, to be loved, Deity must be "known." Known? Can a babe be truly said to know a saintly man or woman? It is only by dwarfing and contracting our concepts of the Perfect that we can pretend to know That Who or Which transcends our present limits of knowing. A Perfect is implied in our every effort after the less imperfect. But to say that the Perfect grows, not for us only as we grow, but absolutely, is a value as yet beyond our rating. It is as if our babe saw in the saint a projected image of himself fulfilled. How much worthier is not the word of Hosea: "Then shall we know if we follow on to know"!

¹ Cf. the recent article: Does God Develop? (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1933.) Cf. also the writer Rabbi Hanina silencing such ascriptions, "as being no less derogatory to Deity than praising a millionaire for possessing only a hundred thousand." (*E.R.E.* art.: GOD [Jewish].)

XXIX

ORIGINAL BUDDHISM AND THE IMMORTAL¹

IN the words he uses for that More which he wills life to bring him, man expresses this as what he may *become*, may come to *be*. It is then for him a vision of highest worth. It is a New that he is seeking. When it is a Less that he seeks, he will word the More as what he may come to *have*. Now this is the story of Amṛta: the Immortal. It is that of a Becoming in the New, reduced to a coming-to-have.

Religions, at various periods, with varying frequency and with varying fervour, have made vocal man's yearning for a world which he need never leave just because he has to "die." In or of such a world, he feels he is not only, and no longer in, a More; he will have attained, that is, he will have become, the Most, Highest, Best. And by this he means he will be ever Man-in-the-New, because he has no longer about him, or of him anything that is, or can be, worn out, old, unfit, to be discarded.

This feature is not a monopoly of later scripture. Nowhere for me does it find utterance with such zest and eloquence as in the Vedic hymns. Does any of you know those lines to the sacred juice Soma—divine milk-punch, as Bloomfield with quaint scurrility calls it—in the IXth book of the Rġveda, where Soma

¹ Spoken at the Congress of Orientalists, Brussels, 1938, and published in *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, Bruges, 1939.

is addressed as Pavamāna, the Winnowing One, or Purifying Motor? (I quote Griffith's translation.)

O Pavamāna, place me in that deathless undecaying world
wherein the light of heaven is set, and everlasting lustre shines !
Make me immortal in that realm . . . where is heaven's
secret shrine,

where are those waters young and fresh !

Make me immortal where men move even as they list,

In inmost heaven's third sphere, where lucid worlds are full
of light !

Make me immortal in that realm of eager wish and strong
desire !

Make me immortal in that realm where happiness and bliss,
Joy and felicity combine, and longing wishes are fulfilled !

Here is no more realm of added conditions of rest and peace—heaven of the old and weary—here is the ever-surging life of eternal adolescence, the winning, the ever creating the New ! With language fitted almost exclusively for the needs and concepts of life in the actual, life in the More, we think, and think rightly, of the Most as ineffable. We can only rightly name that which we know. As the Buddhist poem words it, with a reticence that is characteristic, but in no way sceptical:

There is no measuring a man gone hence;
that whereby to word him, that for him is not;
in matters that to end are brought, the ways
to tell to end are brought, yea, everyone !¹

The youthful courage of the Veda hymn is not so reticent, yet does this vision of fervent aspiration appeal to me as does no tombstone-vista of rest and peace.

There is perhaps only one thing in the lovely lines wherein they are for me defective, and that is the

¹ Sutta-Nipāta, ver. 1076.

irrationality of the prayer: "make me immortal!"¹ The man who is praying is immortal here and now. But he has about him the mortal. And he is praying for a becoming, wherein and whereby he may be rid for ever of his mortal appanage, his mortal instruments necessary to him for life in this or that world, i.e., a body and mind-ways of using body. But in Vedic India man was held to be only conditionally immortal. Survival of the dying of his last body was held to depend upon fit sacrifice, fit prayer by son, by priest. And the early Upanishads, though they reveal a great religious advance, still contain such a prayer as

May I, O God, become bearer of the immortal!²

A deeper vision would have prayed for a man's becoming perfectly well. *Ārogya*, not *amṛta*, should have been the word. For the man who is perfectly well, immortality follows as result; he has no further need of instruments that wear out, needful though these be for his long apprenticeship, his long wayfaring in the worlds.

In leaving our Pavamāna prayer I would remind you that it is not typical of Vedic aspiration. I have found less than twenty contexts in Rig-Veda and Atharva-Veda on *amṛta* and *amṛtatva*. Nor are there a greater number in the Brāhmaṇas. But in the relatively short compass of the thirteen Upanishads reckoned earliest, the words immortal, immortality occur about one hundred times. Only in the short Māṇḍūkya is no mention of them. For them, the other twelve, *amṛta* is a keyword. Man's right aspiration is declared to be towards a state, the state of

¹ *Mām amṛtaṃ kṛdhi.*

² *Amṛtasya deva dhārāṇī bhāyāsam.* Tait: I, 4, 1.

the worthy in other worlds, state of the *deva*, which is void of old age, illness and death. And since death was the most serious of the three, the word representing all three was "the deathless," the imperishable. Amṛta was thus a term much in the thoughts, on the lips of teachers in the years preceding and accompanying the birth of Buddhism.

Nor was it yet reduced to a merely poetic term of supramundane sentimentality. It had gained new force, new intensity. For in a teaching of Immanence, then newly accepted in Indian culture, *amṛta* was now no longer an attribute of the great Devas only, or of a supreme world or heaven. In a dim way it was being felt that the very self, the very man, as immanent deity, potentially deity, is here and now immortal. It was man himself who was the *pura*, the city of the actual Immortal. And with the banishment of all that makes the man or *ātmā* mortal, with the taking into the very man of Deity, fear was banished. Thus we find no-fear (*abhaya*) a co-attribute with the immortal. The Chāndogya calls man "Brahman, immortal, fearless." The Kaṭha says: "the self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless (*amaro amṛto abhaya*) is Brahman." All devas were called immortal: "as immortal deva he becomes immortal"—so Kauṣītaki.

We can see that the term, though in form negative, is as to its content positive. Undying, or not-dying means actually "more-living." In Kauṣītaki Indra is made to say: "I am *prāṇa* (breath of life); I am *ātmā* (living spirit); as such, reverence me as life-duration (*āyus*), as immortality, for so one reaches full term here, and in the next world one obtains immortality, imperishableness (*akṣiti*).

Our own traditional religious teaching is not free from the teaching in that last clause: in the next world . . . We are told we awake to immortality at death—a teaching for me as mistaken as to say: man is mortal—but by rite, prayer or faith can be made immortal. It is only when Buddhism lifts its earlier voice, that we see clearer notions about the long way of man, immortal but in mortal conditions. In the *Iti-vuttaka* we have a *Sutta*, I believe unique, on the dying in the next world of a *deva*, as a phenomenon no less inevitable than it is here. The *deva* on dying is expected to be returning to earth. That he might be worthy to be reborn parentless in the worthier *Brahmā*-world is nowhere told;—it is a curious lacuna. The Sayer was only interested in the dying *deva*'s having possibly the luck to catch a Buddha teaching on earth.

But it is clear that the *deva* would not attain *amata* just by being *deva*. The *attha* or End which he sought—this was the pre-nirvāṇa *summum bonum*—was not yet this. *Attha*, as we know, became depreciated, to mean, in later Buddhism "meaning" or a literary "spirit" as against "letter"; in later Sanskrit to mean "business, affairs." But not when Buddhism began! Had this depreciation not taken place, we should have found the word *amata* linked, not as it came to be, with nirvāṇa, but with *attha*. Usually the linking with nirvāṇa is the explaining of *amata* by nirvāṇa, showing that the term nirvāṇa as *summum bonum* was later. (I say "usually," for I have found *amata* in a list of twenty-six synonyms for nirvāṇa.)

Let us now come to the birth of Buddhism. This took effect with the word *amata* as a very trumpet-call to the New Word, or, to cite the Pali metaphor, as

the beating of the drum that brought news. It is odd how we have overlooked this! Look at the accounts in the Pali Canon of the hesitating man Gotama, being inspired to teach and—if we translate rightly¹—what to teach. The vision has come to him, to whom, as very psychic, visions were no novelty. The man of a worthier world is begging him to teach, and it is in these terms: "Do thou now open the gate of the immortal! Teach men now perishing, and they will not perish; they will grow." There flashed upon Gotama, as he watches the water-lilies, insight into man's nature as a perpetual becoming, and he responds to the vision: "Wide open is the gate of the immortal! They who have ears to hear, let them send forth faith to meet it!" And soon after, when accosted by Upaka about his radiant mien, he ends with: "To found the kingdom of the true . . . I will beat the drum of the immortal in a world grown blind."

I see no reason to doubt, that in this ecstatic language we have, not the enthusiasm of the metre-making editor only, but that, in great exaltation after weary doubt Gotama did utter words like these. Had the editor (as was too often the case) had the fashioning of them, we should have found, not the immortal, but nirvāṇa. But before nirvāṇa came into the religious idiom of Buddhism, as the *summum bonum*, we can see, that what the earnest seeker had in mind as his quest was, not nirvāṇa, but *amata*, the Buddhist seeker as well as the brahman. The early Upanishads, I repeat, show this over and over again. Thus Chāndogya: "This Brahman who is 'in' the *pura* of man's heart: this should be searched for; this surely is what

¹ See *To Become or not to Become*, p. 108, and *Buddhism*, 1924, p. 102.

one should desire to know . . . this does not grow old; it is ageless, deathless." (8, 1, 4.) And Kena: "with knowledge one finds the immortal." And Bṛhadāraṇyaka: "Were the whole world mine, should I be thereby immortal?"—a woman's question. And so on.

Turn now to the Pali Monks' Anthology: we find men described as seeking after *amata*, not after nirvāṇa: Uttiya "left the life in the world on the quest of *amata*."¹ And Ajjuna of Sāvatthi "joined the new Jain Order thinking among them to win to *amata*."² (I cite the Commentary, which took final shape much later, but the two citations are in the *story* of the exegesis, and have all the appearance at least of belonging to the traditional account handed down about the two men.)

But the most noted cases of search for *amata* are in the Canon itself, the Vinaya. These, as is known, introduce us to two famous figures, leading men of Gotama's disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, men who would have exerted a marked influence on the youth of the Order's history, had they not predeceased the Founder. I linger a minute over this, because it is a striking instance of the blindness of us inquirers into Buddhism, and of Buddhists, as well as an object-lesson of the way in which a new teaching, quite other than *amata*, came to elbow the quest for this out of the centre of the young mission's teaching.

Sāriputta and Moggallāna were the leading pupils of the sceptical sophist Saṅjaya. And one day, as the two were looking on at a big fête on the hillside, one said to the other: "In less than a hundred years not one of this crowd will be left on earth!" Gravely

¹ *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 34, P.T.S. ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

impressed they consulted their teacher about man's hereafter. He put them off with his "may be," "may not be," and they decided his teaching was a hollow thing, since for the wise man this surely demanded a Yea or Nay. And they promised each other that whichever first found light on the matter would let the other know. Sāriputta meets Assaji, one of the first of Gotama's new disciples, and seeing him radiantly happy asks who was his teacher and what had he taught? Assaji replies nervously, as a beginner. Sāriputta, waxing a little impatient, then says: "The samana Gotama of the Sakyans teaches the universality of causation." That is, I should judge, not with respect to the material world, but the new idea of proto-Sāṅkhya, namely, the new analysis of mind, of man's inner world, as no less subject to uniform procedure than were outward visible things. And then we are told, not that Sāriputta asked whether the samana taught anything about *amata*, but that he at once got insight, not into man as immortal, but into man as able to *bring things to an end*, namely, by stopping the cause. And more, he informs Moggallāna that he had "won to the immortal," and both join Gotama.

If we look critically at this odd story, we must surely conclude it is so utterly inconsistent, so irrationally so, that we are, in the documents, up against what geologists call an "intrusion," that is, *e.g.*, when stratified rock is found broken into by unstratified volcanic rock. The quest for the immortal belonged to the age of the two brahman students. It was like a freshly superposed stratum of sand on sand strata. The finding a solution in causation was like a mass of lava pouring over the strata. If we had found Sāriputta, a man of high intelligence in the tradition, finding in causation

new light on his own quest, and discussing this with Assaji or Gotama, this would have been of surpassing interest. But we do not; and my solution, published a decade ago,¹ is that we have here a mix-up of the teaching of two teachers: Gotama and another who has remained nameless, but who became known as exponent of the new mental analysis.

My point to-day is, that we see here the outcrop of a new vogue, winning later to the honour once given to *amata*, thrust by subsequent editors like a stopper into the earlier ideal: the query namely of the early Upanishads: *kvāyam tadā puruṣo bhavati?* "Where does then—at death—the man come to be?" (Brh., 3, 2, 13.)

The editors of the Pāli Canon have so shaped their materials as to show, that its teaching was from the first much interested in the idea of causation. But not because it may be shown to be a sheet-anchor of hope in life, namely, that you cannot initiate something new, something better without a corresponding result inevitably following. Their idea is to show that by causation you can know, that if you want to stop anything, you have only to stop the cause of it. And, as we know, a formula which became famous was drawn up—*when* we do not know—giving only this one-sided application of causation.²

Now we may see, in what is a very precious source of reference:—the personal poems of monks and nuns in the Anthologies—how for a time the older interest in *amata* as a religious ideal was maintained side by side with interest in causation as, if not an ideal, yet a basis in religious attitude. Of the 264 men-poets, only two or three refer at all to causation.

¹ JRAS., 1927: *The Unknown Co-founders of Buddhism*.

² The Paṭiccha-samuppāda, or "arising-because-of."

E.g., Migajāla:

Showing a vision by the light of truth
Of things as come to be by way of cause. (v. 422.)

and Adhimutta:

To him who seeth as it really is,
The pure and simple causal rise of things,
The pure and simple sequel of our acts,
To such an one can come no fear, O chief. (v. 716.)

In the seventy-three nuns' poems I find four references to causation.

E.g., Sakulā:

Act, speech and thought I saw as not myself,
Children of cause, fleeting, impermanent. (v. 101.)

Pajāpati:

Now have I understood the cause of ill,
And thirst, the cause in me, is dried up. (v. 158.)

and Seli:

Neither self-made the human puppet is,
nor by another is it fashioned;
By reason of a cause it came to be,
By reason of a cause it dies away.
(Samy. I, 134, P.T.S. ed.)

and Sumedhā:—here the reference to cause is just an editorial comment at the end of this long, remarkable and I think *written* poem:

Endurance in the truth the Master taught.
This was the cause, the source, the root,
This the first link in the long causal line. (v. 521.)

But we can imagine how Sumedhā would have sent her stylus swiftly scratching many lines about causation, *if* it had appealed to her as integral to her faith, so much has she to say about that faith. Her very

moving peroration is on the contrary all about *amata*. Listen!

Since Amata exists, what are for thee the bitter draughts of sense?

Since Amata exists, what are for thee the fevers of desire?

Amalamhi vijjamāne:—How does she not reach back across the centuries,—perhaps four of them,—to the day of the "wide open gate" of *amata*? She goes on:

This that doth ne'er grow old, that dieth not,
This never ageing, never dying Way,
No sorrow cometh there, no enemies,
Nor is there any crowd, none faint or fall,
No fear cometh, nor aught that doth torment,
This the immortal by full many hath been won,
And e'en to-day by many may be gained,
So there be full surrender; he who striveth not
He cannot. (vv. 506, 512-23.)

Surely no one has ever got more rapture out of the negative than this Buddhist nun! If you compare her lines with those on the Soma *Amṛta*, you will be struck with the positive, and therefore the stronger force in the Veda lines. Yet the cloud of the negative is more in the words than in the meaning.

I cannot here and now stay over the other anthologies. But you may remember in *Dhammapada*, that interesting collection of the very old and the later, the line

Appamādo amatapadam (v. 21),

a saying echoed in a Sutta whercin, in reply to the brahman's question: how to make the best of this world and the hereafter, the Founder is said to have prescribed *appamādo*: earnestness.¹ Less likely perhaps are you to know the interesting eloquent lines:

¹ *Anguttara*, iii, 364.

When now, when then he grasps the rise and fall
of many things, rapture and joy he wins
with them who can discern the deathless That. (v. 374.)

I found myself alone in connecting this *amataṃ taṃ vijānataṃ* with the idiom of the early Upanishads, but compare Aitareyya:

So he knowing That became immortal.

And Kauṣītaki:

He who knows this having reached That became immortal.

And Kena:

Knowing That, the wise become immortal.

And Bṛhadāraṇyaka:

That is the Immortal veiled by being.

For the Anthologies the real rival concept is not so much causation as *nirvāṇa*, emerging gradually as not merely a cathartic discipline, but as *summun bonum*. The monks use it, roughly, as often as *amata*; the nuns use it far oftener. The case is the same in Dhammapada and Sutta-nipāta.

When we look at the prose Suttas, we find the word *amata*, *amataṭṭhaṃ*, tending to be used as a poetical notion. The Majjhima calls the Buddha giver of the immortal (*amataṭṭha dātā*).¹ The Saṃyutta speaks of

The people when they seek to cross the stream
Ask for the land of immortality. . . .²

and so on. The word was still a name to conjure by.

But there had come in, possibly from the Vedic association of *amṛta* with Soma-juice, the fanciful metaphor of *amata* as a divine liquid, not as of nectar,

¹ i, 111; 195, 224 (P.T.S. ed.).

² Vol. i, p. 123.

of ambrosia, to be drunk or eaten, by such as no longer lived by either the one or the other, but as sprinkled, as anointed by wise teaching on a hearer. Thus the aged ailing man Nakulapitar, after listening to the Master, tells a disciple, "the Blessed One by his religious talk has sprinkled me with *amala*."¹

When finally we come to the Commentaries and scholastic books, we see the word *amala* either stolidly identified with *nirvāṇa* or else passed by. Further, and this is important, if we look through the latter books, e.g., Buddhaghosa's and Buddhadatta's, we, to go by the ample indexes, find the word almost or quite ignored. It is clear that, for these monks, and their world, the word, the old concept of *amala* has faded out. Not for them were their pulses quickened by the throbbing of the Founder's drum of the immortal.

The mere losing of a venerable term for the religious ideal and substitution of another were less significant, had those monks clear vision about, not the deathless, but death; did they see, in this every time, an opened gate, an *apāruta dāra* to a finer living beyond, or, if already in a world beyond, to an advance in the discipline of opportunity afforded by life again on earth. But for them there is little of this; there is manifest a fear of death—have you ever read Buddhaghosa's description of it? They seem to have been lacking in what the men of beyond could have told them, had they maintained the right use of *Jhāna*:—that death is for all a gentle friend, ridding the dying man—I mean of course spirit—of the ailing body well before his last breath in a painless waiting, or if suddenly, also with no pain at all. Fear of death and dread of

¹ *Samyutta III, i. Cf. Psalms of the Sisters, p. 41.*

life beyond death because it meant more bodily life:—such was the return Buddhism got for letting go its vision of life as a whole.

And even in such vision ascribed to its teachers of the next world, where the good deed here found reward there, we only meet with a low picture of physical pleasures and comfort. We find no evidence of good life here finding reward in a higher standard of spiritual values there. You have only to read the *Vimānavatthu* anthology, shortly I hope to be published in English, to see this.

How much nearer akin is the resounding drum of the Founder's outburst to the triumphant song of the Hebrews: "Lift up your heads, ye doors, and be ye lift up, ye everlasting gates, and the Man of glory shall come in!"

Or even to our own dramatist echoing those words:

Then heaven ! set ope thine everlasting gates !

XXX

THE WILL AND THE WAY¹

THE title of our discussion is a thin disguise for the subject of questing. We go out for many a quest in this Society, sporadically or systematically, and it may be the wiser plan, on an occasion like this, to concentrate not on this quest or that, but on main object and general method, lest we lose the wood in the trees. I learn that my predecessor took this line, so that I run a little risk of boring you by lack of freshness of subject. Yet there is infinite variety in the ways of individual mind, and I may say nothing that either he has said or you would put forward. So that what I say may serve to stimulate the different central attitude of each of us.

Thus Mr. Holmes' title was "The Spirit of the Quest." Mindful that "spirit" is an ambiguous term, I may say that my message is just the converse: "Will and Way" in the quest of the spirit.

THE QUEST OF THE SPIRIT.

The "of" here is also ambiguous. Spirit's quest, is it, or our questing of spirit? Let us take it both ways—what do I, spirit, seek? what do I think about spirit?

Our prospectus speaks of our Society's central object a little differently: "to seek for spiritual values."

¹ A Presidential address delivered to the Quest Society, May 18, 1922.

What may this mean? To be of value is to matter much as compared with other things. To be of supreme value is to be the "one thing needful" in life. And "spiritual" is "relating to spirit." And spirit? This let us call here that real "I," that real "you," who is not body as such, not mind as such, but that invisible being who functions and expresses himself as body through the instrumentality called mind, that being of whom we are intensely conscious in the words "I," "myself," but of whom we know neither the beginning nor the ending, and of whose attributes we are absolutely sure of one only: that spirit is alive, alive in that "he" is ever changing, evolving, and as we *hope*, growing. Thus "spiritual values" now appears as "things that matter, are good for, make for the growth of, spirit, or of you and me, as in ourselves we really are."

Growth towards what? Towards a state of maturity we can only conceive yet as "perfection," or "the divine nature," or which we can now figure as growth in wisdom, beauty, holiness, or as becoming utterly "well."¹

You may take me up here with: In life is not growth, maturity, always followed by decay? Have you, a student of Buddhism of all subjects in the world, not thought of this deadlock in stating that spirit grows?

Yes, I have. The Buddhists were sagacious. They did not outrun their words. They never used the word "life" when they said "whatever comes to birth, comes also to decay and death." Just as they had no word coinciding with our "love," so they had no word so charged with a vague, immense meaning as our word

¹ We need here the noun of our adverb and half-obsolete adjective "well." "Wealth" is also specialised, and so, degraded.

"life," largely through Christian teaching, has come to have.

When we say "life" we habitually think of life as it expresses itself in body through mind. That life, as category, may not be exhausted by this dual channel we do not always tell ourselves. Yet it is a tenable hypothesis that "life" is more truly *an essential attribute of spirit* who informs, animates body and mind than it is of these two (and in lower organisms, is an attribute of something analogous to spirit in ourselves). Hence, by this hypothesis, we do not land ourselves in an *impasse* when we figure our real self as "being that grows," and refuse to identify life with growing and decaying bodies and mind and with nothing else.

OUR QUESTING AND THE WORLD

Let us now leave quest of spirit and speak of will and way in terms of our questing, and then of our questing as way and as will. At the end we will come back to spirit.

Our quests—we assign them some importance. What is it that makes a quest important? Two notions suggest themselves: one is that the quest be one which in a way affects everybody, comes into life generally. It must not be confined to a corner of life wholly, must not belong only to things abnormal, supernormal. It must be connected, connectible with the very stuff and movement of life. The other is, that a quest to be important must be for something that is wanted, a need, the being without which is hindering, hurting mankind like a retarding spring, a cold summer, absence of sunlight. If our quest have both these qualities we know it is important.

Many quests have not this dual importance. Our several quests are so many ways, selected by our will, which are to a very varying extent coincident with our life itself. The more our quest covers our life, the more critical becomes this dual aspect of its importance. Let us consider that one about which I have a little experience, the branch of comparative religious study. Just now it is concentrating on Jesus-research. It is akin to much of my own "way," Buddhist research. We are engaged in seeking for originals beneath a heap of disguising superstructure.

Many would question how our results, if we get any, affect everybody? And in what way mankind is hindered by a lack of just that knowledge which we seek to make clear in the results of our search?

Anyone who can glance backward at known history and is not too short-sighted to see that the world will not always stand to its creeds as it does now, will be able to follow us here. We who seek would say to him: From time to time there has come to a portion of the world a message, a teaching—not absolutely new, but not grasped by the multitude—through the person of one whom we will call Helper of men. And a great part of the world has come to be extraordinarily affected by this teaching, in the form in which it spread. And records of it, set down too long after to be trustworthy as they stand, are with us. In them, chiefly, we dig for our originals.

But many hold that *one* collection of these records, be it Tipitaka, Bible or Kuran, contains in its message, taught at a certain time and place, a revelation true and sufficient for the world's spiritual health for all time. All who hold such an opinion are greatly affected by it in their present and forward view of life. Equally so

are those who do not hold it. Those who do hold it, will not look for any new revelation, or if they do, it is to look for light on the lines of the one all-adequate revelation. They walk along the way beholding a height; they will not expect at a turn in the way to see a new peak swim into their ken. They will teach contentment with the old. They will not strive to win new light. They will not look for a new star in the east. They will con their records with their impressive sayings, their inconsistencies, their evident editorial patchwork. And they will to some extent live in a past, not to say a dead, world while they are in a new.

Those who do not hold with one past revelation as final, will either do the opposite of these things, or they will lose all faith in such teachings, past and to come, and will say: All men are liars; religion is a weary farce.

Now our Jesus-research, our Gotama-research, has, or should have, these ultimate results in view:—Either that research confirms the view as to the truth of one gospel, delivered just there and then, for all and for all time, or it undermines it. And when mankind in general recognises that a creed undermined is about to crash, it will look for some guide to take its place; it will ask itself how to get that guidance which the old creed failed to give. It will seek new light.

So that such a quest does in a way affect mankind generally, does in a way point, if indirectly, to what mankind is even now wanting, nay, points directly to the felt want of certainty about the past gospel, whichever it be.¹

¹ The growing work of the Pali Text Society, the greater part of its income derived from the sale of its issues, is another instance of a growing want.

That even popular literature is using such research to feed this want we can see. Take Wells's *Outline of History*, a work for the million. We there find the personality of Jesus dealt with in a frankly undenominational, historical manner such as would, in such a publication, have scarcely been possible in the last century.

And if our quest, whatever it is, be for us a living way along which we walk with will, we shall be habitually alive to the importance of the world's becoming more and more aware of its importance. For until the world admits that our quest in a way affects it, and feels to some extent the want of what we seek, our quest is important rather in theory than in practice. We do need to be working to some extent in sympathy with the race, that is, with ourselves, and not to be walking in isolation, if we are to be really effective.

It is recorded that one of earth's wisest sons was only persuaded to begin his mission of teaching his little world that the good life was, there and then, of more importance to man than the popular polytheistic creed, with its priests and sacrifices and ritual,¹ by being shown that there were some who would understand, some whose eyes were dust-free, some who were as lotus-buds emerging from the water to blossom.

And the way to hasten mankind's awakening interest is to leaven, to infect those, be they neighbour, friend or stranger, with whom we can come into contact now. If when we are abroad we keep the husk of our quest, like the man in the parable, carefully "laid

¹ 1940: *Editorial Note*.—I should now add: or than the newer cult of Immanence as it was taught to sons of nobles and brahmins.

up in a napkin"—if we go about with the torch of our quest carefully extinguished—we shall persuade no one of its vital importance. We should risk boring a few to win over one. Let us try oftener—not without opportunity and tact—to draw attention to at least two matters: that (1) it is of vital importance to the intelligent to come to a decision, within the next fifty years, about the so-called psychic nature of us, whether it is limited or not to receive impressions from the five senses and from one undifferentiated general sense, whether, if not so limited, it can be very greatly developed and exploited, wherein it can contribute things that are objectively valid; next, (2) about the fitness of any teaching of the old-world creeds to be a sufficient guide, one or all of them, for the expanding ideals and broadened needs of the new world, and if there be not fitness, then as to the need of everyone *to think out what it is whercon more light is wanted*, more than the old creeds give. If, as we speak of any one of such things, a coal from the altar has touched our lips, we shall give all but the callous, and as yet quite unfit, a chance to kindle their spirit by ours.

Let us any way not make either of two mistakes about the world: (1) let us not suppose it remains in every way the same old world, and (2) let us not forget of what the collective will at times is capable.

(1) It is in some ways a new world. The child is trained in the habit of learning the new as he never used to be. And adolescent and adult carry on the habit. For opportunities and means to learn the new are in more general access than ever they were. It is no longer so toilsome to break out of grooves. So we cannot glibly say, what the world will *not* attend to or take up. (2) Again, there are crises when the will of

a group or of a people will do the impossible. War, shipwreck, persecution, oppression may reveal here a will as strong and unflinching as that of a hero, a saint, a martyr. Let the world want a thing badly, and the world will get it. Let it only will peace strongly enough, let it only know "the things that belong unto its peace," and there will be no more war.

Meanwhile it is up to us to be willing the world with ourselves into the better way. What of our own way?

THE WAY

Is our will trotting along in a grooved way, comfortably, void of a wish to worry others to come along? Whether or no we have a quest that is just a hobby and a relaxation, or our very life-work, how does it rank in respect of our central quest, the purpose of our life, that purpose which, in the prospectus of our society, we are committed to try to understand; in other words, do we, in the way which is our life, see at all where we are going? For if we do not see this, a dreadful thing may happen. We may lose the way itself. By this, I do not mean that we necessarily stop our going, our work. I mean, we suddenly realise we are going on without any clear idea of the way as a whole. We have been seeing only a part. We have been walking along a way with no outlook, no prospect. We have been in a cutting, and not on the hillside.

There is a famous hymn which says:

I do not ask to see
The distant scene. One step enough for me.

For ultimate realities this is true enough. We are a long way from being fit to understand the greater mysteries. But we need not be so in the dark as to the distant scene on the offing, unless we choose to be so. Where childlike humility is right, childish incuriosity is wrong. "One step enough" may not be pure humility. It may be mixed with much alloy: intellectual sloth, imaginative dulness, a lack of initiative, acquiescence in dogmas, theological or scientific, of an age that is passing away. Over this "one step enough" we have been saying: "I have no time to attend to distant scenes, no opportunity, no aptitude, I have no special ability to take up the general way of our human destiny. Others may have it. I am making bricks. Others may build with these. Let me just concentrate."

Then, it may be, comes the crash of some crisis—such as that of the Great War or more private tragedy—and even the near way is blotted out. We lose our way, for we have had no distant objective, and our step by step method had no further orientation, no beckoning significance to direct it.

"O but," perhaps we say, "our little steps are only significant when considered as a minute section in the work of humanity, our work becomes great in virtue of the cause. We lay a stepping-stone where others will pass over."

This is a sirens' song which is only the more dangerous because it has so much truth in it. It is fine to be doing even spade-work in a great cause. It is true that humanity to-day progresses through the work of its earlier children. It is not fine that each worker sees no more of the way than a private soldier in a battle, or a hodman carrying up bricks. It is not

proven true that each is merely a sectional worker. Be the lot just now never so humble, there is no one who is not a separate spirit walking along an individual way to an uttermost, as yet inconceivable goal.

Well, if we have found our way again, and found a truer way—as we shall have done unless we are unteachable—then a notable thing will have happened. If we have looked up from our one step at a time, and understood something of the significance of the outlook, something of the real purpose of our going, we have found that the old quest or quests have got fitted into our way as they never were before. Their value is transformed. Their true significance comes out, if not all at once, at least gradually. There seemed at times a wall barring our view. Now we see how our work can minister to something that is our way, yet is much bigger and longer than our present work.

Such an experience as the foregoing is doubtless not that of everyone. But it is true, and it may happen to some. It is a little thing to be walking along a way; it is a great thing to be walking along a way that cannot be lost. I use "way" for the life of the real us, of spirit, as choice and self-surrender have shaped it. And that life has included, does and will include many quests. There is no student of Buddhism who has not a tenderness for the figure of way or path. Used for the individual life, the way is the very centre of Gotama's teaching, the noble path of the divine living.¹ It is a fine simile. Way never repeats itself, as life does not. Walking along it suggests progress, and also growing fitness. Way suggests view; way suggests goal.

¹ Commentators prefer to define "divine" (*brahma*-) as "best."

WILL

Let us now see what can be done for way, when will is driving us along it. What is will properly so called? Not wish only, or merely desire, but synergy of body and mind. Will is spirit, real self, directing body and mind to an end conceived as such and no other. Way is self, spirit, I as I live. Will is self, spirit, I in action. And we are all going along a way, but we are not all or always going along the way with will.

We are so going when doubt is absent. It may be new to be free from doubt. It is never new to be in doubt. Only the very stupid have never known doubt. Doubt is halting for fresh decisions. Will has faltered. It may fail to respond even when the fresh decision is made. Why is this?

Will gets tied up to so many old things. Which old things? Here are some with will sticking to them: The will to stand still, to be content to stand still; the will to believe something because other people believe it; the will to believe as true what is contained in certain venerated books; the will to hold sacred what (we hear) has always been held sacred; the will to believe something because we like it; the will to look always backwards, not forwards; the will to be content with what we know; the will to stop at a certain point because we do not clearly see further; the will to see no further; the will to wait because it is dangerous to go further; the will to hope we may not have to go further; the will that wishes there may be nothing round the next corner to see; the will to be saved the trouble of going round it, and so on. It is in such ways that our will has been stifling fresh judgments, not

suffering us to recast and decide " This is the way. Walk ye in it." Will has been hushing us rather in the words of Jeremiah's scathing irony: " Ask for the old paths, where is the good way; walk therein and ye shall find rest for your souls." Yet there were watchmen who said, Hearken to the sound of the trumpet. And (our wills) said, We will not hearken. Peace, peace. . . .

It may be that, as with the way, so with the will, some other instrument must tear away, brace up and transform will. A vision may do this. Love may. Or we may develop imagination.

I could tell of what a vision did for a general at a crisis. His name I must withhold. It was the eve of a decisive battle, and he had a few hours in which to rest. His was a good cause, but a black hour of misery came over him. Doubt gnawed him whether relief that had been promised for his inferior forces on the morrow would come, would come in time. The worry obsessed him and all his will seemed drained out of him. He foresaw certain death to thousands, certain misery to tens of thousands, and for the first time he felt more like a murderer than a successful soldier. Would he win? Could he afford to survive where so many were to fall? Then as he lay, not in sleep, he seemed to be in a lane of fighting men, advancing, with an old-world halberd in his hand, along an avenue to certain death. He felt no fear; he had no choice; he had to go on. Suddenly the avenue broadened out to a way of safety, and he was no longer in desperate straits. He was in a great light on his way to victory. He was winning; he had won. . . . His summons came as grey dawn was creeping up, and from that hour all fear fell away and he felt sure he would win. His will was steeled to win and he won.

This might be matched, if Englishmen were less reticent, oftener perhaps than we think. And instances of love firing will "to find out the way" might be given did time permit. Blessed are they who have known such wonder-working love, which will not brook the impossible, but opens up avenues to light when all other motives falter.

Sei's noch so fern die Liebe wird's erreichen!

as Beethoven's *Fidelio* sings. Hard is it and toilsome to find the true, but when love drives will, the quest of truth is the loveliest way, the true way to the true.

Way-and-will-illuminating love comes not to everyone. But in everyone will may be quickened and drawn along by the constructive power of mind we call imagination. We have heard much of this lately and M. Coué has been turning it on to cure this sick body and that. More even do we need his methods for the body politic. That is still very sick, and no wonder, but it may be in the throes of new birth. The country, all Europe, needs to dwell less on its state and sick symptoms, and more on the fact and certainty of renascence after fearful years. It needs to believe in its convalescence, "day by day in every way." Let it so talk and so write and it will come to will the betterment it pictures. What it wills strongly it will get. In this way there is no one who cannot brace up and quicken the will, whether he imagine his own betterment, or that of his world.

WILL AND WAY IN THE QUEST OF THE SPIRIT

And now, finally, to see that we leave ourselves in no confusion as to will and way and quest of spirit, so far as we have touched on these matters. We have

suggested that "spirit" is the real "we," whom we know as yet through mind and body; that the "spirit's quest" is growth towards perfection or utter well-ness; that "way" is spirit, "we," as we live; that "will" is spirit, "we," in action. How can we best use will in our way so as to forward this quest?

First, let us look upon the way, that is, upon life itself, as quest. This is the supremely right view of life, and it will be happier for us if we face it as such. "We are all seekers still"—wrote Matthew Arnold—though often we know it not. What is it we seek? We seek to know, for we do not know enough. We seek to be strong, for we are weak. We seek to be better, for we are not nearly as good as we might be. We seek the true, for we walk amid error and illusion.

By all these things we grow, spirit grows. And spirit, as he or she grows, waxes not older but younger. When we admit this, we have freed ourselves from the usual way of speaking of life in terms of body and mind. But we have only done so by a *tour de force*, by an inversion of that usual way. By speaking of spirit growing younger, we are speaking as we do now of a recuperated body and mind: "He looks twenty years younger." We mean just "more well." It is a protest against the tired, old-age view we are so apt to take of life. We talk of growing older and older here below, and many say, hereafter we shall never be tired and old any more for ever and ever. For my part I do not believe we have deserved to enter on perpetual youth and total absence of weariness so soon as all that. But how limp, how awkward, how stultified is man's imagination, from lack of exercise about matters outside his five little senses!

Let us think a little less that we are growing old. Let us consider what children we all really are ! We teach children, and think it all no longer applies to us. And yet it must be borne in daily on many of us how little grown-up the elders are. Chiefly because we are in so many ways incorrigibly childish. So few are really wise. In so few can we find capable counsellors. And this is because, whereas this present body of them is ageing, and their mind, too much in subservience to the body, is shrivelling and wrinkling with it, " they," that is, their spirit has not been growing as it might. It is stunted, its outlook has been shut off. It is not walking in the right way; it is not driven along that way by will.

But once we admit, once we really believe, that, whether body be waxing or waning, and whether mind, in so far as it works by sense and images of sense, is conforming to body, the spirit, that is we, can be *uninterruptedly growing*, that is, improving as it fares along its way, then we quite lose the tired, old-age view of life. Our present quests become just a passage in the long, long way of the spirit's life. And the will we put into our seeking is the acceptance of the gift, of the opportunity of such a splendid adventure as is this long, long way towards perfection, as well as the effort to grow towards it.

This will-to-grow will vary to some extent in form according to the nature of what we are seeking. If we seek to disentangle the true from the not-genuine, the original from the superadded, the will becomes effort for utter sincerity, the pure will to the true. So that we stand by our results, whether they are what we wanted or expected them to be, or whether they are not. This is not nearly so easy as it sounds. And we

do well to take to heart the noble exordium at the end of Mr. Mead's discussion in the last number of *The Quest* (pp. 368 f.).¹ If our quest be some other form of rendering service, more obvious if not more genuine than beating out truth, will that makes growth is the will of brother and sister to help brother and sister. With no other will can we safely try to help. If our quest be to enlarge our knowledge of our psychical nature as yet so imperfectly sounded, if we are testing channels that are yet more abnormal than they need be, the will that makes growth is a veritable synergy of our best effort, bodily and mental. Not only uttermost sincerity, the pure will to the true, but the will to empty ourselves of preconceptions and of mere curiosity, the will to receive, to become pure instrument, so that not only we but the world eventually may be helped.

Not all recipients of new light by these channels have proved themselves able to summon up such pure self-emptying will to be transmitters only. The new light has been tainted at its inception, and has done as much harm as good. We have no right to set down all recipients of revelations as liars. But it is a hideous wrong to embroider the messages.

Psychic science is also a quest—like that of creed-research—which is creeping into the dual importance of being admitted as something entering into the general life and of catering for a felt want. I need only refer you to its novel appearance, as a science

¹ "No labour in this field can lead to enduring results which is not undertaken . . . with the one object of getting at the historic truth fearless of all consequences . . . submitting to strenuous moral discipline in which the seeker's spirit is tested and purged to the uttermost. . . ."

among sciences, in the popular publication *Outline of Science*.¹ It is as yet a baby science, and one day the writer's utterance on it in that series will be ranked as those of a child crying in the night. But the inclusion of his article is very significant.

Whether it be along these uncharted coasts that we seek for the true, or in the mines of old records, whether we are out not for Jesus-research, but for Jesus-service to our fellows, or whether our way be the making of new things of beauty, the will that makes for growth of spirit needs that rich blend of imagination which, so blended, is faith: faith that new light and plenty of it will come when the hour is at hand; faith that it may, for aught we know, be waiting to come in one form or another, to each of us if we turn our faces to the source of new light, if we can persuade ourselves that, in a would-be recipient, it is better to have the heart of a little child than to be over-careful that we are learned and critical.

It was a great creator of new things of beauty who wrote his J. J.—*Juvel Jesu!*—in the corner of each new manuscript. We might do worse than utter the *sursum corda* of a *Juvel aeterna lux, aeternus amor* when will takes up the daily way. Indeed it may be will's only way of safety. . . .

No, I do not echo Bach's *Juvel Jesu*. According to John's gospel, Jesus said: "I am the way, the truth, the life," and then: "No man cometh unto the father but by me." According to Matthew and Luke he said: "Ask, and ye shall receive . . . your father knoweth your need before ye ask . . . say, Our father . . . give . . . forgive . . ." In these welcomes to direct access (followed by the early Church) we find no trace

¹ *Psychic Science*, by Sir Oliver Lodge.

of an intermediary making access and asking indirect. Is not the day gone by for the way that goes round about, for the will that says, I am the way for you?

For we are, every one of us, in the Way of all the worlds, and a Will is weaving it as it were a great web. If you, if I place our will within that Will, we shall be shown the way marked out for us in that web.



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